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Abstract 
This thesis charts and theorises a general transition from authoritarian to 
participatory forms of governance and natural resource management, as viewed 
from the locale of a Saharan oasis town situated within wider temporal and spatial 
change processes. 2VWURP·VZRUNRQWKHDELOLW\RIFRPPXQLWLHVWRUHJXODte 
access to the commons hinges on resource users jointly agreeing on and 
conforming to rules of use. Similarly, recent theoretical developments related to 
Social Ecological Systems and adaptive management also emphasise group consensus 
as a prerequisite for adaption. These approaches presume a degree of equality in 
social relations across the group. In Beni Isguen, Algeria, by contrast, the 
management of water commons is complicated by class inequalities. This region 
has recently seen a shift from religion to capital as the dominant ideology behind 
ruling factions, entailing the contraction of a theocratic influence, with the 
accession of a secular merchant class. This latter faction has achieved this by 
ideologically and pragmatically positioning themselves within the hierarchical 
administration of the nation-state, and thus conforming to national laws. This key 
shift in political alignment followed a long period of local resistance to over-arching 
ruling powers. I argue that this conformation has entailed a displacement of a 
ORFDOLVHG ¶VRFLDO FRQWUDFW·ZKHUHE\ZHOIDUH ODERXU DQG UHJXODWLRQZHUHSUHYLRXVO\
DFKLHYHG WKURXJK WKH ¶PRUDO HFRQRP\· RI UHFLSURFDO UHODWLRQV to a citizen-state 
contract based on the assumption of rights and certain services (e.g. protection of 
private property, creation and maintenance of infrastructure), and a reliance on the 
market to provide goods and other services (e.g. labour). These historical social 
changes have implications for theoretical developments regarding the role of the 
citizen-state relationship in terms of the protection of private property vs. 
protection of communal property, of anthropological perspectives of legal 
pluralism, and social contract theory.  
 
Furthermore, the thesis describes mixed modes of resource management involving 
new voluntary associations as alternative forms of local governance from below, 
alongside customary regulatory officials in charge of water. The emancipatory idea 
of some regarding civil society has received thorough critique by anthropologists 
(Benthall 2000; Comaroff & Comaroff 1999), yet along with Butcher (2014), I argue 
that despite this, the recent opening of the civic sector has created an opening for 
new forms of activity within the Algerian political landscape. However, the 
informal agreements of voluntary associations DSSHDUWR ODFNWKH ¶WHHWK·QHFHVVDU\
to regulate uncooperative individuals. Authority today is locally perceived as the 
prerogative of the state, and so some state regulation appears necessary. The study 
thus views these processes from the viewpoint of the crucial determinant of life in 
the desert: water, and from there its social dependents, and how they organise 
themselves.  
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1. Introduction: Anthropological 
research in the Algerian Sahara  
 
 The difference between the desert and the oasis is man. 
 ~ Saharan saying. 
 
This thesis investigates the role of micro social movements in managing unstable 
natural resources in the midst of socio-political change in Algeria. The focus of my 
study is on the micro-level of how changes from authoritarian to inclusive forms of 
governance are negotiated at the everyday level in the Algerian Sahara. The so-
called Arab revolts, and the challenge by populations of autocratic rule in Muslim-
majority countries have met with mixed success, and arguably failure across the 
MaghUHEDQG0DVKULT,Q$OJHULDWKHLPSDFWRIWKLV¶$UDE6SULQJ·(2010 onwards) 
was subdued. Algerians, who experienced the turbulence that resulted from aborted 
attempts at democracy in 1989, a violent civil war during the 1990s, and a 
WXPXOWXRXV ¶%HUEHU6SULQJ· LQare wary of the violent instability commonly 
associated with political transitions. In 2012, the Algerian state, nervously 
watching the social foment on its borders, quelled discontent through largely 
superficial stop-gap policies, from shipping football supporters to nearby countries 
to watch international matches, to cash hand-outs, drawing on funds from its 
considerable gas reserves.  
 
=RRPLQJLQWRWKHGHVHUWUHJLRQRIWKH0·]DEYDOOH\*KDUGDwD (see figure 3.1), this 
wilƗya (province) has been navigating a parallel shift in governance practices but 
over several decades, and for different reasons. Since Algerian independence in 
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1962, traditional theocratic authority over the Mozabite Berber community has 
waned, while the activity of small social movements, or associations (e.g. 
neighbourhood associations, farmer associations, employment associations), has 
increased dramatically. Many of these associations have taken over the roles that 
previous social institutions fulfilled, albeit from a consensual perspective, rather 
than led by traditional hierarchies (such as gender, age, wealth, family social 
standing and piety). Hierarchical structures continue to be formally replicated in 
new forms, although civil society leaders do not have any significant coercive power 
over other members as their religious forebears did; their role is rather that of 
coordinator and instigator of activity. Minor conflicts are still resolved through 
recourse to traditional means (the family, and larger kinship groups), but for more 
serious conflicts the state is now the ultimate arbiter. The ensuing degree of 
removal in the governance of the oasis community and its resources has resulted in 
mis-management by central authorities (i.e. the Algerian state), which lack the fine-
grained understanding of local socio-ecological complexities. The state has 
historically been extremely heavy-handed in quashing dissent, especially during the 
¶EODFN GHFDGH· RI WKH V DQG DOVR GXULQJ WKH  ¶%HUEHU 6SULQJ· 1RW ORQJ
before this was the violent war of independence from colonial France, 1954-1962, 
revealing cycles of political unrest and resistance and these memories remain 
within the present day Algerian imagination. Of interest to this study, is how 
micro-social movements have been rallying to manage the oasis resources of Beni 
Isguen despite the erosion of traditional organisations and interference by the state. 
While they may not be able to address all their ecological, political and economic 
issues alone, small-scale agricultural communities are more suited to dealing with 
many of their own problems. At issue, then, is finding the balance of power between 
central and local direction, decision-making and solutions. Complicating this matter 
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is that many Berber activists have long pushed for political autonomy in the region, 
although the Mozabites ² the subjects of this study ² while not inactive, have been 
quieter than other groups on this front. 
 
In this introductory chapter, I assess the general conceptual framework of the 
thesis, including a brief but critical introduction to the theoretical framework under 
analysis (systems theory). I present the rationale for the study, followed by an 
introduction to my field site and study methods, and discuss the wider relevance of 
the findings. The final section gives a synopsis of the thesis chapters.  
 
1.1 General conceptual framework: social and ecological change in the 
0·]DE 
Significant sRFLDOFKDQJHVRYHUWKHODVWILYHGHFDGHVDIIHFWLQJWKH0·]DERDVLVhave 
come from integration with the wider Algerian nation-state and its juridical system 
continued from the colonial era, the market system and engagement with global 
media by the younger generations. Such changes have resulted in a more gradual, 
TXLHW¶UHYROXWLRQ·DQGH[SHULPHQWation with political change rather than the recent 
explosive change in the surrounding countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
Syria. Ecological change is also apparent, such as greater temperatures, increased 
drought, and yet more severe flash floods, as global climate change is predicted to 
make weather patterns even more unstable across North Africa (Ward et al. 1999). 
Institutions and cultural practices have been developed in many regions to deal 
with such unpredictability, yet as social and ecological changes occur at increasing 
rates and in complex ways, small communities may actually be disempowered in 
their ability to cope. Many studies have addressed the manners in which 
communities use cultural practices as a buffer to change (e.g. Paumgarten & 
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Shackleton 2011; Berman et al. 2012; Bryan et al. 2013), but few address how 
through process of conflict and rupture, communities may find new solutions. 
 
The seemingly remote Sahara has not been immune to the foment of dynamic 
political change. The Sahara desert is more than a static backdrop to social life; the 
Sahara is a dynamic system itself. 'HVHUWVFRYHUSHUFHQWRIWKHHDUWK·VWHrrestrial 
surface (Mares 1999: xxix). Deserts are often referred to as marginal, liminal spaces 
on the edge of civilisation, terra incognita where unknown, mythologised monsters 
lie, a hotbed of anti-social activity, training grounds for terrorists who plan to 
murder us in our sleep. Yet, humans have adjusted their lifeways to harsh, arid 
environments for millennia, with ingenuity involving considerably detailed 
ecological knowledge, technology and husbandry of plant and animal species. 
Husbandry has included the date palm, (Phoenix dactylifera Linn.), a cultural 
keystone species (sensu Garibaldi 2009) for oasis dwellers, which is a likely 
FRQWHQGHU IRU WKH P\WKLFDO ´WUHH RI OLIHµ (Zaid & De Wet 1999), the domesticate 
originating from somewhere between Egypt and the Levant. Date palms require 
only minimal upkeep, usually only twice a year during pollination and harvest time, 
and so fit well with both nomadic and sedentary forms of subsistence. Alternatively, 
they can be cultivated intensively, for greater date production. Furthermore, every 
part of the palm tree may be utilised in human subsistence, for construction, food, 
firewood, baskets and more. Date palm oases provide an alternative example 
challenging limited views of the recentness of globalisation, for research shows that 
they have always connected historical migration and trade routes, serving as hubs 
of cosmopolitan life (Battesti 2005: 13). Yet oases, along with deserts, are today 
perceived to exist in virtual isolation from the rest of the world (Scheele & 
McDougall 2012). This study reveals how a particular society actually tried to seek 
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isolation on a rocky desert plateau to practice their religion free from other political 
influences, akin to a monastic order. They were forced, however, by the same 
environment to travel as merchants in order to feed their families in the homeland. 
Yet, their oases continued to be developed, transforming the barren rocky valley 
knRZQ WRGD\ DV WKH 0·]DE LQWR D OXVK JUHHQ YHJHWDWHG VSDFH WKURXJK LQJHQLRXV
manipulation of underground water reserves by means of artisanal wells, large 
dams and complex irrigation canals. 
 
As well as being notoriously harsh places to live in, desert ecosystems and climates 
are usually extremely variable; consequently they are sometimes described DV¶QRQ-
HTXLOLEULXP V\VWHPV· (von Wehrden et al. 2012), whereby these ecosystems have 
multiple or chaotic states from barren to full vegetative cover. This unpredictability 
has resulted in a range of livelihood strategies and means to buffer against risk. For 
example, once perceived as bad management, overstocking of herds is actually a 
strategy for managing disequilibrium (Homewood 2004), whereby larger herd sizes 
act as a buffer. In terms of settled livelihoods, Park (1992) has described how in 
Mauritania, communities manage chaotic flood plains through a hierarchical 
society; once the seasonal flood waters settle, lands are then redistributed as parcels 
according to family status. In Tunisia, oasis farmers may reduce or expand the 
number of plots farmed in a particular year according to water availability (Battesti 
2005: 151). 7KH PDQDJHPHQW RI VRFLDO FKDQJH KDV HQWDLOHG ERWK ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· DQG
innovative measures, and different forms of change have necessitated different 
approaches. Yet, large-scale processes, such as climate change and increasing 
globalisation have accelerated changes in the past decades. This has made it harder 
IRU FRPPXQLWLHV WR NHHS XS RU DWWHPSW WR PDQDJH RU HYHQ ¶VORZ GRZQ· VXFK
developments. Commenting on recent Amazigh (Berber) social movements in 
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Algeria, Roberts (pers. comm.), a Berber specialist has suggested that such 
movements are better equipped to deal with progressive social change than are 
traditional political structures, which rely on more routine forms of governance. 
While questioning the inflexibility of traditional government (see chapter seven on 
the flexibility of curf or customary law), I develop this general theme by viewing 
associational life as an innovative political development based on inclusion rather 
than hierarchy.  
 
Recent agrarian studies have been dominated by a resurgence in systems 
approaches (e.g. Kremen & Miles 2012; Giller et al. 2011; Nemecek et al. 2011). 
7KLVIUDPHZRUNKDVEHHQVXJJHVWHGWRDGGUHVVWKH¶VRIW·VLGHRIDJULFXOWXUDOVWXGLHV
WR FRPSOHPHQW FODVVLFDO ¶KDUG· DSSURDFKHV VXFK DV DQDO\VHV RI ELRSK\VLFDO
properties and rational economic theory that aims for optimal production through 
WHFKQLFDO LQQRYDWLRQ DQG LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR FRPPRGLW\ PDUNHWV ¶6RIW· DVSHFWV
LQFOXGH IDUPHUV· GHFLVLRQ-making, such as preferences and perceptions based on 
socio-cultural backgrounds (Darnhofer et al. 2012). The classical approach may 
work in certain contexts (such as large, homogenous farming environments), but 
not all, due to heterogeneous environments and varying socio-cultural preferences. 
Practitioners of this approach have proposed adaptive management (Milestad et al. 
2012) (among others) as an innovative and more appropriate framework. Adaptive 
management is said to be a more suitable framework for dealing with complexity 
and uncertainty in integrated socio-ecological landscapes (Fabricius & Cundill 
2014). As desert oases clearly fit the description of complex socio-ecological 
systems, I tested this framework in the context of the Algerian Sahara. 
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1.2 Rationale for the study 
I carried out preliminary research into the feasibility of adaptive management 
theory to explain how farmers deal with change in Morocco (Benessaiah 2011). 
Specifically, the study examined the role of knowledge production, and its effect on 
perceptions of an aspect of ecological change, the deadly palm tree disease, bayoud 
(the soil-born fungus Fusarium oxysporum f.sp. albedinis). I found that the 
dissemination of ecological knowledge was related to status. This meant that 
knowledge within the population as a whole, such as that of the disease was uneven, 
resulting in a limited ability to successfully diagnose and treat the disease. 
Individuals of lower stature often had less access to knowledge, and likewise their 
knowledge was not circulated. As social learning is suggested as a key feature of 
adaptive management, I further examined the relationship of scientific knowledge 
(through agricultural extension agencies) to local knowledge. I found that people 
ZHUH JHQHUDOO\ SURXG RI WKHLU WUDGLWLRQDO NQRZOHGJH DQG ZKLOH WKH\ GLGQ·W UHIXVH
scientific knowledge, they sought a realignment of the two as complementary, for 
they perceived that agronomists positioned themselves as superior, when really 
they held theoretical as opposed to practical understanding.  
 
From Morocco it was a natural step to follow the spread of bayoud disease eastward 
WR WKH OLPLWV RI LWV UDQJH LQ WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ FHQWUDO $OJHULD The present study 
expands on these findings to study oasis management in its entirety, looking at 
date palm farming methods, irrigation systems, local management institutions and 
the cultural background that informed management practice. My key question that 
emerged was: did oasis dwellers use adaptive techniques to manage their dynamic 
social and ecological resources? By drawing on a theoretical conceptualization of 
adaptive management in the literature, this then became my primary research 
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question. I critically review this literature in the next chapter. The following sub-
questions were formulated to orient the research: 
 
1. How is knowledge produced and contextualised about date palm growing 
and irrigation management?  
2. How are ecological disturbances conceptualised? 
3. What cultural practices exist to manage disturbance and risk?  
4. How are sociological changes framed within local understanding? 
5. What institutions exist for regulating social processes? 
6. How does private and communal land tenure affect oasis management? 
7. How are conflicts resolved? 
8. Are farmers able to respond to new or extreme change? 
9. To what extent do changing government development policies and scientific 
management methods affect management of  date palm oases? 
 
These questions aimed to inform my understanding of how local governance 
practices have changed in response to local and wider transformative dynamics at 
different scales. I utilised various approaches aimed at conceptualising these 
processes, as I will now explain.  
 
1.3 Introduction to systems approaches  
Many scholars urge that social and ecological processes should be studied as 
integrated total systems (Rappaport 1968; Bateson 1972; Lansing 1987; Berkes et 
al. 2000). This trend, common to environmental anthropology and similar 
disciplines, seeks a human-in-ecosystem approach (Davidson-Hunt et al. 2003: 2; 
Ingold 2000: 5). Recent investigations in this genre have been inspired largely by a 
UHYDOXDWLRQ RI KXPDQLW\·V SODFH LQ WKH ZRUOG WKURXJK H[SRVXUH WR DOWHUQDWLYH
ontologies and cosmologies of indigenous people, also inspired by continental 
philosophers such as Deleuze. This view is laudable in opposing the long-held 
dichotomy of Nature and Culture, or Body and Mind, emblematic of European 
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enlightenment thinking. Several questions emerge from this integration, however. 
Many societies do see other species as persons (Viveiros de Castro 2012), thus 
stretching the idea of society to include non-human domains, while a symbolic 
distinction between humans and non-humans does still occur (Descola 2013: 38). 
For example, certain societies may live within forests, yet they maintain clear 
symbolic divisions between the human village and the surrounding natural 
landscape (Ellen 1996: 110). Analytically conflating social and ecological systems 
and processes may serve to highlight their similarities, while playing down their 
differences. This study explores these issues and more. 
 
A theoretical question that follows then is: is it possible to link social and ecological 
systems into an entire overarching system, considering the differences between 
them? In order to talk about the system as a whole, are social processes perhaps 
oversimplified in order to fit with ecological concepts? Furthermore, there is a 
danger of reifying social structures (Vayda & Walters 2011: 7) which only exist as 
continually negotiated agreements in the minds of individualsIRU´it is people who 
are the initiators and receivers, the agents and patients, and not their culture, 
however you might define cultureµ  (Carrithers et al. 2010: 163). Some argue that 
biological systems should be differentiated for they have distinct ontological status 
and can be measured, as opposed to social systems (Andersson 2009). Indeed, on the 
one hand, some theorists suggest that humanity should be set apart due to its 
capacity for reflection, symbolic communication and thus intentionality and agency. 
Westley (2002), for instance, argues that because only humans possess the capacity 
for meaningful symbolic communication, then they cannot be considered as 
belonging to the same sphere as biological systems. Thus, when considering 
human-environment interactions as a whole, the human sphere of action should 
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perhaps be understood aside due to the ability of humans to rapidly reflect and thus 
modify their actions DV RSSRVHG WR WKH ¶EOLQG· LQWHUDFWLRQV RI QRQ-human 
components); or indeed in contrast to action, lack of action and will, due to a 
multitude of factors from ignorance to political oppression. Thus agency and power 
differentiate the human factor from the ecological, at least in terms of complexity 
and direction. Actor network theorists and others, however, do ascribe agency to 
non-humans, or at least to the interaction between humans and non-humans. Yet, 
in connecting lines or networks of matter and semiotics in this way (see for 
example Latour 2005; Ingold 2011; 2013), one wonders how far physical metaphors 
can be pushed when applied to social themes. Furthermore, actor network theory 
has been criticised, for while it can describe positive accounts of the stabilisation of 
networks, it is less useful for providing critique, in a way that can recognise the 
´XQIROGLQJ QDWXUH RI UHDOLW\ FRQVLGH[r] the limits of knowledge and see[k] to 
FKDOOHQJHVWUXFWXUHVRIGRPLQDWLRQµ(Whittle & Spicer 2008).  
 
The coupled social-ecological systems (SES) framework NQRZQ DV ¶UHVLOLHQFH·
theory (which has largely replaced the earlier sustainability paradigm) has 
attempted to incorporate and address these issues in pragmatic and theoretical 
ways, with varying degrees of success. The resilience approach has dominated 
environmental governance discourse, policy and funding structures over the past 
decade. It has been used to try to understand complex human-environment 
interactions from global fisheries, conservation management of species, and range 
management to agricultural landscapes (Janssen et al. 2000; Folke et al. 2005; 
González et al. 2008). These often involve livelihoods which are directly reliant on 
ecosystems, while others involve ecosystems that are affected by a human 
component in a less direct form. To summarise, the resilience framework attempts 
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to depict processes of continuity, change and resistance that goes beyond simple, 
measurable linear interactions, to qualitatively consider a greater complexity. The 
concept of the ecosystem has been widened to include human actions. This more 
broadly conceived human-ecosystem is conceived to exist within a state of dynamic 
equilibrium (as opposed to previously held conceptions of static homeostatic 
regulation). The resilience approach aims to identify the ability of a socio-ecological 
¶state· to buffer against the forces of change, which may destabilise and force it to 
decompose. Following a breakdown, the state may recompose RU¶IOLS·into another 
known or new state. Thus, resilience aims to theorise shocks, the buffers against 
these shocks, and how much these buffers can take until the state breaks down. At 
the pragmatic level, due to the complexity of multiple interactions, uncertainty is 
incorporated into the theory. To deal with uncertainty, management actions, aimed 
at increasing stability (or conversely to assist with FKDQJH VKRXOG EH ¶DGDSWLYH·
that is, reflexive, through formalised, systematic experimentation aimed at 
increased understanding of system-wide dynamics. This is termed adaptive 
management. 
 
Social ecological systems theory involves the important notion of self-regulation. 
Further to the problematic notion of social ´systemsµ, largely left behind by 
anthropology in the 1970s (although the concept has seen something of a 
comeback, see chapter two), the idea of self-regulation is problematic. This idea is 
central to neoliberal ideology, which has led certain economists and bankers to 
(successfully) urge for near total deregulation by governments, instead to be guided 
by the invisible hand of market logic. Indeed, some authors point to a similarity 
between neoliberal economics and SES theory (Walker & Cooper 2011). It has often 
been suggested (e.g. Schlager & Ostrom 1992) that small-scale societies possess the 
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capacity to self-regulate for various reasons. Such a view of regulatory dynamism 
could have implications for legal anthropology and environmental law more 
generally. For instance, in this thesis I argue that in the political era of nation-
states, the autonomous capacity of small societies is limited through imbrication 
with the state. In chapter seven I discuss issues relevant to legal anthropology, 
particularly the literature on legal pluralism to analyse the presence of multiple, 
potentially conflicting local and state systems of control, regulation and 
management of natural resources and people. The environmental management 
literature still abounds with uncritical studies on co-governance (Ackerman 2004; 
Armitage et al. 2008; Berkes 2009), although the literature on the anthropology of 
development does address this problem considerably (Ferguson 1990; Escobar 
1995; Agrawal 2005). I further discuss and problematise the idea of self-regulation 
in chapter nine.  
 
The study presented here aims to clarify and resolve some of these theoretical 
ambiguities. I wished to interrogate the adaptive management procedure, by asking 
how local people managed complex, dynamic socio-ecological change in the 
Algerian Sahara. In particular, I investigated human-environment based problems 
of flooding, land ownership and labour relationships in the context of changing 
political, legal and economic conditions at local and global levels. To do this I 
utilised an historical event-based analysis (sensu Walters & Vayda 2009) in order to 
attempt to disentangle causal drivers of current problems, thus challenging the 
more abstract, virtually untestable systems framework. The event-based approach 
offers a historical view that contrasts with the synchronic structure and function 
given by systems theory, by focusing on observable, contingent human-
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environment interactions through time and space. The historical ethnography that 
I present below has emerged from this event approach. 
 
1.4 Berber governance: an introduction to Beni Isguen 
My fieldwork was carried out among an oasis community of Mozabite Berbers, a 
conservative religious minority widely renowned for their honesty, business 
acumen, hard work and capacity for autonomous governance. This community is 
now facing the challenge of global integration while maintaining certain core 
values and practices. Mozabites are not primarily agrarian based, but rather a 
merchant society. A sub-section of the population does engage in farming, however, 
and furthermore, the extreme vagaries of the desert environment are such that 
ecological pressures such as heat stress, drought and also flooding must be 
managed for they affect the population as a whole. The sociological differentiation 
between the peasant class and merchants (and now an additional sub-class in the 
form of Sahelian migrant workers) has resulted in increasing local inequality which 
furthers social exclusionary practices, despite religious claims and practices aimed 
at achieving equality among believers. The fissuring of proclaimed unity and social 
differentiation would perhaps not be such an issue in a less severe environment, 
which requires, if not Durkheimian social cohesion as such, then at least minimal 
coordination between households to prevent the destruction of life and property by 
regular catastrophic flooding. This common need was brought especially to the fore 
of local consciousness following the recent devastating flood of 2008, which I deal 
with in chapter eight. 
 
Studies on Berber governance typically involve a greater analysis on Berber or 
Amazigh OLW ¶IUHHPHQ·SOImazighenLGHQWLW\SROLWLFVDQGWKH¶%HUEHUTXHVWLRQ·,
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have not elaborated on this at length in this thesis, for Mozabites do not participate 
strongly in wider Amazigh social movements, even though they are very aware of 
them. Although the colonial French admired and ideologically differentiated the 
Mozabites from Arab populations as they did Kabyles, Chaouia and other Berbers 
for their political organisation (which also served their divide and rule policy), they 
did not attribute to them la genie Berber, which invested and projected upon them 
notions of republican rule and secularism. By contrast, Mozabites were organised 
according to a theocratic form of government (rather than the democratic Kabyle 
djemcaa), thus instantly confounding both of these fantasies at once7KH0·]DEKDV
not had any in-depth ethnographic description since the late nineteenth century 
(Masqueray 1886; Amat 1888), while much anthropological work continues to be 
done on the Kabyles (Scheele 2009; Roberts 2014). Furthermore, I am less 
interested in continuing colonial tropes, preferring to inspect the 0·]DELQWKHOLJKW
of the postcolonial nationalist situation, in that while they rejected French rule, 
they accepted its laws under the alternative but structurally similar Algerian rule. 
This forms the primary thesis of my wider historical analysis of the reasons for 
many of the sociological changes discussed in this thesis, which involve the 
interplay of local and global forces. I outline this new theory of Mozabite social 
change in chapter nine. 
 
, FKRVH WKH0·]DE IRUP\ field site because I was interested in the issue of social 
organisation of natural resource management, and thus in forms of constraints and 
cooperation, and looking at how identity politics and values play into this. I was 
LQVSLUHG E\ 6DKOLQV· (2008) investigation into political philosophy regarding 
¶:HVWHUQ· FRQFHSWV RI KXPDQ ¶QDWXUH· DQG WKH FRQVHTXHQFHV RI WKH ODWWer on the 
former. Sahlins argues that social organisation can be hierarchical (top-down, 
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authoritarian), equitable (bottom-up, self-organising), or individualist (anarchic), or 
have elements of either. He posits that Western political theorists such as Hobbes 
and John Adams believed that human nature unchecked would result in anarchy2. 
As a result, sociological forces were needed to govern this unruly nature, whether 
by top-down force in Hobbes famous case, or according to Adams via a balance of 
power among relatively equal political entities (though Sahlins is quick to point out 
the difference between equality for all and equality reserved only for the elite ² 
known as ´isonomiaµ: 20)). This latter principle can be related to the notion of 
self-UHJXODWLRQ IRXQG LQ HFRQRPLFV DV WKH ´LQYLVLEOH KDQGµ DV RSSRVHG WR WKH
interventionism of Keynesian theory, or in ecology including resilience theory. 
Anarchist writers, by contrast, prefer to appeal to an inherent goodness in human 
nature, whereby people can organise socially without the need for authority 
(Kropotkin 2002: 288; Graeber 2004: 76). I will return to this important 
conceptualisation regarding politics, individual and group morality, in chapter nine. 
 
North African Islamic political and religious ideology, based on the same Semitic 
root that has affected European Christian thought, involves similar conceptions of 
human nature that must be governed by authoritarian means to ensure sociality. 
Beni Isguen constituted an ideal site to investigate such changes in political 
ideology, due to changes in how its hydraulic system has been managed. This 
system requires cooperation by all parties to keep channels clear in order for the 
circuit of irrigation water to flow, so that all plots may have water for their farm 
                                                 
2 $VHPDQWLFFODULILFDWLRQKHUHLVQHHGHGLQUHIHUHQFHWRP\XVHRI WKHWHUP¶DQDUFK\· Here, 
Sahlins is clearly reflecting the use of  anarchy as given by political thinkers such as 
Thucydids, Plato and Hobbes, as a metaphysical lack of  order, needing an authoritative 
IRUFH WR UHJXODWH WKHP ´Dll things composed in whole or in part of  matter, or all visible 
things, have a natural tendency to fall into "discordant and disorderly motion," thus their 
original state is one of  anarchy, until they are taken in hand by JRGµ6DKOLQV-30). 
7KLVLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURPP\ODWHUGLVFXVVLRQVDERXW¶DQDUFKLVP·ZKLFKLVDQLGHRORJLFDO
movement opposed to the state, but not to small-scale forms of  organisation. 
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plants and trees. Challenges to the management of this system came from the 
insertion of immersion pumps and state built wells, resulting in a disregard for the 
need for flood irrigation; a disregard for local water guards due to a shift in power 
to the state and a national legal code. Many blame a change in local values from 
community-RULHQWHG ,VODPLF RQHV WR ¶:HVWHUQ· LQGLYLGXDOLVW YDOXHV LQKHULWHG
largely from the effects of mass media and emigration, as playing a disruptive role. 
)XUWKHU ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· QRWLRQV RI DXWKRULW\ KDYH EHHQ FKDOOHQJHG 2WKHU LVVXHV
include the loss of farming knowledge, and the devaluation of agriculture in 
general, which have their own causes and histories. 
 
The catastrophic 2008 flood caused many to reassess the need for cooperation. 
Blocked channels cause floodwater to pool and quickly erode adobe buildings, 
which can be two-stories high. Some proponents of a return to a community-based 
ethic argue that appeals for cooperation must be made to individuals based on their 
various different motivations (or fears), highlighting a strategy focused on self-
interest. For example, religiously-minded individuals should be persuaded through 
that channel or discourse. The practically-oriented may be reminded about the 
ecological benefits, such as of the silt nutrients of the flood waters from the 
mountains, the leaching of the soils or the build-up of salt in the soil. Those more 
concerned with material wealth can be shown how damaging a lack of cooperation 
can be to property. The already community-oriented can be persuaded of the 
intangible benefits of cooperation, such as shared sense of identity and place, a 
sense of inclusion and good-will among neighbours, and the social capital that 
comes from being able to rely on each other in times of need. 
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Whether to cooperate is not just based on rational calculation, however, but is 
driven by ORFDO KLVWRULHV DQG HDFK LQGLYLGXDO·V VHQVH RI WKHPVHOYHV LQ UHODWLRQ WR
others, in other words, politics. For example, trust and therefore actions may be 
affected by perception of injustice or corruption in community dealings. Water 
guards or other officials may be devalued if they are seen to give favours to 
relatives or to others to whom they owe a debt of bondage. On the other hand, 
community values and religious teachings about service, selflessness and the 
devaluation of calculation play an important role in continued cooperation. 
Religious identity is an essential glue to Mozabite society, and continued animosity 
between them and cohabiting Shaamba Arabs further solidifies this3.  
 
Recent calls for enhanced cooperation to effectively manage the local oasis 
resources has resulted in the formation of various environmental organisations, 
involving farmers, date palm specialists, local and non-local agronomists, ecological 
specialists and concerned citizens. Environmental management may be defined as 
the controlled use of an environment by humans in a way that is sustainable (Nath 
1998: 45); here, this involves various forms of date palm agriculture and water 
management, by individual and collective action. A managerial emphasis may 
falsely imply overly strong collective planning activities, however. As is likely the 
case in other environmental contexts, this study shows that the state of the oasis 
may be more the result of a hodgepodge, or collective, of individually negotiated 
and contested actions based on local political histories regarding the navigation of 
environmental conditions, uncooperative neighbours, strong behavioural norms, 
                                                 
3 Identity can at times be more fluid however depending on the situation, in a relational 
IDVKLRQ GHSHQGLQJ WR ZKR WKH ¶RSSRQHQW· LV LQ WKH ZRUOG FXS VRFFHU FRPSHWLWLRQ
Mozabites are Algerian. At other times there is a unity with all Muslims. At home, they are 
Ibadite Muslims, differentiated from other sects. 
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semi-formal customary and formal state law, and experimentation with new 
agronomic techniques. The ethnographic method is ideally suited to address and 
capture this complex messiness, of contingent negotiations as well as the more 
adept organisational practices of locals. I found that social adaptation to ecological 
problems in Beni Isguen is indeed a compositional picture of planning and mistakes, 
of individual anarchic as well as group cooperative action, of mixed economic, legal 
and political modes of practice. These diverse elements may or may not constitute 
an adaptive adjustment of the human-oasis system as a whole, if it can be addressed 
as such, to change that is at once conscious and blind in its direction.  
 
 
1.5 Significance of the study 
At the substantive level, the study documents the history of  the oasis and date 
palm management in central Algeria, and describes contemporary Mozabite life and 
economy, focusing on the variation in oasis and date palm management among 
farmers. Methodologically, I tested, and found support for, the power of  historical 
event analysis as a tool to adequately explain local changes in subsistence practices 
and management decisions. At the theoretical level I have interrogated the notion 
of  adaptive management and social-ecological systems (SES) theory more 
generally, by my use of  ethnographic methods, with attention to moral values, local 
environmental knowledge, social institutions and unequal power structures within 
the town and between the town and central power. The analysis presented here 
reveals additional complexity in these human environment relationships, and 
challenges essentialist notions of  farmer adaptation in oases ecosystems. At the 
applied level, the study is significant because it critiques adaptive management as a 
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policy tool in natural resource management, whether by government bodies or non-
governmental organizations.  
 
With a micro-level focus that incorporates wider political processes, the study not 
only questions the static structure of ecological systems, but also interrogates the 
relationship between agency and broader social structures. Critiques of steady-state 
systems are not new, and DURVHDVVRRQDV5DSSDSRUW·VPigs for the Ancestors (1968) 
monograph was published (Vayda & McCay 1975; Friedman 1974; Ellen 1982), 
which Rappaport acknowledged in the second edition of his book (Rappaport 2000: 
427). This study not only interrogates the static systems approach but deals with 
new SES approaches, adaptive dynamics and resilience by resituating a critique 
within a new theory of contested dynamic or chaotic environs. I argue that chaotic 
environmental systems such as those of Saharan North Africa demand dynamic 
social responses, and that such dynamic social and ecological spheres evolve in 
concert, as human actions in turn have environmental consequences. This is not to 
state that all human institutions are environmentally determined, however. Such 
dynamics have been documented among pastoralists, but not among small-scale 
farmers, who actively manipulate their environment. The study highlights dynamic 
social processes, which reflect unpredicable ecological change, by emphasising the 
role of intergenerational conflict and change as opposed to cohesion, and its 
mediation and resolution within dynamic notions of identity. 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The primary question of  this thesis is: do oasis dwellers in Beni Isguen use 
adaptive management to manage their resources? Chapter two presents a critical 
review of  the key literature underpinning the adaptive management concept, with a 
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look at systems ecology in anthropological and ecological theory. After setting out 
the theoretical background of  adaptive management, chapter three outlines my 
aims and objectives of  how I tested for the presence of  adaptive management in 
Beni Isguen. This is followed by a discussion of  the methods I chose to achieve 
those aims. Chapter four provides an extensive historical background to my chosen 
ILHOG VLWH WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ DQG WKHQ FULWLFDOO\ UHYLHZs key literature on the 
Mozabites of  the region. After this in chapter five we enter the contemporary oasis 
of  Beni Isguen, one of  the five cities or qsǌr RI  WKH 0·]DE entailing a detailed 
account of  farming life in the region, including adaptive strategies. The next three 
chapters (six to eight) present an in-depth analysis of  specific problems identified 
with the aid of  local actors. Thus chapter six investigates the economics of  labour 
practices in the valley and how these have shifted over time, through an historical 
analysis. Chapter seven explores land tenure regimes, beginning with the 
observation of  (apparently) abandoned land and investigation of  inheritance 
disputes, with a view to the colonial hangover still present in Algerian policy and 
law, despite attempts to affect structural change. Chapter eight investigates the 
politics of  communal resources management, continuing the theme of  property 
from private to communal, entailing further legal and political considerations.  
 
Throughout the research I used mixed methods, combining participant observation 
with interviews, field surveys and an abductive investigation of  causal events (i.e., 
using a type of  multiple working hypothesis approach, as developed by Vayda and 
Walters 2011). I chose the causal event approach as an explicit counterpoint and 
means to challenge the systems framework. The causal event approach entails the 
use of  partial explanations, by starting with concrete events in the present and 
subsequently adding layers of  contextualisation through the linkage of  (potentially 
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multiple) causal events through time. Systems, on the other hand, involve the pre-
existing idea of  the presence of  such systems before demonstrating that they 
actually exist. Thus, in chapter nine, I first provide a meta-analysis of  the previous 
three main problems (which combine causal histories of  change, involving how the 
fields of  economy, law and politics have been negotiated from a local perspective). I 
then test the framework for adaptive management developed by Fabricius et al. 
(2007) against my own ethnographic data to assess my research question: is 
adaptive management actually practised LQ WKH 0·]DE )LQDOO\ , SLW WKH HYHQW
approach against the systems modelling to analyse the pros and cons of  each. In 
the concluding chapter I summarise the key findings and discuss the relevance for 
expanding current understanding. I outline the coding used in my notes in 
Appendix I, an example of  a farm survey is given in Appendix II, and in Appendix 
III I present the results of  the resilience analysis.  
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2. Are systems really systems? A 
review of  systems approaches in 
ecological anthropology 
 
Resilience and systems approaches dominate current management approaches to 
natural resource management.  When I began this study my belief was that the 
social dimension of the systems approach was lacking in sophistication. Hadn't 
anthropology already left this behind in the 1960s? It appears that the concept has 
seen renewed attention in anthropological studies, some critical, and some not. Yet, 
before dismissing this scholarship we must understand its recent trajectories. What 
I present below, therefore, is a critical analysis of systems as they have been used in 
anthropology, followed by a review of the recent resilience scholarship and adaptive 
management theory. 
 
2.1 Combining social systems and ecosystems 
 
2.1.1 Anthropology and ecological approaches 
Here, I describe the historical usage of the ecosystem approach in ecological 
anthropology. Glacken (1976) documents the dis-articulation of nature and society 
LQ ¶:HVWHUQ· WKRXJKW following the industrial revolution. Many disciplines have 
followed this divide into the humanities and the sciences, yet some have attempted 
to join them. Marx provided early attempts to model human-nature relationships in 
the 19th century (Wolf 1982: 74). During the 20th century, various disciplines have 
attempted to link environment and society, consolidating into half a dozen sub-
disciplines. These include Robert Park's human ecology, (1936), Julian Steward's 
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cultural ecology (1955), the ecological anthropology of Rappaport (1968), Bateson 
(1972), Netting (1974) and Vayda and McCay (1975); the human geography of Carl 
Sauer (1956) and others; the ethnoecology of Conklin (1957) and Berlin (1992); 
William Cronon (1983) and Donald Worster's (1977) environmental history; 
Darrell Posey (1985), William Balée (1998) DQG&DURO&UXPOH\·V (2007) historical 
ecology; and the more recent emerging political ecology of Blakie (1985) and 
Greenberg and Parks (1994). 
 
7KH¶QHZHFRORJ\·(Scoones 1999) (to be discussed here as relating to arid or semi-
arid non-equilibrium systems) radically departed from the traditional ecology of 
equilibrial, climax ecosystems, a concept originally conceived by Sir Arthur 
Tansley (1935). While the systems approach was championed earlier by Bateson 
(1972), the ecosystems framework was first introduced into anthropology by 
Clifford Geertz in Agricultural Involution (1963). This usage was to ameliorate the 
tension of environmental determinism, such as of anthropogeography, and the 
historical possibilism and diffusionism that arose from the Boas school (Geertz 
1963; Moran 1990). Deterministic theories propose that human behaviour and 
social systems in general are caused by environmental features. Such ideas were 
ethnocentrically used to justify political domination over other populations, by 
stating that a temperate or balanced climate gave rise to more virtuous qualities 
whose inhabitants were thus destined to rule over 'lesser' peoples (Moran 2009: 28). 
According to the competing paradigm of environmental possibilism, however, the 
environment only plays a passive role that limits the options available to societies, 
but in no way shapes emerging cultural properties (Moran 1990: 10). To counteract 
environmental determinism, the concept of culture was seen as the unit defining 
human adaptation. Emphasis was given to diffusion and historical processes. The 
   
 
24 
´FXOWXUHDUHDVµDSSURDFK of Ford and Kroeber was inclusive of this trend, wherein 
geographical regions were divided into culture areas based on shared traits (Ibid.). 
7KHEDODQFHQRZVKLIWHGWRFXOWXUHEHFRPLQJD´VXSHURUJDQLFHQWLW\µWKDWrelegated 
individual choice to its patterns (Davidson-Hunt & Berkes 2000: 4). 
 
Possibilism and culture areas could be used to describe historical processes of a 
particular area, but they could not be used to generalise beyond this. Julian Steward 
(1955) was interested in cross-cultural comparisons of the interactions of social 
structures and subsistence methods. The focus was not on environmental or 
cultural determination, but the means of resource utilization. Steward was 
interested in whether a society's adjustment to their environment required specific 
behaviour, or whether there was room for variation. His methods involved three 
components: 1) analysis of environment and subsistence method, 2) analysis of 
subsistence technology and any associated behaviours, and 3) describing the extent 
to which such behaviour patterns affected other elements of culture (Steward 1955: 
40-41). Steward emphasised that the environment only affects certain aspects of 
FXOWXUH NQRZQ DV WKH ´FXOWXUDO FRUHµ ZKLOH RWKHU HOHPHQWV DUH FRQGLWLRQHG E\
historical processes. He differed from the social evolutionists by formulating the 
idea of multi-linear evolution; yet he also differed from the British functionalists by 
emphasising the relation of a variable to limited set of variables, rather than to the 
whole social system (Moran 1990). Steward, more than anyone before, merged the 
field of human-environment interactions. He went beyond the generalisations of 
environmental determinism and the particularism of the possibilists to formulate a 
PHWKRG RI UHVHDUFK WKDW ´SDLG FDUHIXO DWWHQWLRQ Wo empirical details that causally 
linked the cognized environment, social organisation, and the behavioural 
H[SUHVVLRQVRIKXPDQUHVRXUFHXVHµ 0RUDQ6WHZDUG
VFXOWXUDOFRUHZDV
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found to underestimate the complexity, subtlety, and scope of social and 
environmental systems, and the emphasis on subsistence as the organising factor of 
social systems was shown to be debatable (Geertz 1963). Too much weight was 
given to culture as the unit of analysis (Vayda & Rappaport 1968). Furthermore, 
WKH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ RI ZKDW FRQVWLWXWHG WKH ´FXOWXUDO FRUHµ DQG WKH ´HIIHctive 
HQYLURQPHQWµZDVVHHQDVVXEMHFWLYH(Ellen 1982: 61). 
 
2.1.2 The rise of systems approaches 
7DQVOH\·V IRUPXODWLRQRI WKH HFRV\VWHPFRQFHSW UHVWHGRQ WKH LGHD WKDWELRORJLFDO
communities would reach equilibrium through succession, until arriving at a 
¶FOLPD[· community, and was strongly influenced by the work of F. E. Clements 
(1916). Before this, the physical environment was seen as just a backdrop to biotic 
activity, yet Tansley felt that the relationship between the two was far more 
involved (Golly 1993). The same would be theorised within anthropology 
regarding human activity.  During the 1940s and 1950s the concept gained more 
ZLGHVSUHDGXVHDQGZLWK2GXP·VFundamentals of Ecology (1971), the ecosystem as 
an analytic unit was firmly established. Geertz (1963) is significant in that he 
postulated the combination of humans and their environment as a single analytical 
unit. This theoretical approach focuses on the elements of systems in terms of 
structure, equilibrium and change, rather than on paired points, as in the nature-
FXOWXUHGLFKRWRP\RI6WHZDUG·VDSSURDFK7KLVUHGXFHGWKHQXPEHURIYDULDEOHVLQ
what Geertz saw as a more complex system of interactions, and that change is not 
only predicated on ecological processes, but includes political, economic and 
intellectual developments (1963). Although Geertz first used the ecosystem concept 
in anthropology, Rappaport is widely held to have produced the first 
comprehensive study of the ecosystem studies in the analysis of human behaviour, 
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in Pigs for the Ancestors (1968). Where Steward viewed humans as an external factor 
to the environment, Vayda and Rappaport (1968) argued that humans should be 
considered as integral to ecological systems. They started to use the units of 
ecology: individuals, populations and ecosystems, as a unified field of ecology. As 
*HHUW]·VEURDGHFRV\VWHPFRQFHSWLQYROYLQJHFRORJLFDOVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOelements 
proved hard to operationalize, Vayda and Rappaport moved to a study of adaptation 
using biological ecology methods. 
 
Following this progression, a number of ecological anthropologists started to use 
the ecosystem as the unit of analysis, with humans as one aspect, one species among 
many involved in self-regulation. Odum was one to call for a new field of 
ecoenergetics. This was criticised by some as a ´FDORULFREVHVVLRQµDVLQJOHIRFXVRQ
energy flow through human populations. During the same period a number of 
studies began to query why human behaviours such as religious actions seemed to 
contradict what would be expected from a self-regulating ecosystem. This type of 
ecological anthropology was heavily criticised for being overly functional and 
reductionistic (see for example Ellen 1982: 118). Such reactions to these new, 
perhaps naïve neo-functionalist developments caused a dearth in use of the 
ecosystem concept in social anthropology in the 1980s. 
 
1982 saw the organisation of a session by Emilio Moran at the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science Meetings to discuss the benefits and 
limitations of the ecosystem concept in anthropology. This session made it into a 
book in 1984, which was revised considerably in a 1990 edition. The ecosystem 
concept was seen to add greater holism, adding the physical and biological 
components to the study of human societies, and was seen as bringing to an end the 
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conflicting environmental and cultural determinisms. Limitations drawn from the 
conference were that the ecosystem could be reified and conceived as a biological 
organism; time and structural change were ignored; boundaries were poorly 
defined; adaptation was conceived in only energetic terms; there were problems 
with shifting levels from ethnography to analysis; and there was a lack of 
accounting of individual agency in such systems (Moran 1990: 16²24). It is not 
clear that these limitations have been overcome by current systems approaches, 
such as in resilience theory, as I discuss below. 
 
In the social realm, anthropologists have used the notion of systems to talk about 
cultural life, such as kinship systems, political systems, economic systems, symbolic 
systems and more (e.g. Leach 1970; Keesing 1974). Milton (1996: 15²17) critiques 
the notion of systems in discussing cultures, by highlighting the problem of 
ERXQGHGQHVV´FXOWXUDOH[FKDQJHDQGLQWHJUDWLRQDSSHDUUHODWLYHO\VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG
SURFHVVHV 7KLV LV QRW WKH FDVH LI D FXOWXUH LV D V\VWHPµ 6KH DUJXHV IXUWKHU E\
representing cultures as systems or boxes, that this would make exchange between 
systems highly disruptive, when in fact it is relatively fluid, and so theory does not 
match empirical observation of global flows. The last decade has seen a resurgence 
of the systems concept, especially within ecological anthropology. Before describing 
the new turn in ecosystems thinking, centred on social-ecological ¶UHVLOLHQFH·,ILUVW
describe a different view of stability, equilibrium and change in ecological theory, of 
so-called ¶QRQ-HTXLOLEULXP· VWDWHV upon which the new theories of resilience are 
based. The conceptualisation of non-equilibrium appears to be far more relevant to 
our understanding of the variability of environments such as deserts, and how 
people have learned to adjust their behaviour accordingly, involving a cultural 
component, including for example subsistence behaviour, technology, sociological 
   
 
28 
practices to spread risk, and local ecological knowledge of plant and animal 
husbandry as well as climate systems. Investigation of this cultural knowledge of 
ecological dynamism is central to understanding how people have adapted to 
change in Beni Isguen. 
 
2.1.3 Non-equilibrium ecosystems 
A major shift in ecological thinking occurred in the late 1970s concerning 
ecosystems, and this would challenge in turn, the basis of the concept in 
anthropological theory. Holling (1973) began questioning the notion of equilibrium 
in ecosystems, arguing instead that such systems are in a constant transient, but 
persistent state. Holling conceived of a system that could withstand shocks and 
remain resilient. Vayda and McCay (1975) were the first to use this conception in 
ecological anthropology, stating that the focus should be on how societies 
responded to natural hazards and maintained their essential structure, rather than 
on homeostatic self-regulation. 
 
Ecological theory has conventionally assumed a drive toward stability of  ecological 
¶V\VWHPV·6XFKLGHDVZHUHVWURQJO\EDVHGRQWKHFRPPXQLW\HFRORJ\RI &OHPHQWV
(1916), where biological communities go through stages of  succession towards a 
climax, and change is a deviation from the stable state or balance. This view of  
equilibrium systems came from advances in thermodynamics, where equilibrium is 
seen as the energetic balance between a system of  particles and its external 
environment. Equilibrium in thermodynamics is based on final macro, aggregate 
states, rather than on the multiple pathways that can achieve this state (Grabbatin & 
Rossi 2012). Such thinking remained in ecology until the 1970s, which saw an 
explosion of  mathematical ecology and insight into the instability of  real and 
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model systems (e.g. May 1977, in Scoones 1999). These systems involve non-linear 
interactions and high temporal and spatial variability. Where previous systems 
ecology implied that environments tend toward equilibrium, newly emerging 
concepts emphasised multiple stable states, the recognition of  the sensitivity of  
non-linear dynamics to initial conditions and thus lacking long-term predictability, 
DQG WUXO\ FKDRWLF V\VWHPV GRPLQDWHG E\ VWRFKDVWLFLW\ WKDW KDYH QR ´VLPSOH
UHJXODWRU\IHHGEDFNPHFKDQLVPVµ6FRRQHV 482). 
 
7KH¶EDODQFHLQQDWXUH·DSSURDFKKDVEHHQDWWDFNHGJHQHUDOO\E\PDQ\LQZKDWKDV
EHHQGXEEHGWKH¶QHZHFRORJ\·(Blumler 1996; Scoones 1999; Zimmerer 1994). The 
ecosystem concept was challenged by empirical evidence on forests in the 
northeastern United States (Drury & Nisbet 1973), upon which the authors 
charged that there was no concept of  succession, at least in temperate climates. 
This lack of  succession challenged the idea of  a mature forest, and thus an 
equilibrium idea of  ecosystems in many cases. Such succession to climax processes 
in ecology may only be certain in the tropics where rain is constant and height is an 
advantage (Blumler 1996). Furthermore, the equilibrium model for tropical 
rainforest ecology promoted by Richards is now widely regarded as problematic 
(see Ellen 2007: 56). Further research, specifically on arid, desert lands, has shown 
that in such regions climate is more important as a determining factor than 
biological communities, first pointed out by Noy-Mier (1973). Wiens· (1977) work 
has been pivotal in non-equilibrium theory. He found that in arid and semi-arid 
environments equilibrium interactions begin to break down, and that populations 
are strongly influenced by abiotic factors, not by species density or limited 
resources. Wiens importantly proposed that natural communities exist along a 
continuum, where low environmental variation results in equilibrium interactions, 
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whereas areas with unpredictable environmental variation result in non-equilibrium 
communities. Evidence from other arid lands such as Australia confirm these 
findings: for example Caughley et al. (1987) proposed that non-equilibrium systems 
will be found where the coefficient of  variance for rainfall exceeds 30 per cent. 
These conditions are also typical for the Sahara, where rainfall variability is 
extreme, receiving only 10-100 mm per year at quite unpredictable times (King & 
Thomas 2014). 
 
Despite these new theoretical developments in ecosystem theory, management and 
policy geared toward tackling desertification continues to be based on the 
equilibrium model. Notwithstanding heavy stresses, for example in Turkana, 
Kenya, of  frequent droughts and raids on cattle, nutritional deficiencies and 
emigration, such dynamic ecosystems are seen to persist in a relatively stable form 
(Ellis & Swift 1988). In these systems, policy and management intervention based 
on inappropriate equilibrium models has damaged herder livelihoods (Westoby et 
al. 1989). Further research on pastoral-rangeland interactions has revealed that 
both equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamics occur in arid environments at 
different times or in different areas of  the resource (Vetter 2005). Management 
actions have not been updated to reflect the new findings. 
 
Concerning agriculture in arid lands, Thompson & Scoones (2009) suggest that: 
 
Such static, equilibrium-centred views, we argue, provide inadequate insight 
into the dynamic character of agri-food systems, particularly in an era of 
global economic and environmental change, where factors such as climate 
change, rapid land use shifts and uncertain political economic conditions in 
agricultural economies all impinge on the day-to-day realities of poorer 
producers and consumers in the developing world. [Thompson & Scoones 
2009: 387] 
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Much work has been done on how Sahelian pastoralists manage in dis-equilibrial 
ecosystems, such as opportunistic stocking (Sandford 1983), but little has been done 
on farmers who live in areas of high variability in rainfall. Some farming practices 
make sense in this light, such as mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding and 
extensive planting (Mortimore & Adams 2001).  Farmers in Morocco tend to plant 
extra fields further from rivers during a wet year, concentrating only on the core 
areas during a dry year (Benessaiah 2011). 
 
Partridge (2005), a critic of non-equilibrium theory, points out that even the 
proponents of classic ecosystem ecology such as Clements, Elton and Odum never 
believed in perfect balance, but that systems rather tended toward equilibrium: 
 
Even the most stable association is never in complete equilibrium, nor is it 
free from disturbed areas in which secondary succession is evident. [Clements 
1916: 1, cited in Partridge 2005] 
 
7KH ¶EDODQFH RI QDWXUH· GRHV QRW H[LVW DQG SHUKDSV QHYHU KDV H[LVWHG 7KH
numbers of wild animals are constantly varying to a greater or less extent, 
and the variations are usually irregular in period and always irregular in 
amplitude. [Elton 1930: 17, cited in Partridge 2005] 
 
An ecosystem is a thermodynamically open, far from equilibrium, system... In 
hierarchical organization of ecosystems, species interactions that tend to be 
unstable, nonequilibrium, or even chaotic are constrained by the slower 
interactions that characterize large systems... [Odum 1992:542, cited in 
Partridge 2005] 
  
Partridge rather suggests an equilibrium to non-equilibrium dialectic, of an on-
going pattern of ecosystem disturbance and recovery, which Partridge compares to 
the checks and balances required for the process of walking. He argues that such 
rhythmic fall-and-recovery is first order disequilibrium, yet the overall activity of 
walking is stable, and thus shows second-order equilibrium. Partridge concedes 
that some systems require disturbance to drive them, such as chaparral, which 
requires fire for seed germinatioQ 3DUWULGJH·V (2000) examples of self-repairing 
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systems remain unconvincing, however, with reference to a simple binary 
interaction (the Canadian lynx-hare cycle), or to single-purpose group interactions 
such as a football team (2000: 87), or similarly goal-driven mechanistic systems 
such as a thermostat. In nature, there is no such demonstrable unity of purpose.  
 
It may be seen, therefore, that a geographic region can exhibit a spectrum of 
equilibrium to non-equilibrium properties (Grabbatin & Rossi 2012), and in arid 
and semi-arid areas this is dependent on climatic conditions. Farmers may or may 
not have institutions in place to deal with these situations, depending on the scale 
of regularity or uncertainty. During my time with farmers in Beni Isguen, I found 
an example of this in the form of emergency rules for the sharing of water from 
private wells during drought periods with those whose wells are dry. 
 
2.1.4 Socio-ecological systems 
 
SES theory explained 
 
Systems ecology has survived, thus far, by embracing and incorporating the notion 
of change, combining dynamism with structure. The question may be then, which 
parts of the structure persist, and which are subject to change, beyond previous 
formulations such as Stewart·V FXOWXUDO FRUH" A unique approach to this problem 
was postulated in the 1970s by C. S. Holling (1973).  
 
+ROOLQJ·V(1973) work was originally firmly based in ecology, rejecting equilibrium-
based models, asserting instead that ecosystems are complex adaptive systems. Due to 
the complexity of multiple non-linear interactions in an ecosystem, Holling 
emphasised that uncertainty is the primary condition of such systems. Thus, the 
FRQYHQWLRQDO SUHVFULSWLYH ¶FRPPDQG DQG FRQWURO· PHWKRG RI QDWXUDO UHVRXUFH
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management is not useful as prediction is impossible (Walker & Salt 2006: 25). 
Rather than sustainability, Holling argued that ecological resilience is to be sought, 
which may be defined as the capacity to absorb disturbance without causing 
significant changes in system behaviour. Thus the opposite of resilience in a system 
is vulnerability. Ecological resilience is differentiated from engineering resilience, 
which focuses on the time it takes for a system to bounce back from a shock, 
whereas in the case of ecological resilience, it is the magnitude of shock that can be 
experienced before the system transforms (Holling 1996: 33). 
 
Addressing the issue of risk in the management of natural resources, Holling (1973) 
originally wrote against the conventional prescription of maximum sustained yield 
based on equilibrium systems. This method maintains that a surplus of production 
can be continually harvested, such as of cod stocks without depleting the 
population. He argued such sustained pressure over the long-term can in fact make 
WKH V\VWHP·V FRPSOH[ IDFWRUV H[WUHPHO\ IUDJLOH ORVLQJ RYHUDOO V\VWHP UHVLOLHQFH
Thus, the focus for conservation managers should not be on simple linear 
interactions alone, such as sustained yield, but on general ecological resilience to 
multiple factors including economic pressures (Walker & Cooper 2011). An 
emphasis on uncertainty led to the formulation of adaptive management theory, 
discussed in the following section (Walters 1986).  
 
With the establishment of the Resilience Alliance in Stockholm in 1999 (Resalliance 
2016), scholarly work progressed to increase the scope of ecological management to 
include the social realm, whereby social and ecological processes could be analysed 
as a complex whole (Folke 2006). For this, similar trends and patterns would need 
to occur within the two spheres of influence, and it seems that economic theory has 
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played a part since early on in resilience thinking, as these disciplines have often 
borrowed concepts from each other. This conceptual leap involved a shift from the 
idea that some ecosystems undergo extreme perturbations, or that maximum 
sustain yield causes stress on all ecosystems, to the idea that all socio-ecological 
systems can be thought about as non-linear, complex adaptive systems. These ideas 
can be summarised in two key concepts of resilience thinking: 1) ecological 
resilience, and 2) the adaptive cycle. 
 
An exemplary method of illustrating ecological resilience by resilience scholars is 
the model of a ball in a basin (Gunderson 2000) (figs 2.1 a & b). The ball represents 
that state of the system (as defined by key variables), and the surface is the forces 
acting to change the state. A pit in the surface represents a stable state, which is 
kept in place by mutually reinforcing structures and processes. These feedbacks 
keep the system state from the edge of the basin, which is the threshold after which 
the system flips into an alternative state. A deep basin represents a system with 
high resilience. The ball tends to roll to the bottom of the basin due to feedbacks, 
yet due to disturbances it rolls around, and can thus be described as tending toward 
equilibrium, which is seen as a moving target. Therefore it follows that a system 
with a shallow basin is vulnerable to disturbance, and may easily be pushed into a 
different state, which has its own equilibrium tendencies. A classic example is that 
of a clear lake (state 1). A threshold is crossed when too much phosphorus enters 
the lake from agricultural runoff, transforming the lake into a murky one (state 2). 
State 1 is resilient to shocks of phosphorus when a low level of phosphorus is 
retained in the lake sediment. In this situation, the sediment mops up excess 
phosphorus, keeping the lake clear. If phosphorus input is continuous however, it 
accumulates in the sediment, making the system vulnerable to rain shocks, which 
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cause high agricultural runoff. This excess level of nutrients causes an increase in 
algal growth, and soon dead algae accumulate in the sediment, depleting the 
oxygen in the lower waters. A new state has now been entered from which it is 
very hard to return ² simply reducing phosphorus will not restore the previous 
state (Walker & Salt 2006: 53²57). 
 
 
Fig 2.1.a Ball (dynamic equilibrium) in one ecological state on right-hand basin. A 
core conceptual illustration of resilience by resilience scholars to reveal multiple 
equilibria.  
 
 
Fig 2.1.b Equilibrium shifts to alternative ecological state. 
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In 1986, Holling proposed the idea of the adaptive cycle to represent a general 
theory of states of transition, meant as a heuristic rather than a definitive model, as 
certain states may be skipped within the cycle. Holling was heavily influenced by 
the work of Joseph Schumpeter, an economist, who used the cycle to describe boom 
and bust cycles (Schumpeter 1950, in Walker & Salt 2006), again highlighting the 
emphasis on risk in both disciplines. The four phases of the cycle are growth (r), 
FRQVHUYDWLRQ . UHOHDVH  DQG UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ Į). Gunderson (1995) then 
extended the concept to linked socio-ecological systems, arguing that the 
production of novelty destabilised human forward-ORRNLQJEHKDYLRXU7KH¶U·SKDVH
involves exploitation of resources and rapid growth. There is low regulation of the 
system, components are loosely connected, and the system is resilient. Examples 
include vegetative growth into the space left by the collapse of a large tree in a 
forest, or the growth of innovative businesses following deregulation. Following 
this, the system becomes more organised and efficient, and the competitive 
advantage moves from actors who can grow rapidly, to those who can thrive within 
high competition. Diversity reduced in favour of efficiency, and increased system 
connectivity leaves little room for new competitors. Examples include mature 
forest, and large monopolising corporations. Inflexibility in the system leaves it 
vulnerable to processes that release organised capital (Peterson 2000). 
 
:KHQ D GLVWXUEDQFH RFFXUV WKDW LV JUHDWHU WKDQ WKH V\VWHP·V DELOLW\ WR DEVRUE
VKRFNV WKH V\VWHP IOLSV LQWR DQRWKHU VWDWH 'XULQJ WKLV WUDQVLWLRQ WKH V\VWHP·V
capital and connections are thrown into disorganisaWLRQDQGUHOHDVHWKH¶·SKDVH, 
until the disturbance is spent. Examples that release locked up capital include fires, 
banking crises, and revolutions. As a result of the destructive processes during this 
phDVH WKH V\VWHP·V ERXQGDULHV DQG FRQQHFWLRQV DUH ORRVHO\GHILQHG 7KXV D OLWWOH
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LQSXWFDQHDVLO\UHRUJDQLVHWKHV\VWHPFUHDWLQJWKH¶Į·SKDVH7KHQHZVWUXFWXUHRI
the system is hard to predict, for example, the budding of buried seed creating a 
new vegetation cover, or the new structures of Eastern Europe countries following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (Peterson 2000). 
 
Two stages of the adaptive cycle can be identified. The r to K stage is generally 
gradual and incremental. If the system subsequently breaks down, this can occur 
quite rapidly at the second stage. During the second stage, three possible outcomes 
can occur, resilience, where the system maintains its essential structure and reverts 
to its original identity; adaptation, where the system shifts into a different state 
maintained by different feedbacks (such as species composition in a forest), or 
transformation, characterised by a shift into a completely new regime (as in a shift 
from forest to grassland) (Walker et al. 2004). Management interventions can thus 
be optimally timed according to the phase the system is in. The system can be 
subsidised to pull it back from the peak of the K phase into the r phase, preventing 
it from entering the release phase. Or, the system can be adjusted during the 
reorganisation phase with little effort to maximum effect (Walker & Salt 2006: 
123). 
 
Socio-ecological systems as adaptive cycles do not exist as bounded units, according 
to resilience theory, but interact with other systems at different scales in time and 
space, above and below. For example, a farm is influenced by processes operating at 
larger scales such as regional droughts, or at smaller scales such as tree lifecycles. 
These systems apparently also have adaptive cycles, and such systems within 
systems have been dubbed a ¶SDQDUFK\· (Holling et al. 2002). Each scale can be at a 
different phase of the adaptive cycle. Furthermore, larger scales set the conditions 
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for smaller, faster scales, which in turn act as sites of variation, and can drive 
change in the upper scales. 
 
 
Fig 2.2 The adaptive cycle and the panarchy. Another key concept among resilience 
scholars. Referred to by the latter as a heuristic visualisation device, but acts as a 
model to connote boom-bust cycles at varying, interconnected scales. 
 
The last decade has seen many efforts to improve the social dimension of resilience 
theory, with work on institutional arrangements for governing socio-ecological 
systems (Ostrom 1990; 2009). For instance, stable institutions are said to be 
preferable in times of stability for resource accumulation and wellbeing, however, 
institutions must have the flexibility to change during times of uncertainty (Duit et 
al. 2010). It may be possible to map the transformation of governance institutions 
in Beni Isguen on the adaptive cycle model, although conforming the model to 
¶UHDOLW\·FDQEHSUREOHPDWLF. For example, the management of oasis resources was 
previously carried out by an older, hierarchical institution named O·RXPQD (water 
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guards), which has been largely replaced by new farmer associations and NGOs. 
Complicating this, however, is the fact that O·RXPQD still exists in parallel to the 
newer ones, albeit in diminished form. I discuss the implication of the compositional 
hybrid nature of these governance systems in chapters 6-9. Detailed ethnography 
showed that institutions were OHVVSURQHWRPDSSLQJLQWHUPVRIVLPSOH¶ERRPDQG
EXVW· 
 
Criticism of SES theory 
Despite rejection of 1960s systems thinking, the resilience concept is still employed 
by anthropologists, whether uncritically (for example, Salmon 2012; Leslie & 
McCabe 2013; Panter-Brick 2014; Sogn 2014; Ulturgasheva et al. 2014) or 
critically (Rival 2009; Hornborg 2013; Hatt 2013; Fabinyi et al. 2014). Often these 
focus only on the social domain, though they retain the same concepts such as 
response diversity, system memory, adaptive strategies, and self-organisation. 
Sauer (2014: 9), for example, argues that ´LI D FXOWXUH V\VWHP ORVHV LWV SROLWLFDO
economic, social, or ideological autonomy, or a combination of them, the system 
becomes something new, even though somH SUHYLRXV WUDLWV VWLOO H[LVWµ. This 
definition is problematic, for on the conceptual front, it contradicts panarchy theory 
of the integration of multi-level systems, that is, systems which are affected by 
higher or lower level systems, such as the nation-state. My research further 
problematizes the question of autonomy and integration as related to identity. 
Today, no communities are unaffected by dynamics of state interference, whether 
through development programmes, education, taxation, law and more. In Beni 
Isguen, local and state legal systems have become entangled and while some judges 
attempt to balance statutory and customary law, individuals opportunistically 
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¶IRUXPVKRS· (von Benda-Beckmann 1981) between the two according to personal 
interest.  
 
Some criticism notes the analogy between resilience thinking and neo-liberal 
economic assumptions of self-regulating markets, pointing to the more radical 
writings of Hayek (Walker & Cooper 2011). The same authors point to the use of 
resilience concepts, such as a de-emphasis on long-term planning in security 
discourse, to justify a constant state of security (Ibid.), invoking perpetual crisis, and 
thus for government to legitimise more stringent controls over their populations 
and to replace basic human rights with martial law (Calis 2011; Zebrowski 2013). 
Some have even suggested that the formulation of resilience reflects a postmodern 
turn on the problems of positivist notions of certainty, fact, and truth (Worster 
1993: 166, in Nadasdy 2007). 
 
The bulk of criticisms of resilience theory centre on issues of agency and power (see 
for example, Hornborg 2009; Hornborg 2013). Resilience scholars have attempted 
to incorporate governance issues (Adger et al. 2001; Galaz 2005; Cash et al. 2006; 
Lebel et al. 2006; Fabricius et al. 2007; Duit et al. 2010; Anderies et al. 2012). In all 
of these works, power is theorised according to the case in question, whereas for 
Hornborg, power is singularly dominated by economic forces, à la Marx. As Weber 
suggests, however, other forms of power such as ideological, military and political, 
may play an equal role (Mann 1986: 518²524). For example, who decides on the 
boundaries of the system to be fortified against disturbance, and thus what is to be 
excluded? As opposed to the biological sciences, boundaries in the social sciences 
are notoriously hard to demarcate (Scheele 2009: 150). The panarchy framework 
PD\EHFULWLFLVHGIRU¶IODWWHQLQJRXW·VRFLDO inequalities, and thus begs the question, 
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resilience for whom (Cote & Nightingale 2011; Davoudi et al. 2012)4? The question 
of whether resilience is good or bad is ultimately a normative, moral one (for 
example, if an authoritarian regime is replaced by a fragile, democratic one), such as 
the outcome of conflict or distribution of collective goods (Duit et al. 2010). These 
issues require the examination of the applicability of universal ideas of the good 
society to all. In societies displaying great economic disparity, the value of a 
resilient society will vary, from those who desire change, to those with considerable 
assets who wish for maintenance of the status quo. Finally, a veritable cottage 
industry has emerged based on critique of the resilience concept in the journal 
Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses. Most contributions come 
from political science scholars, who comment on parallels between governance and 
resilience describing the latter as normative and in line with neoliberal ideologies, 
or masking security issues as adaptation to change (e.g. Joseph 2013; Kaufmann 
2013; Bourbeau 2013), although some also argue for the potentially subversive 
qualities of resilience (Hornborg 2013; Chandler 2014). 
 
Recent resilience theorists argue that the conceptual aspects of the social element of 
their theory has been significantly improved (Folke 2006; Duit et al. 2010). They 
posit that despite criticisms around structural-functionalism of earlier incarnations 
of complex systems theory, current dynamic systems theory with its attention to 
multiple causes and effects is superior to commonplace analysis in the social 
sciences, which are limited to a linear and probabilistic ontology. They go on to 
suggest that such analyses miss out emergent properties that arise from the 
interaction from different parts of the system (Ibid.). Hatt (2013) demonstrates that 
the resilience conceptualisation of the social is less advanced than the progressive 
                                                 
46XFK FULWLFLVP HFKRHV WKRVH PDGH E\ )ULHGPDQ LQ UHVSRQVH WR 5DSSDSRUW·V WKHRULHV RI 
systems thinking in the late 1970s (Friedman 1979: 261)DVNLQJ´DGDSWLYHIRUZKRP"µ 
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ecological formulation. By emphasising the cohesion of the social system as a whole 
as adaptive, Hatt argues that this echoes early functional sociological analyses, as 
opposed to the more dynamic equilibrium found through contestation and 
competition of ecological systems. Drawing on Gramsci, Hatt proposes a 
conceptualisation of the social as equally dynamic and contested, based on multiple 
VRFLDO ¶DWWUDFWRUV· RU QRUPV DQG YDOXHV 7KLV KH DUJXHV JLYHV D PRUH YDOLG
description of power and inequality in society. 
 
Regarding agency, it has been argued that while the structural complexity of both 
social and ecological systems may be comparable, the feedback processes are not, as 
humans have a reflexive capacity, while ecological components do not. For 
example, societies perceiving crisis events may postpone ecological disturbance 
effects, in space or in time, leading to a greater disturbance further down the line, 
or for someone else (Davidson 2010). Reflection and subsequent action inevitably 
involve moral and normative leanings (Folke & Rockström 2009). Others fear that 
when science moves from description to prescription in the social realm beyond 
basic resource management, there is the risk of political management based on 
PHWULFV HIILFLHQF\ DQG REMHFWLYH ¶IDFWV· UDWKHU WKDQ RQ GHPRFUDWLF VWUuctures and 
equity, in short, a New Public Management (von Heland & Sörlin 2012). To 
FRQFOXGH UHVLOLHQFH VFKRODUV DGPLW KRZHYHU WKDW WKHLU ZRUN LVQ·W Peant to be a 
theory of everything. Thus, perhaps a more fruitful outcome may be achieved by 
the use of resilience assessment methods alongside other social science frameworks. 
 
2.1.5 Adaptive management theory 
In order to understand the theoretical history of adaptive management, the 
previous sections have reviewed the relevant literature on systems theories and 
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their use in anthropology. Adaptive management theory forms the central 
framework that is to be tested by this study. 
 
Explaining adaptive management theory 
Adaptive management has been postulated as the answer to the question of 
uncertainty inherent in complex systems (Holling 1978; Walters 1986: 86; Walters 
& Holling 1990; Lee 1993: 9; Gunderson et al. 1995; Gunderson 1999). It also 
recognises the plurality of potential stake-holders in socio-ecological systems, 
resulting in greater inclusivity than classic top-down approaches (Stringer et al. 
2006). Lee (1999) claims that adaptive management contains philosophical, 
technical, ethical and theoretical dimensions. A definition of adaptive management 
includes reference to adaptive governance, adaptive capacity, and coping strategies. 
I chose to interrogate the adaptive management concept (by studying how farmers 
actually engage with their oasis environment in practiceGXHWRWKHWKHRU\·VSRWHQWLDOWR
capture how people both passively respond to environmental phenomena and 
actively manipulate it5. I discuss the results in-depth in chapter nine. Here then, I 
focus on the literature relating to adaptive management and governance only.  
 
Management implies governance at varying scales, in response to dynamic change 
and surprises of systems moving between multiple equilibria (Duit et al. 2010). The 
focus is on managing change, rather than trying to return to a predetermined 
equilibrium. Folke (2006) describes the related adaptive capacity as a complex 
interplay between maintaining and developing with change. A focus on adaptation 
is apparent in the third premise of socio-ecological resilience, as the capacity of the 
system to learn, with an emphasis on reorganisation (Carpenter et al. 2001). The 
                                                 
5 For a critical review of  the use of  adaptation term in the social sciences, see (Bargatzky et al. 
1984). 
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need to focus on linked social and ecological systems comes from the assertion that 
most studies have focused on the adaptive processes of the social realm, treating the 
ELRSK\VLFDO V\VWHP DV D ´EODFN ER[µ DVVXPLQJ WKDW LI WKH VRFLDO SURFHVVHV DUH
improved, ecological sustainability will automatically follow. Successful human 
adaptation may in fact come at the expense of the social system. Similarly, focusing 
only on the ecological dimension for sustainability leads to further erroneous 
conclusions (Folke 2006). Governance models emphasise social networks, social 
memory, leadership, and knowledge system integration (Ibid.). Although a focus on 
traditional knowledge and learning is important to assessing adaptive management 
capacity, in Beni Isguen I found other social processes such as reconciliation ability 
(such as between ethnic groups who worked together), as well as the ability to 
sensitively quell local conservative doubts while pursuing a progressive agenda 
were key to the successful navigation of creating and responding to social change. 
At times, stronger regulations were necessary for the management of oasis 
resources, ranging from norms enforced through social visibility and gossip, and by 
appeal to local authority figures. The shadow of the state upon everyday 
management practice, however, provided complications that limited the autonomy 
perhaps needed to make appropriate adaptive decisions in real-time, such as in the 
case of flooding. The competing interests of certain elements within the society 
(such as the merchant elite who sought to subvert the authority of the cazzƗba and 
O·RXPQDby appealing to state procedures) complicates and even potentially leaves 
obsolete the idea of social learning as a homogenous group adaptive response to 
stressors (again, I explore these issues in detail in chapter nine). 
 
Adaptive management follows the simple premise that despite incomplete 
knowledge, managers must act. Walters (1986) originally formulated the theory as 
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a set of structured experimentation steps, in order to reduce uncertainty by 
showing what is not known, resulting in the subsequent design of policies for 
continued learning (see figs 2.3 and 2.4 for examples of iterative cycles of 
experimentation and evaluation). Adaptive management is not simply trial and 
error, however, but involves a process LQYROYLQJ WKH ´FDUHIXO HOXFLdation of goals, 
identification of alternative management objectives and hypotheses of causation, 
DQG SURFHGXUHV IRU WKH FROOHFWLRQ RI GDWD IROORZHG E\ HYDOXDWLRQ DQG UHLWHUDWLRQµ
(Allen et al. 2011: 1). Importantly, adaptive management may not be suited to all 
environmental conditions. The approach is best suited to conditions of high 
uncertainty and controllability; where controllability is low the development of 
alternative scenarios is suggested as a more appropriate response. Adaptive 
management may help in situations of low controllability such as climate change, 
by way of mitigation. Conversely, where there is less uncertainty, management 
experiments are unnecessary (Ibid.). Oasis systems, particularly the water 
component, typically show high uncertainty. Controllability is variable, however, 
depending on the hydraulic system in place. Water in Beni Isguen comes from 
multiple sources, from artisanal to deep state-owned wells, but accessibility can be 
severely limited by factors from prolonged drought to non-cooperation in local 
collectives. Thus adaptive management is potentially appropriate to the Beni 
Isguen situation. 
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Fig. 2.3 Adaptive management, often characterized as ¶learning by doing·, is a 
formal iterative process of resource management that acknowledges uncertainty 
and achieves management objectives by increasing system knowledge through a 
structured feedback process. As illustrated, integral to the adaptive management 
process is both a decision component and an opportunity to learn. Structured 
decision making (gray circles), a term often confused with adaptive management, is 
an organized and transparent approach to the decision process for identifying and 
evaluating alternatives and justifying complex decisions; however, structured 
decision making does not necessitate the iteration and consequential higher order 
learning (white circles) inherent in adaptive management (from Allen et al. 2011). 
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Fig. 2.4 The adaptive management process (from Schreiber et al. 2004). 
 
Criticism of adaptive management theory 
Adaptive management has been criticised for being technically proficient, yet 
lacking in social theory and method (Johnson 1999). Furthermore, implementation 
has been slow despite enthusiasm, due to unclear definitions (Allen et al. 2011; 
Williams & Brown 2014), management policy which favours reactive approaches to 
proactive ones (Schreiber et al. 2004), and a failure to understand and include the 
social as well as the ecological dimension of uncertainty in modelling (Tyre & 
Michaels 2011). Adaptive management may also be incompatible with the need for 
legal certainty (Allen et al. 2011; Biber 2013). Adaptive management often involves 
consultation with various concerned stakeholders to define management goals, and 
limitation of possible actions, yet the complexity generated by such collaboration 
has been blamed for failure (Schreiber et al. 2004). It is hard to imagine the success 
of a project that does not involve the complicity of affected parties, although how 
PXFK ¶VWDNH· D VWDNHKROGHU UHDOO\ KDV DQG WKXV UHODWLYH OHYHUDJH PD\ EH D
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complicated political issue.  Indeed, some maintain that political issues tend to be 
ignored by the implicit normative values of technical modelling (see for example 
Voß & Bornemann 2011). Finally, despite a reliance on institutions, a tension may 
exist between institutions· long-term goals and stability, and the need for flexible 
management approaches (Williams 2011). 
 
Adaptive management may be differentiated according to active or passive 
approaches. Active adaptive management (as referred to in the previous paragraph) 
may be seen as structured or semi-structured experiments in the form of 
management prescriptions or policies. Passive adaptive management refers to an 
experiential approach characterised by flexible institutions and learning. 
Monitoring is central to both (Walters & Holling 1990). Rist et al. (2013) in a 
general review argue that this definition by Holling & Walters was misunderstood 
by subsequent scholarship, and that passive adaptive management actually refers to 
ordinary management, as all managers incorporate their reflections into subsequent 
planning, and WKDWRQO\DFWLYHDGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQW LV WKH ¶WUXH·RQH , UHWXUQ WR
this issue in chapter nine). Armitage (2003), nevertheless, suggests that it is in 
reference to the latter that adaptive management may be linked to traditional 
knowledge and community-based management. 
 
The approach LVRIWHQDVVRFLDWHGZLWK¶WRSGRZQ·PDQDJHULDODSSURDFKHV(Lee 1999), 
or if local management is included it is often in terms of co-management with 
outside bodies (such as government development agencies or scientific teams), in 
the context of conservation and land resource management (Moller et al. 2004). 
Some literature does address adaptive management and capacity of local people, 
however, with a focus on traditional yet dynamic institutions and knowledge, and 
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ZRUOGYLHZV WKDW DUH DEOH WR FRSH ZLWK XQFHUWDLQW\ )RU H[DPSOH WKH ,UDTZ·DU
Da/aw are able to rely on reciprocal relationships with extended kinship and trade 
networks to provide food during lean times (Tengö & Hammer 2003: 135). 
Armitage (2003) identifies a social institution in Central Sulawesi known as nolibu 
that allows for open discussion and knowledge sharing among community members 
where all may voice issues, as an alternative to hierarchical meetings dominated by 
the village elite. Bray (2000: 20) describes how the ejido system (common property) 
of the Quintana Roo of Mexico has been adapted, and that local people have been 
VKRZQ´DVFDSDEOHRIPDNLQJFRQWLQXDODGMXVWPHQWVWRVKLIWLQJHFRORJLFDODQGVRFLDO
realities, as organizations that learn and that have considerable "resilience" or 
´UREXVWQHVVµ7KLVsystem has been shown to be influenced by the stability of land 
tenure, new institutions and aggressive local marketing. Elsewhere, others assess 
specific adaptive practices such as crop diversification that help to resist increased 
pests and disease from climate change, and greater climatic uncertainty (for 
example Lin 2011). Similarly, Toledo et al. (2003) provide evidence of multiple land 
use strategies, such as swiddening, as examples of adaptive management in Mexico. 
It has been argued that local management is able to provide better feedback, in 
terms of fine-grained monitoring, than distant research scientists, who may only 
visit for short periods (Resilience Alliance 2010). Successful adaptive management 
may thus combine elements of the old and the new, joining innovation with 
continuity (Benessaiah 2011; Toledo et al. 2003). Finally, all these examples may or 
may not be LQFOXGHG ZLWKLQ WKH FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI ¶WUXH· DGDSWLYH PDQDJHPHQW
depending on the breadth of the definition given; some such as Rist et al. (2013) are 
more conservative, compared to definitions given by the likes of Armitage (2003). 
Rather than become hung up on a definition when it came to analysing whether 
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farmers in Beni Isguen utilise adaptive management or not, I used a series of 
indicators as developed by Fabricius et al. (2007) to systematically test this. 
 
A key criterion in most reviews of successful adaptive management at the 
community level are the presence or absence of experience in the form of flexible 
traditions and institutions, combined with the capacity for learning and innovation. 
Fabricius et al. (2007) provide a framework for categorising adaptive management 
at the FRPPXQLW\ OHYHO WKDW DVVHV ´XQGHUO\LQJ FDXVHV RI DGDSWDWLRQV DQG
DGDSWDELOLW\ LQ LQGLYLGXDOV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQVµ (2007: 2). The authors ask the 
TXHVWLRQV¶ZK\DQGKRZGRFRPPXQLWLHVDGDSWZKDWLQIOXHQFHVDGDSWLYHFDSDFLW\
ZKDW DUH WKH EHQHILWV DQG KRZ FDQ WKLV FDSDFLW\ EH SURPRWHG"· They further 
differentiate between WKUHHW\SHVRIFRPPXQLW\DV´SRZHUOHVVVSHFWDWRUVµZKRKDYH
QRSRZHUWRPDQDJH ´FRSLQJDFWRUVµZKRDFWRSSRUWXQLVWLFDOO\DQG´DGDSWLYHFR-
PDQDJHUVµ ZKR DFWLYHO\ PDQDJH HFRV\VWHP VHUYLFHV IRU ORQJ-term benefits. 
Opportunistic coping strategies are termed as actions with a short-term focus, such 
as controlling stocking rates, adjusting crop ratios and migration, but there is a 
lack of social learning among actors and institutional change for the longer term.  
 
Adaptively managed communities in contrast, have six qualities:  
 
1. Leadership and vision (organising toward a common goal),  
2. Knowledge networks (local knowledge regarding ecological processes, 
history, policy; incorporation of  other knowledge, new methods),  
3. Institutions nested across scales (the ability to reorganise or establish new 
institutions, linked to other non-local institutions to increase their 
influence),  
4. Embedded cultural management practices (e.g. supernatural sanctions for 
resource protection; linked land and identity),  
5. Beneficial policies (e.g. clear land rights, inclusive participation in 
governing), and  
6. Motivation (e.g. common interests, values) (Fabricius et al. 2007: 8²10). 
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The presence or absence of these factors was used to provide a framework to test 
whether Beni Isguen farmers adaptively manage their oasis resources. I return to 
these indicators and compare them to my ethnographic data in chapter nine. 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
In this critical review chapter, I have focused exclusively on recent systems theory 
as it pertains to anthropology. Of course, I also refer to a greater array of theory 
within and beyond the anthropological literature elsewhere in the thesis, (including 
but not limited to economic anthropology, legal anthropology, political 
anthropology, the anthropology of globalisation, postcolonial theory and 
Maghrebian ethnography); these fields are addressed in the subsequent chapters 
where relevant, relating to ethnography presented.  
 
At the beginning of this FKDSWHU,DVNHGZKHWKHUWKH¶QHw ecoloJ\·UHSUHVHQWHGLQ
reformulations of systems theory by resilience theorists presents something new or 
relevant to anthropology, or if in fact anthropology had moved beyond such 
representations. I conclude along with Hatt (2013) that while perhaps resilience 
does offer a new theory of equilibrium, it gives a less than satisfactory view of 
sociological processes, such as inequality, conflict and power. Hornborg (2013) 
suggests that the resilience concept does contain subversive potential but as yet 
this remains unrealised and instead continues to uncritically reflect and uphold the 
status quo. The approach clearly retains limitations such as those highlighted 
earlier by Moran (1990) that have not been overcome. The question is whether the 
framework does indeed reveal a greater complexity of socio-ecological interactions 
and thus increases understanding, or if while appearing to give greater clarity, 
actually obfuscates more than it illuminates. In this study, I utilise an alternative 
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approach, the event-based method, to attempt to unpick this puzzle by focusing on 
demonstrable phenomena rather than untestable abstractions. In the next chapter I 
outline my research methodology in detail as to how I practically and 
philosophically approached this question. 
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3. Methodology: Conducting 
ethnography in Beni Isguen 
 
An interest in the complex intersection of social, political, economic, and 
HQYLURQPHQWDO FKDQJH KDV SURYRNHG D ZLGH UDQJH RI QHZ ZRUN LQ UHFHQW \HDUV«
While building on the environmental history tradition, some new methodological 
GLUHFWLRQVDUHHYLGHQW8VLQJDYDULHW\RIK\EULGLQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\PHWKRGV«ZKLFK
place special emphasis on understanding contemporary social and ecological 
processes in an historical context, important new perspectives that counter 
conventional Malthusian and balance-of-nature views have emerged.  
 
Such approaches do not simply rely on the authority of an abstract and detached 
science to speak for nature, with a constructed narrative of change that follows a 
particular YLHZRIHFRORJ\«. Instead, a range of methods - quantitative, qualitative, 
textual -  drawing from both the natural and social sciences inform a more integrated 
type of study, which investigates real processes of environmental and landscape 
change; the social, political and economic processes that influence and are conditioned by 
environmental change; as well as the cultural symbols, interpretations, and meanings of such 
change.µ>6FRRQHVHPSKDVLVPLQH@ 
 
 
This chapter describes how my research question and sub-questions were 
operationalized. After careful review of specific research questions and data to be 
collected, specific methods were chosen to deliver results. The overall task was to 
understand human-environment relations regarding oasis management, through 
participating in everyday farming tasks. To reiterate, the primary research question 
was: do farmers in Beni Isguen practice adaptive management? I attempted to 
understand whether specific socio-ecological events in the commonly remembered 
history of oasis governance were related to (mis)management. Furthermore, I 
wanted to comprehend how Mozabites dealt with social change as it pertained to 
overall oasis governance. These social changes, which came in the form of 
colonialism, development, globalisation and political economic transformation may 
EH FRQFHLYHG RI DV ¶VKRFNV· WR WKH UHVLOLHQFH RI WKH RDVLV KXPDQ-ecosystem, albeit 
more gradual ones. It was these subtle processes that I wished to understand, and 
to test whether the resilience framework could capture. Alongside classical 
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ethnographic methods, I used an event-based method to (re)construct multiple lines 
of causation into a historical ethnographic account of social-ecological change, thus 
drawing on and integrating multiple disciplinary approaches. 
 
To gain a detailed understanding of these historical change processes, and to infuse 
this with richer detail than the more abstract, synchronic systemic illustrations, I 
used life histories to understand the chains of events that may have led to these 
changes. I expanded these findings by exploring causal contexts through archival 
research and reference to academic historiography. The approach I employed is 
partially modelled on E\ $3 9D\GD·V SURSRVDOV IRU D PRUH HYHQW-based causal 
analysis to explain environmental change (2009: 24). As I will discuss later (chapter 
nine), my use of 9D\GD·V DSSURDFK YDULHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH SUREOHP EHLQJ
investigated, raising questions about the limitations of this method/analysis. I am 
not uncritical of the scope of the event method, and for certain investigative 
understanding, other ethnographic methods such as participant observation were 
found to be more insightful. Partial historical analyses are contemporary with 
current approaches to the anthropology of time, for conventional monological 
means of historical presentation ´FDQREVFXUHDVZHOODVHQOLJKWHQµ (Hodges 2014: 
34), indeed reflecting colonial modes of representation rather than how history is 
employed and reconstructed by local people according to praxis. Here I present in 
detail my aims and objectives, research questions, sampling, data collected with 
each technique, and means of analysis. 
 
3.1. Aims and objectives 
Agricultural landscapes are by definition spaces where not just ecological, but 
economic, socio-political and cultural factors interact (Thompson & Scoones 2009). 
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Understanding agricultural issues require the combination of different methods and 
divergent theory, often separated in different fields or disciplines. This may be by 
multi-disciplinary means, or by scholars of disciplines that straddle, combine or 
borrow from different fields, such as ecological anthropology. Complex systems 
theory (Holling 2001) exemplifies one such attempt to integrate human-
environmental interactions, requiring a methodology that can both understand and 
connect myriad influences. This chapter outlines how I proposed to test for 
DGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQWLQWKH0·]DEDQGWKHFRPSOH[V\VWHPVWKHRry that underlies 
it), by ethnographic means and by an abductive causal event analysis.  
Concurrently, the event-based method is assessed as a means of explaining how 
farmers farm, through the different layers, backwards in time and outwards in 
space, from the material to the ideological. 
 
My primary question was to investigate whether adaptive management is an 
accurate framework for describing how farmers use to manage the dynamism and 
unpredictability of their desert oasis ecosystem. To explore this possibility I used 
ethnographic methods including participant observation, oral histories, interviews, 
farm surveys and event analysis to understand local social historiography, 
economic productive practice, knowledge of ecological disturbances, cultural risk 
management practices, political structures and sociological regulation or conflict 
mitigation institutions pertaining to the management of their date palm oasis. 
These local strategies and contingencies were then contextualised within wider 
scales of influence, such as globalised political economic trends or climate systems 
changes, in time and space using event analysis.  
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Secondarily, I was interested in the roles of cultural values, institutions and identity 
in relation to theoretical models of adaptive management. According to the 
resilience formulation dynamic, unstable ecosystems require social institutions to 
show some degree of flexibility and learning capacity in order to navigate them, or 
else exhibit organisational decay and transformation into another configuration in 
attempting to deal with new socio-ecological realities. 
 
The following key themes that were investigated through the research and writing 
were thus: adaptation, labour systems, land tenure systems, conflict resolution, 
management organisations (e.g. irrigation officials), political economy, and 
environmental change. While these can be related in a preliminary conceptual 
framework that diagrams how date farmers manage changing oases, the research 
explored these relationships in greater detail, as outlined in the following sub-
questions derived from the literature review and my own fieldwork: 
 
1. How is knowledge produced and contextualised about date palm growing 
and irrigation management?  
2. How are ecological disturbances conceptualised? 
3. What cultural practices exist to manage disturbance and risk?  
4. How are social changes framed within local understanding? 
5. What institutions exist for regulating social processes? 
6. How does private and communal land tenure affect oasis management? 
7. How are conflicts resolved? 
8. Are farmers able to respond to new or extreme change? 
9. To what extent do changing government development policies and scientific 
management methods affect management of  date palm oases? 
 
Thus the aims and objectives were to: 
 
1. Document farmers·NQRZOHGJHEHOLHIVSUDFWLFHVDQGYDOXHVUHOHYDQWto the 
management of  date palms (question 1). 
2. 'RFXPHQWRUDOKLVWRULHVRI IDUPHUV·H[SHULHQFHVDQGUHVSRQVHVWR
environmental change events (question 2). 
3. Document local attitudes to social change in relation to local norms 
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(question 3). 
4. Document social institutions and practices related to oasis management, 
such as property norms, law codes and modes of  production (questions 4-7). 
5. Analyse local understandings of  adaptive capacity, ranging from traditional 
farming practices to newer agronomic advances (question 8).  
6. Analyse the wider political economic context (question 9). 
7. Finally, analyse presence or absence of  indicators of  adaptive management 
(as set out by Fabricius et al. 2007) (main research question). 
 
 
3.2 Justification for Beni Isguen oasis as field site 
 
Figure 3.1 Map of Algerian administrative zones or provinces. Source: 
http://transcontinentales.revues.org/1275. (16/04/2015) 
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Figure. 3.2 Map of %HQL,VJXHQRDVLV0·]DEYDOOH\Ghardaïa province, Algeria. 
Source: Google Earth (27/03/2015). 
 
The Berber qsar or town of Beni Isguen (figs. 3.1, 3.2) in central Algeria (otherwise 
UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ RU MXVW WKH 0·]Db) was chosen as a field site for 
several key reasons. After developing my research ideas in the Moroccan Sahara in 
2011, the next logical site was Algeria, for it contains the edge of the bayoud zone. 
Beni Isguen actually lies exactly on the edge of the bayoud range. In Morocco I 
studied how farmers attempted to manage the deadly date disease, bayoud (Fusarium 
oxysporum f.sp. albedinis). For the present study, in Algeria I wanted to broaden out 
the focus to a greater range of drivers of change to include subtle, gradual social 
changes, such as cultural values and market forces (such as the introduction of 
wage labour), and management of a Saharan oasis6 overall, including all the social 
institutions in place. This necessitated more extensive research in order to form 
long-term relationships and get to know the complicated social structures and 
                                                 
6 An oasis is generally a human-created ecosystem of  vegetation within semi to hyper arid 
regions, usually desert, around a spring or other water source. Natural or non-human oases 
do exist, presumably when migrating birds stop at water sources, leaving seeds in their 
GURSSLQJVZKLFKJURZLQWRSODQWVDWWKHZDWHU·VHGJHWKXVIRUPLQJRDVHV2DVHVXQWLOWKH
modern period were important for economic, political and military purposes, for the control 
of  vast trans-Saharan trade routes that reached into sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and the 
Levant. 
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practices, histories and relationship with the state and so on. After travelling 
extensively through the huge Algerian Sahara and meeting various farmers and 
officials, the location that stood out to me was the M·zab valley, for several reasons. 
Firstly as mentioned already, it lies on the frontier of the spreading bayoud disease 
from Morocco and western Algeria. In Beni Isguen, I learned that they had 
discovered how to control the disease, and I wanted to study this in situ. Lying at 
the centre of Algeria in the northern, rocky Sahara, at 1000 years old it actually is 
one of the younger oases, and as such has imported many of the best varieties of 
date palms from all around the country. Although numbering 128 varieties, it still 
does not have the greatest diversity of date palms (the western Touat valley has 
around 500). Furthermore, although the oasis is somewhat transformed from its 
former state, a limited form of communal management is in place, compared to 
other more modernised oasis communities. 
 
Beni Isguen was preferable to other Algerian oases as it fitted the criteria I wished 
to investigate. For example, the modern commercial oasis of Biskra in the east 
consists of large, privately owned plots of land supplied by individual wells, with 
little left in terms of communal management. 320 km south east of Biskra lie the 
oases of Oued Souf7. There, the Algerian State has considerably damaged the 
delicate Saharan ecosystem through a well-intentioned development project to 
increase water availability (Coté 2006: 62). In the process, an aquifer was punctured 
thereby raising the water level, killing tens of thousands of date palms. The date 
palm system there was, and still partly is, known as the ghout system, whereby 
clusters of date palms are grown in the valleys of desert dunes. On first impression 
                                                 
7 Oued Souf  is a site of  my own paternal ancestry, making the study a kind of  
¶DQWKURSRORJ\DWKRPH·GXe to my familiarity with Maghrebian culture. This familiarity is 
RIIVHWE\PXFKFXOWXUDOGLYHUVLW\LQWKHUHJLRQDOORZLQJIRUWKH¶RWKHULQJH\H· 
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I wondered where the oasis was, seeing only a handful of trees at any one location, 
but later I realised that on achieving greater elevation, one can see these clusters 
stretching back in every single dune valley back by 10 km, thus creating a vast 
oasis network of small clusters! Here the formal social structures have largely 
disappeared such as the djemcaa or qabƯla, the tribal council of elders, although 
informal, tribal links and ways of life remain intact. By contrast in Beni Isguen 
many of these organisations are relatively intact. 
 
As in many parts of the Sahara, work for oil companies draws many workers away 
from agriculture, from unskilled physical labour, to the engineering and design 
aspects of complex irrigation infrastructures (Zaimeche & Sutton 1998; Ross 2008). 
In the western regions of the Touat (Adrar province), many of the oasis systems 
were still managed more communally, based on the ancient fogarra irrigation 
system8. Many of these, however, appeared dishearteningly degraded due to 
ecological reasons such as drought, a situation further exacerbated by the State 
drawing water away to new development; also degradation of these oases was 
furthered by emigration of youth away to the cities or oil fields for work. By 
contrast the date palms of Beni Isguen were thriving. Rather than wasting my time 
LQ P\ TXHVW IRU WKH ¶ULJKW· ILHOG VLWH WUDYHO WR GLIIHUHQW VLWHV JUHDWO\ HQULFKHG P\
understanding of desert agriculture in Algeria, and further travels continue to 
enhance it. 
 
Beni Isguen oasis retains a communally managed flood-based irrigation system, 
which feeds the systems of collectively owned wells. This is now augmented by 
                                                 
8 An ancient gravity-based irrigation system in the form of  underground tunnels running 
from a water source to the field. This system comes from ancient Persia, known as the 
qanƗt. 
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deep state-owned wells. The older system, somewhat similar to the political 
organisation of river-fed irrigation systems of Morocco (Ilahiane 1996), necessitates 
a level of communal organisation and agreement for the whole system to work, and 
so understanding this was key to addressing the core questions of this study. 
Further, Mozabite identity - a topic of interest in understanding cultural issues that 
complicate the science of adaptive management ² was a hotly debated topic locally. 
Being an ethnic island in a sea of Malikite Arabs, the Ibadite Mozabite Berbers felt 
their difference keenly, and actively maintained it. Being very much a religious 
community, values were actively discussed; they were perceived as being influenced 
by the multiple forces of globalisation and mass media, and not necessarily for the 
better. 
 
(FRORJ\RIWKH0·]DE 
In ecological terms, the Sahara provides an ideal setting for studying dynamic 
systems, with highly unpredictable climate involving droughts and floods (Ward et 
al. 1999; Mougou et al. 2011)%HQL ,VJXHQDQG WKH0·]DEYDOOH\KDVUHPDLQHG LQ
drought conditions for the past 3-5 years9, and such prolonged stress enables the 
study of longer term responses by local actors, beyond the brief coping mechanisms 
used for a single seasonal drought. The Sahelian/Saharan-Atlas mountain ecotopes 
produce highly variable rainfall. Locals cite certain periods of the year such as 
autumn and spring when rain potentially may fall or flash floods arrive, but in reality 
floods and rains may occur several times a year or several years apart, with varying 
degrees of severity. Table 4.1 gives the major ecological disturbances in the recent 
                                                 
9 The important feature of this is that no one knows when the drought will end, thus the 
GXUDWLRQRIWKLVHFRORJLFDOFRQGLWLRQLVXQSUHGLFWDEOHLQSHRSOH·VPLQGV 
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past according to living memory (compiled from information given by two farmers, 
one younger based on personal daily recorded, corroborated by one older farmer). 
 
Working alongside farmers and palm specialists 
Focusing on a single town (locally called a qsar¸ pl. qsǌr, i.e. a fortified settlement 
common across the Maghreb) of approximately 7000 inhabitants allowed me to 
concentrate on the complexity of interactions at a particular locus in depth. 
Working mostly with the farming sector of the community allowed me to narrow 
down the scope of analysis and begin to understand these complex relationships. 
Although this study attempts to investigate complex socio-ecological ¶V\VWHPV· DV
units within greater units of scale, an alternate view is of the interactions between 
actors and things as networks (Law 2004: 200; Latour 2005). Similarly, the event-
based method allows for the visualisation of multiple, causal chains. This study 
attempts to explore whether intangible forces and motivations can be mapped into 
these chains. The main actors in these oasis networks are homeowners, 
agriculturalists, phoeniciculteurs (date palm specialists), local and international 
NGOs, hotel owners, and the mosque. Non-human actors include date palms, 
climate, and technology. The whole qsar had a stake in the oasis, however, as many 
SHRSOHHYHQWKRVHZKRGLGQ·WRZQSURSHUW\FRQWLQXHGWRLGHQWLI\ZLWKLWDQGPDQ\
walked through on Friday holidays, boy scouts used it, people played football there 
and swam when there was water. 
 
My data comes from the many conversations and observations, interviews, general 
discussions I gathered over the 11 months that I was there (September 2012-April 
2013, and September 2013-Novermber 2013, during that time I lived in two 
consecutive houses inside the oasis, and thus observed much of the daily comings 
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and goings. In the summer I slept on the roof like the others and so saw even more 
such as the workers getting up before dawn, people strolling on Fridays, scout 
meetings, people swimming and so on. I was present when prayers were taking 
place on one occasion, and I participated in wedding ceremonies several times in the 
oasis both outdoors and indoors. I participated in many formal and informal 
gatherings of farmers ZKHWKHU RQ SHRSOH·V ODQG RU LQ WKH DJULFXOWXUDO FHQWUH ,
YLVLWHG WKH LQVLGH RI SHRSOH·V KRPHV SUHFLVHO\ WZR WLPHV LQ WKH ROG WRZQ RI %HQL
Isguen, when women were present (but hidden from view), and in quite a few 
houses with men inside the oasis, and also small tourist hotels. In fact, in general 
men often experience precisely the same problem as myself, that they have no fixed 
PHHWLQJSODFHVVXFKDVWKHYLVLWRU·V OLYLQJURRPLQWKH IURQWRIKRXVH LQRUGLQDU\
Arab houses, and so often are forced to meet ad-hoc in oasis gardens or outside one 
of the mosques. My language capacity, which I rapidly adapted to the region, also 
allowed me to for effective conversations and mutual understanding.  
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Figure 3.3 Phoeniciculteur Hamza and his workers transporting dates. (08/10/13) 
 
In order to uncover subtle social transitions such as changing values, informal rules 
and norms which required in-depth understanding and trust, I worked intensively 
with several agriculturalists over the course of a year. This entailed direct 
participation in farming and everyday life, oral histories and informed conversation 
(semi-structured interviews). Specifically, I worked most intensively with two 
phoeniciculteurs (date palm specialists, see figs. 3.3, 3.4), working at and travelling 
EHWZHHQPDQ\VLWHVLQWKH¶DQFLHQW·RDVLV,DOVRZRUNed with landholding farmers to 
various degrees ranging from weeks to days. The reason for choosing to spend the 
bulk of my time with mobile agriculturalists rather than landholding farmers 
should be explained. An exclusive focus on phoeniciculteur livelihoods might be 
initially seen as limiting, in the sense of understanding management decisions, for 
as non-landholders they are not the primary decision-makers regarding resource 
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management. As specialists they do advise, however. The primary advantage of 
spending time with phoeniciculteurs was that they move. They were constantly on the 
move around the oasis, as compared to farmers who would only travel early in the 
morning and late in the evening back and forth from their farms, unless they lived 
on them permanently, as a few did. This allowed me a much greater chance of 
witnessing a greater range of everyday happenings around the oasis than would 
have been the case if I remained at a fixed location. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Phoeniciculteur Nourreddine at work. (23/02/13) 
 
Phoeniciculteurs cannot be dismissed as mere gardeners for several reasons. First, 
the agronomical knowledge they hold is essential to the maintenance of healthy 
palm groves, of planting, selection, pollination, thinning, harvesting, selection, 
irrigation, disease and much more. Second, most are repositories of much local 
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history regarding traditional practices of oasis farming, many having learnt from 
fathers, grandfathers and uncles. Many farmers, on the other hand having started 
out anew have not had the benefit of receiving agricultural knowledge from older 
generations10. Third, phoeniciculteurs form part of a web of relations from the 
market, landowners, migrant labourers, the mosque, family and tribe, the state, 
local and international environmental NGOs. Understanding their position in the 
order of daily life helped me greatly to understand the wider social structures that 
impact and contextualise local management decisions, as well as the perceptions 
and attitudes towards such structures and observations. Phoeniciculteurs are active 
in preserving their knowledge, passing it on to future generations and learning new 
technical knowledge, while making connections to local and international NGOs, 
all of which made them a fascinating subject in investigating the role of flexible 
learning and institutions in response to dynamic environments. 
 
Working with farmers and phoeniciculteurs meant raking paths, gathering dates, 
some climbing of trees (but usually I observed the harder tasks from the comfort of 
the ground, such as the scaling of more gigantic trees or pollinating palms), 
weeding, fixing irrigation canals, digging holes, pruning, planting, carrying tools 
and buckets of fruit and more. As stated above, working with phoeniciculteurs meant 
moving between sites every couple of days or several times a day. This afforded me 
much movement and the ability to meet many local actors, as well as observing 
first-hand interactions whether economic or familial, collaborative or conflictual, or 
merely the everyday greeting of virtually everyone we passed on the street and the 
                                                 
10 Many farmers (but certainly not all), now mostly working in the new development area 
adjacent to the old oasis, are not the descendants of  farmers but often shop owners or 
tradesmen who seized the opportunity offered by the government to develop virgin land. 
There are further reasons for rupture of  intergenerational farming knowledge, to be 
discussed later (e.g. socialist policy, factory and oil production work). 
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narrow paths between walled gardens and farms. Such movement varied from the 
information given in the static setting of farms as it formed a kind of transect, for as 
ZH PRYHG WKURXJK WKH RDVLV· ZLQGLQJ SDWKZD\V GLIIHUHQW WKLQJV ZRXOG RIWHQ EH
SRLQWHG RXW DQ DQFLHQW PRVTXH D ZRPHQ·V 4X·UDQLF teaching school, an ancient 
irrigation channel. As my research progressed, more intimate histories were 
remembered and shared, such as how as a boy my friend helped his father draw well 
water by donkey taking the most part of a day (now by contrast performed in 
minutes by electric pump), or the story of how a group of slaves were killed in cold 
blood upon our passing a tomb. 
 
I also worked, in a more static manner, with farmers in the old oasis, but mostly in 
the new development area, called Ntissa, which adjoined the old oasis (see fig 3.2). 
Whereas the old oasis has been almost completely colonised by homes, the new 
area consists of larger 2-5 hectare farm plots. This area can be differentiated by 
younger date palms; the oldest grown since the inception of the development in 
1988, thus still affording little shade due to immature palm trees, and by the lack of 
a watershed, i.e. a communally-managed flood drainage irrigation system, with 
individual or state-owned collective wells instead. 
 
Interviews with farmers gave me their interpretations for the physicality of what I 
saw in the farms and irrigation systems, for example, why olive trees were planted 
where they were, to give shade or as a windbreak to protect more delicate orange 
trees from the harsh desert winds, or why weeds were left or cleared. Interviews 
were in fact a necessary tool in addition to participant observation, as what I saw on 
farms only made sense after hearing their long-term plans, economic status or 
farm-management philosophy (see for example fig 5.4). Thus farmers· intentions 
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were made clear, thus presenting choices within a range of possibilities and 
constraints, such as knowledge, financial input, labour force, ecology, culture, 
markets, government support and so on.  
 
Beyond clarifying immediate phenomena interviews provided histories of how 
problems and disasters such as severe floods and droughts (listed in table 4.1) were 
dealt with by means of twiza or communal aid. This helped enhance my 
understanding of disaster management processes over time. I was also able to gain 
an understanding of sensitive matters that I was unable to directly witness such as 
conflict resolution, customarily involving a scaling-up process according to the 
escalation of the dispute. This began by recourse to influential authority figures, the 
family patriarchs, and if not resolved then went to the higher levels of the council of 
the cashƯra, to the cazzƗba (the mosque clerisy). This was now complicated by the 
appearance of new associations and an increased reliance on state law courts by 
those who wished to subvert traditional hierarchies, as in the case of inheritance 
disputes. Such disputes had a direct effect on oasis management, through the 
WHPSRUDU\ ¶DEDQGRQPHQW· RI ODQG SORWV VHH FKDSWHU VHYHQ DQG WKH LQFUHDVLQJ
disregard for the mosque-sanctioned irrigation officials, resulting in environmental 
destruction in the form of violent flash flooding (chapter eight). 
 
As well as using immersive methods, I also visited with and interviewed other 
farmers and undertook farm surveys (see appendix II for an illustrative survey), but 
also non-farmers including those connected to the sphere of agriculture such as 
landowners, labourers, agronomists, government officials, and other members of 
Mozabite society. Indeed, it was important to understand the wider sphere of 
cultural relations, norms and structures, and this latter population of non-farmers 
   
 
69 
formed another essential category of interlocutors. These individuals were 
invaluable to me, some of whom were met casually, some forming long-standing 
IULHQGVKLSVJLYLQJPHLQVLJKWLQWRWKH¶HYHU\GD\·RI0R]DELWHOLfe. 
 
Participating in group discussions 
In order to understand knowledge networks and social structures I also attended 
meetings of local associations and NGOs, such as the meetings of farmer groups by 
the RADDO network which held conferences for issues such as mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change. Such meetings were invaluable for learning first hand 
which issues were most important locally and which issues were debated, giving a 
critical edge that could be lacking in one-on-one interviews. I was not invited to 
attend certain local group meetings such as the local environment protection 
meetings (Association for the Protection of the Environment in Beni Isguen ² 
APEB), or the village meetings of the cashƯra or ayyen (council of notables 
responsible for administration of the town, which was answerable to the town 
council of the government), and here I had to rely on the help of friends to fill me in 
on proceedings. That I was not invited to such meetings is understandable, as I am 
not a member of Mozabite society and therefore not a decision-maker. I was invited 
to many of the agricultural meetings, however, and even called on for my expertise 
and advice at times. I offered what I could. 
 
Some methodology textbooks and academics rightly encourage neutrality of the 
ILHOGZRUNHU LQ WHUPV RI QRW DVNLQJ OHDGLQJ TXHVWLRQV RU ¶FRQWDPLQDWLQJ· WKH
LQIRUPDQWZLWKRQH·VSRLQWRIYLHZRQDPDWWHUZKLFKLQWXUQFDQOHDGWKHPWRWDLORU
their response accordingly. For instance, if you come out and tell them that you 
think a practice is bad, they may feel ashamed to then tell you the practice is good. 
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I, KRZHYHU IHOW WKDW PDQ\ ZRXOGQ·W DOORZ WKHPVHOYHV WR VSHDN IUHHO\ XQWLO , KDG
given my views, which allowed people to get a sense of who I was and what I stand 
for. This went beyond mere reciprocity of views to forging deeper bonds of trust, 
which entailed a real sense of responsibility to my new friends. Therefore in group 
GLVFXVVLRQV,GLGQ·WIROORZWKHSURWRFRORINHHSLQJP\LGHDVWRP\VHOIDQG,IRXQG
this allowed for more intense debate, while allowed for the understanding of doubt. 
 
3.3 Limitations of the study and ethical considerations  
Based on my empirical observation of Mozabite daily routines, life consists of three 
main spheres: Work, the home and the mosque (see also Bourdieu 1962). Due to my 
(male) gender I was unable to spend much time in Mozabite homes, due to total 
segregation of the sexes (conventional to many Islamic interpretations of female 
honour and modesty but also pre-Islamic patriarchy (Afsaruddin & Ameri 1999: 
121)). I was also precluded from joining in the worship in the mosque, as I am not 
an Ibadite, or indeed a Muslim. I even considered proclaiming the shahada and 
declaring myself an Ibadite for the sake of inclusion, but after reflection and 
discussion with other anthropologists, I decided that it would be unethical to do so. 
I was fascinated by what I imagined was being preached within the mosque in 
regard to the relationship with God, but also instruction pertaining to communal 
values, yet I contented myself to being informed by friends on such details. Religion 
permeates every facet of Mozabite life, through praxis and language, such as the 
everyday religious greetings, supplications and blessings that are uttered during 
every interaction or alone, to the highly structured, mandatory prayers five times a 
day, often starting around 4.30 am in the morning (shifting according to seasonal 
change). Not being able to join in such fundamental activities frustrated me, but 
these were not directly necessary as it was the work sphere that was the most 
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pertinent to my investigations, and I was able to understand broader social 
information both indirectly, and later directly through observation of weddings, 
meetings and so on. 
 
Mozabites are a self-confessed closed-society who are happy to explain generalities 
and principles about their lives with outsiders, but will rarely disclose private 
details. Faithfulness (related to al amena, a local concept discussed below) to such 
privacy and a notion of inside and outside group membership are paramount. The 
installation of the Mozabite pentapolis11. in such a barren, dry landscape with 
virtually no access to water in the eleventh century was intentionally founded on 
the idea of exclusion from political and ideological influences, as well as safe from 
the military force of nomads. This mind-set made it relatively easy to understand 
abstract ideology, but made it very difficult to get to the everyday substance of 
local conflicts and problems, the nitty-gritty of anthropological fieldwork. This was 
compounded by my lack of understanding of the Mozabite language of which I 
speak very little, although I could understand and speak perfectly the local Arabic 
dialect after a little time as I had grown up speaking Tunisian Arabic. Thus local 
IULHQGV ZHUH WKH ¶JDWHNHHSHUV· WKDW SURYLGHG HVVHQWLDO DFFHVV WR 0R]DELWH VRFLHW\
situations, meetings, and discussions over tea that I would have found impossible to 
realise otherwise. The few times I did try to introduce myself as a stranger, even 
though linked to people that they knew, I was treated with suspicion and names 
were rarely offered. Thus access was virtually always through introductions to 
networks from parties that could vouch for me, who knew or knew of me in some 
way and thus I became part of their story and trustworthy. With their strong work 
ethic, the fact that I was doing research on farmers and agriculture (as opposed to 
                                                 
11 7KH ILYH FLWLHV RU WRZQV RI  WKH 0·]DE DOVR NQRZQ DV D KHSWDSROLV LI  LQFOXGLQJ WKH
outlying towns of  Guerrara and Berriane. 
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simply visiting as a tourist) was perceived as useful to the community, and people 
told me so, thus helping my general acceptance. The majority of people I spoke to 
conversed with me freely, from farmers, agronomists, NGO employees, 
government officials, journalists, tour guides, students, academics, merchants and 
on and on. (In fact the one person who avoided me, in the mode of tebria that I 
wrote about, was someone to whom I confessed that I was not a Muslim, after he 
had invited me to pray with him and his friends. I was asked about my religious 
beliefs surprisingly little. 
 
The fact that I am Tunisian with Algerian roots appeared to give us some degree of 
cultural commonality (although one of my Algerian cousins nuanced this by saying 
that the Mozabites may have been more willing to talk to me because of my (other) 
status as a European outsider, who would be less suspicious than an Arab Algerian 
DQG SHUKDSV PRUH SUHVWLJLRXV 7KH ¶1DWLYH DQWKURSRORJLVW· appears to be a 
common category within studies on the Middle East and North Africa, causing 
some to ask, more than slightly tongue-in-cheek, whether it is possible for a non-
native to do good ethnography there (Gilsenan 1990). I am aware of the drawbacks 
of such a position, however, in that much may be assumed in terms of 
understanding on the part of the local informant, and even on the part of the 
DQWKURSRORJLVW IRU ZKRP WKH UHVHDUFK VLWH LV OHVV ¶RWKHU· DQG ZKR WKXV PLVVHV
certain details that the non-native might not (for wide ranging discusions on this 
subject, see Jackson 1987). I tried hard not to make such assumptions, and I feel 
that the site was sufficiently different to my upbringing which was partially in 
middle-FODVV7XQLVLD)XUWKHU ,KDYHWUDLQHGP\ ¶RWKHULQJ OHQV· through previous 
work I have done living with Andean and Amazonian communities (for two months 
   
 
73 
in 2005, and one year in 2006, respectively), which I assumed to apply through 
vigilant attention to the everyday details of life. 
 
Introductions also gave them information of my status as a PhD student. I quickly 
OHDUQW WKDW HVSHFLDOO\ LQ ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· VRFLHW\ ZKHUH HDFK NQRZV WKH KLVWRU\ RI WKH
other members of society, knowing my particular status meant that they then knew 
how to address me, whether as an equal, higher or lower in rank than themselves. I 
was made known as an anthropologist through the Tazdait association who were 
my primary point of contact, and this knowledge quickly spread through much of 
the community. Education ranks highly among Algerian values, despite the 
disappointment (and subsequent surrounding political upheavals in nearby 
countries) around subsequent lack of employment. However, as a student (rather 
than a professor) I was probably allowed to make a few mistakes, which were 
indeed necessary to the learning of subtle norms and practices.  
 
I also noticed after some time that whom I associated with had an effect on my 
bearing in the society, and who would want to associate with me. For example, 
persons from the elite or higher classes, such as landowners, administrators, 
professionals and the like would be more open to me if I was in the company of 
other respected individuals, but treated correspondingly if I was in the company of 
agriculturalists or labourers, who have lower social status. Allegiance to certain 
individuals could make it difficult to spend time with other groups, and this 
depended on not only their social-economic, ethnic, gendered status or age class, 
but also on their reputation. Hawes (2008: 371), when living with a Berber 
community in Algeria also noted embarrassment by her higher status host when 
she spent time with lower status Black Africans. 
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Due to the extreme privacy values of Mozabites, I decided not to conduct a census 
and general household survey. However, I did collect data based on around 50 
landowners, and many other members of Mozabite society. I also made a list of 
family names and how these relate to the tribal and village structures, from a freely 
available local document regarding Mozabite genealogy (see chapter four). 
5HJDUGLQJJHQHUDOLVDELOLW\WKH0·]DEYDOOH\VKRZVPDQ\VLPLODULWLHVWRRWKHURDVLV
towns in the Maghreb in factors such as ecology, weather, irrigation systems, 
subsistence patterns, ethnic variation, relation to the market, plant disease, religion 
and political organisation (e.g. council of elders, new associations). The Mozabite 
cazzƗba is similar to the djemcaa or council of elders found in many other traditional 
Maghrebian societies. Some details may vary such as knowledge of palm trees, 
particular management practices, beliefs and customs, ownership rules, 
particularities of irrigation management, variations of ¶Xrf or customary law and 
local interpretations of the 4X·UDQ, making this site all the more worthy of detailed 
study. 
 
3.4 The fieldwork approach 
To understand how oasis farmers deal with social and ecological change, I needed 
ILUVW WR LGHQWLI\ ¶FKDQJH WRZKDW· i.e. the iniWLDO ¶VRIW· ERXQGDULHVof the unit to be 
studied (the oasis), to form a working knowledge of an operational baseline of 
farming in Beni Isguen. This was done primarily by my participation in daily 
farming activities. Then, change events were identified through oral histories and 
direct observation during my fieldwork. I interviewed many individuals associated 
directly or indirectly with the oasis. I then analysed responses to change through 
an event-based analysis. Finally, I examined whether farmers do adaptive 
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management by referring to the framework described by Fabricius et al. (2007), 
with a focus on existing institutions and norms, and their flexibility in dealing with 
new situations, with reference to learning. 
 
3.4.1 Methods used and data collected 
 
Participant observation 
The actions people engage in everyday life often differ from spoken ideals, and what 
people do is often different from what they say they do. Participant observation was 
developed to address these issues, to get at the finer details of everyday life 
(Bernard 2006: 136²164; Puri 2010). I undertook this method with varying degrees 
of participation with several agriculturalists including two phoeniciculteurs and 
several farmers. These details were subsequently methodically recorded in field 
notes. This facilitated a bond between myself and the farmers which over time 
transcended that of researcher and subject. With most, friendships were formed and 
we shared many details of our personal lives, dreams and aspirations, problems, 
attitudes, perceptions and the like. This allowed me a quality of insight into the 
deeper trends and forces at play in Mozabite life that greatly transcends that which 
a researcher studying for a few days or even a few months, would be able to record. 
Thus I was able to slowly understand the more gradual, subtle forces of social 
FKDQJHLQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\5HVHDUFKHUVRIPRUHFRPPRQVKRUWVWXGLHVQHYHUKDYH
their assumptions challenged. Mozabites themselves recognise this, for example, 
when a researcher from Algiers came and made a joking but derisive comment 
DERXWWKHWUHDWPHQWRIZRPHQLQ%HQL,VJXHQDORFDOIULHQGRIPLQHUHWRUWHG´\HV
EXW\RX·YHQHYHU VSHQWPRUH WKDQ WZRGD\VKHUH DW D WLPHµ i.e. you have no real 
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experience on which to base such statements, just fleeting observations of women 
covered in white sheets in the street. 
 
I noticed a reciprocal relationship in terms of depth of information shared. The 
more I gave of myself, in terms of personal information or work, the more 
LQIRUPDWLRQ ZDV JLYHQ EDFN WR PH DQG WKH PRUH SHRSOH·V OLYHV XQIROGHG LQ P\
understanding. Such an approach is not merely a research strategy, but essential 
practice for progressing an anthropological study, and quintessential for building 
everyday relationships. For example, intimate details, such as one·s relationship 
with parents, nostalgic memories (especially pertinent to oral histories) were shared 
in this manner, or particularly at the end of the day or over dinner when winding 
down, rather than during the more busy morning activities. 
 
I participated especially during the date harvest and pollination seasons, to observe 
and experience farmers enacting management strategies, dealing with 
contingencies and understanding the contexts that these practices occur in. The 
key benefit of the participant method is that it enables the researcher to directly 
observe decision-making in process. I maintained a focus on following people 
interacting with date palms, in order to not get lost in ideas of higher order 
phenomena such as culture, kinship, education, religion, gender, identity or 
modernity (Coupaye 2009). As participant observation often has a high degree of 
uncertainty, intuition and the IROORZLQJ RI RQH·V JXW LQVWLQFW in chasing leads is 
HVVHQWLDOLQWLPHVRIGRXEW,ZRXOGUHPHPEHUWKLVPD[LPWRVLPSO\¶IROORZSHRSOH
and daWHSDOPV· 
 
The date palm occupies several domains of interest to local people, and thus also to 
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researchers, in that they may be seen as cultivars in terms of productivity, 
nutritional, medicinal, and ecological provisioning.  They are also used as 
insurance-a long-term bank account-as well as bestowers of symbolic sweetness to 
newlyweds, and a source of sexual vitality. Indeed, the date palm qualifies as a 
¶FXOWXUDO NH\VWRQH VSHFLHV· (Garibaldi 2009; de Grenade 2013); as a SODQW ´ZKRVH
H[LVWHQFH DQG V\PEROLF YDOXH DUH HVVHQWLDO WR WKH VWDELOLW\ RI D FXOWXUHRYHU WLPHµ
(Cristancho & Vining 2004: 153).  
 
Participant observation provided a baseline of everyday events for further analysis. 
These everyday events were then compared to oral histories regarding change and 
the literature.  Evidence of change provided the starting point for an event analysis 
to determine the causes of these changes, and the importance of social, cultural, 
economic, political and ecological factors. These observable daily activities also led 
WRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILPSRUWDQW¶LQYLVLEOH·SKHQRPHQDLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\PD\
not be revealed in the course of interviews or surveys, such as biological knowledge 
of tree and pest life-cycles, knowledge of ecology and climate, processes of learning 
(passive observation, active experimentation, transmission from parents or other 
farmers, travel to other oases, theoretical knowledge from agricultural extension 
agents, textbooks, online research or formal education), religious ideas related to 
agriculture and farming identity, land ownership, inheritance law, dispute-solving 
institutions and more. 
 
Oral histories 
In the course of semi-structured interviews, a selection of informants was asked 
about the histories of their families and communities, to construct a timeline of 
significant events. Questions were asked about how they and their ancestors 
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responded to change events and processes, going back to the limits of living 
memory. Once identified, particular change events were triangulated and verified 
among other informants and from sources such as those relating to climatological 
data. 
 
These data provided an account of present management strategies and how these 
have been developed according to knowledge learned, and experiences over the 
lives of individuals and communities. As well as providing me with potential socio-
ecological change events and responses, oral/life histories can be analysed to show 
the varying ways in which cultural values pertain to oasis management and 
responses to change, and how identities are constructed across the generations and 
the effects this has on responses to change. 
 
The best oral histories were done in combination with participant observation as 
mentioned above, as more intimate memories were shared after more time had been 
spent together. Sometimes, it also took the right line of questioning, coming from a 
UDQGRP WRSLF )RU H[DPSOH DIWHU VHYHUDO PRQWKV RI ZRUNLQJ WRJHWKHU LW ZDVQ·W
until I asked one farmer if he followed the news that he revealed to me that he used 
to be heavily active in politics, campaigning for the local al Nahda party. Further, 
he was a member of O·RXPQDan ancient institution for guarding water, a primary 
IRFXVRIWKLVVWXG\VHHFKDSWHUHLJKW+HRIWHQUHPLQGHGPHWKDW\RXFDQ·WMXGJHD
book by its cover in that a person may have many facets, unknown to many, even in 
a small community. This person was a full-time farmer, spent regular time at the 
mosque, worked as a local politician (before getting married) and trained youth at a 
ER[LQJ FOXE 0RVW RI WKH SHRSOH KH LQWHUDFWHG ZLWK GLGQ·W NQRZ DERXW WKH RWKHU
aspects of his life. 
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I especially spent time with older farmers, and with people who had learnt from 
older farmers in order to understand key events in the past, and how these were 
dealt with. Talking to these old specialists gave me insight not only into the 
subtleties of certain choices and preferences for certain techniques or plant species 
used, but of entirely different economic systems prevalent in the oasis in the past, 
including their theories for the reasons behind the changes of the new system. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
At first I allowed myself to be guided by events according to the participant 
observation method. Of course I had my research questions and framework in the 
back of my mind to help guide my attention. Over time as my understanding grew, 
more detailed issues and questions came to light. I often jotted down questions in 
the morning as a result of processing my notes the night before, based on any new 
information gleaned that day. These formed semi-structured topics, which became 
crystallised into major questions to be used in more formal interviews toward the 
end of the study period. In the final month of the fieldwork, I focused more on these 
structured interviews and I became more proficient at doing farm visits and 
obtaining large amounts of replicable information without the need for noting 
questions beforehand. 
 
Again, this method worked best with participant observation, or simply with people 
who I had got to know over time, for the quality of interviews varied according to 
trust. As mentioned, the Mozabites are quite a closed society as they themselves 
admit, and so the limitations of the interview method showed themselves often, but 
of course it would not be practical to do participant observation with each 
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interviewee. I perceived the quality of information to be not only equated to trust in 
myself but also potentially to socio-economic status. For example, wealthier 
LQGLYLGXDOVZKRGLGQ·WNQRZPHZRXOGSUHVHQWD¶URV\·LPDJHRIORFDOHYHQWVRIWKH
type one might give to tourists, a kind of glossy overview. On the other hand, lower 
status individuals who were less happy with the status quo would complain more 
freely about corruption and unfair practices. The names of these individuals are 
changed for the sake of sensitivity. I also used informal interviews to verify the 
information given to me in previous meetings or activities. I would repeat back my 
understanding of what I thought was said in Arabic, and the respondent would 
confirm or further elucidate their statement. I found this a powerful way to assure 
the veracity of my findings. 
 
Interviews explored such topics as date palm and general farming knowledge, 
transmission, social networks, livelihoods, and values, all pertaining to my research 
questions. Such factors built on the baseline of data from which I established 
responses and causes of responses to change events. These data were contrasted 
ZLWK LQGLYLGXDOV· LGHDO OLYHOLKRRG DVSLUDWLRQV ,GHQWLW\ FKDQJHV DQG LV FRQVWUXFWHG
according to socio-ecological conditions over time. This is affected by 
intergenerational differences which may help in understanding conflicts about 
values. Understanding individual intentionality is important for arriving at the 
motivations underlying certain decisions and courses of action. These elements are 
largely ignored in the treatment of adaptive management, conceptualising scientific 
models in purely technical terms only.  Such a method involves having a prepared 
list of topics for discussion but in contrast to structured methods, it allows the 
researcher to ask follow up questions, thereby potentially identifying aspects 
previously unconsidered, through guided conversation (Bernard 2006: 208²236). 
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Farm surveys 
I undertook farm surveys involving quite detailed questioning, which I formalised 
over time to become quite structured and comprehensive (see appendix II for an 
H[DPSOH :KHQ IDUPHUV ZHUHQ·W SUHVHQW DV ZKHQ , YLVLWHG SORWV ZLWK
phoeniciculteurs, I carried out surveys on tree and plant composition, date palm 
variety, size of plots, irrigation systems, position within the oasis and name of the 
owner. This gave a good sense of variation of farming methods and diversity of 
palm species. 
 
Group interviews and discussions 
I participated in many group activities, including many farmer meetings set up 
through local and international NGOs such as RADDO (Réseau Associatif de 
Développement Durable des Oasis7D]GDLW ORFDO IDUPHUV·DVVRFLDWLRQDQG%(DE 
(Biodiversity: Exchange and Diffusion of Experiences). Participants were a range of 
farmers, agronomists, officials and academics. I rarely led discussions, preferring 
instead to listen to the topics that were raised by farmers themselves, and noting 
the importance of these, as opposed to my own pre-formulated topics. As a 
researcher I was sometimes asked for my input, which I gave where appropriate. 
My weekly participation in a group for English practice for locals served as a useful 
focus group. Again, I rarely imposed my research agenda on them, although they 
knew what I was doing and were interested in my studies. I preferred to listen to 
what was on the minds of individuals at the time, and as I had time for this (as 
opposed to Participatory Rapid Assessments for example, e.g. Chambers 2006, in 
Bernard 2006: 264) and I learned a great deal this way. Conversations almost 
always had a moralistic tone, even though they were very jovial, at times hilarious, 
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usually taking place between two or more generations, and so advice was often 
given, solicited or not. Sometimes I would pose a question to the group, however, 
and they would be happy to discuss and debate it, the many voices adding greatly 
to my research on topics not only around oasis management, but also on Mozabite 
tradition and social organisation. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Beni Isguen English language group. (15/10/13) 
 
Participatory maps and seasonal calendars  
I planned to construct seasonal calendars with farmers, but decided not to as this 
had been done perfectly well quite recently by local ethnoscientist and friend, Mr 
Nourreddine Ben Saadoun (2010). I did create a map with the aid of an irrigation 
specialist of the different named zones of the Beni Isguen oasis, along with the 
principal named water canals (figure 8.1). The wells are all named too, but with 
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around 1000 plots, and one well feeding about five plots each giving 200 wells, I 
GLGQ·WPDSDOORIWKHse, there were simply too many. 
 
Archival research 
Local archives such as the Institute of Sheikh Tfiesh and the White Fathers library 
in Ghardaia were accessed to learn about local historical, political and religious 
institutions. The Sheikh Tfiesh association for the service of heritage was founded 
1995 to house Ibadite cultural documentation. It holds manuscripts, and recorded 
oral history. I read documents, both in thesis and book form, in English and 
French, related to local archaeology, politics and sociology, mostly by local scholars 
and students (e.g. Khalifa 1985; Daddi Adoun 1991; Yahiaoui 1999; Spiga 2010). 
 
 
3.5 Data management 
Notes from conversations and interviews were taken down in small notebooks in 
situ which were then written up in full on a laptop computer later that evening or 
the next morning. Notes were processed using the Nvivo computer programme for 
qualitative data and coded for themes. The final coding themes that emerged were a 
combination of themes from my conceptual framework, and from unexpected topics 
whose importance was realised in the course of my fieldwork (see appendix I for full 
list of codes). 
 
I also kept a field diary to record ideas, as well as more personal reflections to 
process the developing impressions that I had. I undertook regular free-writing of 
my impressions in order to give form and coherence to the wealth of information 
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that I was receiving. I ordered concepts into flow charts in order to help me to 
visualise the multiple connections between ideas. 
 
3.6 Data analyses 
Analyses of local understandings of adaptive capacity and the reported causes of 
farmer responses to social and environmental change were the primary sources of 
research findings. The former required creating a typology of local understandings 
of adaptive capacity from comparisons of text in Nvivo. For the latter, the 
abductive causal eventism method as proposed by Vayda (2013) was used to 
construct chains of events that establish a narrative explanation for their responses.  
Examining these chains of causes and effects, I could extract factors or variables 
that played an important role in the explanation.  I then compared these to other 
potential causal factors, to uncover factors which may have not been revealed in 
immediate answers (e.g. there may be preattentive elements that are obvious to the 
specialist, but not to the layman or novice researcher (Gladwin & Murtaugh 1980)). 
These were identified during participant observation and formed the basis of 
further questions. I also analysed the extent to which changing values, institutions, 
knowledge, political-economic and ecological factors were important for adaptive 
management. These factors were considered as potential causes of adaptive 
management events, and eliminated on the basis of factual and counterfactual 
evidence or reasoning. 
 
Abductive causal eventism   
An event-based analysis was used as an analytical approach to try to understand 
how certain conditions or events of the Beni Isguen oasis had arisen, through 
careful management, or mismanagement, or due to other factors. It was also used to 
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analyse whether certain human actions have arisen as a response to ecological 
problems. In this way I was able to try to understand whether local management 
has been adaptive, as defined by adaptive management theory, in terms of: flexible 
institutions to deal with surprise shocks, ability to reorganise institutions if the 
need arose, access and approach to knowledge, direct learning ability, reflection on 
the course of current management plans (if such plans exist), how local values and 
identity assist or hinder management, links with outside organisations such as 
government and NGOs, local solidarity or mistrust, and so on. 
 
Event analysis is not common in anthropological studies, many of which take a 
more discursive approach, and is not without its critics. Its analytical rigour comes 
from a focus on concrete events working backwards from effects to causes, rather 
than causes to effects, thereby avoiding the false logic of consequence explanations 
(Vayda & Walters 2011: 14). Vayda (2009: 3) gives a rather broad definition of an 
¶HYHQW·DV´VRPHWKLQJWKDWKDSSHQVVRPHZKHUHGXULQJDSDUWLFXODULQWHUYDORIWLPHµ
It is an appropriate approach in ecological anthropology which has involves 
observable physical phenomena which may have been affected by human actions, as 
in the case of natural resource-based livelihoods. The first iteration of this 
methodology was articulated by Vayda in 1983 to explain the human causes of 
HQYLURQPHQWDO FKDQJH HYHQWV ZKLFK KH WKHQ ODEHOOHG ¶SURJUHVVLYH
FRQWH[WXDOLVDWLRQ· 7KLV DSSURDFK XUJHG UHVHDUFKHUV WR IRFXV RQ VSHFLILF KXPDQ-
environment interactions, and explain these by situating them within 
´SURJUHVVLYHO\ZLGHUDQGGHQVHUFRQWH[WVµ(Vayda 1983: 265). The approach became 
known as event ecology in 1999 through a polemical and provocative article aimed 
at the shortcomings of political ecology, a recent trend in scholarship for explaining 
human-environment relations. Vayda and Walters (1999) lambasted political 
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ecology for pre-favouring political economy theory in explaining socio-ecological 
SUREOHPVDQGDORQJZLWKRWKHUVDVNLQJ´ZKHUHLVWKHHFRORJ\"µ (see also Walker 
2005). Vayda prefers an open-ended approach to causation, allowing the researcher 
not to close off any potential avenues prematurely in the search for causes of a 
problem, be they political, biological, or whatever. The approach has been further 
elaborated by Vayda and Walters in a series of papers (Vayda 2009; Walters & 
Vayda 2009; Vayda & Walters 2011; Vayda 2013; Walters 2012). 
 
The latest iteration has been dubbed somewhat ineloquently, Abductive Causal 
Eventism (ACE). This methodology was adopted as a term over event ecology to 
reflect the inclusivity of a broader range of causes of events: social, physical, 
chemical and so on. It uses an abductive approach to explanation, following Peirce 
(1932: 495-499, in Vayda 2013), by focusing on discrete events or chains of events 
and working backwards in time and space to establish potential causes.  Abduction 
involves the use of multiple working hypotheses, following the work of Chamberlin 
(1890, in Vayda & Walters 2011: 8), which in this case refers to the many 
hypothetical causes that might be tested in the process of establishing an 
explanation of an event. Similar to detective work, hypotheses are sought to 
´DFFRXQW IRU REVHUYHG IDFWV RU HYHQWV LQ FRQWUDGLVWLQFWLRQ WR ORRNLQJ IRU IDFWV RU
HYHQWV WR WHVW K\SRWKHVHVµ (Vayda & Walters 2011: 11). Then, factual and 
counterfactual questions are asked in order to keep some explanations and eliminate 
others. This type of method is utilised by historians and medical specialists where a 
degree of uncertainty exists, necessitating analysis through abductive logic. The 
hypoWKHVHVPD\RULJLQDWHIURPWKHLQYHVWLJDWRU·VNQRZOHGJHDQGH[SHULHQFHDQGLW
follows that one with more experience will generate better potential explanations. 
This also reveals the limitations of the approach, for its success depends on the 
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researcher exhausting all possibilities before going through the process of 
elimination, thus it goes without saying that if a possibility which has evaded the 
analyst is missed, the whole line of enquiry will be compromised. The experience of 
the researcher is strongly implied in all social science investigations, however, so 
this issue may not be more of a problem to this approach than any other. 
 
The approach benefits from not depending on abstract structures as premeditated 
theoretical explanations, and so the researcher is not drawn into reifying systems 
and structures (Walters & Vayda 2009: 24), making it very suitable for analysing 
resilience models and formulations. Indeed, Vayda and Walters argue that the more 
specific a claim, the more susceptible it is to contrary evidence; so importantly, the 
opposite is also true, that causal claims about larger and more abstract entities 
become impervious to counterclaim. Thus, discovering how traditional knowledge 
systems affect so and so, is more likely to be inconclusive, than pursuing how 
specific items of knowledge affect certain actions (2011: 6). 
 
In this thesis, abductive reasoning is used to explain responses to social and 
ecological changes in date palm oasis management that have been identified 
through participant observation of current practices and oral histories collected in 
interviews with farmers. To the extent that it is possible to conceive of responses as 
events, then it should be possible to apply event analysis, and trace the causes of 
those responses (Puri 2015). Of course, working backwards from purported 
responses helps to confirm their relationship to social ecological changes in oasis 
management, as well as explore the role of values, knowledge, institutions, and 
other factors discussed above, in these responses.  
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The steps involved in the event approach are as follows:  
 
1. Identify the what (is to be explained) question, such as an (anthropogenically 
caused) environmental change event, (e.g., destruction of  property by 
floods), but verify such an event has actually occurred before proceeding to 
the why questions. For example, desertification has been taken as a given in 
many environmental studies, a misreading by colonial authorities based on 
erroneous misconceptions, prejudice and unfamiliarity with local 
management methods and strategies (Vayda 2013). 
2. Ask plausible why questions about the causes of  the event, from event back 
to causal event, and not vice versa, and come up with multiple potential 
causal chains. 
3. Collect data guided by the multiple working hypotheses to test potential 
causal chains, ask factual and counter-factual questions, to eliminating some 
causes and reinforce others. 
 
Limitations and criticisms of event ecology exist. Political ecologists, for example, 
have defended discourse analysis, and Walters (2012) concedes that the 
simplification needed for the event approach may occlude such a dimension. Hebert 
(2011: 61) argues that the concrete events to be explained are not always so 
objective, in that environmental phenomena may be subjective and therefore 
contested, as her fieldwork in Alaska illustrated. Vayda & Walters consistently 
argue against systems and processes, such as those used in the socio-ecological 
systems (SES) theory behind adaptive management, although to be clear, Vayda 
LVQ·W DJDLQVW WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI SURFHVVHV per se, where repeating 
sequences can be clearly demonstrated, rather he is against the need for holisms, as 
superfluous to explaining specific events.  
 
A key point of disagreement between event and complexity theories such as SES 
may be the concept of emergence. Adaptive management policy is predicated on the 
idea that complex systems are highly unpredictable. Similarly, complexity theorists 
argue that emergence cannot be reduced to the some of the parts (although some 
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complexity theorists have been able to model the emergent properties of complex 
systems such as bat roosting behaviour patterns by demonstrating simple rules of 
interaction between individuals) (Rocheleau 2011). Vayda would probably argue 
that phenomena can be explained by causal chains, multiple ones if need be. It needs 
to be established whether emergent phenomena can be explained as events. Many 
phenomena such as sand dunes, bird flocks, hurricanes and consciousness are 
described as emergent patterns, behaviours, properties or states and thus probably 
IDOORXWVLGHWKHUHPLWRIDQ¶HYHQW·H[SODLQDEOHE\event analysis. Other examples of 
emergence (Talley 2015) include: 
x Billions of neurons interact to form Mind, consciousness 
x Dozens of birds flying interact to form Flocking 
x Moisture, temperature, pressure interact to form Hurricanes, tornadoes 
x Buyers, sellers, transactions interact to form Markets 
x Lots of conversations interact to form Culture 
x Lots of water molecules interact to form Liquidity 
x DNA, protein, other molecules interact to form Life 
x Mom, Dad, and the kids interact to form Family 
x Lots of families interact to form a Community 
x Lots of communities interact to form a nation-state  
Vayda would surely classify such phenomena as just the sort of abstract categories 
he wishes to avoid, ones that cannot be broken down to particular causal chains, 
thus remaining impervious to falsification. This is consistent with general 
DQWKURSRORJLFDO GHEXQNLQJ RI LGHDO W\SHV RU IHWLVKLVDWLRQ DV RSSRVHG WR ¶UHDO· OLIH
OtKHUSKHQRPHQDVXFKDV ¶ERWWRP-XS· VRFLDORUJDQLVDWLRQ VXFKDVQHLJKERXUKRRG
organisations, may be described within event terminology and emergence also. This 
begs the question, can such occurrences be explained by the sum of the parts, or are 
they a new condition, not contained by any of the component parts alone, but 
EURXJKW WKURXJK WKH ¶PDJLF· RI WKHLU LQGLYLGXDO DQG FROOHFWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQV" 7KLV
thesis addresses these philosophical dilemmas, which I deal with systematically in 
chapter nine. 
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Finally, some might accuse Vayda of positivism. This would be erroneous, for while 
he focuses on concrete events, his approach is of multiple working hypotheses 
rather than deductive hypothesis testing through experiment as logical positivists 
have argued for. Rather, tKLVPDNHV9D\GD·VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSRVLWLRQRQHRIFULWLFDO
realism, where our view of the world can constantly be improved through greater 
understanding and findings; the critical realist is critical of our ability to know with 
certainty (Danermark 2002: 86). The event approach to history has also been 
criticised by Bloch (1992: 103), who favours a longue durée view of history, as taken 
up by Braudel (1958). I describe certain persistent ideas through the longue durée 
approach, but I found during this study that the event approach was more powerful 
in the understanding and explanation of ecological management problems and then 
contextualising them by working backwards and outwards to causes. I was not 
completely faithful to this mode of analysis and perhaps I stretched it beyond 
breaking point in order to cover what I wanted to understand. I give a detailed 
description of the limits of the event approach in chapter nine. 
 
Resilience assessment 
Finally, to compare the usefulness of an adaptive management framework, a 
Resilience Assessment (Resilience Alliance 2010) was carried out based on the 
accumulated data, and a model of the pertinent socio-ecological interactions was 
constructed (see appendix III). From this I was able to observe what extra 
dimensions regarding response to change this approach highlights; alternatively I 
was able then to see what ZDVQ·W FRYHUHG E\ VXFK PRGHOLQJ (see again chapter 
nine). 
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All data were analysed using the Nvivo qualitative analysis software and coded to 
reveal salient cultural domains, to analyse relationships qualitatively and to draw 
out a heuristic framework from which to organize a theoretical analysis, which was 
then compared to current systems theories for a comparative analysis. For example, 
patterns relating to separate responses regarding change and response events have 
been coded and analysed.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter involved a discussion of my research questions and methodology 
which emerged from a review of the literature on WKH ¶QHZ· HFRORJ\ RI
disequilibrium systems in the previous chapter. Next, I present the location and 
people with whom I used these methods, the farmers of the oasis of Beni Isguen, 
central Algeria, which is then followed by a critical review of ethnographic work on 
WKH0·]DEUHJLRQ as a whole. 
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4. Locating the field: Beni Isguen, 
WKH0·]DEDQGLWVSHRSOH 
 
This chapter situates my field site in key geographical, historical, and cultural 
contexts, and also provides an account of relevant ethnographic work on the 
region. I begin with a description of the physical landscape and climatology. From 
this follows an account of Mozabite history, from the early schism in Islamic 
history by the Kharijites which led to the formation of Ibadism, and how and why 
this was taken on by nomadic Zenete Amazigh (Berbers), who later called 
WKHPVHOYHV WKH %HQL 0·]DE VRQV RI WKH 0·]DE RU 0R]DELWHV , WKHQ critically 
discuss the key ethnographic sources on the Mozabites, followed by a review of 
relevant ethnographic works from the wider region, focusing on the Sahara and the 
0DJKUHE PRUH EURDGO\ , DUJXH WKDW %HQQRXQH·V (1986) important work gives a 
counterpoint to the previous functionalist analyses of Mozabite adaptation to 
change, which posit religion as the key factor in maintaining social cohesion, 
despite forces of imperialism (Ottoman, French). Contrasting with the synchronic 
conceptions of cohesion, he provides instead a historical perspective that reveals 
conflictual internal dynamics of social change and class formation leading to social 
inequality. Yet, I argue that Bennoune does not go far enough with his theory of 
social change, for he does not explain why changes that began a millennium ago 
have only come to fruition in the past few decades. I here suggest that the Algerian 
revolution and independence provided the key trigger for an ideological shift which 
OHG WR D SROLWLFDO UHFRQILJXUDWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH 0·]DE DQG WKH VWDWH EDVHG RQ
integration rather than isolation.  
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4.1 LDQGVFDSHRIWKH0·]DEYDOOH\JHRORJ\DQGK\GURORJ\ 
7KH0·]DEYDOOH\ OLHVZLWKLQ WKH URFN\QRUWKHUQDUHDRI WKH$OJHULDQ6DKDUD RQ
the edge of the Grand Erg Occidental and the Grand Erg Oriental. It lies 200 km 
from the Atlas Mountains in the north, and about 560 km from Algiers (located 
geographically between 33° and 31° 15' north latitude, 2° 30' and 5° longitude). 
The region forms part of the Ghardaïa province. The geology is of hard, salmon 
coloured limestone, in contrast to the shifting dunes classically associated with the 
Sahara, which in reality contains very diverse landscape formations. This geology is 
known locally as the shebka, signifying the net-like structure where valleys and 
ravines have been eroded over time into the hard substrate (see Figure 4.1). The 
valley covers 275 000 hectares, or 40 km2, at 20 km long about 2 km wide; altitude 
LVPDVO7KHULYHUVVXFKDVWKHRXHG0·]DEDQGRXHG1WLVVDIORZLQIURPWKH
al Bayadh Mountains in the west (300 km) and the Laghouat Mountains in the 
north (200 km) (others are oued Metlili, oued Sebseb). These rivers are dry for 
most of the year, yet run violently when the aforementioned mountains receive 
rainfall. Such rainfall and subsequent flash floods are, characteristically of the 
region, unpredictable (a non-equilibrium state, according ecological terminology), 
occurring perhaps three times in a year, or once every three years, and these at 
different strengths and velocity (Pavard et al. 1975). 
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)LJXUH7KH0·]DEYDOOH\$OJHULDSource: NASA 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=51296 
 
7KH ODQGVFDSH LV H[FHHGLQJO\ GU\ ZLWK ZHDWKHU FODVVLILHG DV ´KRW GHVHUW FOLPDWHµ
(according to the Köppen climate classification (Koeppen 2016)) with an annual 
precipitation of 61.4 mm. This is statistically highest in November at 12.1 mm and 
lowest in July at 0.3 mm., the hottest month (NOAA, years 1964-1990). Indeed, 
July usually has a temperature average high of 36.90 C (record high of 49.00 C); 
January is typically the coldest month with an average low of 5.30 C (record low of -
5.40 C). More generally, the warm season is from June-September with an average 
of 360 C, and the cold season is November-March with an average of 210 C. With 
rainfall variation above a C.V. of 33 per cent (Ellis 1994) WKH 0·]DE ecological 
conditions are driven by climate and may be classified as having non-equilibrium 
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dynamics12 (Ellis et al. 1993)7KH0·]DEH[SHULHQFHVKRWGXVW\ZLQGVLQWKHVSULQJ
from March-May. These are largely ideal conditions for the cultivation of the date 
palm Phoenix dactylifera L., which favour hot, dry conditions for the ripening of 
dates, and the rains that may come in November are past the timing of the 
harvesting of most varieties such as bint aqbela. The region does lack the humidity 
that the popular deglet nǌr dates prefer; these are more prevalent in eastern Algeria 
and Tunisia. 
 
Despite its hyper-arid appearance, the region harbours a blessed secret to those 
with the knowledge and the capacity to use it: vast underground aquifers. These 
were surely put here by God, to offset the harshness of desert life, according to my 
interlocutors in Beni Isguen. The North Western Aquifer system (NWSAS) (see 
Figure 4.2) (also known as the Système Aquifère du Sahara Septentrional (SASS)) 
extends over 1 million km2, across Algeria (700,000 km2), Libya (250,000 km2), and 
Tunisia (80,000 km2). Previously understood to be a finite source of fossil water, it 
is now known to recharge by 1 billion m3/year. Use levels still remain 
unsustainable, however, as this recharge represents only 40 per cent of current use 
(Gonçalvès et al. 2013). Specifically, exploitation is now 2.5 billion m3/year, as 
compared to 0.6 billion m3 in 1970 (Mamou et al. 2006). The NWSAS is understood 
to contain reserves of 60 billion m3. 7KH0·]DEGRUVDO VLWVEHWZHHQ WKH WZRPDLQ
aquifers, the occidental and oriental basins (Wallin et al. 2005). The principal 
aquifers are known as the Continental Intercalcaire (CI) and the Complex Terminal 
(CT), and shallow phreatic aquifers from the quaternary age also exist. The aquifers 
range from 400m to 2000 m in depth (Al-Gamal 2011). 
                                                 
12 This coefficient of  variation (C.V.) was calculated by myself  based on historical data from 
the Ghardaia region, from http://www.tutiempo.net/en/Climate/Ghardaia/605660.htm. 
C.V. was calculated as a percentage using the formula: CV = ( / ) x 100. Total annual 
precipitation was used from 1983-2013. 
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Table 4.1 Extreme weather events (as given by local sources). 
Year Weather Event 
1930s Drought 
1952/4 Flood 
1970s Flood 
1981 Earthquake 
1984 Locust 
1995/6 Wind (500 palms fell in Beni Isguen) 
2004/5 Snow 
2008 Flood (Ghardaia) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The North Western Aquifer System (NWSAS). (Source: 
http://gridnairobi.unep.org/chm/waterbasins/NWSAS-19-03-08.jpg) 
 
4.2 Mozabite historical background: Ibadite Islam meets the Zenete 
Berbers  
Some historical background of the Mozabites is given here, not only to describe 
how they came to live in the current geographical area, but also to explain the 
emergence of certain cultural forms that have survived the long durée, such as social 
support and isolation as forms of moral regulation of the oasis landscape and 
processes. 
 
The history of the Mozabites and their movements can be traced back to a sectarian 
split in the early days of Islam. Mozabite religious identity, Ibadism, came from the 
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earlier Kharajite faction (although some Mozabites refute Kharajite ancestry13), 
which separated from the Muslim community during the time of Ali. Most sources 
(e.g. Masqueray 1878; Zeys 1887; Amat 1888; Alport 1954; Bourdieu 1962; 
Donnadieu et al. 1977; Holsinger 1980; Bennoune 1986; Bierschenk 1988; Ghazal 
2013) explain the fissure by pointing to a dispute based on religious doctrine, over 
the battle of Siffin (Safar, 37 = July 657), between Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the 
prophet Mohammed, and MucƗwƯyya of the Umiyad clan. The events that led up to 
this disagreement surround the well-known issue of the legitimacy of Ali as the 
successor to caliph Umar, as opposed to cUthman of the influential Quraysh family. 
cUthman ZDVYRWHGLQGXHWRKLVIDPLO\·VSROLWLFDOZHLJKWEXWWKHVXSSRUWHUVRI$OL
denounced this win as a conspiracy against the family of the prophet. However, 
according to Willams: 
 
[cUthman] lived more luxuriously than his predecessors and he allowed his 
family and the chief companions to become owners of vast private properties 
in the conquered lands. At the same time he antagonised many of the 
companions. Discontent grew in the camp cities, where it was felt that all 
spoils and revenues of the conquests should be divided equally among the 
community. Ali was known to share this view. [1964, in Bennoune 1986: 
99] 
 
After the 11th year of cUthman·V UXOH WKH SRSXODFH URVH XS DJDLQVW KLP DQG
eventually he was killed. A delegation of rebels approached Ali to convince him to 
accept candidacy of the office of Caliphate. After his election, a conservative faction 
made up of two companions DQG WKH SURSKHW·V ZLGRZ $LVKD GHQRXQFHG $OL·V
election, even accusing him of complicity in cUthman·VPXUGHU$FLYLOZDUDPRQJ
                                                 
13 Masqueray (1878: XI) gave the following response to this claim by a Mozabite man: 
´One of my Mozabite performers, as I translated Kharidjites as rebels, heretics, out of the 
religion, was indignant. I replied, objecting that this meaning is derived from the Arabic 
verb kharadja "going out" is that we find in all Arab historians and with their translators 
(e.g. Ibn Khaldun. - Baron of Slane); he replied: "There is no Mozabite that accepts this 
because Ali said: They hurt me because they came out against me. This signifies our 
religious ancestors separated from Ali, but not religion. We are more religious, better 
Muslims than the Arabs." 
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the rival factions ensued. When Ali and his followers moved their camp to Kufa, 
MucƗwƯyya, the governor of Syria and cousin of cUthman, made a decisive move to 
crush Ali. Following several campaigns, MucƗwƯyya, a skilled diplomat, suggested a 
truce and arbitration by means of a committee, who would make a pronouncement 
based on a reading of the 4X·UDQ. Bennoune suggests that: 
 
Ali and a large number of his supporters accepted this proposal, either 
because they were trying to end the deadly conflict or because the members 
of the Kura (4X·UDQ readers) faction had previously conducted an implacable 
political campaign against cUthman culminating in his murder, expected 
that this 4X·UDQic judgement would be in their favour and therefore justify 
their past struggle against the corruption of Beni Umaiya. [1986: 100] 
 
One faction, the Tamin tribe, disavowed this move, claiming that the arbitration 
was against and above the word of God, and that judgement was for God alone. 
Arbitration was interpreted according to the 4X·UDQ to be allowed only in two 
circumstances, when there is conflict between husband and wife, and when game is 
killed during the haj (pilgrimage) and compensation is required (Alport 1954). The 
Tamin faction withdrew to Harura near Kufa and elected Abd Allah Ben Wahab as 
their imƗm, calling themselves the al Haruriya. History was against Ali, however, 
and Kura pronounced in favour of MucƗwƯyya. Consequently, the followers of Ali 
´ZHQW RXWµ DQG ZHUH WKXV UHIHUUHG WR E\ RUWKRGR[ 0XVOLPV DV .KDUDMLWHV ´WKRVH
who went out from the community of the faithfulµ. The Kharajites joined with the 
Haruriya under Ibn Wahab. Together they led many violent attacks upon the 
8PDL\DGHQRXQFLQJ WKHLU FRUUXSW UHLJQDQG FDOOLQJ IRU D FRQGLWLRQZKHUH ´VRFLDO
justice, equality and fraternity could be maintained among all true followers of the 
3URSKHW ZLWKRXW GLVWLQFWLRQ RI ELUWK DQG VWDQGLQJµ Ibid: 101). The Kharajites 
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continued to carry out revolutionary warfare using guerrilla tactics, down to the 
HQG RI WKH 8PD\DG G\QDVW\·V UHLJQ )ROORZLQJ WKLV .Kawarij divided into the 
Azarika, Sufriya and Ibadyia factions. The latter was formed by Abu Bilal, Djabir 
ben Zayid and Abdallah Ibn Ibad (after whom the Ibadites referred to themselves). 
 
Positioning themselves DJDLQVW ¶DUWLILFLDO· DUELWUDWLRQ LV LPSRUWDQt to Mozabites 
today and to this study for several reasons. Firstly, Ibadite doctrine is absolute that 
the 4X·UDQ is the final word, and all actions are either right or wrong. Secondly, 
serious sins cannot be expiated, enforcing a strong fear of God. It is precisely this 
quality that people invoke today when they comment that people are acting badly 
against local norms, and I return to this sentiment in chapter nine. Braudel (1958) 
refers to this type of commonly held trope over time as the longue durée. 
FuUWKHUPRUHKHUHFDQEHIRXQGWKHRULJLQVRIWKH¶UDGLFDOHJDOLWDULDQLVP·SURIHVVHG
by the group, which I discuss throughout the thesis in relation to observed practice. 
 
During the reign of Marwan II (129 = 747), the followers of Ibn Ibad liberated 
Sanaa from the imperial army, and from there captured Mecca and Medina, 
although these were taken back a year later. Another insurrection was launched by 
the Ibadites in Oman four years later, but this was put down. Meanwhile, Ibadite 
missionaries spread into Hadramout, Yemen, Oman, Persia, East Africa and the 
Maghreb (North Africa). Pavard (1975: 6) claims that Ibadite traders from Oman 
spread their doctrine as far as India and China. 
 
Although Islam spread across North Africa within only two decades of 
0RKDPPHG·s death, Arabs set themselves apart from the new indigenous converts, 
despite the doctrine of equality. Thus, the heretical Kharajism with its radical 
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HJDOLWDULDQLVPZKHUH´WKHRQO\KLHUDUFK\DPRQJWKHPZDVWKDWRIWKHLQWHQVLW\RI
their faith and the recWLWXGH RI WKHLU FRQGXFWµ (Entelis 1986: 13), was deeply 
attractive to the indigenous Amazigh (Berbers). Indeed, Entelis (1986: 13) asserts 
that North African Amazigh had a tendency toward heretical forms of the invading 
religions, as they took up the Donatist form of Christianity previously (and later 
Arianism from the Vandals in the fifth century), probably as a form of political 
protest. More importantly, even non-Arabs could rise and become caliphs according 
to Kharajism, and all Muslims could depose an unjust imƗm (Ibid: 14). Thus, 
Ibadism took hold among Amazigh populations in western Tripolitania: the Zenata 
and the Nefouca. 
 
+DYLQJEHHQGHIHDWHGLQWKH0DVKUHTWKH,EDGLWHVSURFODLPHGD´VWDWHRIVHFUHF\µ
and many under the leadership of Ibn Rostam, a Persian, migrated to the Maghreb 
to establish a ¶´NLQJGRP RI *RG RQ (DUWKµ ZKHUH ,EDGLWH LGHDOV RI VRFLDO MXVWLFH
KXPDQ EURWKHUKRRG DQG SROLWLFDO HTXDOLW\ ZRXOG SUHYDLOµ %HQQRXQH  104). 
Within two years, the Ibadites took hold of Tripoli and Kairouan, in present-day 
Libya and Tunisia, respectively. They held Kairouan, the imperial centre of North 
Africa for four years, until it was recaptured by an imperial army from Egypt. From 
here the Ibadites withdrew, trekking about 700 miles towards central Algeria. 
There they settled on a former Roman camp on a pass between the Tell Atlas 
highlands and the lower fertile plains, which they named Tahert (761 A.D.). This 
theocratic state stood for 150 years, rising to become a major cosmopolitan trading 
centre, standing as it did between the agricultural area of the north and the 
pastoralist sheepherders and grand nomads of the south. The two main historical 
sources of this period are Ibn Saghir (Calassanti-Motylinski 1908), an orthodox 
Muslim, and Abu Zakaria (Masqueray 1978), an Ibadite scholar. Tahert attracted 
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mDQ\IURPDVIDUDV,UDT3HUVLD2PDQDQG7ULSROLWR´WUDGHVWXG\DQGOHDUQIURP
the successful institutional experience of the democratic-theocratic republic" 
(Bennoune 1986: 106). Accordingly, Tahert became one of the busiest trading 
centres of the Islamic world at the time (Ibid.)14.  
 
This period is significant for this is when Mozabites learned to become successful 
traders, and during this period emerged a secular council, the majlis ayyen, which 
ZRXOGYLHIRUSRZHUZLWKWKHUHOLJLRXV¶FLUFOHRIVDLQWV·RUclerisy, the ruling cazzƗba. 
As a result of such prosperity, the Ibadite ideal of equality was thus threatened by 
the creation of class conflict (this theme is taken up in chapter nine). Factionalism 
always arose during the election of a new imƗm and the greatest new faction was 
that of the merchant class. This class invariably supported the ruling elite. This 
FODVVLVWKHPRVWSRZHUIXOLQWKH0·]DEWRGD\ZKRVHSRZHUKDVQRZXVXUSHGWKDW
of the ruling cazzƗba. Importantly, it is to migratory trade that Mozabites turned to 
strategically when agriculture was not enough to support their households in the 
LVRODWHG 0·]DE YDOOH\ 0XFK UHFHQW VFKRODUVKLS RQ PLJUDWLRQ DUJXHV WKDW WKLV
SKHQRPHQRQLVSDUWRIKRXVHKROGVWUDWHJLHVODUJHO\LQUHVSRQVHWR ¶PRGHUQLVDWLRQ· 
(De Haas 2007), or previous colonialism such as to raise cash for taxes (De Haan et 
al. 2002). Historiography of Mozabite migration shows that regionally the practice 
was much older. Moreover, the practice of trade during this period alerts us to the 
fact that Mozabites engaged in the slave trade, and several sources confirm that 
                                                 
14 7KH HFRQRP\ ZDV VHW XS DFFRUGLQJ WR D UHGLVWULEXWLYH HFRQRPLF SULQFLSOH ´$W WKH
moment of harvest, the Imamate appropriated an amount of surplus from every producer 
not only of cereals but also of sheep, cattle and camels. Upon the completion of this 
collection, the grains were distributed among the indigent households; then the 
functionaries of the Imamate proceeded to sell these sheep, cattle and goats, and camels in 
the market. A part of the money received from such sale was sent by the imƗm to the 
governors as their administrative budget. The remaining sum was converted into wool and 
oil, which was then proportionally distributed to every household. This distribution 
IDYRXUHGWKH,EDGLWHLQGLJHQWIDPLOLHVµ%HQQRXQH 
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this was indeed the case (Savage 1992; Scheele 2012: 49). The descendants of some 
RI WKHVH VODYHV PDNH XS SDUW RI WKH GHPRJUDSKLF RI WKH 0·]DE WRGD\ DQG DUH
recognised as part of the Mozabite community, although some differences between 
¶EODFN·DQG¶ZKLWH·0R]DELWHVH[LVWDV,H[SODLQODWHU 
 
In 909, this Rustamid kingdom was overrun by the incoming Fatimids. From this 
time the Ibadites withdrew into the desert to Ouargla, about 400 miles away, where 
another small colony of Ibadites existed. Speculating on their collapse, they largely 
blamed this on the fact that they had tolerated foreigners, even admitting dissident 
elements into the administration and thus paving the way for the fall and 
annexation by the invaders. Thus in Ouargla the imƗm renounced his leadership 
and withdrew into a spiritual life, and from then on religious and secular control of 
the community fell on thecazzƗba. Thus the last imƗm SURFODLPHG D ´VWDWH RI
VHFUHF\µ DQG WKH ,EDGLWHV ZRXOG ZLWKGUDZ WR SUDFWLFH WKHLU UHOLJLRQ LQ LVRODWLRQ
away from mixed communities. This sense of isolation and psychological or 
spiriWXDO ¶GLVVRFLDWLRQ· UHPDLQV LPSRUWDQW LQ LGHD DQG SUDFWLFH DPRQJ 0R]DELWHV
today. Many pondered out loud to me that reintegration with the Algerian nation-
state, and indeed opening their doors to the world via tourism may have been the 
cause for many of toGD\·VVRFLDOLOOV 
 
The new city of Sedrata was also well placed for trade, however, as a major caravan 
route crossed it from southwest to northeast. Thus the city prospered, although not 
for long. The new site was dangerously exposed to the surrounding desert plains 
filled with armed nomads, and powerful kingdoms in the Black South. Thus the 
Ibadites planned their withdrawal further into inhospitable terrain. They founded a 
new site (built on prior Amazigh settlements) just 120 miles southwest in the arid 
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limestone plateau in the shebka $UDEIRU¶QHW·QRZNQRZQDVWKH0·]DE7KLVDUHD
was avoided by nomads as it was devoid of resources for grazing or watering, the 
valleys crisscrossing the limestone ridges were utterly barren, although some 
ancient settlHPHQWVDUHDSSDUHQW,Q$'WKHILUVWFLW\RIWKH0·]DEZDVEXLOW
al Atteuf (Tumzabt, dialect of Tamazight (Berber): Tajnint), followed by Bou Noura 
(Tum. At-Bounour) and Melika (Tum. At-Mlichet) a few decades later, followed by 
Beni Isguen (Tum. At-Izjen) and Ghardaia (Tum. Tagherdait). As described by 
$OSRUWZLWKLQWKHULYHU0·]DE 
 
lie the five cities perched on the slopes or on higher ground in the riverbed. 
They are built fairly close together, so that from each it is easy to see one or 
two for WKH RWKHUV« WKH\ DUH VXUURXQGHG E\ VWRXW ZDOOV DQG HDFK LV
crowned by the Minaret of its mosque, shaped like an obelisk and lacking 
any kind of decoration. [Alport 1954: 34] 
 
Conflicting sources attest that Beni Isguen was in fact built in the fourteenth 
century (Bafouloulou 2013: 11; Pavard et al. 1975: 12). Social conflict due to limited 
resources and an expanding population resulted in the creation of Guerrara (Tum. 
Igraren) and Berriane (Tum. Iberguen) about 45 km away, in the seventeenth 
century. These seven cities form the heptapole of the Mozabite federation. Metlili 
was founded also by Mozabites in sixteenth century, although this was overtaken 
by settling Shaamba nomads. Population pressure meant that the local agricultural 
resources were insufficient to feed the population, causing male Mozabites to 
emigrate to outlying Algerian towns and cities in order to trade, and then sustain 
the desert population by sending resources back home. Population pressure within 
limited space contributes to violent conflict to this day, and is the driver of other 
changes that I deal with in later chapters. Thus came about the primary livelihood 
by which Mozabites are commonly known around Algeria: merchants with a 
reputation for honesty in their dealings (Alport 1954; Holsinger 1986). Later, with 
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access to European markets following French annexation, some of these grocers 
and butchers would form large-scale capitalist enterprises. This differs from 
=XZD\DPHUFKDQWVLQ/LE\DIRUH[DPSOHZKR-RKQ'DYLVFODLPVGLGQ·W
EHFRPHFDSLWDOLVWVLQWKDWWKH\GLGQ·WIRUPRSSUHVVLYHLQWHUQDOFODVVUHODWLRQVHYHQ
if they did exploit foreign labour. I will argue that such success through wealth 
paradoxically has contributed to a breakdown in social relations that are necessary 
to the prevention of dangerous flash floods, which require cooperation between 
households (chapter eight). I suggest that those with great financial resources no 
ORQJHU ¶QHHG· HDFKRWKHU FDXVLQJ WKHPHVV\HQWDQJOHPHQWVRI UHFLSURFDODLG WREH
void, although such powerful individuals can create need among who they choose (as 
opposed to the poor whose need is linked to kinsmen by bonds of reciprocity), by 
strategically creating favours for those they wish to influence, such as certain 
authority figures. 
 
7KHSHRSOHRIWKH0·]DEQHJRWLDWHGUHODWLYHLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPWKHODWHU2WWRPDQV
who were to take over most of North Africa, reaching present day Algeria in the 
early sixteenth century. After the French annexed Algeria in 1830, they at first 
DOORZHGWKH0·]DEFRQIHGHUDWLRn self-rule based on a treaty of 1853, provided that 
they pay an annual tribute. In 1882 this arrangement was nullifiedDQGWKH0·]DE
ZDVRIILFLDOO\DQQH[HGLQWRWKHFRORQ\DVWKHRIILFLDOFDSLWDORI ¶7HUULWRLUHGX6XG·
The Mozabite religious council which was operating in a state of secrecy since the 
withdrawal to Ouargla refused to recognise the authority and validity of the 
annexation and the newly appointed officials, however. As such, they lead the 
population in boycotting the French administration and its schools, hospitals, 
military service and taxes. Bennoune posits that: 
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the Mozabites tried to minimise as much as possible their dealings and 
relations with the colonial power and the medium of its domination; 
consequently a silent struggle was ushered in and prolonged to the end of 
French rule in Algeria. [1986: 110] 
 
According to Ghazal (2010), French imperialism caused certain influential 
Mozabites such as Atfiyyash and Al-Yaqzan, influenced by the pan-Islam Islah 
movement to forget sectarian divides and reunite under the umbrella of Islam, for a 
unified Algeria. This question of state legitimacy is one that has been repeated 
again and again in Ibadite history, and I argue, one that shapes events today, 
especially the local capacity to self-govern and manage local resources, involving 
questions of scale. I suggest in this thesis that questions of autonomy and 
integration have been debated all through Mozabite history. 
 
Cataldi et al. (1996) argue that it was only with the formation of independent 
Algeria that the autonomous self-rule of the confederation fell apart. The religious 
self-organisation was at odds with the new socialist government, and new flows of 
economic and industrial development upset traditional forms of management. 
Bennoune (1986), however, argues that change was in fact internally driven. With 
the development of a merchant class, a new lay council, known as the ayyen, was to 
challenge the authority of the religious council. Bennoune (Ibid.) further asserts 
that the new political configurations were influenced by the migrations of these 
merchants to the Algerian Tell, who were exposed to alternative forms of 
governance. What Bennoune fails to explain, however, is why the merchant class, 
formed centuries ago only recently displaced the cazzƗba from its seat of power. 
This thesis argues that conscious integration with the nation-state involved a 
decline in local power due to local recognition of state judicial authority, legitimised 
because of its Islamic nature. Yet, the merchant class probably pushed for 
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integration along more pragmatic lines in order to secure trading arrangements 
with national markets. Countering commonly held tropes of neoliberal modernity 
sweeping across the globe out of Euro-America, my investigations argue for an 
understanding of change that recognises more agency in local decisions and debate 
on integration (even if limited) with the nation-state. Of importance to this study, 
integration with the Algerian state meant that local systems of oasis management 
were eroded, whether the water JXDUG·V institution as replaced by the state-
enforced local council, or of local customary law being replaced by statutory law 
with direct effects on land ownership and property in the oasis.  
 
4.3 Mozabite life today 
Today, there are about 500,000 Mozabites living globally (Bennoune 1986), with 
DSSUR[LPDWHO\LQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\*KDUGDwDSURYLQFHDQGWKHUHVWRIWKH
diaspora residing in the Algerian Tell Atlas, France and Europe. The other 200,000 
UHVLGHQWV RI WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ DUe made up mainly of Shaamba Arabs of different 
Islamic sects, but also a small minority of Kabyles, Touareg and other Sahelian 
migrants from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Other inhabitants include migrants 
from the north of Algeria in the Tell, and from the desert south, such as Adrar and 
Tamanrasset. The administrative capital Ghardaia is thus very cosmopolitan, 
DOWKRXJK0R]DELWHDQGRWKHUV·OLYLQJTXDUWHUVDUHPRVWO\VHSDUDWH (see figure 3.1).  
 
Language & ethnic makeup 
The principal language of Mozabites is Tumzabt, a branch of the Berber 
(Tamazight) language, of the Afro-Asiatic family. Tumzabt as a spoken dialect is 
eroding, with many terms being replaced by Algerian Arabic, although efforts are 
being made to preserve it, for example through locally produced dictionaries (e.g. 
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Mefnoune & Abdessalam 2011). The Mozabites are known to be from the Iznaten 
(Zenete or Zenata) Berber ethnic group. Mozabite women invariably wear a white 
woollen hƗ·ik completely covering their bodies with the exception of one eye. Men 
wear either the white gandoura gown or baggy trousers with a low crotch and a 
shirt, as well as a white skullcap. This dress varies little (although elders complain 
that the youth are increasingly refusing to comply with dress norms), creating an 
impressive sight when Mozabites gather outside the mosque for the regular five 
prayers, most of which are followed without fail by individuals over 12 years old. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The qsar of Beni Isguen. (23/09/13) 
 
The qsar of Beni Isguen 
Within the town of Beni Isguen, my primary site of research, reside about 7,000 
Mozabites (see Figure 4.3). The town sits on a hill with the watch tower of Sheikh 
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Belhadj, named Boulila, uppermost. Next is the central mosque, around which the 
core living space exists in concentric circles. Originally these were arranged with 
extended family groups, with the cazzƗba living closest to the mosque (Cataldi et al. 
1996). Further out can be found the shops and market place known as Lalla Achou 
(figure 4.5). The qsar (fortified settlement) can be entered via the two principal 
doors, Bab Echergui OLW $UDE ¶(astern-IDFLQJ GRRU· LQ WKH VRXWKHDVW DQG Bab 
Elgharbi OLW$UDE ¶western-IDFLQJGRRU·LQWKHQRUWKHDVW$ODUJHZDOOVXUURXQGV
the town. One other large mosque exists near the Bab Elgharbi to accommodate 
outlying inhabitants. The walls have been expanded two times, to accommodate the 
growing population over time. Outside the latter mosque lies the main cemetery, 
made according to austere but visually attractive lines, with multiple arches made 
with date palm branches and white limestone.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Inside the outer wall of the Beni Isguen. (19/12/12) 
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In fact, the majority of the buildings in the old qsǌr are built according to simple, 
traditional materials and dimensions, its soft lines and human scale creating a 
KDUPRQLRXV HQYLURQPHQW )RU WKLV UHDVRQ WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ ZDV GHVLJQDWHG D
World Heritage Site in 1982 (UNESCO 2015). The winding streets are very tall 
and narrow to maximise shade in the desert heat. Islamic principles of privacy are 
built into the architecture at all times, with entrances involving an elbow-shaped 
bend so as to protect the inside from sight, and entrances never facing each other. 
Similarly, windows are small and never exist at the ground level. There are even 
specially built viewing holes from the first floor from where women can observe 
visitors but not be observed themselves (this is common in the Islamic world). Very 
little in terms of furniture can be found within buildings, although niches are built 
into walls for storage. An ingenious window built into the roof allows light to 
penetrate all floors without the need for windows in the walls, while allowing air to 
flow in around the building (Bouchair 2004). Beni Isguen is a minor trading hub, 
where commodities from China and Germany alike can be found in the shops on the 
main road linking Beni Isguen and Ghardaia.  
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Figure 4.5 The central market place where the customary auction takes place in the 
morning, as well as conventional market stalls selling produce from the oasis 
farmers. (03/02/13) 
 
According to Sheikh Tfyish, Beni Isguen was created as a merger of five villages in 
´%XOLRXRQWKHOHIWEDQNRIWKH1·7LVVDZDGL7LULVLQRQWKHULJKWEDQNRIWKH
wadi; Murqui, on the Djebel which now bears the same name, opposite Bounoura; 
Ajennounai, after the dam; and Tafilelt, abovHWKHSUHVHQWWRZQµ3DYDUG: 12). 
This resulted in the consolidated qsar that can be seen today. Beni Isguen is known 
locally to be the most conservative of all the Mozabite towns, retaining many 
customs and practices such as dress and religious observations. Subsequently it was 
looked to by the others qsǌr as a source of heritage, such as in the reformulation of 
,EDGLWH OHJDO FRGHV ,QGHHG VRPH FODLP WKDW WKH 0·]DE DV D ZKROH VHUYHV DV D
repository of values for Algerian society as a whole (Hadj-Nacer 2011: 6).  
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The oasis 
 
Figure 4.6 The author inside the oasis. (14/02/13) 
 
The adjoining oasis of Beni Isguen is approximately 200 hectares, containing 
around 26,000 date palms, with approximately 1000 individual plots. It is divided 
into 16 cartiers (see figure 4.7). A growing number of these plots contain houses due 
to the spilling over of urban growth into the agricultural area, although some plots 
do not. Plots may increase or diminish in size according to division with inheritance 
over generations, or with accumulation and fusion of several plots by those who can 
afford it, although this is rarer. Plots are usually around half a hectare in size, and 
are comprised of date palms (on average about 5 varieties, mostly bint aqbela, ghars, 
dela, temjouhert and deglet nour, and often two or three less commons varieties) as the 
general over-story for shade, grape vines which are also commonly shaped for 
shade, orange trees, figs, lemons are common. Ground crops are generally herbs 
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such as mint for brewing in tea, rosemary for cooking, and flowers such as 
bougainvillea and roses. A small plot with a small house can cost today upwards of 
½ )DUPV WHQG WR EH -5 hectares in size and crops vary depending on 
farming strategy, preference, and how long the farmer has been working the land 
and how intensively. These plots are awarded through government concessions if 
the land has been well managed after five years. Again, date and other fruit trees 
are usual, and intercropping of these trees is common to prevent heat stress with 
the palms, and also wind stress for weaker trees such as oranges. Olive trees are 
becoming more common and several commercial olive presses have been initiated 
locally. Also common is alfalfa, grown for livestock, usually cows and goats. Farms 
often have ground crops, usually under polytunnels for faster growing times. These 
include tomatoes, chilies, courgettes, aubergine, peppers and so on. All gardens and 
farms contain a water basin to provide the necessary water pressure to push water 
through irrigation ditches, which are usually made by digging in the sand with a 
hoe. Most farms have personal, shallow wells, in addition to having access to 
government drilled, deep wells which must be paid for.  
 
The day of a farmer or tree climber begins early, with pre-dawn prayers, and then 
travel to their land via bicycle, foot or car. Invariably, their migrant workers will be 
waiting for them at the land outside the gate, or inside if they slept on the land. 
during harvest time, for example, the climber will select a tree and then climb up to 
the crown without a harness, whispering bismillah (in the name of God) while the 
workers (including myself) would spread sheets15 to catch the falling dates. Before 
HPEDUNLQJRQWKHILUVWFOLPEWKHFOLPEHUVKRXWVRXWORXGO\´RKQHLJKERXUVNQRZ
WKDW ,·P JRLQJ WR FOLPE WKH SDOP WUHHµ three times, so as not to surprise any 
                                                 
15 6RPH RI  WKHVH VKHHWV FDPH IURP WKH PDWHULDO RI  WKH ZRPHQ·V ZKLWH ZRROOHQ hƗ·LN, an 
example, as related to me of  one of  the ways women participate indirectly in the oasis. 
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uncovered women in the local area, for from the top of the tree the climber can see 
quite far into many neighbouring plots. He then prunes any dead branches with the 
aid of a simple rope harness and after leaves the harness again and climbs into the 
crown, attempting to avoid the spines, and begins to cut the first date cluster. On 
dropping the cluster to the ground, he shouts sulley ani bi, and the workers below 
yell back sula alahu alihi waslem (praise be to God and the prophet Mohammed). 
The workers gather the branches and date clusters into baskets and then move on 
to the next tree. The basin tap is often left on for a few hours to irrigate the garden 
meanwhile. A mid-morning break usually consists of milk and dates, and mint tea 
brewed on palm leaves. The work day can continue to either the lunchtime or mid-
afternoon prayers, depending on the seasonal heat, after which a bath and siesta 
take place. The evening is usually a more relaxed period, during which the climber 
may come alone to water gardens, or harvest some ground crops for the markets. 
The day maybe punctuated by visits with owners and friends, who discuss plans, 
politics, recent events and so on. They may discuss what is going wrong with a 
certain tree and what to do about it, or to complain about neighbours. 
 
Agriculture declined in Beni Isguen after the abolition of slavery, as individuals 
mainly preferred to trade, and only a handful of farmers persisted (although 
agriculture carried on in other qsǌr such as Ghardaia and Bounoura). The oasis 
became mainly a place of relaxation for families, as a cool retreat from busy life in 
the crowded town or elsewhere. (One Mozabite man informed me that the oasis 
garden is where Mozabites congregate in small groups, unlike Arabs who gather in 
cafes.) An adjoining agricultural area was developed in 1988 after the government 
granted free land concessions, and agriculture has seen something of a renaissance, 
as rich and poor alike attempted cultivation, with varying degrees of involvement 
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according to wealth. Even those who receive little in return in terms of produce 
clearly benefitted otherwise in symbolic capital, in terms of companionship and 
status from owning land and palms. 
 
Figure 4.7 Map of Beni Isguen oasis and cartiers. These are: 1) Inghid, 2) 
Bouchemjen, 3) Bahmed ou Musa, 4) Ujujen, 5) Bahmed Kesi, 6) Teriyaki, 7) 
7LULFKLQH$DPRXG7OHW0DUJKRXE%HVHO¶$EVKD7LNDEOLQH
14) Tejbeselit, 15) Zaliga, 16) Ntissa. Source: Google Earth (12/02/15) 
 
The Ronarts give a sense of agricultural life in the oasis during in the mid-
twentieth century: 
 
In centuries of hard work they created palm groves of nearly 300,000 palm 
trees irrigated by a dense network of channels under the monotonous 
gUDWLQJVRXQGRIWKHSXOOH\DQGFRUGVWKH´VRQJRIZDGL0]DEµZKLFKNHSW
in ceaseless motion by donkeys and camels, take up in leather buckets the 
water of some 3,000 wells over 200 feet deep. These plantations requiring 
an enormous investment of work and energy are not to be regarded, 
however, from the point of view of economic returns; in fact their 
maintenance is made possible only by the gains of the Mozabite merchants 
established in the towns all over Algeria. [in Bennoune 1986: 108]  
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Figure 4.8 Plumbers repairing an immersion pump in an artisanal well. (29/10/13) 
 
Today, these wells are no longer drawn by animal, but by immersion pump16 
(figure 4.8), ZKLFKDUULYHGLQWKH0·]DELQZLWKWKHintroduction of electricity 
and other infrastructure by the French administration 7KXV WKH ´VRQJ RI ZDGL
0]DEµLVQRORQJHUKHDUG:HOOVZHUHWKHFUXFLDOa priori LQQRYDWLRQLQWKH0·]DE
necessary for sustained inhabitation. Some of these wells in the oued (North African 
form of Arab. wadi, ¶ULYHU EHG· ZHUH about 20 m deep, yet on the rocky hilltops 
where the dwellings were placed wells could be 45 m deep. These, my informants 
asserted, were done by the institution of twiza, communal work, over perhaps 
decades. Whatever the likelihood of this claim, it is also likely, yet impossible to 
                                                 
16 Although the grooves worn by ropes into the hard marble, made by constant pulling 
over decades, even centuries, can still be seen by the wells. 
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corroborate, that slaves were used for this exceedingly hard, brutal work, as in the 
creation of other Maghrebian oases (Scheele 2012: 110). We do know that 
Mozabites were active in the African slave trade not only as financiers (Savage 
1992), but as consumers, although only among the wealthy, according to my 
interlocutors. The oued flooded only irregularly, thus the wells were essential, as 
Saharan agriculture requires almost constant watering especially in the summer, 
due to the intense heat and porosity of the sandy soils. When the oued did flood it 
provided three services: recharging the groundwater aquifers; bringing silt and 
thus vital nutrients for agriculture; flushing away the dangerous (to plants) salt 
built up in the soils from evaporation (and also killing plant diseases according to 
one old farmer). Each well was named, and corporately owned by the immediately 
surrounding landowners. 
 
Over time, an elaborate irrigation system (described in more detail in chapter five) 
was raised to capitalise on the flash floods, needing only minimal interventions by 
the O·RXPQD or water officials (the politics of managing communal resources is 
investigated in chapter eight). This differs from the equally elaborate social systems 
needed to govern water allotment times according to need (or political clout) 
prevalent in other oases that have constantly running water (e.g. Price 1995; Price 
& Brewer 1996). When the first floodwaters were spotted by guards in the watch 
tower in the form of dark clouds, messages would be sent and gates in water 
channels closed so as to direct the first water into the aquifer. Once this was full, 
water would be re-channelled into the gardens. Each garden was surrounded by a 
wall, with an opening on one side to receive water, and another to release it, thus 
all gardens were connected like porous cells, or nodes on a circuit board. Large 
dams such as Sidi Ahbess in Beni Isguen were constructed to help channel this 
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water, but also to gather precious silt, to be added to scarce manure in feeding the 
agricultural soil. Today, a small industry still exists that transports this silt in open 
back trucks from the dam to gardens and farms. Also, several families in Beni 
Isguen oasis own goats, profitable not only for their milk, but for their manure. 
Some, primarily in the new agricultural concessions, also use chemical fertiliser. 
 
Production was organised mostly by small-scale farmers working on their own 
small plots or on the land of wealthy landowners in a feudal-type system of 
sharecropping, or khammƝs. The self-enforced isolation of the Ibadites was not to 
last; even with the ingenious creation of soils over time and a slow rate of 
population growth, the valley could not sustain the population indefinitely. This 
raises the question of self-sufficiency of oases. Battesti (2005) broadly classifies two 
types of oasis: one which is largely self-sufficient, being found on the edge of large 
water bodies such as the Nile, Euphrates and Tigris, or more commonly, as 
dependent on wider trade, whether inter- or trans-Saharan in nature. According to 
the classical hypothesis, these oasis settlements emerged as stopovers for the cross-
desert caravans, beginning in 500 A.D., linking important water sites (Toutain et 
al. 1990: 8). Scheele (2012: 51) argues, however, drawing on Pascon, that virtually 
no oases were ever self-sufficient due to the enormous input and limited, unstable 
outputs of Saharan agriculture. ´2DVHV«RQO\H[LVWZLWKLQQHWZRUNVRIUHODWLRQVµDV
Retaillé puts it (1986 in Scheele 2012: 51). The inputs were for the maintenance of 
complex irrigation systems, such as the fogarra with miles of underground channels 
that begin to silt up as soon as they have been constructed. Battesti (2005: 14) also 
maintains that many western and central Saharan oases can be understood only in 
relation to caravan traffic between the eighth and fourteenth centuries when the 
easier path along the Nile was blocked by Christian kingdoms during the lucrative 
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slave trade. Marouf (1980) however, criticises the idea that oases were merely 
storehouses for nomadic merchants, and I myself have witnessed relatively 
successful, self-sufficient oases in the Tafilalet region of Morocco, where local 
communities organise themselves to maintain water canals, and entire villages 
describe themselves as full-time farmers17.  
 
Indeed, many sources agree that until recently the entire Mozabite community 
migrated from the hot crowded towns during the stiflingly hot summers, to the 
relative coolness of the ghƗba (lit. Arab: forest, meaning oasis), provided by the 
beneficent palm trees. Today, families still sleep on the rooftops during hot seasons, 
and spend time in the cellars during the day, primarily the women and children as 
the men are invariably working in the fields or in their shops during the day, or 
worshipping in the mosque, coming back to eat or sleep at siesta time or night. 
Many now migrate north for the summer to cooler climes, or utilise modern air 
conditioners, while rising land prices in the oasis further preclude second home 
ownership. 
 
4.4 Mozabite community 
Much has been written about the external or abstract forms of Mozabite society, 
architecture and such, but little has been written on the substantive details of 
everyday life. One Mozabite confirmed to me this secrecy from outsiders, ´ZHDUH
                                                 
17 In the Ziz Valley, Morocco, different ethnicities and status groups either associated or 
differentiated from a farming identity. According to local legend, Arabs were said to have 
maintained the practice of  date palm horticulture from its spread from Arabia. High status 
Shurfa (descendants of  the prophet) Arabs had little to do with farming. Berbers preferred 
to do only minimal agriculture, for it was associated with low status. Haratin (former black 
slaves) were also associated with farming, and were previously related to nomadic Berbers 
through a patron-client relationship. Profession of  100% farming did not mean that they 
had no household members remitting wages from afar, but I noted many young people 
working in the oasis who were proud of  their livelihood. 
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happy to give information on general principles, but not oQPRUHLQWLPDWHGHWDLOVµ
Indeed, even Masqueray (1878: 3) conceded the difficulty of doing ethnographic 
reseDUFKDPRQJ0R]DELWHVFODLPLQJWKDWWKH\DUH´WKHPRVWVHFUHWLYHSHRSOHLQWKH
ZRUOGµ18. Mozabite family life is a highly private affair not only from ethnographers 
and other outsiders but also from other Mozabites, as Mozabite men only have 
access to their own family networks, as the viewing of non-kin females is strictly 
forbidden. Indeed, Mozabite females³who arguably have more freedom than other 
North African women as they must manage affairs while their husbands are away 
trading in the Tell regions³have JUHDWHU DFFHVV WR WKH LQVLGHV RI HDFK RWKHU·V
households through networks of friends as well as family. Women also have their 
own cazzƗba and cashƯra or clan meetings, as discussed below. 
 
&DQZHFDOO0R]DELWHVD ¶FRPPXQLW\·"0RVWVFKRODUVXVHUHIHUHQWVVuch as shared 
language, common faith and geographical location to help define them as such (e.g. 
Bourdieu 1962: 44), although probably as they are spread across several towns they 
are referred to as a confederation. This also likely includes the fact that there are 
factions and schisms within the confederation itself, and perhaps refers to (not 
unproblematically) the idea of segmentary organisation. Mozabites themselves do 
self-identify as a religious community, and much religious thinking is spent on 
issues of sociality and codes of behaviour regarding Ibadites and non-Ibadites. In 
terms of political structures, however, the smallest unit is the household. This may 
cover several families under a patriarch. This unit may be eroding somewhat, as 
discussed at length in chapter seven. From this, households are organised according 
to cDVKD·LU (sing. cashƯra), VLPLODU WR WKH FRQFHSW RI ¶FODQ· IURP WKH $UDELF IRU WHQ
cashra 2XVVHGLN   H[SODLQV WKDW WKHVH FRQVWLWXWH ´WKH WUDGLWLRQDOO\
                                                 
18 0DVTXHUD\·V ZRUN ZDV FOHDUO\ PDGH KDUGHU GXH WR 0R]DELWH UHVLVWDQFH GXULQJ WKH
French colonial period. 
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GRPLQDQW IRUP RI VRFLDO RUJDQLVDWLRQ LQ WKH 0]DEµ DQG WKH ´EXLOGLQJ EORFN RI
0]DELVRFLHW\µ7KHVHDUHXVXDOO\Pade up of more than ten families, represented 
by ten male heads, collectively named after a common ancestor. Furthermore, 
´HYHU\0]DELEHORQJV WRDQ cashƯra  by birth, and remains a member of it for life, 
unless he leaves the town where he was born and settles in another city in the 
Mzab. In this case, he must be integrated into another cashƯra. The cashƯra is 
WKHUHIRUHDORFDOJURXSµ)öldessy 1994: 79, in Oussedik 2012: 97). Thus individuals 
are connected to an cashƯra by real or fictional descent. Oussedik again:  
 
a woman belongs to the cashƯra of her father for life; her children will belong 
to that of her husband. As a unit of social organisation, the cashƯra combines 
forms of descent and locality to assign a place to every inhabitant of the 
Mzabi cite, with incomers absorbed through fictive kinship. [Ibid.] 
 
The cashƯra are responsible for assisting the common interest of the group, such as 
marriages, funerals, redistribution of funds and housing for the poor. Redistribution 
may be done through the cashƯra council, or directly by wealthy families to poorer 
ones. This takes place in a building designated for this purpose known as tadert an 
WD·FKLUW (Tumzabt), about once per year. The new building belonging to the At 
Khaled cashƯra, for example, can hold 500 individuals, and 30 families may be 
present at any meeting, with each man bringing his eldest son. Other cashƯra or 
associations may be permitted to use the space at different times. The women also 
have their own separate cashƯra meetings. Each cashƯra is named and has its own 
VHFWLRQ LQ WKH FHPHWHU\ ,QGLYLGXDOV DUH EXULHG LQ WKH KXVEDQG·V cashƯra site, as 
inheritance is patrilineal. Conflict between cDVKD·LU does exist, as described later. 
Beyond this, several cDVKD·LU are grouped into aarǌsh (sing. aarsh) or tribes. For 
example, in Beni Isguen are three aarǌsh, made up of varying number of cashƯra as 
shown in fig. 4.9: 
   
 
122 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Mozabite family ¶lineages· within the cashƯra and aarsh in Beni Isguen. 
 
The aarsh as vestiges of tribal units rarely meet, instead, from each cashƯra, certain 
wealthy, powerful male heads make up the majlis ayyen, the council of notables. 
These deal essentially with administrative issues at the level of the town, and they 
cAVKƯUD 
aArsh 
aArsh 
aArsh 
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form a link in the chain of national governance between local and regional 
municipal councils. Above them is the halqa cazzƗba (today only in moral terms), the 
circle of saints, the clerisy who previously held disciplinary power, who today retain 
moral authority over the community of believers. These are generally made up of 
twelve elected tolba, or religious scholars, including the sheikh, imƗm, the prayer 
caller, religious teacher, etc. They are said to be removed from the material world 
and devoted only to the holy. They are responsible for washing the dead, the final 
rites. Punishment for infractions used to be meted out in the form of tebria, 
temporary social ostracism or excommunication. Today this happens rarely, mostly 
for marriage infractions such as giving more gold in the dowry than the specified 
amount (50g, reduced recently to 30g on petition of poorer individuals), or for 
wedding celebration including illicit musical performances (supplied invariably by 
black Mozabites who retain this differentiating aspect of their historical practice). 
At rare moments, the cazzƗba from each qsar join to form an overall council of the 
Mozabite clerisy, named majlis Ammi Said. Thus, the political organisation may be 
described as a theocracy, even if the power of the cazzƗba is waning. I will now 
explain these organisations in more detail. 
 
Political organisation 
The kinship, clan and tribal units do perhaps confirm rudimentarily to a 
segmentary form of organisation. Briefly, anthropologists since Durkheim (1984 
[1883]) and Evans-Pritchard (1940) (although Gellner (1985) pushes this 
genealogy back, interestingly enough to Masqueray, based on, among other 
Algerian ethnic groups, the Mozabites) have used this principle to describe stateless 
political organisation. Simply put, it describes patterns of allegiance building in 
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times of conflict or dispute (Eickelman 2001: 117). Roberts (2014) provides the 
following description of segmentation as:  
 
The self-regulating interaction of the kinship groups of which they are 
composed at every level of social organisation. Each tribe is segmented into 
a number of clans, each clan into a number of lineages and each lineage into 
DQXPEHURIKRXVHKROGVRUWHQWVDQGDWHDFKOHYHO«RUGHULVPDLQWDLQHGE\
WKH ¶EDODQFLQJ DQG RSSRVLWLRQ· RI WKH YDULRXV VHJPHQWV WKH WKHRU\
presupposing that the segments are of roughly equal size and strength. 
[Roberts 2014: 16] 
 
Segmentation differs from segmentary lineage theory, in that segmentation defines 
the possible forms of organisation, according to cultural values of honour and 
loyalty, whereas the latter, as used by Gellner (1969) refers to a more 
unproblematically observed balancing of political forces (see Hammoudi 1980; for 
refutations of segmentary lineage theory see Roberts 2002; Munson 1989; Munson 
Jr 1991; Munson Jr 1993). 'XULQJ P\ WLPH LQ WKH 0·]DE I did hear of conflicts 
between factions, but I did not witness them. I experienced social gatherings, 
formal and informal according to lineage groupings, however, such as in working 
together in the oasis, or large cashƯra meetings. Meetings and organisation also took 
place that went beyond segmentary tribal lines, however. First, it was described to 
me that religion created a brotherhood that went beyond kinship groupings. 
Further, association meetings took place, such as neighbourhood associations 
formed to take care of issues such as roads, drainage etc. These newer institutions 
bumped up against the remit of the existing traditional institutions, such as the 
cashƯra (the subject of chapter eight, which tackles old and new political 
organisation). Conversely, the Other tended to provoke manifestations of group 
identity: the Shaamba Arabs further down the street provoked notions of Mozabite 
identity, whereas Algeria entering the football world cup engendered feelings of 
affinity with all Algerians, Arab or not, and further issues such as the Israel-
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Palestine conflict for example, promoted notions of kinship with all Muslims. Each 
of these examples involves a sense of opposition in the formation of affiliation, and 
so broadly agrees with ideas of segmentation beyond kin lines to those of wider 
identity. 
 
Ibadite doctrine 
Religious doctrine is imparted to Mozabites from an early age via the madrasa 
(religious school), during daily sermons, and even broadcast from speakers through 
the town after the maghreb or sunset period. Mozabite principles are based largely 
on the conservative notions of Ibadite dogma, derived from two fundamental tenets: 
that all actions are either right or wrong, according to the law of the 4X·UDQ. Only 
two instances may be arbitrated, namely, conflict between man and wife, and the 
case of killing game while on pilgrimage, where compensation must be paid. Second 
is a fundamental belief that all Muslims are equal (as detailed above), and that the 
caliphate should be elected, not dynastic (Alport 1954). The main principles are as 
follows: 
 
1) That the law is laid down once and for all time in the 4X·UDQ, that therefore it is 
essential not only to know the 4X·UDQ, but to understand it; also that prayers must 
not merely be repeated but understood. 
2) That there is only one way of being righteous, any other ways being sinful and 
leading to certain damnation. 
3) That sin can never be expiated or forgiven; and that punishment by the law can 
only have secular and not spiritual or redeeming effect. 
4) That Works are as important as Faith; that sinners are damned whether they are 
true believers or not; and that a man's conduct in this world determines precisely 
his position in the next. 
5) And, finally, that since all Muslims are equal, luxurious living and ostentation by 
some is sinful; that no man can command who is not expressly elected to do so; that 
a man should live soberly and modestly, shunning all stimulants and intoxicants 
including music and dancing; and that he should practise charity and strict honesty 
in his personal and business dealings.  
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These tenets reveal that, beyond a literal interpretation of sin the 4X·UDQ, Work, or 
deeds are as important as knowledge and belief. Indeed, individuals are judged on 
their actions as being hard working and righteous, or lazy and thus sinful. The very 
idea of idleness is anathema to Mozabite values of personhood, as someone useful to 
God and the community, conceptualised as al amena (faithful, loyal). Bennoune 
(1986) clarifies the position of religious interpretation, however, stating that:  
 
since the 4X·UDQ is the word of God created by Him, and the Sunna is the 
political tradition of the Prophet and his close companions, Abu Bakr and 
Omar, the 4X·UDQ and the Sunna are the basic frame of reference of the laws 
and rules governing al-Umma al-Islamya; this fact requires the thorough 
study of the Holy book, the Hadith, and the numerous Ibadite Itifaqat 
(platforms or constitutions).  [1986: 105] 
 
Such interpretation and arbitration does exist, therefore and forms the basis of ¶XUI
(customary law) from which disputes are resolved. Resolution follows certain 
procedures through informal and formal social institutions, as I explain in chapter 
seven. These resolution processes are key to understanding rules centred on oasis 
resource use, such as land tenure law, conflict resolution and individual rights such 
as those forbidding a building from overlooking another. The latter case involves 
material and moral considerations, for overly tall buildings would rob QHLJKERXUV· 
homes of sunlight/shade DQG DOVR WKH IDPLO\·V SULYDF\ ZRXOG EH FRPSURPLVHG
Indeed, many Mozabite rules and norms have a strong moral component.  
 
Sense of duty 
I wish to convey a sense of how strongly lived life was dictated by temporal and 
other obligatory structures, as the emphasis on work and right action above 
indicates. The difference in the ways that we respectively conducted our lives was 
evident from the first time that I entered discussion with my friends at the English 
discussion group. Education had become increasingly valuable to them over the 
   
 
127 
past couple of generations, and they enquired as to my own path. I replied that I 
KDGQ·W HQWHUHG KLJKHU HGXFDWLRQ XQWLO WKH DJH RI WZHQW\-four, upon finding my 
passion, as it were, in terms of vocation and personal direction regarding further 
schooling. Several replied that they wished they were able to take such time to 
choose their vocation, that education was seen more as a duty, than a calling. There 
was a pressure on them by their families, especially by their fathers, to perform well 
in their studies. Some later related to me that they wished that reward should be 
based on effort, not results. 
 
Mozabite daily life appeared initially to me to consist of endless duties. To begin 
with, the majority (over 12 years old) rose before dawn for the fajr prayers at the 
mosque (the women also prayed at the mosque but at different times). After this, 
breakfast would be taken with the family, and then the men would depart early for 
work, the women presumably would cook, wash and take care of the children. Some 
women would shop at the market. In fact, despite the appearance of extreme 
subjugation (primarily due to their personal invisibility), women were visible in 
terms of their presence, in their all-covering white hƗ·ik, leaving one eye revealed. 
Furthermore, they could be seen travelling back and forth unaccompanied by men 
alone or in small groups. This differed from many other Saharan communities, 
where women are rarely seen at all. I believe that the relatively high autonomy of 
ZRPHQ LQ WKH 0·]DE LV GXH WR WKH KLVWRULF DEVHQFH RI PHQ ZLWKRXW ZKRP WKH
women had to run households alone.  
 
At one p.m., some of the men would go home and prepare for the duhur prayer, 
especially if it was hot, and then eat and sleep until the mid-afternoon aasr prayer. 
Many would go back to work for the later afternoon until the sunset, maghreb 
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prayer. Along with the pre-dawn prayer, this was possibly the most important, and 
RQH·VDEVHQce at the mosque would be noted, putting RQH·VYLUWXHLQ question. This 
time also served a social purpose, as men would often congregate outside in the 
cooler weather, a flock of white robes and skullcaps, standing or on the earthen 
benches, until the final LVKD·D night prayer. These regular prayer times punctuated 
Mozabite life from the time of puberty until the grave. I reflected on what it must 
be like to live with such repetitive obligations, but on asking my questioning, my 
informants replied that they felt a real sense of peace during this communal 
worship. It was cited to me more than once the 4X·UDQLFYHUVHVWDWLQJ´WKHJUHDWHU
the number of steps to the prayer congregation, the greater the virtue in the 
KHUHDIWHUµ ,QGHHG 0R]DELWHV ZHUH NQRZQ WR OHDYH ODUJH FRQIHUHQFHV en masse in 
order to pray at the correct times, frustrating foreign organisers. 
 
Individuals were under normative pressure to attend institutional meetings, 
whether attendance at the cashƯra gatherings, or the regular neighbour association 
meetings, and could even be fined for non-attendance. Mozabites of the diaspora 
were expected to send monies home, and the children were schooled on the 
importance of duty and faithfulness to the family (al amena). Even the diaspora were 
expected to return for Friday holidays, and for burials, especially for notable 
persons such as the imƗms. Indeed, I witnessed such an occasion, where 
approximately 3,000 Mozabites congregated en masse for the funeral of the grand 
imƗm in Beni Isguen. The cazzƗba even went so far as to extend the Islamic 
convention of burial the day after death, postponing the funeral for three days until 
Mozabites from Europe and beyond could attend the important event. 
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As well as religion, farmers had another master: the seasons. One palm specialist 
FRPSODLQHG WR PH WKDW WKH\ FRXOGQ·W VLPSO\ GR D VHW DPRXQW RI ZRUN RU JR RQ
holiday when they wanted, and at harvest time I observed the palm climbers to be 
extremely anxious, for the window could shrink if the winds became strong, drying 
out the dates and making their customers angry. These two oscillating rhythms 
dictated the lives of farmers (for prayer times also followed natural cycles of the 
sun, and religious festivals are governed by moon cycles), making their lives not 
their own. Many preferred for God and nature to be their master rather than a boss 
at the factory however, boasting the independence of being self-employed. 
 
4.5 Colonial encounters: eWKQRJUDSKHUVWU\WRSHQHWUDWHWKH0·zab 
After the attempts of two others, Masqueray (1878; 1886; 1995) claims to be the 
first ethnographer allowed to study among the Mozabites. He was allowed access 
to local historical records, later copying it surreptitiously. He primarily focused on 
the document to theorise social ordering practices, and he describes conflict and 
resolution among opposing towns and factions. Gellner (1985) describes him as the 
primogenitor of pre-segmentary theorists. Roberts (2002), however, refutes this, 
stating that while assuming to build on earlier French ethnologists, including 
Hanoteau & Letourneaux, Gellner (1969: 41-42; 1985: 143; 1996: 649-51, cited in 
Roberts 2002) denies the importance of Berber governance institutions such as the 
djemcaa, instead proclaiming a synchronic model which does not hold up to the 
evidence. Furthermore, 'XUNKHLP·VRULJLQDO IRRWQRWH FODLPV0DVTXHUD\·VZRUN WR
be the inspiration for his mechanical solidarity theory in his Division of labour, yet 
Durkheim does not describe precisely how the latter contributed to the former·s 
theory (Ibid.). Importantly, Masqueray also described Mozabite legal norms. There 
is little in the way of direct observations in his writings which instead depend 
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largely on archival documents. These documents may still exist in the libraries of 
Sheikh Tfyesh and the White Fathers in Ghardaia.  Masqueray is an important 
source for understanding previous forms oI JRYHUQDQFH HYHQ LI KH ZDVQ·W FOHDU
about certain aspects such as the sfuf, political parties (Roberts 2014: 138). 
 
Amat (1888), a colonial French medical doctor, provides a more substantial body of 
ZRUN RQ ODWH QLQHWHHQWK FHQWXU\ 0·]DE +LV PRQRJUDSK VKHGV OLJKW RQ KRZ
information was gathered for colonial rule, from local history, economy, even 
highly dubious anthropometric measurements, as well as topography, botany and 
zoology. He describes doctrine at the time, for example, that worldly luxury was 
forbidden and condemned. Adultery, music, dancing, tobacco and alcohol are all 
banned; only a ´KHDOWK\VRXOµLVDOORZHGWRZRUVKLSDQGSUD\Wo Allah. Women must 
be veiled. Importantly for this study, the ¶doctrine of secrecy· or dissociation is 
described as follows: if one must obey the laws of the unbeliever, one must not 
make friends with them. ´,QKLVLPSHQHWUDEOHKHDUWZLOOUHPDLQHWFKHGKLVEHOLHIDQG
KLV GLVGDLQ IRU WKH ZLFNHG RI WKH ZRUOG LWV ERRNV LWV ODZV DQG FXVWRPVµ This 
practice influences how Mozabites interact today with non-Mozabites, and I utilise 
this notion of dissociation in m\WKHRU\RIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOFKDQJHLQWKH0·]DE
(see chapter nine).  
 
According to Amat, following the abolition of slavery when slaves were released 
and told they had to look for work to live, they went back to their former masters. 
Rules about how slaves are to be treated are prescribed in the 4X·UDQ, including 
marriage. Slaves spent most of the time watering the oasis gardens, or labouring on 
earthworks or drilling wells. Amat believed that after annexation, Mozabite society 
would disintegrate due to the loss of free labour. Despite the colonial legacy, 
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$PDW·V ZRUN UHPDLQV WKH PRVW FRPSUHKHQVLYH YLHZ RI 0R]DELWH OLIH DQG
institutions, including details of the workings of the cazzƗba whilst it was still at the 
height of its power, and informed my analysis of political FKDQJH $PDW·V RZQ
prediction of Mozabite social change or degradation was not fulfilled; the end of 
slavery did not bring about the end of oasis livelihoods, although I argue later 
(chapter nine) that while Beni Isguen saw a lull in agricultural activity, people were 
able to adapt by either changing livelihood or using the system of twiza for 
productive labour. 
 
In 1954, Alport was the first British anthropologist to ZULWH DERXW WKH 0·]DE
(producing only a short article and not a more extensive ethnographic work). 
Alport informs us of the geographic origins of the three aarsh of Beni Isguen: one is 
from Sedrata; one is made up of cDVKD·LU from the Atlas; and the third, At Anan, is a 
later group of immigrants grouped together under the same name (see figure 4.8).  
 
/LNHPRVWVFKRODUVRIWKH0·]DE$OSRUWFRQVLGHUVKRZWKLVVRFLHW\PD\EHDEOHWR
VDIHJXDUG LWVWUDGLWLRQDOZD\RI OLIHXQGHUWKHRQVODXJKWRI ´:HVWHUQFLYLOL]DWLRQµ
+H VWDWHV ´,I LW LV WUXH WR VD\ WKDW WULEDO DQG WUDGLWLRQDO VRFLHWLHV VXFFXPE WR
Western influence principally through poverty, ignorance, and inferior 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ LW IROORZV WKDW WKH %HQL 0·]DE DUH SURWHFWHG E\ WKHLU ZHDOWK
education, and privileged urban governmentµ Ibid: 42-43). He finally asserts that 
Mozabites are used to capitalist markets and ¶Western· ways, that it is their 
Calvinist-style outlook that prevents them from accumulating wealth in order to 
gain individual advantage, that their ascetic sensibilities instead guide them to 
employ such wealth in the wider sustenance of the community. I concur with 
Alport regarding the successful generation of Mozabite wealth, however, my 
   
 
132 
research suggests that although redistributive factors are still present (such as 
hƗbǌs, a form of instituted charity), today they are in decline. 
 
%RXUGLHXRQWKH0·]DE 
In 1958, Pierre Bourdieu wrote 6RFLRORJ\G·$OJHULH (translated to English in 1962), 
devoting a section to the Mozabites. Bourdieu was mainly concerned, however, 
with how the Mozabite diaspora, who mostly remain in the North, maintain their 
cohesiveness and their traditional values without being acculturated by the wider 
Algerian society. And further, how capitalist practices can be reconciled with 
devout practices based on pious asceticism? Bourdieu finds the answer to the first 
question in the above mentioned ittifcaqƗt, religious law from which jurisprudence 
finds its principles. He describes how the Mozabite cities are symbolically arranged, 
so as to keep out profane influences, such as having the marketplace on the outside, 
away from the sacred centre consisting of the mosque and family homes. When 
individuals return from trading in the Tell, they must undergo a cleansing ritual 
upon returning to the valley (for an expansion on this symbolism see Benessaiah & 
Calis Forthcoming). He describes for the first time the flexibility of customary law, 
IRUGHDOLQJZLWKFRQIOLFWDQGPRUDOLVVXHV´the basis for one of the most astonishing 
of social successes, and the key to this miracle of combining a completely successful 
adaptation to modern innovations with a total fidelity to an extremely strict 
traditionµ (Bourdieu 1962: 44). Indeed, Bourdieu postulates that the key to their 
success lies in a capacity for modifying or adapting in certain ways, while knowing 
how to maintain their most important values, although unfortunately he provides 
no evidence for this statement. 
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Bourdieu further argues that Mozabite principles paradoxically prepared them for 
´WKH ZRUOG RI the FRPSHWLWLYH FDSLWDOLVWLF HFRQRPLF V\VWHPµ Ibid: 48). Similar to 
Protestantism, as argued by Weber, work is a sacred activity, and idleness much 
frowned upon. Luxury is condemned, and persons are respected for their moral 
TXDOLWLHV WKH GHYRXW 0R]DELWH PXVW FRQGXFW KLPVHOI DV D ´OLYLQJ UXOHµ Ibid: 47). 
Furthermore, as Mozabite customary law contains rules not only on serious 
infractions but on personal consumption, Bourdieu argues that these qualities 
predispose Mozabites toward the accumulation of capital as an end in itself, as 
wealth is not to be enjoyed, and therefore must be reinvested (Ibid: 47-48). 
Moreover, traditions encouraging solidarity encourage family corporate businesses, 
allowing Mozabites to sell at competitive prices due to low overheads. Information 
networks are prominent, and newcomers are offered loans to help them start their 
own businesses. While Bourdieu provides insightful speculation as to the nature of 
how Mozabites are able to deal with change, my own research shows how 50 years 
on, change is occurring at an unforeseen pace. While Mozabites were previously 
able to separate sacred and profane tasks through manipulation of the built 
environment, today the cazzƗba has been unable to stem the global flows of 
information infiltrating beyond the walls into the intimate spaces of Mozabite 
homes through computer and television screens. Along with the integration into 
the postcolonial nation-state, this factor has caused Mozabites to compare 
themselves to the global other, and within the private sphere, such a lack of visibility 
(chapter five) is hard to control by customary means.  
 
Recent ethnographic works 
Following GoiFKRQ·VLQLWLDO(1927) description of intimate family life, Amina Farrag 
(1971) SURYLGHVIXUWKHULOOXPLQDWLRQLQWRZRPHQ·VOLYHVLQWKH0·]DE+HUNH\ZRUN
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describes the internal workings of Mozabite ordering practices, which conforms 
with my own analysis. She gives an alternative view of Mozabite cohesion, 
revealing the mechanisms of social order, particularly among women and how these 
are avoided. She states that women were once considered the safeguard of tradition, 
and therefore were banned from leaving the valley, but due to the wider integration 
RIWKH0·]DELQWR$OJHULDQVRFLHW\ZRPHQZHUHQRZEHFRPLQJ¶PRGHUQLVHG·RQWKH
insistence of men, included in schooling and allowed to leave the valley. However, 
this change was not responded to equally by all women, and thus such values were 
no longer equally shared. Farrag goes on to describe how the cazzƗbat, the female 
counterpart of the male cazzƗba, punished infractions of law by means of 
excommunication. After French annexation and later independence, both religious 
groups lost much power, retaining only moral authority. She states that even 
though perhaps half of Beni Isguen males are under tebria, the younger generations 
tend to ignore it.  
 
The cazzƗbat still has a more powerful hold on the women than its counterpart does 
RQ WKH PHQ ,PSRUWDQWO\ WKHUH LV D ´mutual interdependence between the formal 
mechanism of control vested in the cazzƗbat and the informal mechanisms of control 
such as the power of the mother-in-law, and other controlling factors such as 
gossip, and public opinionµ)DUUDJ,QIDFWWKHPRWKHU-in-law appears 
to be the key actor in surveillance of younger women, providing information about 
inappropriate behaviour to the cazzƗbat. Farrag explains that this control is being 
circumvented due to a social differentiation in status based on wealth, despite a 
stress on egalitarianism and austerity. She divides status into two groups: higher 
status being ascribed to the wealthy such as doctors, large landowners and those 
with multiple shops, whereas lower status is ascribed to unskilled or semi-skilled 
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labourers, teachers, and those with a single shop (these groups were classified 
according to accounts from local individuals). The worst kind of infraction is sexual 
misconduct, as all rules around women are guided toward the maintenance of the 
household, and all women regardless of status are put into tebria for this. 
Ambiguous categories include women going to the (male) doctor, or sending girls 
to the school. For these, the cazzƗbat places women in tebria, yet the wealthier 
women simply ignore it. Either the practices of wealthier women are not revealed 
as they, through the husband, can afford to live separately, away from the mother-
in-law, or they ignore the call for tebria and associate with circles of other wealthy 
women who also ignore the call. Farrag asked women who ignored the tebria if they 
were afraid of going to hell for not repenting (done in front of the cazzƗbat toward 
the end of the tebria, prior to reintegration into the community), they replied that 
´*RG ZDV DZDUH WKDW WLPHV ZHUH FKDQJLQJ DQG WKDW WKH\ ZHUH QRW FRPmitting 
serious offences anywayµIbid: 324). Thus, of primary importance was the visibility 
of younger women, which was more apparent among poorer families with more of 
the extended family living beneath one roof, under the gaze of the mother-in-law. 
 
0DQ\ VFKRODUV RI WKH 0·]DE KDYH FRQWLQXHG WR VWUHVV WKH UHOLJLRXV IDFWRU LQ
providing cohesion of the Mozabite confederation. Bennoune (1986) contests this, 
providing a convincing (Marxist inspired) alternative to this functionalist 
interpretation. Essentially, Bennoune contests what he calls a synchronic cultural 
ecology explanation, whereby Mozabite cultural institutions and practices arose as 
adaptations to their social and physical environment. Instead he argues for a 
KLVWRULFDOO\ FRQWLQJHQW H[SODQDWLRQ IRU 0R]DELWH VRFLDO IRUPV EDVHG RQ ´LQWHU-
VRFLHWDO FRQIOLFWDQGVWUXJJOHµ %HQQRXQH He gives a detailed historical 
description and analysis, citing the egalitarian basis of Ibadism, and the subsequent 
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formation of class differences, based on the need for, and the success of trade by 
Mozabites from the time of Tahert onwards. Beyond the kin and party based (safs) 
categories described above, Bennoune describes social differentiation based on 
original inhabitants of each city, called the Azils, and later immigrants, called the 
Nazils. Further, he shows how the emergence of the merchant class led to the 
growth in power of the lay council, countering that of the halqa cazzƗba. Bennoune 
posits that the rising power of the lay council had its origins in the new ideas 
DEVRUEHG E\ 0R]DELWH PHUFKDQWV LQ WKH 7HOO WKXV FRQWUDGLFWLQJ %RXUGLHX·V
assertions that the core structures could defend themselves from contaminating 
influences from the outside (although perhaps he would argue that this shift in 
power was part of the flexibility in the Mozabite disposition). Thus while most 
scholars ascribe a loss of power by clergy to the influence of French colonialism and 
later independence, Bennoune emphasises internal factors in such political change, 
while not denying some degree of influence of the former. 
 
Algerian sociologist Fatma Oussedik (2012) also explores how despite the doctrine 
of equality, ethnic and racial difference does exists. She centres her discussion on 
the recently revived rite of Baba Merzoug, while providing some background detail 
on Mozabite involvement in the slave trade.  She begins by discussing how Ibadism 
tempers the way in which locals deal with other social groups, creating a certain 
type of distance to be maintained (the doctrine of dissociation). This included the 
regulation of the integration of other ethnic groups into the community, such as 
slaves (see chapter six for a discussion on how recent sub-Saharan wage migrants 
have been integrated into Mozabite society ² or not, as the case may be). She 
concurs that slaves were a necessary part of the servile labour needed to maintain 
labour intensive irrigation works and such in the valley.  
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The Baba Merzoug rite was revived in the early 2000s. Local history tells us that 
sometime during the nineteenth century, seven black Ibadite men requested white 
wives from the leader of the community. Not able to deny them openly, they took 
them out into a barren valley, and there they were shot. The rite is now celebrated 
DW WKH PHQ·V WRPE ZLWK VHSDUDWH FHUHPRQLHV IRU PHQ DQG ZRPHQ 7KH HYHQW
consists of singing and dancing to the rhythm of tambourine and flute, and the 
dancers enter a trance, under possession of the jnǌn (spirits; sing. jinn). Based on her 
interviews with black Mozabite women, she found that they commemorate the rite 
in order to celebrate their ethnic distinctiveness; as for white Mozabites music and 
dancing are banned (in principle, if not always in practice, as I observed). They 
claimed that mixed marriages were now more common. When asked if they would 
marry recent Sahelian migrants, they replied no, as they are not Ibadites. Thus, 
black Mozabites differentiate themselves from white Mozabites, but separate 
themselves from more recent immigrants from their place of origins, while claiming 
part of wider Mozabite identity. 
 
Oussedik (2012) further discusses membership to the cashƯra, to which any ethnicity 
may belong, briefly outlining the process of manumission and incorporation into 
white families, from servility to dependency, a practice common across the 
Maghreb. She asserts, on behalf of her interlocutor, that while the state is too large 
and remote to deal with local contingencies, the cashƯra LV WKH ´RSWLPDO VRFLDO
structure, allowing for individual development and a proper balance of rights and 
obligations. (I consider this idea of appropriateness of scale for governance, for 
society as well as oasis resources in chapter eight and nine.) It has, in other words, 
EHFRPH DQ LGLRP IRU ´FLYLO VRFLHtyµ (Ibid: 98). She goes on to state that despite 
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apparent contemporary equality between black and white, mixed marriages are 
extremely rare, and there are no instances of blacks entering the ranks of the 
cazzƗba, the highest local authority. 
 
6R IDU , KDYH XVHG WKHVH NH\ WH[WV RQ WKH 0·]DE WR SURYLGH VRPH KLVWRULFDO DQG
current context in ways which complement and contrast with my own 
ethnographic description and analysis. Finally, in this last section I discuss other 
regional ethnographies which bare relation to my work. 
 
4.6 Saharan and Maghrebian ethnography 
Unlike Morocco, since Bourdieu, anthropological scholarship on Algeria has been 
limited (but see Ben Hounet 2007; Bellil 1999; Goodman 2005; Goodman 2009; 
Keenan 2001; Keenan 2004; Keenan 2013; Moussaoui 1996; Scheele 2009; Scheele 
2012). Therefore I will focus this review on North African oases, and then on key 
ethnographic accounts from Maghrebian anthropology which share similar themes 
with my own work. I then broaden the focus to the Sahara as a sociological region 
instead of focusing on political demarcations. Although livelihoods span political 
borders, these barriers do have an effect on livelihoods, although paradoxically not 
always a limiting one, as will be seen, with informal economic trade.  
 
One of the few published ethnographies of a North African oasis is by Hsain 
Ilahiane (2004). Ilahiane explores the relationship of ethnicity and agricultural 
intensification in a southeastern Moroccan oasis. He puts forward the claim that 
ethnicity is a missing variable in earlier models of agrarian change and 
intensification, such as those provided by Boserup and Geertz. Instead, studies of 
multi-ethnic farming development must SD\ DWWHQWLRQ WR ´KLVWRULFDOO\ VSHFLILF
   
 
139 
GHYHORSPHQWV WLHG WR WKH HWKQLF GLVWULEXWLRQ DQG FRQWURO RI UHVRXUFHVµ ,ODKLDQH
2004: 198). Ilahiane pays attention to the historical conditions of French 
colonisation, political wrangling and a harsh environment. He describes the social 
mobility of the underclass of black Haratine who have exploited relaxed laws 
regarding immigration to France, in order to profit from remittances sent back. 
Such funds were used to buy land, and thus status and a right to vote. Land is 
closely tied to the concept of al asl, or origin, signifying ancestry, law and identity. 
Land ownership was previously tied up by the local elites of Berbers and Shurfa 
(alleged descendants of the Prophet Mohammed), specifically formulated to prevent 
outsiders and Haratine from possessing land. Such developments were in fact 
created by the colonial situation, a rare case of an indigenous social group 
benefitting from imperialism. Thus, Ilahiane theorises that social change comes 
from the outside, and that without external changes local actors would have 
continually reproduced the same social structures. By contrast, while also focusing 
on class, I provide a theory of internal and external factors which interpenetrate as 
GULYLQJVRFLDOFKDQJHLQWKH0·]DE 
 
Other recent works on oases have also come from Morocco, such as an MSc thesis 
by El Jamali (2011) with a focus on understanding the factors that cause people to 
cooperate toward a common goal in Figuig, regarding the politics of irrigation 
management. She uses a commons management framework, pioneered by Ostrom 
among others. She discusses how environmental, social, cultural, economic and 
legal variables are important to the analysis. She highlights how water rights are 
linked to landownership, allocated to each farmer over short cycles of time, such as 
15-day cycles. One of her respondents asserts that the system leaves little room for 
cheating, as each farmer knows his rights and as the framework is small it is 
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accountable and well controlled (El Jamali 2011: 45). El Jamali found that contrary 
WRWKHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPDDQGWUDJHG\RIWKHFRPPRQVVFHQDULRVFRPPXQLW\VPDOO-
scale management of commons by communities is possible, despite social 
inequalities. My own work shows that private property can be just as important as 
communally-held ownership for natural management, and that withdrawal of 
participation can be just as important as cheating. 
 
Crawford (2008) provides an account of how Moroccan High Atlas Berbers, 
manage their natural resources in the face of socio-economic change. Central to his 
analysis are discussions of ideal concepts of equality in the community, compared to 
actual inequalities and power dynamics, which finds parallels with my own 
research. )ROORZLQJ 0XQG\·V (1995) work in Yemen, Crawford departs from 
classical writings on Morocco which traditionally focused on tribes, moieties and 
village assemblies, by arguing that the household is the most important political 
unit (2008: 50). He shows how household demographics are important, in that 
having more offspring allows patriarchs to send children away to the cities to work 
and benefit from their sending back remittances, allowing the patriarch to spend 
more time engaging in politics, if he so chooses. Crawford also reconceptualises the 
local relationship to the state as that of an extended segmentary lineage that leads 
up to the king (2008: 13). 
 
In a recent ethnographic account of a Kabyle Berber village, Judith Scheele (2009) 
combines historical narrative with an ethnographic account of how Kabylian 
identity is shaped by intellectual trends in both France and Algeria. In her 
historical analysis, Scheele shows how Algeria was seen as a sociological testing 
ground for French academics, who debated whether good government could be 
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HQJLQHHUHGRUUDWKHUKDGWREH¶RUJDQLFDOO\·JURZQRYHUWLPHXVLQJ.DE\OLDDVDQ
H[DPSOH RI ¶SULPLWLYH· GHPRFUDF\ 7KURXJK KHU GHDOLQJV ZLWK WKH HWKQRJUDSKLF
material, Scheele skilfully demonstrates the contradictions inherent in the idea of 
the autonomous village, operating within a nation state. She does so by 
complicating notions of space and the expression of social order, presenting land 
rights as categorically rigid, yet practically flexible. In other words, the rules must 
be known in order to bend them, as a tool to defuse social conflicts, for example in 
land disputes, which were finally restored after confiscation by French colonialists, 
only to be then reappropriated by the Algerian state. Scheele highlights the 
ambiguities in denoting boundaries, for example while Kabyles themselves establish 
WKH ¶YLOODJH DV ¶D ´PRUDO VSDFHµ   WKH\ PDLQWDLQ links with the outside 
world for reasons of political influence. Scheele shows that although local norms 
are eroded by outside values causing social change, such values are reformulated in 
ways that make sense locally (2009: 149). This sense of a locally contested 
¶PRGHUQLW\· LV FHQWUDO WR KRZ , IRUPXODWH KRZ 0R]DELWHV QHJRWLDWH DQG PHGLDWH
change. 
 
Moving the focus back to the Sahara, scholars have only recently begun to consider 
the region as a local network of diverse communities, rather than seeing it as a 
barrier to movement between political entities. Rather, researchers such as Scheele 
(2012) have made the case that despite the collapse of trans-Saharan caravan trade, 
oases continue to be hubs within pathways of moving goods, people, and 
NQRZOHGJH HYHQ LI VXFK PRYHPHQW RIWHQ QRZ RSHUDWHV ¶EHQHDWK WKH UDGDU· RI WKH
state. Rather than an impenetrable barrier, thanks to the camel and the date palm 
(and now the automobile and aeroplane), the Sahara is commonly viewed by its 
LQKDELWDQWV DV D ¶OLYLQJ QHWZRUN· PXFK DV RFHDQVFDSHV DUH YLHZHG E\ VHD-faring 
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communities +DX·RID  VHH DOVR %HQHVsaiah & Calis forthcoming). Yet few 
studies have pursued this reformulation of spatial relationships in the Sahara and 
movement between its diverse regions19, though scholars have long recognised the 
complementarity between agriculturalists and pastoralists in the Middle East (Asad 
1978; Barth 1973; Chatty 2006; Marx 1977). Saharan trade may not take place at 
such scales as before, but continues to thrive as an informal economy. Goods from 
transistor radios to narcotics and arms can be found moving along established and 
sometimes hidden networks (Scheele 2012: 4), as well as underground networks 
assisting illegal migrants, war refugees, and those deemed as international 
¶WHUURULVWV·6FKHHOH	 McDougall 2012).  
 
Historically, since the spread of Islam, Saharan movement was largely predicated 
on networks of Islamic scholars, whose interest was as much economic, in gold and 
ostrich feathers, for example, as it was religious (Lydon 2009). Islamic literacy 
spread far beyond Arabic ethnicity to much of Northern and Western Africa, via 
the kin networks upon which trade depended. Indeed, without political structures 
to maintain economic stability, along with shear military might, several scholars 
assert that the Islamic legal framework provided the norms of economic 
relationships upon which trade was built (Ibid.). The trade in slaves was extensive; 
caravans might transport 3000 slaves from the bilad Sudan at a time, and casualties 
were frequent and expected (Naphegyi 1871). This trade ceased only a few 
JHQHUDWLRQVDJRDQGFRQGLWLRQVDUHVWLOOUHDGLO\UHPHPEHUHGE\VRPHLQWKH0·]DE
whose grandfathers were slaves. 
 
                                                 
19 Existing studies are predominantly historical, such as Ahmida (2011); Austen (2010); 
Grégoire & Schmitz (2000); Lydon (2009); and Marfaing & Wippel (2004). 6FKHHOH·V
anthropological study (2012) is the sole exception.  
   
 
143 
A common misperception is that Saharan trade collapsed with the rise of 
industrialisation and shipping by the European powers (Holsinger 1980). While the 
routes of luxury items including gold and slaves shifted to industrial Europe, 
internal trade in everyday goods such as wheat and dates, which was far more 
common than the riskier trans-Saharan trade, continued. Present-day trans-
Saharan concrete highways facilitate considerable movement. Movement of people, 
for example, is far more dynamic than simple push-and-pull factors, such as youth 
being attracted to the bright lights of European cities (although of course this does 
occur to some extent), or fleeing from famine or war. Rather, a combination of 
demographic reasons and cultural factors are at play, so that temporary migration 
is an integral component of domestic economies where wages are remitted back, 
and is also a rite of passage for young men who wish to accrue enough  money 
through temporary work contracts to  become marriageable and form their own 
households (Crawford 2008: 46; De Haas 2008). This movement is common out of 
the Sahel and into Algeria, Nigeria and Libya (De Haan et al. 2002). Scholars have 
only recently been attempting to correct common public perceptions of immigrants 
looking for a one-way ticket out of Africa into the West, by emphasising the 
cultural practice of circular migration by many Africans (De Haas 2001; 2008; 
2010). This is nothing new to Mozabites, however, who have been undertaking this 
migratory practice of trade for centuries, thus sustaining their treasured oasis 
homeland. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, I have laid out the historical and ethnographic setting for 
my research. I have critically reviewed the previous literature on the region and 
found most to be limited either in scope or depth of analysis, especially regarding 
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KRZ FKDQJH KDV EHHQ H[SHULHQFHG E\ SHRSOH LQ WKH 0·]DE 'UDZLQJ RQ %UDXGHO·V
focus on the longue durée, I have aimed to show how ideological tropes have 
survived to the present day, as Mozabites negotiate forces of modernity. Far from 
being overrun by structural change, Mozabites have continued, from the beginning, 
to choose their level of participation in the social and political domains of the wider 
population. In this they have been influenced by the doctrine of dissociation. This 
has involved rejection, compromise, resistance and subterfuge in relation to various 
caliphs, sultans, deys, kings, viceroys and so on. Earlier scholars feared the 
disintegration of Mozabite society, while later writers suggested reasons for their 
persistence despite structural pressures, citing religion, flexible legal systems, and 
wealth as stabilising factors. Benounne (1986) has by contrast drawn attention to 
social change in terms of class differentiation, while Farrag (1971) describes the 
details of how local power has been negated at the intimate household level.  
 
While drawing on these latter two works, in this thesis I give a detailed 
explanation for how change has been facilitated through the strategic integration 
with the Islamic Algerian nation, and catalysed by the ¶Trojan horse· of global 
media. As a result of global media infiltrating the homes of Mozabites, the 
institutional cultural guardians, the cazzƗba, have not been able to rely on 
customary channels of communication and power to withstand and mediate flows of 
change, much as their subordinate officials O·RXPQDare no longer able to control the 
violent flash floods (see chapter eight). The decline in the ability to locally manage 
these social and ecological forces, of global information and values, and of churning 
tides of water, has similar causes. While appearing to be strategically useful to the 
community as a whole, national integration has only benefitted a portion of 
Mozabite society, the merchant class, who have been able to leverage the local 
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displacement of political and legal power to exert their own influence. Yet, today, 
the social glue has not decomposed entirely, and despite economic and political 
integration, Mozabites are allowed religious autonomy (while in the rest of Algeria, 
imƗms are monitored by the department of religious affairs, especially after the 
political violence of the 1990s).  
 
Having situated my study within these theoretical problematics, in the next chapter 
I present a detailed ethnographic account of agricultural activity in the oasis of Beni 
Isguen. I focus on key issues concerning management and governance, largely 
around natural resource management institutions but also informal arrangement 
and contingent practices. My analysis of management institutions and problems 
sets the scene for the three principal issues that I analyse in further chapters (6-8).  
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5. Agricultural praxis in Beni 
Isguen today 
 
In this chapter I orientate and sharpen the focus toward general oasis management 
practice by small-scale farmers in Beni Isguen. The approach is largely 
ethnographic with the intention of giving the reader a broad overview of praxis, 
and highlights socio-cultural change around what I perceive to be the major 
political ecological themes (labour relations, land tenure laws and the politics of 
irrigation) to which I subject a more rigorous analysis in the following three 
chapters. The question I will address is whether and how Mozabites are able to 
manage or adapt to these gradual change processes. How and if Mozabites are able 
to collectively respond to political ecological change is largely an institutional 
matter, a tension involving a process of political negotiation between progressive 
and conservative elements, such as farmer associations, the elite merchant class and 
the mosque (chapter eight). 
 
Socio-ecological systems theory all too often presents a functionalist view of social 
adaptation as collective and consensual (Hatt 2013). By contrast, I explore how 
conflict, whether between intergenerational or between powerful groups, can be 
potentially adaptive or maladaptive. In my analysis of contestation, I present how 
socio-economic, ethnic and other sources of friction and mistrust threaten to pull 
apart the collective fabric. On the other hand, a more sophisticated theory of 
conflict is essential to incorporating inequality into social ecological 
conceptualisations, and for this I draw on Gramsci (2000). Indeed, Keesing & 
Strathern (1998: 134) call for a new theory of socio-FXOWXUDOFKDQJHWKDW´DFFRXQWV
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for internal dynamics and conflicts, for cultures as shared systems of cultural 
meaning, and for the constraints and pressures imposed by the material 
circumstances of peRSOH·V OLYHVµWhat follows is a composite drawn from focused 
ethnographic study, field encounters, conversations and explanations or analyses 
which highlight the hierarchical and rule-based (authority), intentionally 
cooperative (equity), or individually anarchic (anarchy)20 nature of management in 
the oasis and the historical causality of these different elements. 
 
After reviewing the hydraulic system and built environment I give an illustration of 
oasis agriculture as it is practiced by farmers. I consider economic subsistence 
FKRLFHV LQ WHUPVRI WKH ¶PRUDO HFRQRP\· DV ODLGRXWE\6FRWW (1976). To do this I 
describe empirical farmer practices which may be essential to dealing with the 
unpredictability of non-equilibrial ecological processes, but are also subject to 
cultural preference and to market forces. Such practices require the accumulation of 
ecological knowledge over time and political coordination with other individuals. 
7KLV LVH[SDQGHGLQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQZLWKDYLHZRQFURSVHOHFWLRQDQG ¶WLG\·
farms. I consider the politics of cooperation in the subsequent section, by focusing 
on efforts to reduce inequality and barriers to this effort and I attempt to provide a 
new theory of socio-ecological change that incorporates inequality and conflict. 
Through the chapter I introduce the main problematics centred on labour, land and 
water that I analyse in chapters 6-8. 
 
                                                 
20 As reflected in WKHWLWOHRI WKHVLV $´XWKRULW\$QDUFK\RU(TXLW\"µ$XWKRULW\PD\WDNHWKH
form of  top-down management from the mosque (cazzƗba). Equality means contemporary 
management through farming associations which for the most part, are not hierarchical. 
The institution of  twiza, reciprocal aid (chapter six) can be egalitarian, or top-down, as 
ordered by the mosque. Yet, mutual aid has broken down due to market forces, through the 
introduction of  wage labour to pay for new services, leading to the final category, anarchic, 
or individualised (non-cooperative) management. 
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5.1 Walled gardens and collective irrigation 
Comprehension of oasis management in Beni Isguen today requires understanding 
the background matrix of the built environment and institutional practices as both 
an historical adaptive responses to ecological disequilibrium (infrequent rainfall and 
floods) but also due to strong socio-cultural norms which shape praxis. This reveals 
a view of socio-ecological interactions that is not reduced to functionalist 
explanations. Indeed, farming in Beni Isguen today may be seen as a historical 
intertwining of ecological adaptation and cultural practices. It may be possible to 
unravel some of these histories, as I attempt to in subsequent chapters, whereas 
others may be impossible to unpick, as I discuss over the next few sections, 
especially on crop selection and other practices. 
 
7KHEXLOWHQYLURQPHQWDQG¶DEDQGRQHGSORWV· 
The most obvious initial impression as I walked with Nejib (a local palm specialist) 
for the first time around the winding dusty oasis lanes on a hot October morning 
was the organic nature of how the built environment was laid out. The format and 
arrangement of plots was not subject to pre-planning except that they clustered out 
of necessity around artisanal wells. The plots were walled using the local tǌb, adobe 
bricks from local earth, coated with white or salmon coloured limestone or gypsum, 
as were all the houses and the mosque and the qsar walls, which blended in with the 
salmon coloured limestone valley walls immediately surrounding. This contrasted 
with immaculate azure desert skies, framed by date palm silhouettes, resulting in a 
VWULNLQJSLFWXUHRI¶QDWXUDO·EHDXW\7KHZDOOV prevented prying eyes, in comparison 
with the more open-plan nature of many oases I have visited or worked in 
previously. This, it was explained to me several times, was to protect the modesty 
of families, especially women from being observed, allowing them to be free to 
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work or relax unencumbered by the warm white woollen hƗ·ik covering (see also 
Hoffman (2007: 6) for a discussion of walls in another Berber context, in the sense 
of material and symbolic gendered boundaries).  
 
 
Figure 5.1 Walking through oasis lanes with phoeniciculteur Hamza and workers. 
(23/09/13) 
 
During my movement through the oasis, I noticed many barren plots, which 
juxtaposed strongly with the meticulousness of the other plots, which were 
bursting with life. Large sections of the Beni Isguen oasis were without life and 
greenery, replete with rundown crumbling adobe buildings. These were described 
to me as abandonné, locked up in legal disputes. Nejib estimated that out of 
approximately one thousand plots, approximately 40 per cent were abandoned, 30 
per cent were well kept, and the other 30 per cent had mediocre upkeep. This 
estimate was supported by my observations in the oasis. 
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Customary procedures exist within the community to deal with conflict, beginning 
with informal resolution at the family level, and ending with the cazzƗba at the 
village level. Now, a parallel legal body of codes exists at the state level, the code 
civil, following French introduction, with mixed results for conflict resolution at the 
local level and in reference to ¶XUI, customary law. These abandonné events, taken en 
masse, are explored using event analysis in chapter seven. The analysis draws on 
local knowledge of ¶XUIFRGHFLYLO and other social changes such as at the household 
level, drawing on concepts and themes from legal anthropology. 
 
The irrigation system 
On further exploration through the winding pathways, most remarkable was the 
complex irrigations system, set up many generations ago by Mozabite engineers. 
The irrigation system was laboriously engineered in a hard, dry valley with no 
apparent access to water. 7KH0·zab valley was originally chosen for security and 
seclusion for Mozabites to perform their chosen form of religious practice, 
undisturbed by marauders or other political and religious ideologies that might 
contaminate the sanctity of Mozabite life. Thus, with great labour, the first wells 
were dug in the agricultural low lying area, in the hard limestone rock, to around 
25m depth. The wells near the homes were of even greater depth, as these were 
built on the high ground, on the hills, for reasons of fortification. The soil was 
extremely poor in the region for growing food. Eventually, large dams were built, 
not just to capture the infrequent flash flood waters, but also to build up the silt, 
used to create a topsoil layer in which to plant crops. Importantly, dams also caused 
the water to filter down and recharge the underground aquifers, refilling wells. 
This infrastructure was probably built through a combination of slave labour and 
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the local system of twiza. Twiza is a common practice of communal, reciprocal help 
centred on farming found in many Berber communities (Berque 1951; Lepkin 2004; 
Bergh 2009; El Jamali 2011), and indeed around the world (e.g. Godoy 1985; 
Sabourin & Sabourin 2007; Jana et al. 2013).  
 
These irrigation systems were continually refined over time through trial and 
error, to become finely tuned to the needs of each individual plot, so that when the 
floodwaters arrived, the appropriate amount of water would be channelled to each 
area, with minimum water loss. /·RXPQD, the irrigation officials, were able to spot 
the flood waters coming from one of the watchtowers, which also served as a look 
out for marauding tribes. A network of these watchtowers was positioned so that 
each could see another. Thus by means of signals, perhaps using a drum or horn, or 
flashing a mirror, individuals could be alerted further down the oasis to prepare the 
hydraulic system. Now, of course, they have mobile phones. Water arriving from 
the mountains of al Bayadh in the east would be channelled first to fill up the 
aquifer. Then it would be channelled by means of gates to the gardens. Each walled 
garden had an opening on either side calibrated specifically to size of the plot and 
number of palm trees within, smaller plots with fewer trees having smaller 
openings to receive less water, and vice versa. Thus, the system resembled a mighty 
circuit board, where water like an electrical charge flowed around the entire 
complex, with minimal interference. All that was needed was to keep the all 
channels and openings clear. This was the duty of each plot owner, but was 
enforced by the water O·RXPQD (see Geertz 1971 for a discussion on irrigation 
politics in Morocco and Indonesia). Nejib informed me that the flood-based 
irrigation system still worked to an extent, but in many areas of the oasis the 
system had fallen into disrepair, due to the presence of other sources of water such 
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as new government installed wells, and to other sociological factors. This lack of 
upkeep affected others, as the system needs all or most parties to help keep 
channels clear. The difficulties of the politics of irrigation are explored further in 
chapter eight. 
 
The built environment of the oasis appears to conform to environmental needs, 
such as heat reduction through an over layer of date palms and using thick earthen 
walls. The physical space serves local socio-cultural sensibilities also, however, such 
as the need for privacy. Walls separate the private domains from the public. As I 
discuss elsewhere, this means that social regulation through visibility is also 
divided, with O·RXPQD governing the outer spaces, and mothers-in-law presiding 
over the intimate spaces. /·RXPQDreport to the secular council, whereas mothers-
in-law must persuade the religious council, the cazzƗba, as to the seriousness of 
misconduct. Therefore, environmental and cultural factors can be seen to be 
intertwined in the physical outline of the oasis. 
 
5.2 Adaptive responses or cultural preferences? 
The everyday praxis of farmers and palm specialists is also governed by these 
factors, combining economic (market prices, labour systems), socio-cultural, 
political (the politics of cooperation necessary for joint works), and ecological 
elements. Contrasting with the uncontrived physical configuration of the oasis, the 
successful nurture of living plants (and animals) under extreme conditions requires 
calculated strategies based on detailed knowledge of ecological processes. Choice of 
what to grow and when was not restricted in Beni Isguen to adaptive maximisation, 
however, as other sociological factors can and do play a strong role. 
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Crop selection: adaption or cultural preference? 
Date palms are central to oasis ecosystems. To ensure good production, they 
require upkeep at key times during the year, including artificial fertilisation in the 
spring, thinning in early summer, and harvest in the autumn. The pruning of fruit 
trees, along with other maintenance means that phoeniciculteurs (palm specialists) 
are well provisioned with work year round. My arrival in Beni Isguen purposefully 
coincided with the harvest season. When not participating in the tasks of the 
harvest, I would survey the plot flora, noting the variety of palms, fruit trees, and 
ground crops. I always noted a diversity of date palms, yet although there are 82 
recorded varieties in Beni Isguen (128 in Ghardaia, and around 500 in the 
neighbouring Touat region), I mostly saw palms from a choice group of 4-5 (a local 
favourite, bint aqbela known for its juiciness, deglet nǌr, a regional favourite in 
Algeria and Tunisia, and usually ghars, dela, temjouhert and one or two others 
recurred). I was prompted to ask the question, was this diversity to cope with 
environmental problems, such as disease for example? Nejib and Hamza, the 
phoeniciculteurs I worked with, informed me that although diversity provided this 
function, it was not the reason people chose these varieties: specific palms were 
chosen primarily for taste, usually sweetness and juiciness21. I corroborated this in 
talking to garden owners, for example, the sweetness of the bint aqbela variety was 
prized above all. Following this, they were chosen for maximum productivity 
throughout the year, by including palms that bore their fruit early (var. ghars, 
around August) and late (var. tardif, December/January).  
 
                                                 
21 Dates are locally classified according to various categories in quite detailed ways, in 
terms of  sweetness, soft/hard, harr/ bƗrid (hot/cold, referring to spiciness) and so on. I 
came to appreciate the variety of  dates much in the same way as a wine connoisseur 
appreciates grapes. Certain qsars were said to have different preferences, for example, the 
people of  Beni Isguen were said not to like the spicy red temjouhert dates, although the 
people of  Ghardaia loved them. 
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Cultural reasons play an important role in selection. For example, you were 
FRQVLGHUHGD¶QRERG\·DQGFRXOGQ·WSURYLGHZHOOIRU\RXUIDPLO\XQOHVV\RXKDGbint 
aqbela dates to give your family at harvest time. One variety of date, tezizaout 
revealed the particularity of Mozabite livelihoods in an interesting way. Generally, 
only men climb palm trees, and as many Mozabite men were away working as 
merchants in the larger cities, this palm which was known to drop its fruit 
(normally date clusters must be cut, not dropping unless it is windy) allowed 
women to put dates on the table during the long absence of the men. As Hamza 
H[SODLQHG´WKHUHLVDVD\LQJWKDW,ZRQ·WJLYHP\GDXJKWHUWR\RXXQOHVV\RXKDYHD
tezizouat trHHDVZKHQWKHPDQLVDZD\WKHZRPDQLVVWLOODEOHWRKDYHGDWHVµ 
 
Certain dates were preserved for heritage reasons also. Arguably, elite land-owning 
Mozabites whose wealth came from outside the land-based production could afford 
to throw money at projects that failed; they could replace trees by buying new ones, 
pay for state well water in times of drought, or simply buy produce from the market 
if their own harvest was insufficient. Again, it could be argued that the 
merchandising practice of Mozabites has been a diversifying strategy over time in 
response to the vagaries of the difficult Saharan environment. Dates do form an 
LPSRUWDQWFRPSRQHQWRIIDPLOLHV·FDORULILFLQWDNHKRZHYHUKLJKFDOFLXPOHYHOV(Zaid 
& De Wet 1999; Al-shahib & Marshall 2003) aid the growth of bones and teeth in 
children for example, and preserved dates can be eaten year round (Al-shahib & 
Marshall 2003). Further, the sharing of dates by the wealthy with the poor, an 
Islamic tithing practice known as zakat, allows for some redistribution of wealth 
while boosting the social standing of charity-givers. 
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Those more invested in full-time (or nearly full-time) farming show more diversity 
and ingenuity in decision-making according to risk; their entire livelihoods depend 
upon it. Decision-making of crop selection and farming methods takes into 
consideration a range of variables: economic viability, market preferences, cultural 
preferences, availability and ecological suitability. Farmers I spoke with often 
started out by growing ground crops, such as tomatoes and cucumbers in poly 
tunnels, in order to receive the returns of a rapid growing cycle. They then 
invested their profits in fruit trees, the benefits of which would not be seen for 
another 3-5 years, depending meanwhile on the proceeds of the ground crops to 
sustain them. When the fruit trees came into maturity, the profits would be more 
significant, especially from oranges and grapes, which have a good market price. 
Date palms are a longer-term investment, maturing after 5-6 years. Ecological 
conditions also play an important part in selection, as intense heat and dry desert 
winds take a heavy toll on plants, not to mention periods of prolonged drought that 
can dry up wells. The wisdom of intercropping is used to create a horizontal and 
vertical vegetative architectural structure, for example to buffer more delicate 
plants such as orange trees with hardier palm trees from desert winds, and also 
protecting against the strong sun from above, the date palm thus creating a 
microclimate for plants, animals and people22.  
 
Stabilising strategies 
Arguably, modern market-based practices and scientific agricultural advice have 
also affected crop selection, driving choice toward maximum productivity. This can 
be seen in crop selection geared toward maximum yield, such as olives, which come 
                                                 
22 In fact, many Mozabites used to own a second house in the oasis, and would spend 
summers there, escaping the heat and noise of  the town during 45-500c heat, showing an 
adaptive micro-migration, now mainly defunct due to access to air conditioning and also to 
rising land prices in the oasis. 
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from the north such as Algiers, and need to be adapted from the very different 
colder, mountainous climate. Older farmers appeared to make different decisions, 
however. For example, one older farmer who had experimented with a drip system 
later reverted to the older, seguia channel-based system. He also preferred locally 
adapted crops. Indeed, risk-aversion may be a more primary, stabilising strategy 
rather than maximising output and thus wealth (which would concur with 
sustainability in terms of resilience thinking, but not necessarily the sustainable 
development discourse) in a harsh and unpredictable environment (an argument 
central to ScotW·V  Moral Economy of the Peasant). Indeed, Scott differentiates 
the moral economy as based on minimising risk involving the maintenance of 
subsistence, rather than geared toward capitalist profit maximisation. This may 
involve relations of mutual aid (Ibid: 167). Scott further argues that when the 
minimum subsistence is not met through interference by the political elite, this may 
result in peasant uprisings and rebellion (Ibid: 3-4).  
 
A principal adaptation to times of great water stress came in the form of a 
relaxation of the rules of collective ownership of wells. Ordinarily, one must own 
land in proximity to a well, approximately a 20m2 radius, in order to be allowed to 
UXQDQLPPHUVLRQSXPSIURPLWDQGRQWRRQH·VODQG6RPHSHRSOHXQGHUPLQHWKHVH 
rules by purchasing a single tree nearby and then running their pump tubing to 
quite far away plots. All wells were named. The number of pumps running into the 
tajdid well that belonged to the wealthy Mozabite ran at about 12 (the maximum 
was usually five). In times of water stress, the emergency rule was that those with 
plenty would give to those without. I noted at the time: 
 
We see a well that has many pumps in it. It was the emergency well in Beni Isguen 
that always had water and the whole village would come to in times of drought. 
Even people from Ghardaia and al Atteuf would get water from there. Its water is 
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sweet. Before electricity, people used to take from it in rotation, 1 or 2 hours at a 
time. Now it is dry, maybe because of all the pumps. To take from a well you have to 
own land nearby, or at least a tree. But people have put in pumps from all around 
DQGQRZLWLVWRRODWHWRWHOOWKHPWRWDNHLWRXWRQFHLWLVHVWDEOLVKHG1RZ1DMGL·V
JDUGHQKDVQ·WGUXQNLQ\HDUV+ZRXOGJHWWKHSXPSIL[HGEut would be worried 
he wouldQ·W be paid for doing it. The garden was once covered in grapes, and now 
DOPRVWDOOJRQH+VD\VPD\EHLW·VWLPHWRIL[WKHSXPSDVWKHUHPD\EHZDWHUDJDLQ
EXW 1DMGL GRHVQ·W ZDQW WR $SSDUHQWO\ WKH father, who was much more generous, 
would pay more to do a better job, but this one is the opposite. There is a large 
double basin above, that piped all the way to Beni Isguen, for free. Now it is empty. 
We come back down and he shows me the old well, takhadimt, and the new one, 
tajdid+·VGDGVD\VLWXVHGWREHOLNHDPDUNHWSODFHKHUHLQWKHSDVWZLWKSHRSOH
pulling water, people farming, etc. now it is the opposite, desolate. 
~ Field notes, 18/09/13 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Tajdid and Takhdimt wells. (01/10/13) 
 
Despite the supplement of state-drilled wells, shortages still occur. Modern 
intensive agricultural strategies rely on stable inputs of water and nutrients. My 
older informants often considered stabilising strategies to be more appropriate in 
the highly unpredictable conditions of the region. For example, when floods did 
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come, they would demolish the ground crops, as the waters could be 1.5m high and 
remain for over a month. Thus, farmers would have to adjust to these conditions by 
having economic buffers such as savings, other work, and borrowing from social 
support networks such as family and friends or wealthy individuals known to give 
saddiqa, OLWHUDOO\¶IULHQGO\-DVVLVWDQFH· 
 
A healthy diversity exists in farming approaches, which are arguably 
complementary. The old oasis is today made up largely of small garden plots 
involving a range of growing intensity. For those with little time to spend 
farming/gardening, the institution of khammƝs, sharecropping, has diverged into 
one based on a money-oriented economy whereby phoeniciculteurs are paid to 
maintain date palms and other crops, as well as irrigation and fertilisation (as 
mentioned above). Some individuals keep goats, selling the manure at a profit to 
land owners, and the milk at the local shops. Others dig up the silt of the primary 
riverbed, oued (river) Ntissa, and sell it by the truckload, also as fertiliser, while also 
helping to reduce silt build-up around the primary dam, ahbess. Such economic 
adaptations thus appear to fulfil beneficial local ecological functions also. 
 
One or two farmers have nurseries, growing local and non-local plants for 
distribution to the local community. Non-local plants come from the north and 
have to be adapted to the local arid climate over a period, depending on the plant 
species. This practice can have potentially non-adaptive long-term consequences, 
however. Dairy farming has also recently been introduced, encouraged through 
subsidies by the Algerian government due to a lack of national milk production, 
some of which has to be imported. Some argue that this has a negative effect on the 
ORFDO FRPPXQLW\·V ZDWHU VXSSO\ as a whole. Cattle are highly water intensive, 
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requiring the supplementation of green crops that require frequent irrigation.  
Thus some farmers argue that dairy farming in the desert draws unsustainably 
from the aquifer. The aquifer is only replenished from distant rains, and Beni 
Isguen is regarded locally as being in a state of drought since 2011. Attempts at 
introducing apiculture have also been unsuccessful, as bees are extremely sensitive 
to environmental conditions (Robinson & Huang 1998) with colonies being brought 
from mountainous regions. 
 
Not all traditional agricultural methods are necessarily adaptive; they may be 
maladaptive but not debilitating (lowering potential production), or neutral. 
Another seemingly maladaptive practice, to my mind, was the act of leaving soil 
bare, allowing soil erosion by wind and sun, and the compacting of soil structure. 
After considerable investigation and reflection, I came to theorise that rather than 
having a functional, ecological explanation, bare soil was due to cultural, historical 
and social reasons. Mozabites and other oasis dwellers value the aesthetic 
DSSHDUDQFH RI D ¶FOHDQ· RDVLV JDUGHQ RU IDUP &OHDQOLQHVV RI RQH·V JDUGHQ VKRZ·V
RQH·VGLOLJHQFHDQGKDUGZRUNYDOXHGDQGHVVHQWLDOTXDOLWLHVDPRng Mozabites and 
other oasis peoples.  Further, a clean garden/farm is often compared to a clean 
body, as in the proper trimming of date palm branches and cleaning of karnaf 
(stumps of branches on the trunk) is like having a haircut (Benessaiah 2011). These 
perceptions of cleanliness may have a historical basis. Cooking and water heating 
was done primarily by burning local wood before the introduction of electricity in 
1941. Hamza told me that khammƝs DQGEHIRUH WKDW VODYHVZKRGLGQ·W own their 
own land, needed strategies for gathering excess firewood from their masters. One 
way was to drop palm branches when harvesting in a certain way so that they 
would break and were unusable for construction purposes. They would be allowed 
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to take these broken ones· home. Furthermore, they cleared every last twig on the 
ground to be used in making tea, cooking, ritual and ordinary ablutions. In this 
way, gardens and farms would have had an absolutely spotless appearance. Recent 
generations have reproduced this aesthetic, especially as the family is usually 
brought to the garden on Friday holidays to spend the day relaxing. 
 
Causal analysis of different three farms 
Here I compare three different farms in terms of overall form, by analysing the 
main variables that have affected farmer decision-making. I begin with a less 
conventional approach to farming, followed by comparison with one of the most 
successful farms in the region, and another that was besieged by problems and was 
quite unproductive. 
 
I did find some farms that were less than spotless in appearance, such as the farm of 
Mahmoud Ben Saleh (fig 5.3). Mahmoud farmed in a particular manner that is 
likely explained by his relative poverty, buttressed by a particular philosophical 
outlook. Mahmoud cannot afford to pay a number of full-time workers as others do, 
employing migrant economic labourers from Mali and the Sahel. Thus, his farm 
appears at first sight to be overgrown and disorganised. On closer inspection one 
can find order, although to fully understand it required 0DKPRXG·V own 
explanations as WRWKH¶PHWKRGLQWKHPDGQHVV·+HRQFHDVNHGPHUKHWRULFDOO\ZK\
he left the weeds growing around the small olive trees (less than 1m high). I 
suggested that they helped prevent the water from evaporating, and also to break 
the wind. He said yes, but also to give form to the trees, so that they grow 
vertically rather than horizontally. Further, he found that his donkey would eat the 
weeds around the olive, but not the tree itself, a very suitable arrangement. He also 
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has palm trees of entirely new semi-wild varieties, of average quality that he has 
left to grow as he has not had time to tend them, an unusual state for regular oasis 
plots, but adding to the local genetic diversity. He told me it took him nearly 20 
years of work to see a profit on his five-hectare plot, which he supplemented by 
working as a mason. But he would rather be his own boss.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Messy farm? 
  
Mahmoud started by growing ground crops, as previously mentioned, but he also 
received some mint roots for free from Ammi Bayoub Abess. Mint is a sure-fire 
income winner due to its cultural importance in sweet mint tea; a small patch can 
EULQJLQDERXW½PRQWK)URPWKHVHSURILWVKHZDVDEOHWRLQYHVWLQSRO\WXQQHOV
His strategy now is to grow olives, which are relatively rare in the region, and 
JUDSHVIURP$OJHULD)UDQFHDQG6SDLQ0DKPRXG·VQHFHVVDU\LQQRYDWLRQVEXWWUHVV
my assertions that creativity comes not only, or not even from wealthier farmers 
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who can afford to make mistakes; for poorer farmers the stakes are raised much 
higher, therefore they pay much closer attention to ecological processes and to the 
results of fine adjustments, not all of them intentional. To give another example, 
Mahmoud did not have enough spare time or workers to tend a patch of date palms. 
These grew from seed, whereas to ensure quality, farmers usually plant cuttings. A 
portion of these untended palms developed good fruit, and are thus probably new 
varieties. Further, some of these new varieties may be resistant to palm diseases 
(like the local variety akerbouch, which is one of the very few which resists the 
deadly bayoud disease). 
 
The diagram below serves to illustrate the main variables as factors influencing the 
decision-making process of farmers according to my analysis. These schemata serve 
WRFRPSDUH WKUHH IDUPV LQZKDW IROORZV WKH ¶PHVV\· IDUPRI0DKPRXG%HQ6DOHK
(fig. 5.4), the highly productive farm of Marwan Jabre (fig. 5.5), and the 
unproductive farm of Omar Ben Sheikh (fig. 5.6). I found that the important 
variables were: a) knowledge, both of direct experience and textual, b) financial 
input, c) labour force, d) culture, e.g. interest by the next generation, e) ecological 
factors such as drought, f) markets, g) personal investment, and h) government 
support. 
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Figure 5.4 )DUP$0DKPRXG·VH[SHULPHQWDO¶PHVV\·DJURHFRORJLFDOIDUP 
 
Here, direct experience of the usefulness of weeds buttressed by written 
agricultural knowledge combined with a lack of initial input, little interest by 
0DKPRXG·V VRQVGURXJKWFRQGLWLRQVDQGDQHPHUJLQJPDUNHW LQROLYHVSURYLGHG
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the context for Mahmoud to opt to convert his farm to mainly arboriculture, 
including fruit trees and olives. The presence of weeds and of income to finance 
additional labour gavHWKHIDUPD¶PHVV·DSSHDUDQFH\HWDOVRSURYLGHGWKHVSDFHDQG
impetus for experimentation. 
 
Mahmoud has found techniques consistent with agroecological principles: requiring 
PLQLPXP LQWHUYHQWLRQ DV WKH\ UHVHPEOH ¶QDWXUDO· HFRV\VWHPV EXW EDVHG RQ QHHG, 
careful observation and experimentation rather than any special training. Compare 
this with the farm of Marwan Jabre, one of the most successful farmers in the valley 
(fig. 5.5). Marwan also started with ground crops, moved to horticulture and 
viticulture, and finally added a dairy. He has a team of around 10 unskilled workers, 
plus one foreman from Adrar, allowing Marwan to do other activities such as 
marketing (I was only ever able to find him on his farm on Friday mornings). His 
farm was immaculate, well organised, with areas for cattle fodder intercropped with 
date palms and peach trees, creating a microclimate and increasing production, in 
RWKHU DUHDV JUDSHV ZHUH PL[HG ZLWK SDOP WUHHV DQG RUDQJH WUHHV 0DUZDQ·V
approach required a significant initial investment, thus becoming financially 
sustainable earlier. <HWDVKLVIDUPLVWKHPDLQVRXUFHRI0DUZDQ·VLQFRPHWKLVLV
the reason he has invested so much in it for it to succeed, in terms of drawing on 
multiple source of agricultural information from text books, internet, NGO-run 
courses and government support. )XUWKHUPRUH 0DUZDQ·V VRQV DUH DOO GLUHFWO\
employed by him to run the farm, doing deliveries, caring for the livestock and so 
on. 0DUZDQ·VWUDLQLQJDVDQDUFKLWHFWKHOSHGLQKLVIDUPGHVLJQ\HW0DKmoud also 
engaged in long-term planning, the difference being that his plans took longer to 
manifest.  
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Figure. 5.5 Farm B: 0DUZDQ-DEUH·VKLJKO\SURGXFWLYHIDUP 
 
)LQDOO\FRPSDUHWKLVZLWK2PDU%HQ6KHLNK·VXQSURGXFWLYHIDUPILJ.6). When I 
visited, he showed me all the dying trees, the ground was very bare. His land was 
LPPHGLDWHO\QH[WWRWKDWRI0DUZDQ·VZKLFKUXOHGRXWEODPLQJWKHVRLOIRUODFNRI
productivity. He also had an abundant water supply, and could afford to drill a 
private well. The main difference was that he was a part-time farmer; he was retired 
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and only partially invested his time in his land. He only employed one labourer on 
WKHODQGLQP\DQDO\VLV2PDU·VODFNRINQRZOHGJHFDPHIURPDODFNRILPSHWXVIRU
the farm was not his sole source of income, thus the stakes were not high enough 
for him to do everything he could to make it succeed. Marwan even told me that 
Omar had gone to him for advice as to correct irrigation procedures according to 
QHZPHWKRGVEXW2PDUKDGQ·WOLVWHQHG and now they had fallen out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 5.6 Farm C: 2PDU·VXQSURGXFWLYHIDUP 
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Farms B and C both had high initial financial input, and potential access to 
knowledge. Thus, this factor alone is clearly not a guarantee of success. Drought 
conditions were a constant, and so was access to water. Farm A was more 
successful relative to farm C, therefore I submit that personal investment, in that 
farming was the sole source of income, as perhaps the most important factor (more 
on this in the next section). Farm B was aided by additional initial investment 
(including loans which farm A was unable or unwilling to take on), a large labour 
force, design experience, support by his sons, and government assistance. Despite 
all this, it may be that MarZDQ·VZHOO-organised farm could be maladaptive for the 
community at large, drawing too heavily on the regions delicate water recharge.  
 
Throughout this discussion I have attempted to convey a sense that agricultural 
SUDFWLFH LQ WKH 0·]DE LV D FRPELQDWLRQ of rational, adaptive measures, cultural 
preference, and economic pressure. Indeed, these factors have historically 
intertwined in a way as to make unpicking them perhaps impossible. Such a 
compositional dialectic of environment and socio-cultural practice confounds clear 
anthropological materialist/symbolic distinctions (see Marvin +DUULV· e.g. 1979) 
DQG 0DUVKDOO 6DKOLQV· (e.g. 1978) fierce debate over materialist versus cultural 
explanations of human adaptation. Next, I discuss the sociology of farming with an 
exploration of political issues that the community faces in attempting to collectively 
manage resources.  
 
5.3 Negotiating inequality 
Social theorists in the past emphasised functional dynamics as necessary for social 
cohesion (e.g. Comte; Durkheim), while others have put forward theories of conflict 
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as appropriate to conceptualising change as more important, such as Marx 
(Comaroff & Roberts 1986: 75). Inequality and political difference has not been 
dealt with sufficiently in the literature on social ecological systems. 
Intergenerational friction, for example, may in fact be an important source of 
novelty, through the generation of new ideas, perhaps inspired by modern 
education. Through the jostling of different parties for power, new, more relevant, 
and more ethical praxis may be acquired. It is clear, however, that a degree of 
cooperation is necessary for the maintenance of the communal irrigation system in 
WKH0·]DE)DFWRUVVXFKDVFHUWDLQVKDUHGYDOXHVHQKDQFHVXFKFRRSHUDWLRQOther 
influences, such as ethnic difference, perceptions of economic inequality and even 
political parties all threaten any necessary coherence. As I have tried to 
demonstrate elsewhere (Benessaiah 2011), the tension between conservative and 
progressive elements potentially serves as an adaptive balance in response to 
¶PRGHUQ· IRUFHV ZKHUHE\ FKDQJH LV PHGLDWHG LQ D ZD\ WKDW PD\ EH ORFDOO\
acceptable and appropriate (Watson 2006: 37). Such progressive adjustment would 
therefore be contingent (self-regulation) rather than definable as adaptive 
management, in that it involves overall change that is not directed, but collectively 
contested. In order to get a sense of social difference, I first give an account of class 
in Beni Isguen, while problematizing classical categories. I then present attempts to 
recreate community spirit and overcome inequality, and barriers to such attempts. 
 
5.3.1 Class: peasant and bourgeois farmers  
 
The socio-cultural basis of farming praxis in Beni Isguen is further complexified by 
the political economy of class inequality. Farmers with extra revenue streams can 
invest more in agricultural inputs from the outset, whereas poor farmers are forced 
to invest over longer time spans. Thus, farmers can be classified as part-time or 
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full-time farmers. Rather than ensuring success, however, I observed farmers with 
extra-agricultural income whose farm plots had failed. I argue, therefore, contrary 
WR WKHRULHV RI ¶VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH· (e.g. Glantz 1988: 323), that farmers with no 
insurance are more likely to have successfully productive farms for the stakes are 
higher: they cannot afford to fail.  
 
)DUPV DQG JDUGHQV ZHUHQ·W DOZD\V KLGGHQ DQG IURP ZKDW , FRXOG VHH JURXQG
vegetation was quite minimal. In fact, I used such absence (when I could observe it) 
to indicate whether people were involved in activities more related to agriculture, 
rather than just arboriculture, which is far less intensive. The presence of ground 
crops suggested to me greater time spent in the oasis, as these would need regular 
ZDWHULQJSHUKDSVHYHU\RWKHUGD\GHSHQGLQJRQWKHVHDVRQ7KLVGLGQ·WQHFHVVDULO\
reveal full-time farmers (I found these through networking) but different degrees of 
involvement with the oasis. Farms or gardens skewed towards arboriculture 
suggested less time spent cultivating, as trees need far less upkeep. Such areas are 
more likely to be gardens, and in themselves perhaps reveal an adaptation whereby 
livelihood activities are diversified and thus less time is available for farming. 
 
People were highly educated in local topics such as plant pests and agricultural 
problems. Diverse sets of people were interacting, essentially different classes 
(although they may not use such terminology, such separations clearly existed, 
revealed in how peRSOHGLGRUGLGQ·WLQWHUDFWRULQWHUPDUU\DVZHOODVQRWLRQVRID
rich elite and poorer manual workers) such as agriculturalists (peasants) and more 
bourgeois administrators and agronomists. So-called peasant farmers had highly 
diverse personalities, however, confusing the usual categories of peasant or 
bourgeois farmer, with some agriculturalists who chose to be landless, that were 
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educated, that were involved heavily with political affairs, that engaged in 
international travel to large conferences, who networked extensively, who liked to 
try new things while vehemently defending traditional practices and views. Also 
prevalent were individualists, mavericks who were not interested in organising and 
cooperating with groups, for various reasons (such as a jaded, eroded trust in a 
perceived-to-be morally degrading society). Farmers generally appeared as 
mavericks, who engaged an agricultural lifestyle for reasons beyond a monetary 
one; reasons cited tended to be independence (from having an employer dictate 
oQH·V DFWLYLWLHV, see also Davis 1987: 17), and love of nature. Many enjoyed the 
peace and quiet away from the cities. For some youth it did provide a viable 
economic option with the right training and investment, while others shied away, 
preferring the route of education and white-collar employment. Thus, farming did 
VHHP WR DWWUDFW D FHUWDLQ ¶W\SH· DQG ZKLOH WKH QHHG IRU HFRQRPLF UHWXUQ LV
undeniable, other values are clearly involved for those who choose the farming way 
of life. Sabourin (2000) argues that social benefits can motivate farmers more 
strongly than the socio-economic productive returns, which was supported by my 
own observations. One farmer, Mahmoud, complained of virtually no production on 
his farm of 20 years, but boasted of how all his neighbours would come and eat 
couscous with him, a great honour. I found it a hub of great sociality, hilarity and 
warmth. 
 
Of course, some had no choice and were forced into farming by family 
commitments, but many chose the freedom to work for themselves rather than 
¶VODYH DZD\·XQGHU WKH UD·Ưs (boss) in the factories and industry, which has drawn 
away so much youth labour and talent from oases. I became interested in the 
difference of outlook, strategy and action between those whom I defined as those 
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who could afford to fail and those who could not. Not all could be easily classified 
into one or the other, but locals would point out a difference between a fully 
committed and a part-time farmer with reference often to the semi-mythical old-
time farmers, the ancien fellah, as a constant quasi-real reference point. The point 
was that for the poor invested farmer the stakes were much higher, and he had 
therefore to be more strategic and robust in his knowledge, yet also more 
innovative (see also Scott 1998: 324). 
 
There was often a clear difference between peasant and bourgeois farmers23, 
however, in terms of manual labour. To remind the reader, Mozabite society may 
be seen as classed roughly between poorer manual labourers, and a bourgeois shop-
owning class24. Black Mozabites tend to inhabit more the former category, yet 
many more are now involved in more prestigious roles, such as the honourable 
capacity of imƗm, probably due to recent education and wise investment. Such a 
hierarchy of roles can be found continuously in local history and indeed across 
North Africa in the form of slavery, still extant in the memory of the people. 
Migrant unskilled labourers from the Sahel, especially from Mali, now fill a similar 
role, ironically from the same population pool in the same geographic region from 
which slaves were originally plucked. Interestingly, these newcomers are far less 
integrated than their forebears, their very lack of embeddedness in society making 
them more chaotic and less controllable, creating something of a headache for the 
                                                 
23 These terms are not used locally, to my knowledge, although I did hear use of  the term 
paysan, used jokingly. The conceptual GLYLGHEHWZHHQDIDUPHUZKRGRHVRUGRHVQ·WJHWKLV
hands dirty, (local terms, i.e. the latter being one that employs labourers and does little 
work himself) most definitely does exist, however, although the boundary can vary from 
farmer to farmer. A local metaphor, mentioned below, is in Tumzabt, el bouze edibi telbouzt 
WKH ¶MXLF\ GDWH· ZHDOWK\ GDXJKWHU GRHVQ·W JR ZLWK WKH ¶GU\ GDWH· ORZHU FODVV IDUPHU
however. 
24 A member of  my English practice group in Beni Isguen insisted to me that this was 
becausHPHUFKDQGLVLQJZDVWKHSURSKHW0RKDPHG·VSURIHVVLRQ 
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order-loving Mozabites (more of this in chapter six). The fact is, however, that 
Mozabites rely on them as a source of cheap labour (as they did the slaves in the 
past, I argue), making them what I call a necessary nuisance, that is, an ambiguous 
local category (see also Sidoti et al. 2015). Lack of trust has led to open hostility 
and violence in some circumstances (see the fear of malaria case in chapter six), 
although steps have been made to remedy and formally resolve conflict in at least 
one case (for example in al Atteuf). 
 
These recent immigrants served perhaps to reconstitute a third, lower category of 
person, that of unskilled labourer, and interactions with them were based on market 
relations. The question of a shift to market values and the effect on personal 
relationships is addressed in chapter six. I will explain how competition for workers 
contrasts with the historical practice of shared labour (twizaLQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\ 
 
5.3.2 Socio-political issues and problems 
 
Barriers to equality 
The successful generation of wealth by many Mozabite families has resulted in a 
greatly unequal society (see also Farrag 1971 for classifications). Class divisions are 
hard to overcome. A great divide does exist between the social classes, limiting 
social mobility. For instance, two of my farmer friends³one whom was black, the 
other from a poor family³had been refused marriage to white daughters of 
wealthier families. Excuses were always made, and then the suitor would find out 
that the daughter had been married off to someone else. Farming does not carry 
prestige, even if it is valued in a more distant, abstract ideal regarding local 
heritage.  
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A loss of trust in the traditional local authority institutions has also affected local 
solidarity. Certain figures within these institutions were perceived to be involved in 
underhand practices involving corruption. For example, one farmer related how 
O·RXPQDwould often look the other way if an infraction was committed by a relative. 
Another farmer told me that imƗms were known to own expensive houses, to 
participate in exploitative business practices, and to receive subsidies from wealthy 
individuals, who later expect favours in return. They complained of different sets of 
rules, one for the rich, one for the poor: the rich could essentially do what they like 
and get away with it, as they held the purse strings of those in power, whether the 
cazzƗba, who still maintained social and cultural control, or the ayyen, who held 
political and bureaucratic power. This sense of injustice, especially by the very 
organisations that were supposed to embody the very highest moral standards 
(ironically the word O·RXPQD comes from the root amƯn, meaning faithful in Arabic), 
has served to significantly erode collective trust in these groups. 
 
Although these local authority structures still exist, their ability to project their 
influence has severely waned (which even includes other institutions such as 
patriarchy and the cashƯra). This change has been initiated by a multitude of factors, 
involving mistrust as stated, but also due to integration with the Algerian nation 
since and indeed with access to wider global flows of information with the internet 
and satellite, affecting the youth especially. Despite such institutional breakdown, I 
will try to show how Mozabites are reorganising, with the recent emergence of 
Algerian civil society, through multiple associations, including farmer associations. 
Instead of relying on the administrative institutions of central government, these 
associations appear to be taking on the task of reorganising local people to tackle 
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local problems, including oasis management. Interestingly, these tend to be more 
egalitarian than the older hierarchical political structures, and I explore the 
implications of this in chapter eight. 
 
The problems of cooperation 
Water is clearly the limiting factor in desert environments (Spooner 1989: 129), 
ZKLFKFRYHURYHUSHUFHQWRIWKHHDUWK·VODQGVXUIDFH(Mares 1999: xxix). Living 
in arid areas often necessitates group cooperation, whether to share scarce 
resources, or to be able to do works beyond the capacity of the individual. Such 
needs usually require rules to guide group organisation. Oases generally consist of 
one of three different types of irrigation system, based on either spring water, 
surface water, or (under) ground water. Beni Isguen oasis hydrology utilises the 
third system. The second type of irrigation system also requires constant 
cooperation between groups, who usually allocate water use on a rotational 
schedule, according to proportionate size of land to be irrigated. Such systems often 
involve issues of fairness and conflict. Price (1995; 1996) has investigated water 
WKHIWLQ(J\SW·V)D\RXPRDVLV+HDUJXHVWKDWZDWHUWKHIWRFFXUVFODQGHVWLQHO\GXH
to a perception of unfairness, whereby others are believed to be breaking the rules, 
OHDYLQJRQHGLVDGYDQWDJHGZLWKDVKRUWDJHRIZDWHU IRURQH·VRZQFURSV2VWURP
(2009) has expended considerable effort in outlining factors, such as commonly held 
rules (or institutions), which play an important part in successful community-based 
management of resources. Rosen (1979) however, gives a more nuanced view of 
social relations, showing how negotiation is still important despite the presence of 
rules and norms surrounding kinship ties of obligation. Beyond individual 
communities, potential overexploitation of underground aquifers is a dangerous 
reality in the North African region as a whole (El Jamali 2011).   
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In Beni Isguen today, one facet of water management involves voluntary 
associations. To give an illustration of the type of problems these groups face, I will 
discuss the group named FaddƗn. In the new oasis of Ntissa, the decision of how to 
manage RQH·V land is largely the responsibility of the individual. The presence of 
collective wells, however, requires participating farmers to collaborate, giving rise 
to political manoeuvrings involving persuasion, cajoling and other methods of 
negotiation (see Geertz 1971). Within groups like FaddƗn, a key issue involves how 
to ensure that individuals act in the best interests of the group at large as there is 
no longer recourse to traditional authority to punish offenders. Indeed, some have 
elected not to join collective well associations for this very reason. For example, 
intentionally or not, individuals often neglect to pay their water rates for using the 
well. This results in the water being cut off for the entire group, which will not be 
reinstated until the bill is paid. This scenario illustrates the difficulty within 
egalitarian group dynamics that cannot rely on coercive, top-down management. 
Instead, some sort of equilibrium must be constantly negotiated between the 
various parties involved to achieve a compromise. Such negotiation involves the 
mediation of various interests and values for the different parties concerned. For 
example, for some, the farm being irrigated from the well may be their sole source 
of income. For others, it may be more of a hobby, as discussed above for full and 
part-time farmers. This conflict of interests must be overcome to ensure the 
continued flow of water to crops that would die within days or a week without it 
(for a full discussion see chapter eight). Comprehending such negotiative practice 
may give rise to new forms of theoretical understanding of non-coercive forms of 
natural resource management. 
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Community values 
In spite of such local inequalities and conflict, a strong spirit of cooperation 
arguably does still exist among Mozabites25. I witnessed many instances of 
collaborative behaviour, from associative initiatives to bring in modern agricultural 
research, to voluntary communal work such litter picking groups. Such activities 
seemed to involve a sense of pride in a distinct Mozabite identity and heritage, 
SHUKDSVHQKDQFHGE\WKHGHVLJQDWLRQRIWKH0·]DEDVD:RUOGKHULWDJHVLWHLQ
Local identity is supported through opposed differentiation with the Other - the 
neighbouring Shaamba Arabs ² and most likely enhanced by the recent deadly 
conflict. Furthermore, a value known as al amena exists which can be roughly 
translated as faithfulness. For example, mothers would tell stories to children at 
bedtime where the hero would always be the one with al amena. Today however, 
some Mozabites regret that anonymous satellite television has so easily replaced 
didactic instruction of locally salient values. When satellite first arrived in the 
1960s, the cazzƗba placed a tebria on anyone who brought in the new technology. 
Eventually, everyone started buying the satellite dishes. The mosque still tries to 
JLYHPRUDOJXLGDQFHRQWKH¶ULJKW·ZD\WRHQJDJHZLWKQHZPHGLDEXWPDQ\FODLP
it is not enough to have any effect. 
 
For Mozabites, religious ethics should ideally guide group relations. Omar, a 
student, related that the type of conflicts between neighbours that interested me in 
WKHRDVLVVKRXOGQ·WKDSSHQLISHRSOHDFWXDOO\DGKHUHGWRreligious teachings. In the 
mosque, preaching always involved advice on a correct relationship with God first, 
                                                 
25 Community values based on equality translate into practice in a number of ways. 
Communal property such as riverbed land is managed so as to allow distribution of 
resources to the poor. Here, families ZKRFDQ·WDIIRUGWRRZQODQG LQWKHRDVLVPD\SODQW
palm trees and claim the harvest from them.  
 
   
 
177 
EXWWKHQRQH·VSURSHUUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHFRPPXQLW\, second. Another individual 
complained that people now went through the motions of attending and practicing 
the regular prayersEXWWKH\GLGQ·WUHDOO\KDYH,VODPLQWKHLUKHDUWV0DQ\SHRSOH
often complained that community members were becoming more materialistic and 
individualistic, surely influenced by contact with the ¶West· and that community 
values were becoming eroded. The embodiment of egalitarianism through 
homogenous dress of white gandoura or baggy Ottoman-style trousers, and 
skullcaps, and identically-sized houses in Beni Isguen town is being challenged by 
individuals who are becoming bolder in ostentatious displays of conspicuous 
consumption, as some buildings in the increasingly urbanised oasis could rightly be 
called mansions, and cars get flashier. 
 
7KH XSWDNH RI ¶:HVWHUQ· YDOXHV LV QRW ZKROHVDOH KRZHYHU The disastrous 2008 
flood inspired the new generation of youth, mostly university students, to rethink 
their community principles. Some stated that their parents had behaved wrongfully 
according to an individualistic orientation, which they associated with modernist, 
¶Western· QRWLRQV RI SULYDWH SURSHUW\ ´D PDQ·V KRPH LV KLV FDVWOHµ DV RQH RI P\
friends put it to me, using the English idiom in the English language).  The youth 
felt that reflecting on the actions of the older generations, they must make 
adjustments and revaluations in terms of their collective values. Such 
LQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOSURFHVVHVVKRZWKDW VRFLDO FKDQJH LVQ·WXQLGLUHFWLRQDO WKDWZLWK
the capacity to reflect it may be more dynamic and complex. I return to 
intergenerational dynamics later. 
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5.4 Discussion: A framework of conflict and power for SES theory 
It may be argued that historically, the political organisation of the majority was 
GHWHUPLQHGWKURXJKDXWKRULWDULDQVWUXFWXUHVVXFKDVWKHHOLWH ¶FRXQFLORIQRWDEOHV·
(the ayyen) and especially the theocratic clerisy, the cazzƗba, and to those whom 
power was sanctioned by them (e.g. O·RXPQD). A Gramscian analysis would suggest 
that the hierarchy of this political order, which maintained patriarchy and the elite 
over the working class, women and the youth, was upheld through a manipulation 
of religious ideology, thus hegemony was maintained through the consent of the 
ruled classes. Such a view describes how order is maintained not just by 
domination, such as the threat of force, but through the manufacturing of consent.  
 
Gramsci revised 0DU[·VSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLF analysis to include a theory of culture. 
Specifically, Gramsci provided a theory of cultural hegemony as central to 
controlling the means of production and class domination. In this way, cultural 
hierarchy was naturalised, and people accepted domination. To overturn the 
dominance of the ruling class, then, the construction of a new hegemony was 
needed ² or portrait of the way the world looked. Hence ¶organic intellectuals· were 
important ² those who emerged from dominated classes and could articulate a new 
critical vision of cultural reality to serve as a basis for motivating the dominated to 
¶UHYROXWLRQ· (Strinati 2004: 152²4).  
 
The theory of hegemony can be applied at the smaller scale also, to the theocratic 
rule of Mozabites by the cazzƗba. Indeed, I argue that political change has come 
about through a confluence of internal and external factors. The secular elite has 
drawn on the power of the Algerian state to further its political influence, and in so 
doing has effectively pushed the cazzƗba to the background. This was and remains a 
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delicate process, however, involving the successful shaping of ideology, and as such 
involved acting at the right time. The crucial timing, I argue, was during the 
formation of the new Algerian state in the early 1960s. The new state was 
legitimate to Mozabite society, for unlike the previous French rulers, it was an 
Islamic state. Such a position was not a given within Mozabite society, and the 
debate, as usual, took place between progressives and conservatives. The key 
concern ZDVKRZWRDFKLHYHWKHRSWLPXPGHJUHHRIDXWRQRP\IRU WKH0·]DEDQG
whether this involved more or less political integration and involvement with the 
new state. The progressives appear to have overcome, and in drawing on state 
juridico-political apparatus, have effectively usurped the cazzƗba hegemony. 
Imperative to the stability of the balance of power is that the cazzƗba do retain some 
influence, now relegated to the moral sphere. 
 
If we apply this framework to the collective well associations, it can be seen that the 
egalitarian mode of relations means that compliance is difficult to achieve. This may 
be because of the additional element in the network of relations: the state. In this 
case the relationship to the state does not involve coercive or hegemonic processes 
to maintain agreements, as it simply shuts off the water supply in the case of non-
payment by an individual. It is not interested in continued organisation but only in 
payment. The more spontaneous organisation of the colOHFWLYH EDVHG RQ ¶VRIW·
agreements, i.e. not backed up by the threat of coercive force, means that 
maintaining the flow of water involves a network that can be broken by the weakest 
link. This example can be perfectly transposed onto the maintenance of the larger 
irrigation system for it contains identical political dynamics involving the different 
interests of the different social classes. Those that rely solely on a farming 
livelihood have a much greater interest in maintain the flow of well or irrigation 
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water, whereas generally for the merchant class it is not of great consequence (they 
can afford to purchase food, or even install an additional well). The achievement of 
consent among more powerful individuals is not ruled out, however, with this 
greater individual agency, for hegemony involves not only coercion but persuasion. 
It is still possible to influence non-complying individuals by appealing to their 
sense of (family) honour. For example, another well-respected individual may 
attempt to persuade them to remember their duty to cooperate with the wider 
community. (I discuss these local channels of conflict resolution in chapter seven.) 
These influential individuals may now come equally from the secular council as 
from the religious one, meaning that persuasion is not just religious in orientation 
(the ayyen is now incorporated into the state administration, giving them even more 
local legitimacy).  
 
This framework for negotiating consent, I argue, provides a much more dynamic 
approach to the unstable relations of power that social ecological systems theory 
ODFNV$V*UDPVFLSXWVLWFRQVHQWLQYROYHV¶DFRQWLQXRXVSURFHVVRIIRUPDWLRQDQG
VXSHUVHGLQJ RI XQVWDEOH HTXLOLEULD« EHWZHHQ WKH LQWHUHVWV RI WKH IXQGDPHQWDO
group and those of the subordinate grouSV·(Gramsci 1977: 182 in Nilsen 2015). I 
propose, therefore, that the incorporation of political theory such as Gramscian 
cultural hegemony is needed to address the sociological processes of conflict and 
inequality that are involved in natural resource management. This would then 
elevate the understanding of the social dimension to that already offered by the 
sophisticated SES conceptualisation of non-equilibrium ecological processes.   
 
   
 
181 
5.5 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by showing that local structures and processes, whether the 
built environment or social institutions, are not just adaptive responses to the 
environment, but involve other historical factors such as cultural preferences and 
PDUNHWSUHVVXUHV)RUH[DPSOHWKHQHHGIRU¶VRFLDOYLVLELOLW\·QHFHVVDU\IRUQDWXUDO
resource management contrasted with cultural norms of privacy. Within individual 
oasis plots, the presence of crop diversity may be more influenced by cultural 
factors, which coincidentally serve an adaptive function. 
 
Thereafter, I described the political sociology of oasis management, with an 
analysis of class differences, followed by discussion of the mediation of equality in 
idea and practice. I finished with a suggestion for a new formulation of SES theory 
that includes the Gramscian conception of hegemony. Thus, I have gone some way 
to portraying the productive transformation of oasis resources as involving both 
material and social relations. Next, I go further into an analysis of issues of class 
and ethnicity involved in contemporary labour relations.  
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6. Misunderstanding migrants: 
Coping with unstable labour 
relations 
 
One of the main problems is labour. You train one guy, often from Adrar or Mali, who 
wait [for work] in Ghardaia. Then someone else offers them more money once you have 
trained them and you are left at square one. Or if you know workers who live nearby 
ZKRUHQWKRXVHV\RXFDQJRVWUDLJKWWKHUH0DOLDQVGRQ·WKave agricultural knowledge 
and you have to spend time showing them what to do. There are no local workers from 
Beni Isguen. 
~ Bayoub Abbess, 24/12/12 
 
6.0 Preamble: From Gift Economy to Market Economy?  
The configuration of contemporary labour relations and how they have changed 
over time is one of three major events that have shaped how farming is undertaken 
today in Beni Isguen oasis. I discuss how recent trends related to a shift toward 
market-based practices have affected social ties previously styled upon reciprocal, 
PXWXDOLVHG ´JLIWµ UHODWLRQV (Mauss 2011 [1954]; Gregory 1982) and subsequent 
changes regarding competition and atomisation, affecting the local conception of al 
amena (loyalty or faithfulness). Classical theorising of an inevitable shift from 
gemeinschaft to gesellschaft (Weber 1978: 41 [1920]) does not fit the Mozabites of 
Beni Isguen, however, who rely on old and new institutions to mitigate such 
change, while at the same time embracing a certain type of merchant economy. 
6WUDWKHUQ·V Gender of the Gift (1988) (drDZLQJ IURP &KULV *UHJRU\·V ) 
framework), presents an overly dichotomised distinction between gift economies in 
Melanesia and market economies in the West (Biersack 1991). Along with other 
recent works (Pascon 1986: 20), I aim here to show that the transition is more 
complex, and multiple forms of economic relationship remain (Hornborg 2001: 
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148). Indeed, to some GHJUHHD ¶PRUDOHFRQRP\· 6FRWWKDV returned, due to 
reflection on what happens to local notions of personhood and mutual aid which can 
be lost in narrower market relations. 
 
Although this chapter is about labour relations and wider economic systems, the 
event to be explained is not, therefore, the (abstract) penetration of market forces 
LQWRWKH0·]DEYDOOH\WKHVHDOUHDG\H[LVWHGGXHWRWKHPHUFKDQGLVLQJDFWLYLWLHVRI
Mozabite traders), but the demand for economic remuneration for labour services rendered 
in the oasis, in the form of cash currency, rather than remuneration by (delayed) reciprocal 
labour. This action further entails a rejection of persons through bonded 
entanglement, as relations are instead commoditised. I attempt to explain the 
etiology of these changes by examining the development of modern infrastructure 
by the Algerian state following independence in the 1960s, as part of a broader 
national economic development programme. This is not to claim that such 
development was not locally desired, yet Mozabites have since reflected on the 
negative repercussions of the resulting higher living costs, which, as I attempt to 
portray, has in turn caused the economic rationalisation of (certain) social relations. 
 
My starting point, however, is the problem of unreliability or instability of labour, 
as premised along the lines of competitive jostling between farmers for experienced 
workers, as decried by the old farmer Ammi Bayoub in the above quote. The reason 
that I explore labour instability, is due to its contrast with stated local institutions 
of al amena (loyalty to the group), twiza (mutual aid), and the hard work ethic more 
generally (discussed below), as well as the fact that it was described as a serious 
problem by farmers. I suggest this situation has resulted from the effects of the 
political subordination of the Mozabite community during the colonial and 
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postcolonial eras (despite resistance by Mozabites to the colonisers), and from a 
subsequent drive toward national economic development. I show that state policy 
intentionally drew labour away from agriculture to industry, as part of a 
modernising development drive, although what form of modernity it was to be 
remains the source of national debate (McDougall 2006: 3). 
 
I begin with the present, therefore, by outlining the contemporary labour relations 
in the valley as I observed them. A contemporary problem is that migrant workers 
do not tend to stay. This pattern contrasts with the reliability of twiza labour 
(reciprocal work). Such instability is partly due to the nature of temporary 
migration, but also due to other factors which I describe. Such transience creates 
further problems for Mozabite notions of order and control, as well as revealing 
ideological views towards black Africans. I then explore the proximate drivers 
regarding labour scarcity, including the development of industry and universities. I 
go on to describe previous historical labour arrangements (in consecutive sections 
on twiza and khammƝs) and the events that lead to the transformation of the current 
configuration, primarily the national economic development programme. This is 
followed by a discussion on AlgeriD·V H[SHULPHQWV ZLWK VRFLDOLVP DQG state-led 
capitalism and their relationship to the political interpretation of Islam. I then 
discuss how the 0·]DEYDOOH\LVRQO\SDUWLDOO\LQWHJUDWHGLQWRWKHPDUNHWHFRQRP\
with local farmers on the one hand unable to export their goods beyond the 
LPPHGLDWHUHJLRQGXHWRVWUXFWXUDOUHDVRQVWKH$OJHULDQ¶UHQWLHU·HFRQRP\and on 
the other hand, an attempt to revive traditional gift economy practices at the local 
level. I finish with a critical UHYLHZ RI %RXUGLHX·V H[amination of the economic 
peasant, followed by a discussion of local attitudes to work and the environment. I 
begin, therefore, by presenting an ethnographic view of current labour relations. 
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6.1. Migrant wage labour: a necessary nuisance 
My wife (also an anthropologist, who was visiting for Christmas) had been asking 
Ammi Bayoub what the main problems of farming in the oasis were. He gruffly 
responded´WKHUHLVQRZRUNZLWKRXWSUREOHPVWURXEOHVmushƗkilµ+HZHQWRQWR
explain, however, that labour was a big problem. Further, you would spend time 
training a worker, and then another farmer would come along and poach him. Such 
workers mostly came from a new labour pool in the region, made up mainly of 
Malian migrants, although there were some from Niger, Burkina Faso in the Sahel 
DQGVRPHIURPFRDVWDO:HVW$IULFDLQFOXGLQJ/LEHULDDQG&RWH'·,YRLUH7KH\ZHUH
invariably young and carried their rich, colourful music blasting tinnily from their 
mobile phones everywhere they went. Mozabites referred to them en masse DV´OHV
0DOLDQVµDVGR,KHUHat times for ease of reference, and to echo the local usage).  
 
Migrants as a necessary nuisance 
The Malians appeared to be a necessary nuisance to the Mozabites, with their 
perceived brash youthfulness, lack of awareness of local customs and sensibilities, 
and limited command of local languages (usually a weak form of French was used; 
the majority had not been educated beyond primary school). Yet the Malians 
performed the key services of unskilled agricultural labour such as digging 
irrigation trenches and weeding, construction of the increasing number of living 
spaces now dominating the oasis, and as caretakers to the various second houses 
and agricultural spaces in the old oasis and the Ntissa areas beyond. 
 
3HRSOHRIWHQFRPSODLQHGWRPHDERXWWKHPLJUDQWVVD\LQJWKH\GLGQ·WWUXVWWKHP
they would rather hire a worker from Algeria. Migrants would often be employed 
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to look after oasis properties while owners were absent. With the war going on in 
neighbouring Mali (in early 2013), however, whose border was not far, tensions 
escalated locally. Migrants were attracted to the higher wages paid by the 
ZHDOWKLHU 0R]DELWHV DQG WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ OLHV RQ WKH URXWH EHWZHHQ Whe border 
FURVVLQJDW7DPDQUDVVHWDQGWKHFDSLWDO$OJLHUVLQWKHQRUWK$VD¶ZKLWH·IRUHLJQHU
some people were afraid for my safety and I kept a low profile. On one occasion, one 
of my benefactors, Ahmed, came to visit where I was staying and he heard a group 
of migrants next door. He became agitated and called the owner of the building. 
:KHQ WKH RZQHU DUULYHG $KPHG FRPSODLQHG WR WKH RZQHU ´, GRQ·W NQRZ WKHVH
SHRSOHDQG,GRQ·WWUXVWWKHP,SUHIHUWRKLUH$OJHULDQVZKRVHasl $UDEOLW¶URRWV·
meaninJ ¶RULJLQV· , NQRZ 7KH\ FRXOG EULQJ ZHDSRQV WKHUH DQG VWRUH WKHP DQG
QRERG\ZRXOGNQRZµ 
 
Although they have been coming since the late 1980s, for the Mozabites, the 
migrants still represent an unruly force, a potential threat as they are not subject to 
the local order. This contrasts with populations who arrived from the same regions 
up until only three or four generations ago as part of the trade in slaves, who now 
self-identify as Mozabites. These individuals were completely under the control of 
their masters, uQOLNHWKHQHZZDYHRI¶$IULFDQV·coming now by their own volition. 
Mozabites of West African origin did not associate with the newcomers. They had 
their own unique Mozabite identity, which they differentiated partially from the 
¶ZKLWH·0R]DELWHV by certain practices. I asked one whose grandfather was a slave 
and knew many of the stories. He had no interest in knowing more about his deep 
past ² the only connection he had to earlier roots was his name. 
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The valley was once fully Mozabite, but with the settlement of the previously 
nomadic Shaamba Arabs (over the past century) and subsequent migrants from 
around the country, the original inhabitants have become a minority. Further, the 
PLJUDQWV ZHUH VDLG WR EULQJ GLVHDVHV IURP ´$IULFDµ DV WKH\ UHIHUUHd to the sub-
Sahara region26. I attended a major conference attended by farmers from around 
Saharan Algeria. All the major problems regarding oasis farming were discussed, 
with one workshop for ecological issues, and another for social ones (I attended 
both). That migrant labour was an embarrassment locally was clear, due to the 
complete absence of any reference to this group. In fact, Mozabite politicians had 
been campaigning to have the migrants removed from the old oasis, now an 
extension of the residential area of the town due to increasing urbanisation, due to 
the allegation of some recent thefts. Malian thieves had apparently broken the 
sacrosanct inner chambers of some family homes in the oasis and stolen something 
of value. The powerful politicians diGQ·WZDQWWKHPFRPSOHWHO\UHPRYHG IURPWKH
area, however (as one of my friends cannily pointed out), as Malians were needed to 
look after the extensive lands of wealthy Mozabites (in the Ntissa farming area). 
7KXVWKH\ZDQWHGWRNHHSWKHPDWDUP·VOHQJWKremoved from the locality, but still 
within the margins of the occupied territory in the valley. 
 
Some wanted them expelled completely. While we gathered low-grade dates into 
sacks for animal feed one day, Hamza confided:  
 
Once someone called me at the time of gathering dates. I said we could meet 
WKDWHYHQLQJ7KH\FDPHDQGWROGPH´<RXPXVWQ·WKLUH0DOLDQVDQ\PRUHµ
Why? The ayyen (bureaucratic council) had decided this year that they are 
trouble. I said, ´2NEXWZKR·VJRLQJWRZRUNLQWKHir place? You? The man 
                                                 
26 In fact, some unfortunate attacks on some migrants had occurred recently in al Atteuf. 
Before I left, however, I was informed by a local Christian missionary that a sort of  
reconciliation had taken place between Malian and Mozabite leaders, to make amends for 
such behaviour. 
   
 
188 
VDLG´2NEXWGRQ·WJLYHWKHPVRPHZKHUHWROLYHµ$WWKHWLPH,DJUHHG%XW
how am I going to stop thieves from robbing my house without a guard? 
Who will work in their place?  
~ Hamza, 12/10/13 
 
A tradition of Malian migratory practice 
Many migrants actually had a history of emigrational work and returned to the 
valley time and time again. Migrants from arid Mali and Niger tend to differ from 
other forested West African countries such as Guinea, whose educated migrants 
tend to scoff at agricultural work, and tended to be lazy when they did undertake it, 
DFFRUGLQJWRIDUPHUV7KLVODWWHUJURXSZHUH¶VWRS-RII·PLJUDQWVKRSLQJWRPDNHit 
to Europe for a better life, compared to the Malians who actually had a tradition, 
regarded as something of an initiation rite, of cyclical, temporary migration (de 
Haan et al. 2004). They would work for a couple of years, make enough to set up 
and buy land or a shop and find a wife and start a family. After the long period of 
slavery populations from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso tended to migrate from the 
dry Sahel to the lusher British cacao plantations of the West coast, such as Ghana 
(Konseiga 2005). Here, the local population were known to be jealous of the 
Sahelians as they had a reputation for working hard (the theory being that the 
Sahelian soil took so much more labour to be productive, and even then it was not 
productive enough, hence the necessary emigration). Following the various civil 
wars of West Africa such as in Liberia and the Ivory Coast, the Sahelian migrants 
re-routed themselves back along the old slave routes to Algeria (Johan Miltenburg, 
Père Blanc missionary, pers. comm: 20/09/13).  
 
,ZDV LQIRUPHGE\+DP]DZKRHPSOR\HG ¶0DOLDQV· regularly that they started to 
DSSHDU LQ WKH 0·]DE MXVW EHIRUH WKH 1990s, congregating around la Post. At first 
they used to gather scrap aluminium and ship it back to Mali. Then they realised 
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WKH\FRXOGJHWPRUHE\ZRUNLQJIRUSHRSOH´7KHUHZDVDWLPHZKHQWKH\ZHUHQ·W
here and work was hard. But al-hamdu lillƗh (praisH*RGWKH\DUHXVHIXOµ 
 
Contrasting with Mozabite perception of disorderliness, inter-Malian relationships 
were in fact highly structured, with a headman for each group of the different West 
African countries, who maintained order, guiding washing activities on the Friday 
holiday, and providing general favours based on his connections, with people as far 
away as Algiers, Tamanrasset and Mali. This headman was elected and could call 
on favours, based on his honour, his ability, and his worldly knowledge to fix things 
(Johan Miltenburg, Père Blanc missionary, personal communication, 08/03/13). 
 
The instability of market-based relations  
Some migrants, such as Mohamed, expressed interest in learning tree-climbing 
skills, presumably in order to increase wage levels and employability. Hamza 
UHODWHGWRPH0RKDPHG·VGHVLUH<HWIRU+Dmza there was an issue of trust, he had 
WUDLQHG SHRSOH LQ WKH SDVW DQG WKH\ KDG WKHQ VLPSO\ GLVDSSHDUHG +DP]D ZDVQ·W
always so cynical of the relationship with his workers. In the past, he had a worker 
from Mali named Ali. He spoke with great fondness of Ali, whom everyone knew. 
´$OL UHWXUQHG HYHU\ \HDU DQG ZRXOG WKLQN ahead, and pre-empt your needs,µ KH
UHPLQLVFHG ´7KHVH ZRUNHUV QRZDGD\V WKH\ MXVW GR WKH EDVLF minimum; they do 
thHLUKRXUVDQGWKHQOHDYHHYHQLIWKHWDVNLVQ·WILQLVKHG<RXDVNWKHPWRVWD\DQG
WKH\VD\QRµ:HZHQWRQWRGLVFXVVKRZwage-based relationships devalued social 
relations based on stronger ties of kinship and reciprocal gift-based economies. 
With the Malians, he implied, there is no social capital.  
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Nejib, a palm specialist, also described his frustration with the wage system, yet his 
sentiments exposed ambivalence toward cash payments. He angrily related how as 
a paid worker people felt they could talk to him in a certain way, revealing a 
hierarchy inherent within commoditised relations. Essentially he felt disposable, 
contrasting with the deep bonds of responsibility that still existed within other 
social relationships, such as the qualities of voluntary service to the community at 
large which are still highly valued. On the other hand, he expressed his preference 
for cash, while previously workers were paid in kind usually with produce at the 
end of harvest (I describe the khammƝs or sharecropping arrangement below). This 
new preference is directly correlated with the multiplication of new possibilities and 
responsibilities upon which one can or must spend said cash. I describe next how 
the range of possibilities has expanded as the cost of living has risen and along with 
it, expectations, and I outline the forces behind these economic changes. 
 
To summarise, there was a problem of skilled labour in the valley. Many argued 
that this was the major problem affecting the entire Saharan Maghreb, after water 
shortages. Some migrants did have agricultural experience, but it was apparently 
inapplicable to local conditions. For those that did have know-how, there was fierce 
competition between farmers by means of undercutting, i.e. offering higher wages 
to labourers who had been trained by others, and this was causing animosity and 
mistrust among farmers who previously used to cooperate as a matter of necessity 
(as I explain below). Conversely, there were some, like Mohamed Jebra, who 
insisted that the workers dLGQ·W QHHG WR NQRZ DQ\WKLQJ DV ORQJ DV VRPHRQH LQ
charge had adequate knowledge. He himself had hired a foreman to manage the 
workers. I observed that this involved a lot of micro-management, however, 
simulating a paternal relationship and reinforcing dependence. Perhaps this served 
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0RKDPHG·V LQWHUHVWV EHWWHU DQG KH FXOWLYDWHG LW RQ SXUSRVH , GR QRW NQRZ <HW
when it came to the harvesting of dates, he complained of the lack of experienced 
climbers. The fact that farming had only started in the Ntissa area 25 years 
previously, and the old farmers were dying out, meant that there was a rupture in 
most cases of traditional farming knowledge. This was exacerbated by socialist 
experiments by post-independence governments in the 1960s. New intensive 
farming methods were being picked up, yet some of these are, arguably less 
sustainable in the fragile Saharan environment of WKH 0·]DE 7KXV VNLOOHG
individuals, trained in the old ways, were DUDUH¶FRPPRGLW\· 
 
6.2. Possible explanations for labour instability 
Here I analyse WKHFDXVHV IRU LQVWDELOLW\ LQZRUNUHODWLRQV LQWKH0·]DEClearly, 
Mozabites required cheap labour, and on the other hand, Sahelian migrants were 
looking for work. Why were Mozabite employers so dissatisfied with them? To 
depict this systematically, I work through various possible explanations and 
eliminate those which do not stand up to the ethnographic evidence. Based on 
9D\GD·V VXJJHVWLRQ SHUV FRPP DV WKHUH DUH PXOWLSOH FDXVHV , KDYH ZHLJKWHG
them according to the importance to my informants as based on their narratives. As 
this is a relatively subjective score I have not ranked them against each other, 
although I give full justification through reasoned inference. 
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Table 6.1 Possible explanations and their weighting for labour instability.  
Potential causal event Valid? 
Weighting 
(0 not important ² 
5 important) 
a) Temporary nature of work 
migration (supply) 
Yes 2 
b) Seasonal nature of work (demand)  Yes 3 
c) Lack of trust between workers and 
employers 
Yes 4 
d) Better pay  Yes 4 
e) Lack of fixed agreements, contracts 
or legal recognition for workers  
Yes 4 
f) Competitive undercutting by other 
farmers (poaching)  
No 1 
g) Hourly wage labour system Yes 5 
 
 
a) Temporary nature of work migration (supply) 
The Sahelian migrants had their own expectations regarding the informal working 
FRQWUDFWZLWKWKHLU0R]DELWHHPSOR\HUVVXFKDV¶OR\DOW\·DQGOHQJWKRIHPSOR\PHQW 
(see figure 6.1 for an illustration of how multiple factors interact). When asked, 
migrants told me that they came to make money, to save in order to buy land, start 
a business and save for a dowry to get married. They were essentially young males 
looking to set themselves up in order to prepare for family life back home. Such 
temporary migration is a traditional cultural practice in the Sahel. From the 
0R]DELWHSRLQWRIYLHZWKHIDFWWKDWWRGD\·VZRUNHUVDUHFRPLQJIRURQHWLPHRQO\
and not seasonally results in a lack of emotional investment, in terms of creating 
lasting bonds of affinity, and in terms of training. 
 
b) Seasonal nature of work (demand) 
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The temporal nature of work in the oasis is not only due to workers expectations, 
but also to the way that farming is adjusted to the seasons. There are high and low 
seasons that correspond to intensive labour tasks, and times when there is less to 
do. Much help is needed during the harvest. December, however, involves a lull 
when there is less to do. I spoke to farmers who related the difficulty of keeping 
workers employed full-time and finding tasks for them to do during quiet periods. 
They felt a responsibility to workers, but could not afford to keep large teams, and 
thus perhaps reduced workers groups to smaller numbers. Thus demand, as well as 
supply factors have an effect on the expectations of work migrants. 
 
c) Lack of trust between workers and employers 
The preceding section (6.1) described the lack of trust by Mozabites of the 
¶0DOLDQV·7KLVZDVSDUWLDOO\EHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHPRVWO\XQNQRZQDQGGLGQ·WILWLQWR
the highly normative order of Mozabite life based on conservative ideas of correct 
EHKDYLRXU LQYROYLQJ DV ZHOO GHURJDWRU\ YLHZV WRZDUG ¶$IULFDQV· 7KLV ZDV
FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH SRVLWLRQ RI ¶GLVVRFLDWLRQ· WRZDUG QRQ-Ibadites, described 
elsewhere (chapter four). Some sympathy for these workers was apparent among 
some Mozabites due to the on-going war in Mali at the time, yet this sentiment 
DSSHDUHGXQFRPPRQ'LVWUXVWRIWKH¶0DOLDQV·WHOOLQJO\FRQWUDVWHGZLWKDWWLWXGHVWR
settled black individuals from the same region, brought generations ago with the 
slave trade, who were known and trusted. Oussedik (2012) argues that this is 
because they were Ibadites, but I propose that it is mostly because they were 
IDPLOLDU DQG NQHZ WKH ¶SURSHU· ZD\V WR EHKDYH QRW WKDW WKLV JURXS ZDVQ·W DOVR
discriminated against, but they were accepted as part of the local order of things). 
Finally, WKH¶0DOLDQV· were not included in the local notion of al amena, as they are 
not recognised as belonging to the in-group to whom loyalty is owed, or upon 
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whom the notion of group loyalty is impressed. Conversely, because the Malians 
were looked down upon and mistreated by many Mozabites, they retained 
animosity towards their employers. I witnessed one farmer yelling at one of his 
Malian employees, on hearing he had been sleeping on the job whilst unsupervised. 
The problem was, he employed several Malians, and had no way of knowing for 
sure which had committed the misdeed. A sense of animosity therefore, goes both 
ways, feeding the unstable state of working relationships between the two groups, 
for such ill-feeling encourages Malians to shop around for better working 
conditions.  
 
d) Better pay 
I witnessed quite a high turnover of employees working for farmers and palm 
experts. As well as being motivated by optimising working conditions in terms of 
respectful working relationships as discussed above, Malians were clearly shopping 
around for the best deal in monetary terms. Thus, another factor of Malian 
organisation was the presence of networks of communication, where individuals 
shared experiences of bosses and wage rates. This factor also meant that Malians 
would move around frequently, also destabilising reliability. 
 
e) Lack of fixed agreements, contracts or legal recognition for workers 
Even though migrants were supposed to be officially permitted by the state, there 
was a sense of nervousness and ambiguity among many about their status. 
Furthermore, there was little in terms of agreements between workers and 
employers, let alone fixed contracts. The minimal understanding was that 
employers would turn up in the early morning outside the town gate and choose a 
worker or two from the group who had been waiting there since pre-dawn. If the 
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employer appreciated the work done, he would tell him where to meet him the next 
day, if not he would return to the same pool the next day to choose someone else. 
This situation suited the employers.  
 
f) Competitive undercutting by other farmers (poaching) 
Several farmers, including Ammi Bayoub, pointed to this factor of undercutting as a 
major problem. Although labour was available, workers had to be trained. The 
problem here was that there was no guarantee that they would be loyal to the 
farmer who had spent weeks or months doing the training. Thus, the sense was 
that others were identifying trained workers and offering them more money, which 
the original employees were often unable to match (especially Bayoub). This belief 
belied the agency of workers (factor d), however, and the fact that based on their 
communications they could choose employers through recommendations of others 
(another less random way for employers to find workers). Therefore I give this a 
low ranking in relation to the shopping around of workers. 
 
h) Hourly wage labour system 
The wage labour system itself, compounded by lack of fixed agreements encourages 
competition, and shopping around for the best work situation, in turn causing 
instability of work bonds and loyalty. Further, the hourly wage system - as opposed 
to one based directly on productivity - leads to lack of incentive for individuals to 
work hard, perhaps then leading to the perception by employers that work 
migrants are lazy. It might be suggested that employers prefer not to give a greater 
share of profits, and thus keep them at a controllable, minimum hourly wage. 
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All of these factors play a role, from the expectations of workers to that of 
HPSOR\HUV WKH XQFRPIRUWDEOHQHVV RI 0R]DELWHV ZLWK XQNQRZQ ¶$IULFDQV· DQG
subsequent discrimination all play a part (see figure 6.1). The financial aspect is 
perhaps the strongest factor, entailing a fragile contract involving the receipt of a 
wage at the end RIDZHHN·VZRUN, which points to the nature of market principles 
and values in guiding labour relations. This reveals how the competitive instability 
contrasts with the need of farmers for reliable for an entire season work. This is 
compounded by the informal nature of the contract, where no legal certainty is 
provided for either party, perhaps also revealing the relative newness of farmers to 
the market system of labour. The supply and demand aspects of employer and 
employee also play a role, based on seasonal needs and motivations, respectively. 
The short-term nature of these relationships, compounded by the loftiness 
displayed by some Mozabites contributes to mutual feelings of distrust. I argue that 
competitive undercutting by other farmers is less of a factor, for it does not account 
for the agency and organised networking by Malians, and so I disagree with Ammi 
%D\RXE·VH[SODQDWLRQIRUZRUNHUXQUHOLDELOLW\ 
  
Such transient relations contrast strongly with the long-term, highly bonded, 
obligatory relations formed through twiza, or mutual aid, a notion which is still 
valued in the valley. I suggest that the Sahelian migrants filled a vacuum in the 
valley of cheap labour that was once supplied by slaves. Next, I will try to assess 
what caused this vacuum, prior to the arrival of the migrants.  
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6.3 Economic context affecting declining agricultural labour in the 
0·]DE 
6DKHOLDQODERXUIXOILOOHGDQHHGIRUDJULFXOWXUDOZRUNHUVLQWKHRDVHVRIWKH0·zab. 
Here, I offer an historical ethnographic analysis of the causes of labour relations, 
and the political context that caused significant changes. This labour void was 
caused by several factors. First and foremost, the industrialisation of Algeria in the 
1960s, and with it the creation of factories, drew the majority of unskilled labourers 
away from the rural areas. Indeed, Bennoune (1986) describes how the urban 
population swelled from 3.6 million to 6.8 million between 1964 and 1971. My 
friend Hamza was perhaps a rare individual who, after spending several years 
working in factories, as encouraged by his father, came back to the oasis to work as 
a phoeniciculteur, as he preferred to work for himself, thus re-establishing an 
ancestral lineage of agriculturalists who worked as khammƝs previously to Hamza, 
and before that as slaves. Hamza has adapted the traditional role of khammƝs, 
however, by branching into more commercial relations, such as trading dates and 
fruit trees, and by employing teams of skilled and unskilled workers from Mali and 
Adrar.  
 
Further, the development of the oil industry, headed by state-owned Sonatrach, is 
the major draw as a source of jobs at different skill levels. Djabbir told me that it is 
SRVVLEOH WR HDUQ ½ SHU PRQWK ´VR WKHQ ZK\ ZRXOG , ZDQW WR VKin up and 
down palm trees27"µ,SLFWXUHGWKDWIRU$OJHULDQVVHFXULQJDQRLO MRELVVLPLODUWR
winning the lottery; one could then easily buy a house, marry, and have children. 
This contrasted sharply with actual economic conditions in the country of 
                                                 
27 Thus earning 10 times more than a date palm expert, who can earn around ½GD\ 
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extremely high unemployment, causing many to seek employment transporting 
contraband for the black market28. 
 
Mozabites were becoming more educated29, with more gaining higher education 
degrees since the opening of the Ghardaia University in the 2000s. The first doctor 
graduated in Beni Isguen in 1967. Now, Nejib informed me, fathers do not want 
their sons to climb palms anymore due to the perceived risk30. A tree climbing 
school does exist in Beni Isguen, and I met a young climber named Youssef who 
had graduated and now worked sometimes as a professional phoeniciculteur. Youssef 
ZDVDOVRGRLQJDPDVWHU·VGHJUHH LQHQJLQHHULQJKRZHYHUZKLFKZRXOG WDNHKLP
out of the oasis as soon as he could get oil work. On learning of this school I went 
to speak with Ahmed Cherifi, who ran it. I had unfortunately missed the season, so 
I could not witness the activities, but Ahmed explained to me how the school was 
run. Previous graduates would teach the new cohort of about 10 boys the essentials 
of palm tree climbing. On inquiring how many went on to professional palm tree 
climbing, however, Ahmed informed me that the vast majority did not, that the real 
value of the activity was in the confidence and endurance it inspired in the youth. It 
promoted broad life skills, thus revealing his pupil Youssef to be rare example of a 
youth who actually climbed trees for a living, although that future was far from 
certain. 
                                                 
28 Indeed, unemployment or underemployment has been the root cause of many protests, 
partly held by the union des chomeurs (unemployed), hundreds in the year of 2013 alone, yet 
LQYLVLEOH DORQJVLGH WKH PRYHPHQWV RI WKH VXUURXQGLQJ ¶$UDE 6SULQJ· LQ QHLJKERXULQJ
countries due to a lack of unification, free hand-outs from the State, and general fear of 
UHWXUQWRWKH¶EORRG\GHFDGH·RIWKHV 
29 Education was previously frowned upon by the cazzƗba due to its potential to subvert 
normative, religious thought and practice. 
30 Falling is indeed a risk and a major cause of  injury, due to loose segments on the dry 
trunk. A French NGO named BEDE has been working alongside Tazdait to secure 
assistance from the climbing company, Petzel to aid in designing special harnesses for 
phoeniciculteurs. I witnessed some testing in-situ of  pre-production models. 
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Phoeniciculteurs were becoming a rare breed, and it was necessary to bring skilled 
climbers up from Adrar, although many of these were also drawn away to oil jobs. 
The Tazdait association was formed partly to safeguard phoeniciculteur knowledge 
and livelihoods. I did hear a story, however, that gave more hope for the future of 
these specialists. Nejib told me that once a youth had approached him, who told him 
that although he had never directly spoken with him, the youth had taken the 
confidence from Nejib through silent observation over time, and gradually taught 
himself to climb. This made Nejib very happy, for it was indeed his wish that his 
actions should inspire the next generation. 
 
The urbanisation of agricultural land is a common problem across the Sahara. This 
phenomenon drives land prices up and farmers out. Many complained to me that 
this was a serious threat to Algerian oases, after problems of water scarcity and 
transient labour, and that although there are laws in place to prevent such 
activities, such encroachment is rarely policed. The opening up of adjacent land in 
Oued Ntissa and across Algeria is a state development initiative to encourage 
agriculture and rural livelihoods and has caused more families to take up 
agriculture again. Now, the old oasis consists of mostly small horticultural plots 
with houses, maintained by phoeniciculteurs (local and from Adrar) along with paid 
migrant labour, and a handful of farms. Adjacent to this is Ntissa, with 
smallholdings of two to five hectares, developed gradually by those without 
resources and more rapidly by those able to invest saving or loans, and pay small 
teams of Malian workers. 
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With better pay and arguably better conditions, industry has enticed unskilled 
labour from the oases generally across the Maghreb, and university education 
leading to the emerging professional sector has attracted the intelligentsia, while 
the hydrocarbon sector has attracted both. This created a need for labour in the 
valley which the Sahelian migrants have necessarily filled. As well as a slave-based 
economy prior to abolition in 1848 (although slavery continued for some time, for 
despite VODYH UHYROWV WKH )UHQFK GLGQ·W ZLVK WR GLVWXUE UHODWLRQV ZLWK ZHDOWK\
clients (Brower 2013: 173)), production took place according to a mixed system 
involving both feudalism and mutual aid. I discuss the system of mutual work first, 
and then describe the semi-feudal sharecropping system after.  
 
6.4. Economic transformations 
3ULRUWRWKHLQGXVWULDOGULYHRIWKHVZKLFKGUHZODERXUDZD\IURPWKH0·]DE
oases, work was based on a particular cashless economic form known as twiza. I 
describe now how the need for cash led to the transformation of this former 
productive economic system, and the structural reasons for this change. Twiza 
describes the relations between farming peers. In the following section, I then 
explain the system of khammƝs, which links landless peasants (or landowning 
peasants who wish to cultivate additional land) to landowners. Thus the two 
together describe institutions of labour and property, involving ¶horizontal·, 
egalitarian relations (twiza) and ¶vertical·, hierarchical relations (khammƝs). These 
taken together outline an overall picture of oasis production prior to Algerian 
independence. 
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6.4.1. TwizaWKH¶JLIWHFRQRP\·" 
Returning to our conversation with Ammi Bayoub (quoted at the beginning), we 
continued to ask him about other farmers in the area. He became silent and 
reflective. According to Bayoub, farmers - of which there were only four or five 
now in the old oasis - had now virtually turned against each other in a competitive 
struggle for a scarce resource: VNLOOHG ODERXU <HW LW ZDVQ·W DOZD\V WKLV ZD\
Farmers used to help each other, as Bayoub outlined, for example, to deal with 
drought:  
 
The last big drought was in the 1940s, it lasted 11 years. They dealt with it by 
twiza, by moving water back and forth by donkey. Twiza consisted of working 
together, two days here, two days there. There were about 20 or so farmers in the 
oasis in the past [working in this way] 
~ Bayoub Abbess, 28/02/12.  
 
Twiza was also used to deal with flash floods. On asking him about how many 
floods he could remember, he told me: 
 
%\*RG,ZRXOGQ·WOLHWR\RXµ>LH,GRQ·WUHPHPEHUQRWVXUH@$KXJHRQHFDPHLQ
1954 that destroyed a lot of property. A lot of people helped each other back then, by 
twiza, to repair the houses, clean the cellars etc.  
 ~ Bayoub Abbess, 19/11/13 
 
On inquiring further about twiza people would tell me that there were two forms, 
¶REOLJDWRU\·twiza that was ordered by the mosque, for the communal restoration of 
public works such as a damaged irrigation canaO DQG ¶YROXQWDU\· twiza. The 
following definition of twiza by French colonial ethnographer Georges Colin (1994) 
captures this dualistic sense. Twiza, as Colin argues, involves: 
 
1) The provision of unremunerated collective work.  
 8QSDLG PDQGDWRU\ ODERU JHQHUDOO\ YROXQWDU\ DJUHHG WR E\ D JURXS«
for another group as return for a favor, especially for agricultural work; 
plowing, harvesting, threshing, the harvest of olives, also for building a 
KRXVH« LQ H[FKDQJH IRURIIHULQJ WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV D VXEVWDQWLDOPHDO« IRU
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the profit of the community for repairing a mosque, maintaining footpaths, 
irrigation canals, etc.  
3) A corvée placed on citizens by a qcaid «KHKDV DWKLV disposal in each 
village belonging to the tribe he oversees, a field or large plot of land 
belonging to the state; it is a mark of bondage as unpopular as it is onerous... 
[Sinaceur 1994: 208] 
 
Lepkin (2004) argues that this contradictory sense of twiza lies in a tension 
between a solidary past and colonial coercion. The actual, forgotten history of 
obligatory twiza lies in the orders of the colonial French government for corvée 
labour from a humiliated Algerian population. Based on local texts, the underlying 
rationale for twiza relates to maintaining group solidarity and creating a just order. 
This was complicated as the French attempted to usurp local categories of equality, 
in the professed interest of righting past wrongs, especially the divide between 
landless blacks and landed whites. Yet, for certain categories of outsider, solidarity 
meant resistance against the despised outsiders (Lepkin 2004: 29-30). Using 
Pascon, Lepkin shows how the mutual aid of twiza was originally distinguished 
from kulfa, which was the imposed by the qcaid or the makhzen (colonially charged 
ORFDODXWKRULWLHV'XHWRD´VOLSSDJHµRIPHDQLQJWKHWZRWHUPVEHFDPHFRQIODWHG
Then drawing on Le Tourneau (1978 [1949]), Lepkin relates how the makhzen in 
Fez periodically imposed corvée labour upon the population for irrigation and 
general upkeep of the city, calling this twiza (2004: 32-33). 2IFRXUVH ¶YROXQWDU\·
twiza, is not exactly freely given either, but forms a kind of informal contract of 
reciprocity (sensu Mauss 1954). 
 
Reciprocal systems of aid based on use-value have probably existed the world over, 
prior to the global capitalist system that now prevails (e.g. Sabourin 2000). This is 
not to say that the newer system is experienced in the same way everywhere, 
indeed local conditions as revealed by ethnographic sources reveal unfamiliar 
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hybridised forms that are locally modified (e.g. Narotzky 1997: 196). Twiza is 
common across North Africa among Berbers as a system of reciprocal agricultural 
labour. These arrangements are generally understood as a form of mutual 
¶HQWDQJOHPHQW·ZKHUHPXWXDOQHHGFUHDWHVPXWXDODVVLVWDQFHWKXVJHQHUDWLQJGHEWV
Over time, keeping tally of so many debts may become impossible, and thus 
neighbours may feel at ease in calling on one another for help. On the other hand, 
Crawford (2009: 106) describes how long-term labour debts may be remembered 
and reciprocation is expected over generations. 
 
On the loss of twiza: 
 
We go back and sit on cushions and chat about the past. He talks of how twiza 
happened when planting or turning the earth. I ask why it changed. He said because 
of cash, people started demanding that after independence, in order to pay for 
FRPPRGLWLHVVXFKDVHOHFWULFLW\,WZDVQ·WMXVWDERXWSXWWLQJEUHDGRQWKHWDEOH 
 ~ Field notes on Bayoub Abbess, 09/04/13 
 
Bayoub described his unease with the changes in modern day social relations, 
VWDWLQJ ´QRZ \RX DUH DIUDLG RI VRPH SHRSOH \RX KDYH WR FKRRVH \RXU IULHQGV
FDUHIXOO\ IRU WUXVWZRUWKLQHVVµ , ZDV FXULRXV WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ DQG ZK\ twiza 
broke down. Nejib explained the situation to me somewhat, also deploring such 
change: 
 
Nejib visits. Inside, I question him about twiza and tebria. He says twiza happens 
no loQJHU DIWHU WKH )UHQFK ¶EURNH· >VLF@ the social structure or at least the 
traditional rules, and replaced them with the civil law. Now, people say they will 
just pay someone. But we talk of what is lost, the camaraderie, such as cannot be 
bought.  
~ Field notes, 01/02/13 
 
Nejib decried the loss of a more complete, human relationship that existed until it 
was narrowed into a uniquely economic category. This economic exchange no 
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longer involved the reproduction of social relations based on values of solidarity, 
but became a transaction where the relationship devolved into one of consumer and 
producer/service provider where the bond was fragile, and thus easily displaced. 
Thus, service providers became essentially ¶disposable· by those who were thus 
minded, while of course others still honoured older, long-term relationships. Cash 
economics simply meant that those who wished to could break those bonds, seeking 
improvement in quality, greater efficiency (less time-consuming feasting was 
necessary, for example) or the best deal. Nejib informed me that often landowners, 
using the language of the hierarchy of the consumer, spoke to him rudely, and so in 
return he would break economic and social relations with them. He told me that 
what motivated him more was when the children came out and started asking when 
the dates would be available once again. Of course, he also needed to put food on 
the table, but this example clearly shows the tension that exists when benefits are 
rationalised into discrete, calculable economic units, and what this does to social 
relations that are based on trust.  
 
Indeed, the very act of reciprocLW\LQ1RUWK$IULFDWKH¶LQWHUHVWHGJLIW·PXVWQRWEH
returned instantly, as to do so would mean that the receiver wants no further 
UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH JLYHU )XUWKHUPRUH %RXUGLHX DUJXHV WKDW WKH ´VSLULW RI
FDOFXODWLRQµLVGLDPHWULFDOO\RSSRVHGWRWKH value of honour and generosity, giving 
the example of the workman who was told never to return after he demanded an 
extra 200 francs for not receiving the usual symbolic meal at the end of the day 
(Bourdieu 1979: 20). Thus the counter-gift must be given in such a way and after 
VXFKDWLPHWKDWWKHFDOFXODWLRQUHPDLQV¶KLGGHQ·DOWKRXJKHDFKUHDOO\LVQRWHGDQG
those who do not repay are remembered, and perhaps mocked. Indeed, describing 
DQ LQGLYLGXDO DV ¶VRPHRQH ZKR FDOFXODWHV· is a great insult, insinuating that the 
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person in question only gives after first evaluating what he or she will receive in 
return for the gesture. 
 
Essentially, the catalysing shift seems to have come when modern infrastructure 
entered the valley, making the Mozabites dependent on these payable services 
which had been privatised by the state. Cash existed in the town for it was the 
currency of merchants, but agricultural labourers had small need for it before this 
period. The biggest change was the technical ability to pump water from the 
existing wells. Previously, farmers used to spend the entire day, or at least six 
hours straight going back and forth hauling the water by beast power, and in the 
hot season this had to be done every other day. Hamza remembered well doing the 
work for his father when he was young: 
 
I spent a lot of time watering the garden here with the hmar, donkey. We fed the 
donkey well, but it would be panting. When Baba was by himself he used to fill up 
the basin, then drain it into his wheat field. People had wheat fields to feed their 
families, some would be used for a special kind of tam [couscous] for the wedding 
FHUHPRQLHVDQGWKHUHVWZRXOGJRWRWKHDQLPDOV:HGLGQ·WVHOOLW+HZRXOGOHWLW
dry and then cut it and take it in bundles to where all the farmers kept their wheat. 
Baba used to grow wheat in Merghoub with Ammi Bayoub. They stopped when it 
became easier to buy in the shops. 
~ Hamza, 12/10/13 
 
A labour-saving device such as the immersion pump was warmly welcomed to 
reduFHWKHEXUGHQRIVXFKDODERULRXVSURFHVVRQWKHIDUPHU·VWLPH7KLVZDVPDGH
possible by the introduction of electricity into the oasis, in the early 1960s. Yet 
many people also complained about the prohibitive cost of electricity bills. The 
government also began to drill deep wells down to the phreatic, fossil aquifer, 
starting at about 120m depth, beyond the shallower, rechargeable albian aquifer, at 
18-30m depth. This was undertaken as a development project to assist with the 
recurrent and severe Saharan droughts in the 1960s. Yet farmers complain about 
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the price of these services also (see previous chapter for how this affected collective 
well associations). These, along with the rising costs of other infrastructural 
services made a life without cash impossible. So, in return for work, as Ammi 
Bayoub stated, people started demanding wages for labour. Based on information 
from Nejib, I hypothesize that during obligatory twiza labour, it became more 
commonplace to provide a cash substitute. Cash would have been more common 
among the bourgeois merchant class than the labouring khammƝs. The merchants 
could afford to start paying for labour. Yet then khammƝs workers also began 
demanding cash instead of a share of the harvest. 
 
To summarise, the rising cost of life led to labourers demanding cash instead of the 
reciprocation of labour. Before delving into the wider economic changes taking 
place nationally, I must explain the changing economic relationship between 
ODQGRZQHUVDQGODERXUHUVLQWKH0·]DE 
 
6.4.2. KhammƝs: sharecropping arrangements 
The khammƝs system 
I discuss here the produFWLYH ODERXU V\VWHP LQ WKH 0·]DE SULRU WR $OJHULDQ
independence, where sharecroppers worked the land of wealthier individuals in 
return for a share of the harvest. Roberson (1987: 1) defines sharecropping 
arrangements as occurring between ´WZRRUPRUHSDUWies [who] agree to combine 
their privately held resources in a productive enterprise, and to share output in 
SUHDUUDQJHG SURSRUWLRQVµ The institution of khammasƗt in the Arab world has a 
long history. It is based on the idea that labour consists of one-fifth (khammƝs 
means five in Arabic) of the five necessary inputs into agriculture (Knauss 1977), 
the other four being land, manure, water and seed, and often also clothing and 
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shelter. Different sharecropping arrangements existed according to how many of 
the inputs the labourer or landowner held, and perhaps other considerations such as 
power relations. According to my interlocutors, the landscape and work 
arrangements of the central oasis 50 years ago looked very different ² and it was 
largely worked by khammƝs in a patronage arrangement with bourgeois 
landowners. The majority of the old oasis was arable land, before market forces 
meant that flour was cheaper to buy in the store. Date palms existed but were more 
sparsely distributed than today, belonging to individual families, and people would 
come with large jars of water especially to water them. Clusters of date palms 
covered only 15-20 per cent of the oasis, on the land where houses were historically 
owned. In fact it probably looked much like the new Ntissa area looks now, and 
thus palms apparently did not provide the usual microclimate that is normal to 
oases worldwide (although a few here and there were surely welcomed as a spot to 
rest from the sun and brew refreshments). 
 
As noted, different complex arrangements existed. According to Bayoub, in Beni 
Isguen only a fifth of the harvest went to the owner, who put in only land, the 
khammƝs providing the other inputs. He explained that this ratio could shift to one-
sixth or alternatively to one-half depending on the final negotiation, and the 
amount of inputs from the landowner, who may also add electricity. Alternatively, 
the land may be divided into FaddƗn (parcels), bordered by a seguia (stream). Four 
FaddƗn might have been cultivated by the khammƝs, and one by the landowner, who 
could grow in it what he liked. Alternatively, the landowner might ask the khammƝs 
to grow the produce and bring it to the ownHU·VKRXVHKhammƝs also helped each 
other, through the institution of twiza. Therefore, there was little need for cash, 
instead mutual help and sharing existed as described earlier. Bayoub also described 
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the custom of saddiqa, (Arab. Saddiq meaninJ ¶IULHQG· DNLQGRI VKDULQJwhereby 
you would never leave somewhere without being given some fruit or other produce, 
EXW´QRZLW·VHDFKWRKLVRZQµ%D\RXE$EHVV11/11/13). 
 
Drawbacks of the khammƝs contract 
The khammƝs relationship was based on a type of unwritten contract which could be 
exploited. Nowadays, it was explained to me, with weaker (monetary) social 
FRQWUDFWVLI\RXGRQ·WOLNHKRZ\RXDUHWUHDWHG\RXFDQJRHOVHZKHUHZKHUHDVWKH
social and contractual bonds of khammƝs and slavery would not allow this. In this 
light, a positive attribute is given to the wage labour relationship. Previously, 
patronage arrangements were favoured by many nomadic Amazigh (Berber) 
groups, who looked down on settled agricultural populations. In Morocco, the 
powerful Ait Atta Berber lineage had black, Haratine client labourers (Hart 1981: 4; 
Ilahiane 1996). I observed when I visited that area that even when settled, most 
Berber individuals perceived agriculture as a lowly affair, participating only 
minimally during the pollination of palms and harvesting of the dates, and plots 
were bare of all other vegetation. Haratine khammƝs were treated barely better than 
animals, even serving as targets for the testing of new rifles (Ilahiane 1996). In the 
0·]DE D UHDO VRFLDO GLYLGH LV VWLOO HYLGHQW DOWKRXJK VRFLDO PRELOLW\ KDV EHHQ
achieved largely through education and access to white and blue-collar jobs. The 
Moroccan Haratine themselves achieved long-fought-for rights through investing 
remittances from work abroad to realise land rights and political expression, at a 
time when neighbouring Berbers were emigrating in one direction only. The 
mushrooming of industry siphoned most of the khammƝs workers away from the 
land to the factories, while many of the remaining have managed to secure small-
holding plots through the government land grant scheme of 1988 (while working 
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at other day jobs such as plastering, for example). The other category of farmer 
today is the bourgeois farmer who pays migrant Sahelian labourers for their 
manual labour. 
 
Historically, slaves would have occupied the lowest strata of Mozabite society, 
below the khammƝs. Yet, such ownership was a prerogative of the wealthy, and only 
an estimated 15 per cent or so owned slaves. It has been argued that the master-
slave distinction, as owner and property, was less clear cut in North Africa than in 
other societies, and that slaves were more integrated into the family household (El 
Hamel 2002). Even now, I observed that some of my black friends maintained their 
SUHYLRXVRZQHUV·VXUQDPHDQGWKDWSDWURQ-client relationships continued, albeit in 
somewhat altered form. For instance, one of my friends, to remain unnamed for 
reasons of privacy, still maintained several lands owned by his white namesakes, as 
his male lineage had done for some time, although now he is paid to do so. 
 
Sharecropping arrangements, along with usury, were not looked upon favourably 
by the prophet Mohamed, who urged instead that the wealthy should give freely to 
the poor (Shafiai 2011). My interlocutor Hamza told me that according to local 
interpretation, it would indeed be the worker who would receive the blessings, 
ZKLFKZRXOGEH VSRNHQDV IROORZV ´$OODK \·LUKDP Hamza, al asƗfir was al malikƗtµ
(Bless Hamza, the birds and the angels). Thus, it is generally felt that the one who 
SURGXFHV WKURXJK VZHDW DQG WRLO UHFHLYHV *RG·V EHQHGLFWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ WKH RQH
who owns the land. This discussion aims to present a picture of labour and 
HFRQRPLFUHODWLRQVLQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\SULRUWR$OJHULDQLQGHSHQGHQFH 
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To be clear, however, the twiza and khammƝs relationships have not entirely 
disappeared, but continue to exist alongside contemporary market relations that 
Mozabites and Malians engage in. Some landowners continue to pay palm experts 
in dates, as Hamza grumbled about one miserly client, as he put it. Furthermore, 
twiza notions of voluntary communal work continue, whereby an individual will 
make a call for aid to rebuild a wall, for example, or a suggestion is made by the 
mosque for voluntary litter picking. I encountered a twiza association one day 
working together to remove rocks and stones to prepare a piece of land for 
planting. They had assembled for the very reason of preserving the twiza concept 
as a form of local heritage. The overall makeup of economic relationships therefore 
is made up of these mixed systems. Such hybrids, I will argue are central to 
understanding how Mozabites mediate change in its different forms, thus making 
external forms locally relevant. In the discussion, I deepen this argument by 
presenting how local value systems may contain notions incongruent to those of 
market principles, resulting in resistance to the latter. Before that, however, I 
discuss the primary forces that have driven overall (if not wholesale) changes 
toward market-based labour relations. 
 
6.5. Algerian postcolonial economic development 
Here I introduce the wider historical context surrounding economic changes. I have 
argued that Algerian economic development in the 1960s, after the revolutionary 
ZDUZLWK)UDQFHZDVDGULYHURIFKDQJLQJHFRQRPLFUHODWLRQVLQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\
This was not, however, the precursor to the penetration of market capitalism into a 
rural Saharan area, which is a more complicated affair. Now, I discuss this series of 
events in more detail.  
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In 1962, after the bloody eight year war with colonial France, and following a 
period of political wrangling among the revolutionaries (mostly between Ben Bella 
and general Boumediene), a socialist revolution was declared, inspired mostly by 
$UDE 1DWLRQDOLVP LQ 1DVVHU·V (J\SW WR LQFOXGH DJUDULDQ UHIRUP (Ageron 1991: 
132). This economic and political orientation was largely in reaction to France and 
her allies as a hegemonic, imperialist force, thus creating an ideological alliance 
with the Soviet Republics, China and Cuba. This non-alignment, anti-United States 
and anti-¶Western· rhetoric never affected pragmatic economic relations with the 
US, however (Ruedy 2005: 221; Entelis 1986: 1²2), and Algeria rejected outright 
Marxism, communism and Soviet-style central planning (Adamson 2005). The 
fledgling Algerian state was reeling from the destruction of its native economic 
structures by colonisation in the nineteenth century, further economic destruction 
in the eight-year revolution leading to independence, with the final shock created 
by the fleeing of technical, professional and managerial expertise (Ruedy 2005: 
195). With the consolidation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and 
elimination of other parties, including the communist party, the political scene 
became a one-party system. Further power struggles continued between Ben Bella 
and Boumediene, until after a coup after which the latter finally began a state 
capitalist programme of national development in  DOWKRXJK LW GLGQ·W
completely distance itself from socialist ideology until the reforms of 1976), which 
placed heavy emphasis on the hydrocarbon sector, to the neglect of the agricultural 
and other sectors (Ruedy 2005: 196). 
 
The socialist development plan of 1963 included the so-called autogestion of the 
agricultural sector, with the creation of peasant cooperatives to manage land 
abandoned by the colonials, although other great estates were taken over by the 
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military and nationalised (Ageron 1991: 133). This socialist system experienced 
great difficulties, however, due to lack of administrative and technical personnel, 
and the sector made heavy losses. The shift to state capitalism may be explained 
due to the victory of its proponents, the petit bourgeois within the bureaucracy, 
who held the ground between the advocates of the worker-managed approach of 
Ben Bella, and the free-market position of the emerging middle class. Analysis of 
this victory asserts the obstruction of the bureaucracy of the working class, 
alongside the need of the elite to exercise economic control (Ruedy 2005: 216). The 
local effects of socialism on farmers in terms of work are discussed briefly later. Of 
importance here, however, is that this led to the industrialisation and development 
of infrastructure in Algeria, including the rural areas such as WKH0·]DE. Following 
the discovery of oil in the Sahara in 1956 (Ruedy 2005: 183), the hydrocarbon 
sector is now responsible for 95 per cent of Algerian exports. Alongside the 
industrialisation drive, education was emphasised, and in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the state spent 30 per cent of the state budget and 11 per cent of GDP on 
education (Ruedy 2005: 226). As previously stated, these events created a draw 
away from agriculture to the industrial and professional sectors. 
 
6.6. Constraints on development by the rentier Algerian economy  
Despite more recent policy aimed at boosting the agricultural sector, there are 
many barriers to small rural farmers actually accessing national markets. This 
included failed development plans based on the idea that rapidly expanding 
industrialisation would go on to feed the agricultural sector. 
 
0DQ\ VSRNH WR PH RI VRXWKHUQ $OJHULD DV D ¶FDVK FRZ· WKDW ZDV PLONHG E\ WKH
North, with little benefits to the Saharan locals ² meaning of course primarily oil 
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SURILW$OWKRXJKPRVWRI WKHQDWLRQ·VPLQHUDODQGK\GURFDUERQZHDOWK LV IRXQG LQ
the South, only 10 per cent of its population lives there. Moreover, the Atlas 
mountain chain means that there is more connectivity between the trans-Saharan 
localities (the Sahara, Sahel and the coastal belt of Guinea to Nigeria), than the 
North and South regions of Algeria (Entelis 1986: 3). Oil work was largely seen by 
locals as an ultimate goal, an opportunity to fulfil RQH·VOLIHORQJGXW\WRSURYLGHIRU
RQH·VIDPLO\DQGWKHUHE\DFKLHYHJUHDWVRFLDOVWDQGLQJ$VPLJKWEHH[SHFWHGWKHUH
were others that viewed such developments as a theft from the land, as one oil 
worker was admonished by his elderly father31.  
 
7KHPRYHWRZDUGLQGXVWULDOLVDWLRQDVWKHGULYHURI$OJHULD·VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
was based on the (mostly untested) theories of the French advisor to Algerian 
industry, de Bernis in 1963 and 1966 (Henry 2004). He suggested that the 
agricultural sector was insufficient to support a decent standard of living, and thus 
the rural population should find employment in industry. Furthermore, he argued, 
the agricultural revolution historically always followed the industrial revolution, 
and not the other way around. Thus the hydrocarbon sector would provide the 
materials for fertiliser and machinery for agriculture, as well as a market place. 
This industrialisation-first program was in line with the postcolonial political 
orientation of economic (and thus political) independence from the globally 
predominant capitalist system, by not exporting agricultural produce and raw 
materials. The first four-year industrialisation program (1970-73) devoted 45 per 
cent of total capital investment to heavy industrialisation, 40 per cent to social and 
economic infrastructure, and only 15 per cent to agriculture. The ailing agricultural 
                                                 
31 A 1974 survey by the World Bank showed that 30,000 Sonatrach workers received an 
aggregated salary of  600 million Algerian Dinars (DA), while 250,000 workers in the self-
management agricultural sector earned 450 million DA (Entelis 1986: 139). 
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sector has ensured that Algeria is now heavily dependent on foreign exports, 
though it has resulted in the creation of land (Entelis 1986: 111-30). Regarding the 
failure of accelerated industrialisation, Abderrezak (2001) explains that:  
 
the various sectors of the economy did not evolve as the coherent entity that 
de Bernis' economic model predicted. In particular, heavily invested and 
export-oriented sectors such as hydrocarbons have not contributed enough 
to the development of other sectors of the economy. The links between 
hydrocarbons and other sectors have evolved into a relation of dependence 
based on subsidy rather than viable economic integration. The deliberate 
efforts to accelerate the industrialisation process through subsidies from 
hydrocarbons to key sectors may have resulted in the creation and 
exacerbation of sectoral imbalances. [Abderrezak 2001: 14] 
 
Algeria is among the prominent group of oil rich nations in North Africa and the 
Middle East (after Libya, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia in production). 
In 1965, the state-owned gas and oil corporation, Sonatrach, was created, followed 
by various other state-owned industrial companies, in iron and steel, textiles, and 
banking, to name a few. The Algerian power structure has been explained as a 
complex tripartite relationship between party, military and intelligence services, 
and oil wealth (Entelis 2011), and with corruption on top of this, some have 
described Sonatrach DVWKHSROLWLFLDQ·VSULYDWHSXUVH32. Today, the state has acquired 
over $100 billion of foreign reserves from exports, for a population of 34 million 
(Lowi 2009: xii). Oil exports went from 12 per cent of exports in 1960 to 60 per 
cent in 1965, and then 97 per cent in 2010 (Butcher 2014). With this excess, 
%RXWHIOLND·VJRYHUQPHQWKDVEHHQDEOHWREX\RIImuch discontent with cash hand-
outs, fending off social pressures that have troubled WKH UHJLRQ VXFKDV WKH ¶$UDE
6SULQJ·(Volpi 2013). Yet Algeria remains an authoritarian regime, and the country 
                                                 
32 ´Corruption is pervasive in Algeria constituting the most serious barrier to fundamental 
economic reform. Algeria scored 2.9 out of 10, ranking 105th out of 159 countries in 
7UDQVSDUHQF\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO·V  &RUUXSWLRQ 3HUFHSWLRQV ,QGH[ SXWWLQJ LW MXVW EHKLQG
Egypt, Mexico, and Zambia, and placing it among the five most corrupt countries in the 
Middle East and NorWK$IULFD0(1$µ(QWHOLV 
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experiences little trickle down in terms of investment. According to some authors, 
this is largely due to considerable cronyism and nepotism at the top, with retired 
generals and family members of current regime officials monopolising most of the 
domestic firms and access to markets (Achy 2013; Lowi 2009: 35). Such contempt 
by the elite for ordinary individuals is known as hogra by Algerians (Entelis 
2011)33. 
 
Thus despite development programmes aimed at rural development, certain 
elements of the state constitute an insurmountable limitation to such economic 
improvement, forcing populations to rely on locally self-sufficient means of 
production. The military oligarchs who control the oil wealth also control the 
agricultural export markets, causing the entry of Mozabite farmers into this market 
to be nigh on impossible (see also Logan & Moseley 2002 for parallels in Zimbabwe 
under apparent development). Ferguson (1990: 255) contends that in Lesotho the 
state claims its very legitimacy and expansion of power based on the poverty 
alleviation discourse. In Southeast Asia, Scott (2009: 64²66) vividly describes how 
the control of poor manpower has been central to the dominance of the state. In 
Algeria, the proponents of the revolution who, 50 years on are still in power have 
little need for small-scale farmers or for creating conditions that would enhance 
social mobility. They continue to draw on oil revenue to keep unruly elements of 
the population quiet when social discontent emerges. Yet, the revolutionaries have 
                                                 
33 This sense of  discontent, combined with a drop in global oil prices and thus the ability 
of  the state to subsidise basic food commodities resulted in the riots of  1988. These events 
led to the preliminary opening of  the Algerian political system, the first in the Arab world, 
EHIRUHWKHUHFHQW ¶$UDE6SULQJ·+RZHYHUWKHPLOLWDU\ LQWHUYHQHG LQSUHYHQWLQJWKH
,VODPLVWSDUW\WKH,VODPLF6DOYDWLRQ)URQW),6IURPWDNLQJSRZHUOHDGLQJWRWKH¶EORRG\
GHFDGH· (QWHlis 2011) with 200,000 dead and 6000 disappearances (Kristianasen 2006). 
Current president Bouteflika exonerated the military from any wrongdoing, ostensibly to 
broker a military hold on power, although many families are still campaigning for 
resolution and justice over missing relatives (Kristianasen 2006). 
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become less relevant to the generations that were born later. Micro-social 
PRYHPHQWVLQWKH0·]DEEDVHGRQ limited associational freedom are attempting to 
solve such economic problems by looking for alternative markets (such as Fair 
Trade), but even then they complain that there is not enough time to effectuate 
such plans. 
 
This situation of purported development on the one hand and forces which counter 
such development might appear paradoxical, unless we adopt a Foucauldian 
perspective of the state, however. Such a view reveals instead of a Weberian 
monolithic, coherent entity, rather the dissipated, fragmented structure of 
competing forces (Gupta & Sharma 2006: 291). The Algerian state is successful at 
portraying itself as unitary and integrated, however, through manipulation of 
discourse and regulation of the media, often entailing silence as to the workings of 
the state. Such silence fuels rumours and speculation, on the other hand, about 
internal conflict within le pouvoir (the state) between the executive and secretive 
intelligence agency. 
 
6.7. Discussion 
I have aimed to unpick the major historical drivers leading to the current system of 
labour relations while attempting not to oversimplify historical contingencies and 
subtleties. These have largely involved political economic forces of change, 
whereby government development has raised the local cost of living, thereby 
inducing a market-based system of labour relations. As I have shown, however, 
contemporary work relationships remain mixed, and older relations of production 
continue alongside the more recent capitalist system. As documented elsewhere, for 
example, farmers may grow cash crops to raise funds for certain needs (such as 
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taxes), while relying on shared work systems for family production (Keesing & 
Strathern 1998: 219).  
 
In the discussion that follows, I will give further arguments, for and against, as to 
the ¶predisposition· of Mozabites to the market based system. To do this I draw on 
Bourdieu (1978), by presenting two conflicting representations by the latter 
regarding the locally conceived Mozabite work ethic. I then argue that some 
Mozabites appear to hold a syncretic, quasi-animistic view of nature that goes 
beyond the orthodox Islamic ontology. I contend that this view complicates a 
capitalist worldview, in which nature is dead raw matter, ready to be exploited. I 
give examples that show a contrasting viewpoint, which may at least cause 
hesitation for some, for ¶transforming· VXFK¶GHDGPDWWHU· may thus entail an act of 
violence. By presenting these alternative viewpoints, I will reinforce my claim that 
ORFDOLVHG HFRQRPLF FKDQJH LV QRW D VLPSOH UHSODFHPHQW RI D ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· SHDVDQW
system by the global capitalist system, but something culturally mediated and 
locally useful. 
 
6.7.1 Local Islam & the Mozabite work ethic 
 
In chapter four, I discussed how for Mozabites, Ibadite interpretation of Islam 
emphasises the importance of work as an expression of faith, for faith alone is not 
sufficient. I then portrayed in chapter five how empirically, Mozabite everyday life 
can be seen to be divided among three principle activities: the mosque, work and 
the family. Indeed, the family-owned plot within the oasis provides a backdrop for 
all three of these activities, at different times. Primarily, it is a site of work, yet on 
religious holidays such as Fridays, it may become a space inhabited by women and 
children, who eat and play together, in quite large social gatherings. Small 4X·UDQic 
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reading groups or prayers may take place on the land, especially for the maghreb 
(sunset) prayer.  
 
Some authors have argued in the past that Mozabites have a protestant-like work 
ethic, based on a puritanical ideology (Alport 1954; Bourdieu 1962)34. This was in 
PDQ\ZD\VUHLQIRUFHGE\P\H[SHULHQFHLQWKH0·]DEOne day, while walking with 
my friend Smail, I complained of having a flu and needing to take some time off. 
Smail informed me that by contrast, a Mozabite would be encouraged never to take 
time off. He went on to emphasise the work ethic, urging that you never see an 
unemployed Mozabite, in contrast to the Arabs, for whom unemployment is 
RIILFLDOO\DERXWSHUFHQWXQRIILFLDOO\HYHQKLJKHU´0R]DELWHVZLOOGRDQ\WKLQJµ
Smail explaLQHG´HYHQVZHHSLQJWKHVWUHHWµ7KHJUHDWHVWVFDQGDOGHVFULEHGWRPH
was the idea of the rich son, who lies about doing nothing. Such decadent behaviour 
would certainly lead to the moral disintegration of society, was the implication. 
Others would complain that young Mozabites no longer wished to do physical 
labour, however, not out of laziness but more from the associated low status, as 
already discussed. This facilitated somewhat the acceptance of the Malians to 
undertake such menial labour. The emergence of a professional class was 
facilitating social mobility, yet gnawing away at local ethics of egalitarianism.  
 
Writing about the Mozabites, Bourdieu (1962) claimed that their values and social 
practices fundamentally predispose them toward the capitalist system. Essentially, 
he argued that the custom of relying on family for labour, combined with Mozabite 
piety, meant that they were disposed to acquire considerable capital (1962: 46). 
+RZHYHU WKLV FRQWUDVWV ZLWK %RXUGLHX·V DUJXPHQW made elsewhere (1978) about 
                                                 
34 $OWKRXJK%RXUGLHXSURSRVHVWKDW-HZV·UHOLJLRXVUHODWLRQVKLSWRZRUNPLJKWEHDPRUH
apt comparison. 
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Berber peasants. In Disenchantment of the world (Bourdieu 1979: 26²7), Bourdieu 
presented the case that for Kabyle peasants work for its own sake was more 
important than effort based on the rational calculation of reward. This, he argued, 
did not dispose them toward the capitalist system whereby labour is converted into 
capital. My ethnography corroborates this value of work for its own sake among 
Mozabites, as I presented briefly above. Does this apparent contradiction mean, 
therefore, that Mozabites are or are not predisposed to the market economic 
system? The facts are that some Mozabites have indeed successfully invested their 
capital in ways that has expanded their businesses, such as the purchase of textile 
factories in France, making certain of them very wealthy. The purported work ethic 
does indeed mean that Mozabites are very industrious in a range of activities from 
business to repairing bicycles and it is true that unemployment is extremely low. 
On the other hand, some complain that youth are becoming lazy, relying on their 
SDUHQWV·ZHDOWKUDWKHUWKDQJHQHUDWLQJWKHLURZQ7KLVmay reveal more about the 
ethic itself, but it seems possible that youth values are shifting with the influence of 
modern media, portraying images of individuals relaxing, enjoying an easy life. 
Thus, the evidence given here complicates conceptions that authors such as 
Bourdieu have suggested of D 0R]DELWH ¶SUHGLVSRVLWLRQ· WRZDUG WKH ¶FDSLWDOLVW
V\VWHP· 
 
6.7.2 Human-environment ontologies 
 
Further constraints to the wholesale adoption of capitalism, I argue, involve local 
conceptions of nature. Bierchank (1988) shows that in two centres of Ibadism, 
2PDQDQGWKH0·]DEIbadite doctrine is locally constructed. Indeed, rather than a 
pure version of Ibadite Islam, local views of nature often entail a quasi-animistic 
syncretism. 
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An ideal Islamic worldview, as an extension of the Judeo-Christian traditions, 
makes it clear that the earth was made for the use of humanity. My experience with 
some Mozabites revealed a different relationship to nature, however. I will use 
several examples to make this case. Sliman, for example, revered the date palm 
(Tazdait in Tumzabt) as having a rǌh, soul like humans. The date palm soul had 
majestic qualities, including durability and fidelity, qualities which should be 
exemplary for humans. He recounted to me an alternative version of creation where 
´*RGPDGH$GDPDQG WKHSDOPRXW RI FOD\ DQG WKHQ breathed life into them, the 
rǌhµ+Hrecounted a legend of how the date stone is marked by the stamp of the 
SURSKHW·V ULQJ DQG WKHUHE\ protects any food left out overnight from hungry 
creatures. He further passionately related the story of how one day he witnessed a 
date palm garden being thoughtlessly torn up using heavy machinery to be 
converted into a hotel. He described the anguish for him of seeing the mighty trees 
destroyed without a care. The punch line to the story was when someone came 
along and mindlessly wished the entrepreneur Allah \D·conkom (God help you)! 
 
I noticed a similar phenomenon among rural farmers in Morocco. Some farmers 
would use the same symbolic humoral healing system35 on date palm diseases, 
placing the palm within the same domain as the human body. Reference would 
RIWHQ EH PDGH WR FOHDQLQJ WKH SDOP DV LI LW ZHUH D VRFLDO ERG\ VXFK DV ¶JLYLQJ D
KDLUFXW·RU ¶JRLQJWRWKHKDPPDP·. Back in Beni Isguen, I noticed practices where 
certain farming objects were treated as if they were persons also. After digging a 
trench one day, I stood the all-LPSRUWDQW IDUPHU·V fella, a kind of digging hoe, 
                                                 
35 The Hippocratic humoral system was taken up by the Prophet Mohamed consisted of  
the four elements being: fire (hot), earth (dry), water (moist), and air (cold), which leads to 
the four humours: (yellow bile - hot/dry; black bile - cold/dry; phlegm ² cold/moist; blood 
² hot/moist.  
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upright for the sake of ease of retrieval. Hamza told me never to leave the fella 
upright but to lay it down to give it a rest, as it has been working all day. Another 
example involved the berating of a young Mozabite oil worker by his grandfather, 
who entreated the young man this work was morally wrong, and that the oil should 
be left in the body of the earth. 
 
The first example reveals a difference of Mozabite viewpoints toward nature. Yet 
arguably, a view of the land as animated by soul is morally more problematic as a 
source of exploitation, as opposed to the capitalist perspective in which resources 
can be extracted as dead matter, along the path to material accumulation. 
Fortunately for Mozabites, the Islamic ontology separates soul as belonging to the 
higher realms of humans and divine beings such as angels, while the earth and its 
creatures remain fair game for the taking. Yet, ambiguities still work within the 
imaginations of mixed Mozabite lineages where the jnoun (spirits, good or bad) still 
linger in out of the way places. Places inhabited by jnoun that have to be placated 
would not appear to be immediately suitable for exploitation. Generally, a belief in 
the jnoun is locally associated with a lack of education, however, revealing a 
potential change in beliefs. 
 
In this discussion I have advanced the idea that certain local ways of viewing and 
being in the world may not be entirely commensurable with the neoliberal project. I 
argued that the Mozabite sense of work does not necessarily predispose them 
toward capitalism. Then I tried to convey that alternative local views of nature 
exist, which may influence and limit the rational exploitation of date palms and the 
earth. Through this I have illustrated how the local economy is a hybrid one (just 
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like local religious interpretation), composed of different systems based on different 
sets of values systems and serving different cultural ends.  
 
6.8. Conclusion 
To summarise, I began by setting out the problem in Beni Isguen of labour based 
on conversations with farmers, Malians, and empirical observation. According to 
farmers, lDERXU UHODWLRQV KDYH EHFRPH OHVV UHOLDEOH LQ WKH 0·]DE, and this was 
described as the second biggest problem after water shortages in the oasis. Farmers 
often contrasted this situation with previous labour relations based on the more 
predictable, twiza institution. Some farmers cited competitive undercutting as the 
reason behind this instability of working relationships. Through my investigation, I 
concluded that such a view marginalises the agency of Malian workers. Indeed, the 
view of many Mozabites of Malians as a chaotic category did not bear up to my 
experience; in fact they were quite organised, and through established networks 
were able to share information regarding sites with favourable working conditions. 
Other factors play a role, such as seasonality of work and lack of clear, reliable 
working terms of contracts.  
 
I then analysed the reasons behind this economic shift, citing state development 
programmes as driving up the cost of living, causing workers to demand cash. I 
advanced the hypothesis that when wealthy merchants offered cash instead of their 
sons in response to the call for group twiza by the mosque, this could have set up 
the preconditions for contemporary economic relations. I further described how 
development drew labour and expertise away from the oasis, resulting in a vacuum 
which the Malians came to fill. I then portrayed, however, that the entry of the 
capitalist set of working relations did not entail a complete replacement of already 
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existing labour systems. I argued that ¶WUDGLWLRQDO· V\VWHPV FRQWLQXH to exist 
alongside wage labour relationships, with each having different functions. I then 
sought to buttress this assertion with a discussion on Mozabite notions of work and 
on local hybridised ontological views of nature, which I contend provide resistance 
to exploitative views of the land. 
 
I term this current scenario ¶DQDUFKLFRUJDQLVDWLRQ· LQUHIHUHQFHWR6DKOLQV· 
conceptualisation, as opposed to equitable or top-down relations, in that the 
interaction of farmers in this case LVEDVHGRQDSULQFLSOH RI ¶HDFK WRKLVRZQ· Of 
course, relations are also mixed, for competitive relations between farmers contrast 
with the hierarchical relations between worker and employee. Twiza involved 
equitable relations between farmers, whereas khammƝs relationships were 
definitively hierarchical. In the market-based system, people could now pay for 
services rather than go through the messy ties of reciprocal obligations. It could be 
claimed that the wealthy no longer need to ask for help, for they are able to pay for 
someone to fix their material problems. Indeed, during conversations some 
suggested to me that need is the glue that binds the community. However, by 
framing relationships in terms of consumption, as documented by others (Carrier 
1992; Baudrillard 1998: 65), feelings of alienation have been seen to creep in. Values 
based on self-interest which locals associate with the West are seen to correlate 
with alienation, a shift which is less than satisfactory for many for whom 
personhood is constituted through the community itself. Reflection on these 
matters has caused some to act rather than sink into apathy. As I will show in 
chapter eight, many have utilised the opening of Algerian civil society to form 
associations based on group activities for anything from sports, employment, 
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disability, twiza, to heritage preservation. Many Mozabite youth appear to be 
admirably active in such activity, displaying great pride rooted in local identity. 
 
Various theorists have attempted to explain the conditions and limitations to the 
ability to embrace the market system by various societies. Weber (2002 [1920]: 
160) argued, of course, that a protestant-style ethic was the basis for a rational, 
market driven economy, yet he failed to explain why societies outside the West 
with such characteristics, such as the Mozabites, did not develop a form of 
capitalism. Mozabites have since embraced market ideology, and recent wealth 
creation has driven social inequity even farther apart than ever before. It would be 
consistent with Weberian theory, however, to say that Mozabite merchant 
activities developed also due to the difficult socio-economic conditions of a small 
community trying to maintain itself on an insufficiently adequate agricultural 
resource base in the desert. Turner (1974), however, in true orientalist style, 
postulates that the ethic of hard work was imported into Islamic communities from 
the West who perceived the success of capitalism. I would argue, the hard work 
ethic of the Mozabites was a result of austere lifestyle perhaps as a strategy aimed 
at the survival of the group combined with a specific interpretation of Ibadite 
doctrine. 
 
Bourdieu himself argued that in Algeria the shift from gift economy to a market 
economy was caused by the French legitimation of private land ownership over 
communally-RZQHG WULEDO ODQGV UHVXOWLQJ LQ ´VRFLDO YLYLVHFWLRQµ RU DWRPLVDWLRQ
(1961: 84, in Fowler 1997: 15). BourdLHX·VJHQHUDOLVHGIRUPXODWLRQwas applicable to 
nomadic tribal groups, for whom commons land was more important, than for 
sedentary populations. Whilst the concentration of private land tenure is important, 
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(which I deal with in depth in chapter seven), I explain the shift from gift to market 
economy according to a more detailed chain of events. Furthermore, I argue that 
the primary driver (in chronological order) of this situation was the removal of 
political independence by the French colonial rulers in 188236, creating entry into 
the previously closed political system of the Mozabites. The secondary driver, 
following independence in 1962, was the national economic development 
programme initiated by the Algerian state and National party, the FLN. This 
resulted in the introduction of modern infrastructure during the 1960s, causing 
subsequent economic dependence on state-owned energy companies. This, I argue, 
explains the creation of the contemporary system of labour relations.  
 
The use of wage labour means less predictability for farmers, and thus less ability to 
make rational calculations regarding farming activities. The economic climate then 
mirrors the ecological one, in terms of predictability. The valley exists in a non-
equilibrium state (Ahern 2011), with great unpredictability around the timing of 
floods and rain which recharge the groundwater that the wells depend on, creating 
a sense of great precariousness to farming livelihoods. Labour relations based on 
mutual aid are in fact more flexible, as the timing of farming activities is not fixed 
and the favour may be returned at any time (see also Robertson 1987: 1). Short-
term or temporary wage labour also provides the same flexibility for uncertain 
ecological conditions. However, this situation does not encourage long-term 
relationships with skilled workers, who need a full time wage, and thus a gap in 
their working calendar causes them to find work elsewhere, thus rendering this 
relationship more fragile in the case of the Beni Isguen oasis ecosystem. 
 
                                                 
36 In 1853 the Mzab had been made a protectorate by Marshall Randon, and left in relative 
autonomy (Jomier 2012). 
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This highlights an important question for this study: how can institutions be 
flexible to deal with uncertain, changing ecological conditions? Reciprocal labour is 
one solution, wage labour another, but the latter creates more work for the farmer 
in temporary work situations with unskilled labourers, and more uncertainty 
regarding the long-WHUPZLWKVNLOOHGODERXUHUV7KXVZDJHODERXULQWKH0·]DEFDQ
be consistent with variable ecological conditions, but only in the temporary form, 
and this causes a problem for farmers as it encourages unskilled labour relations 
rather than skilled ones. This maintains the burden of experienced knowledge 
solely on the farmer, creating a hierarchical, paternal system where labourers 
remain dependent like children, unable to rise to roles of responsibility, and also 
maintaining their position on the lowest rung of the social ladder. Keeping 
labourers on a minimum wage also serves to maintain the hierarchical situation by 
preventing accumulation of capital by said group, and thus social mobility to 
positions of local prominence. 
 
Ammi Bayoub lamented the scarcity of labour. But what he resented even more 
than the impersonal nature of wage labour relations and the loss of camaraderie of 
communal work, was the unreliability of such economic relations as compared to 
the strong ties of inextricably intertwined social relations of communal labour with 
its feasting, the security felt in being able to ask a favour of others, of social capital, 
DVHQVHRIWUXVWRIVRFLDOFDUHHVVHQWLDOO\WKDWRQHFDQUHO\RQRQH·VQHLJKERXUVLQ
times of need. Now that each pays for his needs to be serviced, Bayoub seemed too 
often to feel alone, not knowing when workers or friends were going to show up 
and give colour to the day. In the next chapter, I discuss what happens when the 
social contract regarding care is delegated to the state. 
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7. Local justice: Anomie & the 
postcolonial state  
 
Undivided ownership can only continue so long as no one thinks of drawing up a 
systematic balance-sheet of the individual shares in production and consumption. 
And indeed, the generalisation of money exchanges and of the spirit of calculation 
has everywhere coincided with an increasing number of breakups of joint ownership; 
«0RQH\HQFRXUDJHV FDOFXODWLRQRI WKHUHVSHFWLYH VKDUHVRI HDFKKRXVHKROG LQ WKH
group economy. In short, joint ownership prevents calculation, and conversely, the 
prevention of calculation as the condition of the permanence of undivided property 
and of the community (family or clan) that is based on it. [Bourdieu 1977: 17] 
 
We need religion to keep the moral order. Without it there would be chaos. 
~Field notes, bank manager, 14/03/13, Ghardaia 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The above quotes address changes to the normative order and how to restore it. 
Bourdieu, speaking of a shift from communal to private ownership of property, 
EODPHV QHROLEHUDO YDOXHV DV HQFRXUDJLQJ D ´VSLULW RI FDOFXODWLRQµ DQG D IRFXV RQ
individual monetary shares (Bourdieu 1977: 17). Conversely, he claims that joint 
ownership prevents such calculation. The bank manager I interviewed in Ghardaia, 
on the other hand, asserted that ultimately it is religion that is needed to keep the 
social order. He was reflecting on the recent events of revolution in nearby Tunisia, 
ZKLOHDOVRUHFDOOLQJWKHKRUULILFYLROHQFHRI$OJHULD·V¶EODFNGHFDGH·,QWKLVFKDSWHU,
examine changes related to inheritance and property in Beni Isguen oasis, and 
explore issues pertaining to social regulation more broadly.  
 
The classic debates between Gluckman and Bohannan in the mid-twentieth century 
(see Nader 2002: 25), of whether a Western concept of law (e.g. Roman law) should 
be imposed on other societies in attempting to understand local conceptions of 
order, appear to have been perpetuated with the more recent polemics regarding 
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¶OHJDO SOXUDOLVP· $QWKURSRORJLVWV XVLQJ WKH OHJDO SOXUDOLsm approach (e.g. von 
Benda-Beckmann 2002; 2006) take a broader approach to the definition of law to 
encapsulate social norms, judicial processes and governance (Pirie 2013: 219). Pirie 
(2013: 42), however, argues that to stretch the definition of law too far is to lose 
any sense of analytical clarity, and herself urges for a differentiation between law as 
legal code and conflict resolution or mediation. Pirie (2013: 45²6) further contends 
WKDW ODZ VKRXOG EH GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP VRFLDO QRUPV E\ UHIHUULQJ WR WKH ´FUHDWLRQ
and use of explicit rules and categories, and a type of associated reasoning37µ 
 
Drawing on 0RRUH·V (1973) IRUPXODWLRQ RI ´VHPL-DXWRQRPRXV VRFLDO ILHOGVµ
*ULIILWKV· (1986) conception of multiple legal systems attempted to decentre the 
notion of the state as the sole source of regulation. In response, Roberts (2005: 11), 
posits a centrist view of law, directly linking its emergence to the state as coming 
IURP NLQJVKLS LQYROYLQJ D SURFHVV WKURXJK ZKLFK ´ZKHQ WKRVH LQ SRZHU FHDVH
making decisions on an ad hoc basis and begin pronouncing the same judgements in 
sLPLODUVLWXDWLRQVµ)XUWKHUPRUHKHFODLPVWKDWODZLV 
 
a particular mode of decision-making, that of command, followed by the 
GLVFXUVLYH IRUPXODWLRQ RI DQ LGHRORJLFDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU WKH OHDGHU·V
authority, the articulation of normative propositions, the attempt to achieve 
compliance with such rules, and the provision of adjudicative agencies. 
[Pirie 2013: 43] 
 
 
Despite this powerful assertion, Pirie (2013: 44) reminds us that anthropologists 
have found that law is possible in societies without governmeQWLQWHUPVRI´FRGHV
                                                 
37 $V3LULH  VXJJHVWV ´DW LWVPRVWEDVLF D ODZFRGHPLJKWSUHVHQW DYLVLRQRI 
(moral) order and regularity, associated with a sense of  community and belonging, and 
GHILQLQJZKDWLWLVWREHDJRRGPHPEHU>RI VRFLHW\@µ+RZHYHUEH\RQGEHLQJFRQILQHGWR
UXOHV DORQH OHJDOLVP LQFRUSRUDWHV MXGLFLDO UHDVRQLQJ 7KHVH WZR IRUPV ´HPSOR\ JHQHUDO
categories into which people, events, and objects can be placed, and whose application 
implies duties or rights, along with limits or restrictions on those rights, as well as defining 
UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQWKHPµIbid: 222). 
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DQGUXOHVWKDWKDYHDQLQWHOOHFWXDOOLIHLQGHSHQGHQWRIDQ\SURMHFWRIJRYHUQPHQWµ
pointing to the examples of Hindu and Islamic law. Furthermore, Scheele (2008) 
urges that a move away from labelling customary practice as law should not blind 
us to local conceptions and propensities toward law making. 
 
Aside from these contentions, thematic interests in legal anthropology moved on in 
WKH V WR ´questions of power, and the entwinements of power, social 
knowledge, discourse, and idenWLW\µ *UHHQKRXVH0RUH UHFHQWO\ OHJDO
DQWKURSRORJLVWVKDYHORRNHGDWWKH´EUHDNEHWZHHQWKHLQWHUHVWVDQGYDOXHVRIOHJDO
LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKHFRPPXQLWLHVWKH\VHUYHµIbid.). Indeed, order-making may be 
seen in one sense as maintaining the status quo of those in power. Nader (2002: 28²
9) critiques legal discourse on harmony making in such terms, as used throughout 
colonial history, underpinned by Christian ideals. Alternatively, as I argue, order 
may be conceived as a more delicate balance of power, where contestation takes 
SODFH WKURXJK ´D FRQWLQXRXV SURFHVV RI IRUPDWLRQ DQG VXSHUVHGLQJ RI XQVWDEOH
equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group 
and those of the subordinate groups - equilibria in which the interests of the 
GRPLQDQW JURXS SUHYDLOµ (Gramsci 2000: 206). To suggest such a view is not to 
naively claim that subordinated groups can easily overthrow oppressive groups, but 
it does go toward an understanding of the forms of resistance to power 
subordinates can use (Nilsen 2015). Indeed, as Fuller (1994: 10) VXJJHVWV´it is clear 
not only that 'legal' orders are not all equally legal, but also that legal pluralism is 
at least partially a relation of dominance, and pRVVLEOHUHVLVWDQFHµ 
 
The Algerian judicial sphere is constituted of a plurality of systems including the 
French civil law, Islamic sharƯޏa and customary law (Christelow 2014: 6). This 
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chapter investigates, therefore, how the presence of multiple systems of law 
influences the decision-making process of disputants in Beni Isguen. For example, 
some Mozabites tend to view the French civil law as adopted by the Algerian state 
with suspicion as a colonial imposition, preferring instead local processes. Indeed, 
other locals, however, take a more strategic view and employ different laws for 
different purposes. Rather than becoming entangled in definition of law, I argue a 
focus on social regulatory practice may be more useful, by arguing for continuity 
between formal and informal ordering. Furthermore, I expand on von Benda-
%HFNPDQQ·V FRQFHSW RI ¶IRUXP VKRSSLQJ· ZLWK D reformulation of classical social 
contract theory.  
 
This chapter together with the next thus outline a range of political organisation 
IURP ¶FRQWURO· WLJKW UHJXODWLRQ WR ¶DJUHHPHQW· ORRVH UHJXODWLRQ DORQJ ZLWK WKH
drawbacks and benefits of each), by focusing on regulatory frameworks (this 
chapter), and regulatory institutions (next chapter) and their transformations. 
While there is some overlap, this chapter focuses primarily on private ownership, 
whereas the next chapter concentrates on issues of communal property. 
 
¶$EDQGRQHG·RDVLVODQGV 
To gain a view of how individuals are affected by and also utilise multiple legal 
systems at the everyday level, I focus on inheritance disputes regarding land tenure 
in the Beni Isguen oasis. My starting point was the empirical observation of 
seemingly abandoned plots. Land issues, along with water and labour and changes 
in how these resources have been and continue to be managed, are key to 
understanding local governance within the wider rubric of sociological change.  
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It was plainly clear after only a short time of working with farmers in Beni Isguen 
RDVLVWKDWPDQ\SORWVDSSHDUHGWROLHIDOORZ7KHVHZHUHQ·WIDOORZLQWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
sense, however, as the land appeared to be completely barren, the soil was bare, 
trees (if any) were dying, and so on. They contrasted with adjacent plots that were 
extremely lush and verdant, bursting with the life of palms, fruit trees and brightly 
FRORXUHGIORZHUV7KHORFDOSURYHUEWKDW´WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHGHVHUWDQGthe 
RDVLVLVPDQµEHFDPHVWULNLQJO\FOHDUWRPHLQKRZDODFNRIPDLQWHQDQFHUHVXOWHGLQ
the rapid conversion of these human-made fruit forests into desert. In the course of 
my daily movements through the oasis I saw a lot of this degraded land, sometimes 
ZLWKDQRWHZULWWHQLQUHGVSUD\SDLQWRQDGRRUGHFODULQJLWVVWDWXV´abandonnéµLQ
French and Arabic). Nejib, a palm tree climber, estimated that perhaps 40 per cent 
of the oasis lay in this state. I verified this through direct observation, and by 
means of satellite photography. 
 
)LJXUH  %HQL ,VJXHQ RDVLV 1RWH EDUH ¶DEDQGRQHG· SORWV LQ WKH IRUHJURXQG 
(22/12/12) 
   
 
232 
 
,SX]]OHGIRUVRPHWLPHRYHUWKLVGLOHPPDZK\ZHUHWKHSORWV¶DEDQGRQHG·":DVLW
simply another case of farming as a disintegrating antiquated lifestyle? How did 
this square with the fact that farmers were complaining of a lack of arable land, due 
to the urban encroachment of town buildings in the oasis? With land obviously 
being the first requirement of any farming project, not to mention that land lying 
unused resulted in a temporal rupture in the maintenance of farming knowledge 
across generations, I set out to try to solve this puzzle.  
 
3RVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVIRU¶DEDQGRQHG·SORWV 
As the above proverb implies, dryland agriculture requires constant maintenance, 
DQGODQGWKDWLVOHIWVWDWLFTXLFNO\UHYHUWVWRDGHVHUWVWDWHRULIQRWDQ¶HTXLOLEULXP·
state, then at least a much less productive state, due to irrigation and date palm 
pollinating requirements). This stasis further conflicted with a Mozabite onus on 
the importance of work as a manifestation of faith. Based on my conversations with 
Mozabite farmers and other agricultural practitioners, my experience in other oases 
and the literature, I generated several potential explanations (following Vayda 
2013) to try to discover the causes for this state of affairs (fig. 7.2 and table 7.1). I 
outline these below followed by an analysis based on the existing evidence. 
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Table 7.1 Possible explanations for abandoned agricultural plots. 
Potential causal event Valid? 
Weighting 
(0 not important ² 
5 important) 
a) Emigration No 0 
b) No profit for farmers  No 0 
c) Rising cost of land Yes 2 
d) Holidays away from the oasis  Yes 3 
e) Inheritance disputes Yes 5 
f) Devalorisation of farming Yes 3 
 
a) Emigration 
As noted in the previous chapter, one of the primary reasons given generally for the 
degradation of oases across the Sahara is emigration of youth to the metropoles. 
This is a commonly held perception, as an influential article by Nee (1989) 
demonstrates. What is misunderstood here is the fact that very often, migrants are 
part of family units who strategically send some of their sons and daughters to 
work and send back most of their monthly wages, the patriarch may make a 
monthly trip to the metropole to collect the earnings and leave just enough for rent 
and food (Crawford 2013). As mentioned elsewhere, Mozabites have in fact been 
undertaking this strategy for perhaps a millennium, for the oases were probably 
never self-sufficient. Therefore, emigration was taking place prior to the more 
UHFHQWJHQHUDOHYHQWRIWKH´DEDQGRQPHQWµRIRDVLs plots. I will explain the timing 
of this event in a coming point.  
 
More local emigration is certainly taking place, drawing workers away from the 
agricultural sector to the factories and hydrocarbon sector (as also discussed in 
chapter 6). However, this missing demographic is being replaced by migrant 
workers from elsewhere (Adrar, the Sahel). Regionally, climatic factors such as 
flood or drought are also said to drive emigration. This is a very real and important 
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problem, yet to my knowledge drought and floods are relatively cyclic, and have 
never decisively GULYHQSHRSOHDZD\IURPIDUPLQJLQWKH0·]DE 
 
b) No profit for famers 
A lack of profit could drive farmers to seek other employment, whether due to 
climatic conditions, or to low market prices. Indeed, market cronyism is prevalent 
at the national level, preventing farmers from entering the larger national and 
international markets. Lambin et al. (2001) in seeking to explain global land use 
FKDQJHVEODPHGFKDQJLQJHFRQRPLFFRQGLWLRQVPHGLDWHGE\ LQVWLWXWLRQDO IDFWRUVµ
(Ibid: 266). Another recent review of agricultural land abandonment drivers by 
Benayas et al. (2007) DJUHHV ZLWK WKLV YLHZ ,Q WKH 0·]DE KRZHYHU IDUPHrs 
continue to sell their produce locally or nearby, and there is little evidence that this 
has been a decisive factor for any particular landholder. From my experience, profit 
maximisation is not the highest priority among Beni Isguen farmers (see chapter 
five), who seem content with modest returns, instead valorising other social 
benefits from farming such as independence, status associated with owning land, 
health and recreation benefits. 
 
c) Rising cost of land 
Land prices are inflating in Beni Isguen oasis. This is primarily due to increased 
demand related to population increase, and also to the fact that young families no 
ORQJHU ZLVK WR OLYH LQ WKHLU SDUHQWV· KRXVHKROGV DV GLVFXVVHG EHORZ LQ SRLQW I
8UEDQDUHDVDUHVSLOOLQJLQWRUXUDO¶JUHHQ·]RQHV, a factor common to Saharan towns 
(which also contradicts the outmigration hypothesis). Indeed, Holden & Otsuka 
theorise (2014) that across sub-Saharan Africa, rising land prices are directly linked 
WRSRSXODWLRQSUHVVXUH,QWKH0·]DEVXSSRUWV\VWHPVGRH[LVWHQDEOLQJLQGLYLGXDOV
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to acquire interest-free loans from wealthy patrons. Alternatively, many have 
applied for and received land concessions given by the state (such as the Ntissa area 
in Beni Isguen ² see Aghrout & Bougherira (2004: 108) for more details on 
Algerian state development)38. (It is feasible that farmers may sell their land in the 
oasis for a profit and apply for concessionary land, although a farmer I spoke to 
largely preferred old oasis land as the soils were already improved and because of 
the watershed system to channel the flood waters, whereas the new concession land 
relied solely on new pumps, drilled at a large cost.) Due to the availability of new 
concessionary land therefore, I propose that this factor is not a significant causal 
factor in the abandonment of plots. 
 
d) Travel/technology 
Although not directly related to farming, in the past during the summer (with 
temperatures soaring to 45-500 C) the entire Mozabite population migrated to the 
oasis to benefit from the microclimate provided by palms, and the peace and quiet 
away from the bustle of the city. Increasingly, Mozabites are now travelling to the 
cooler mountainous and coastal Tell regions (North of Algeria), or abroad during 
the summer months to escape the desert heat, while others remain thanks to the 
recent availability of affordable air conditioning. This is largely enjoyed by families 
who have become wealthier. This wealth was generated during the post-revolution 
period when France opened its borders, temporarily, to allow Algerians to 
immigrate. Many Mozabites travelled there and successfully ran factories and 
shops in wealthy districts. Much of this wealth has in fact been reinvested in oasis 
land, which can be seen in the form of large plots with enormous houses, created by 
procuring and combining several smaller plots. Thus, this factor is ambiguous as 
                                                 
38 Land that was perceived by the state to be barren and unused public land was actually 
claimed as rangeland by nomadic herders. 
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reinvestment does occur (see also Ilahiane 2004: 181). On the other hand, many 
smaller plots are left due to inheritance complications, with families preferring to 
travel rather than solve complicated disputes. 
 
e) Inheritance disputes 
In the opening quote of this chapter, Bourdieu (1979) argues that demand for equal 
VKDUHVLQLQKHULWDQFHZDVGULYHQE\DQHZ´VSLULWRIFDOFXODWLRQµWKDWHPHUJHGZLWK
the shift to a market economy. However, as merchants, Mozabites have long been 
involved in cash transactions (long before French colonial rule), contradicting this 
view. By what process then, GLGMRLQWRZQHUVKLSLQWKH0·]DEEHFRPHUHSODFHGE\
private ownership? Inheritance rules of private property are clear according to 
Islamic law, with sons receiving equal shares, and females (mothers or daughters) 
UHFHLYHDKDOIRIWKHVHVKDUHV,QWKH0·]DEWKDWZKLFKLVQRWFRYHUHGLQWKH4X·UDQ 
is dealt with according to customary law, ¶XUI The national law code (civil law), 
introduced by the French (based by contrast on a separation of Church and State in 
the resolution of such matters), provides an alternative, potentially conflicting set 
of rules and procedures. Individuals wanting their share of inherited property have 
been appealing to this alternative system, in order to subvert the local rules. As 
such, much land is locked up in unsettled disputes, and this issue, discussed in 
JUHDWHUGHWDLOEHORZIRUPVWKHFRUHH[SODQDWLRQIRU¶DEDQGRQHG·ODQG7KXV,SRint 
toward access to colonial laws to explain this shift, rather than colonial markets as 
Bourdieu did. 
 
f) Devalorisation of farming 
From my conversations with Mozabite youths, it is clear that farming is not 
perceived as a prestigious activity, and probably never was. That said, there is a 
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certain romantic nostalgia for the oasis among many individuals, whether it be 
drinking tea with peers under the fruit trees, reading the 4X·UDQ; youth initiatives 
to learn tree climbing; horse racing by the large ahbess dam churning up clouds of 
GXVWZHGGLQJFHOHEUDWLRQVZLWK¶LOOLFLW·PXVLFDQGPXVNHWILUHVFRXWJURXSVVLQJLQJ
songs while sauntering through the windy lanes; white clad women in groups 
walking or riding in groups on the back of pickup trucks to family events in the 
cool evenings; or returning to retire and finally be buried with their ancestors, 
Mozabites retain a strong connection to their ochre coloured oasis home. The 
availability of land concessions and government training is attractive to many, who 
with their strong work ethic, are deciding to try their hand at agriculture, whether 
or not they have a background in farming. On the other hand, access to global 
media has given Mozabite youth access to images from beyond their desert valley, 
enticing many with alternative lifestyles centred on consumption, in direct contrast 
to the asceticism of Ibadism. In light of modern lifestyles, some youth feel 
embarrassed about Mozabite norms and habits, feeling themselves to be 
´EDFNZDUGVµDVRQH\RXWKWROGPHYet, still others continue to be proud of their 
culture, finding concrete ways of preserving and maintaining their unique life-ways 
with their many benefits. 
 
I have argued that hypotheses a, b & c, (emigration, no profit for farmers, and rising 
cost of land) have had little relevance as causes of plot abandonment. Explanation 
(d), holidays away from the oasis has had multiple effects, with increased wealth 
driving both a shift away from the valley for some, while others reinvest in larger 
oasis properties (in turn, transforming the old oasis into an extension of the town, 
pushing agriculture out to the new concession zone ² revisited in chapter 9). 
Globalisation is driving some to question their values, through media or education, 
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and driving some away from the oasis, while others continue to remain attached to 
the valley for multiple reasons, far beyond the function of providing livelihoods. 
The central reason for locked-up, disused land is unequivocally inheritance 
disputes. Yet the drivers behind this are complex (see figure 7.2), and I will attempt 
to unravel them now. 
 
([SODLQLQJ¶DEDQGRQHG·SORWV 
Some scholars (e.g. Lambin et al. 2001) through the synthesis of global findings 
have attempted to explain and generalise land abandonment, claiming that 
economic opportunities are the most important driver. My analysis of land use 
SURFHVVHV LQ WKH0·]DESURYLGHVDQDOWHUQDWLYHYLHZSRLQW LQVWHDGEULQJLQJ WR WKH
forefront the complications that arise from navigating multiple legal systems. In 
this section I provide a brief sketch of the role of local authority in managing land, 
and how the legitimacy of this authority has begun to be challenged. 
 
7.3.1 Inheritance disputes 
A significant amount of Beni Isguen oasis land that appeared to be abandoned was 
in fact locked in inheritance disputes. I was unable to do a comprehensive survey as 
I did not have access to land records or legal dispute records, due to the extreme 
sense of privacy regarding Mozabites internal affairs in relation to outsiders. This 
was further compounded by the fact that disputes involving women and their 
inheritance were even more sensitive. However, I was able to carry out an 
ethnographic assessment of the wider social context regarding disputes and their 
resolution, how this context had changed, and how this in turn had affected the 
GLVSXWH SURFHVV D FRQWH[W WKDW , ZRXOGQ·W KDYH EHHQ DEOH WR XQFRYHU WKURXJK
interviews or surveys alone). I now give an outline, beginning abductively with 
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what I observed (the disputed plots), followed by historical context to show the 
causal factors that have influenced the present state. 
 
I often observed the disused plots from early on in my fieldwork, prompting my 
curiosity. I soon asked my companion, in this case the palm expert Nejib, could the 
mosque, or another local authority not intercede and redistribute the land to those 
who needed it? He replied that they could not, as the land was tied up in the law 
courts: 
 
Before, the surviving family head managed the land so that it remained undivided. 
Now everybody wants his or her share. Although they are Muslims, they deny 
4X·UDQLFODZSHRSOHDUHQ·W*RGIHDULQJDQ\PRUH 
~Nejib, 24/11/12 
 
This statement revealed a key institution of patriarchy (as well as religion) that had 
prevented inheritance disputes and the fragmentation (see chapter five, also Rae 
2002: 11) of family plots over time with the classic problem of succession. Family 
plots tend to diminish over time, for with any more than a single offspring per 
generation, property must be divided among them (3-5 offspring per family was 
FRPPRQ LQ WKH 0·]DE 7KLV SUREOHP ZDV VROYHG LQ WKH SDVW WKURXJK WKH
management of the collective family property by the male family head through his 
authoritarian presence. I address below the consequences to family management of 
land that have resulted when this authority was gradually challenged by new ideas 
around inheritance. Before I discuss this further, it is pertinent to further detail 
local ordering practices. 
 
Historical forms of local social control 
Here I outline historical regulatory practices so as to provide a contrast with social 
norms today, and thus develop a view as to how such processes have changed. 
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Mozabites surely feared punishment in the next life more than in this one, yet 
perhaps even stronger a coercive force was the normative aspect of social life: one 
IHDUHGWKHORVVRIRQH·V IDPLO\KRQRXUDQGVRFLDOVWDQGLQJ7KXV in such a face-to-
face society, an LQGLYLGXDO·V actions always necessitate a consideration of more than 
just the consequences for them alone, and although people were known as diverse 
characters and to act alone, immoral acts could have huge repercussions for the 
family honour. Therefore, prevention as well as punishment began at home. Beyond 
this at the wider social level, unsanctioned behaviour could be formally punished 
through tebria (excommunication) by the cazzƗba , who effectively ruled as a 
theocracy. Tebria simultaneously shamed the individual and reinforced the moral 
norms of society, as the rule-breaker had to confess and ask for repentance at each 
Friday prayer in front of the entire community. Historically, a range of 
punishments existed. In a discussion on Mozabite qanǌn (laws) in the late 
nineteenth century, Masqueray described the power of cazzƗba:  
 
masters of conscience through confession, alone able to repress crimes 
through banishment, presidents of all meetings, custodians of all contracts, 
severe guardians of morality and old customs. [Masqueray, my translation 
from the French, 1878: 215] 
 
The cazzƗba were seen as wise and fair judges, and even the Arabs wished to be 
judged by them39. Punishment given by the cazzƗba could take the form of 
banishment, compensation, public penance, prison, or baton blows (Masqueray 
1878: 225). Below the cazzƗba was the majlis ayyen, council of notables, who had 
legislative and judicial power (similar to the djemcaa, or council of elders found in 
                                                 
39 )RUH[DPSOH $´0R]DELWHFKDUJHGD&KDPEkDRI VWHDOLQJFDPHOVXVHGWRH[WUDFWZDWHU
The latter denied and stated that the animal had been purchased in Laghouat and had never 
been put to such use. What did the judge declare? He ordered the camel to be harnessed to 
a winch on a well and after this was undertaken, he said that the animal was indeed stolen 
IURPWKHFRPSODLQDQWµ$PDW1888: 159-60). 
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other Maghrebian towns and villages), although the executive power lay with the 
former. Bourdieu explains that judgements were made based on: 
 
the law of the 4X·UDQ and according to the ittifcaqƗt, the written compilation 
of Mozabite customs. These ittifcaqƗt, which can be modified at any time to 
settle current problems, but which are always interpreted by reference to 
religious jurisprudence, govern political life as well as private morals and 
provide for archaic but very formidable punishments³bastinado, fines, 
banishment and excommunication, the latter being the supremely dreaded 
punishment which excludes the guilty person from the religious and social 
community and entails the loss of all his rights. [1962: 43] 
 
Furthermore, beyond the usual crimes of theft, adultery, violence and murder, the 
breaking of cultural taboos was also punishable, such as use of alcohol, tobacco and 
coffee, of breaking marriage customs such as the amount of allowable dowry, 
playing music and dancing, and so on (Ibid: 47; for detailed categories of offenses 
and punishments, see Amat 1888: 47-50). The cazzƗba had a further powerful 
weapon: the withdrawal of religious services. This would mean no prayers would be 
held, and no bodies washed upon death ready for burial. Over time, the ayyen has 
gradually gained power and independence from the oversight of the cazzƗba 
(Bourdieu 1962: 43; Bennoune 1986), now integrated into the regional framework 
of the national government, although the cazzƗba still retains considerable moral 
influence. Today the use of tebria as punishment is virtually non-existent, yet the 
moral weight of normative behaviour is strong, and as such a sort of informal tebria 
exists, where immoral people are simply avoided. 
 
This reveals the presence of local legal codes and punishments. Yet these 
formalised practices were combined with informal norms. For example, punishment 
was pre-empted and reinforced by social visibility, as I discussed in chapter five, 
whether in general, by O·RXPQD, or by mothers-in-law. Furthermore, while use of 
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tebria has waned (for reasons I explain below), avoidance of anti-social individuals 
continues. Thus, I argue not for such practices to be included within definitions of 
law as such, yet they do constitute legitimate study for legal anthropologists. 
 
Islamic land tenure law 
In solving issues related to property, local political institutions are guided by the 
interpretation of Islamic law. Yet local people may challenge such rulings. During 
one occasion, Hamza explained to me how Islamic sharƯҵa may be contested in 
everyday situations:  
 
The entire Islamic world shares inheritance laws of all private belongings, mulk 
(private property). For example, if you have a shop, it will be sold and divided 
into equal parts, or half if for a woman. Or, if it runs well and makes a good profit, 
one of them may run it, and give a share of the proceeds to the others. But often 
people contest the divisions, claiming that one is worth more than the other. This 
causes them to be stuck in legislation, even on to the next generation. This is not 
good; they should be divided straight away. Or a father may leave a will, but should 
not give a favoured son more.  
~Hamza, 15/09/13 
 
Jurisprudence then, must attempt to apply the sharƯҵa to everyday realities. 
Furthermore, the 4X·UDQ determines proper usage and succession of land according 
to certain categories. First, it is necessary to give a definition of Islamic land tenure 
here (from Forni 2003): 
 
Land tenure can be defined as the group of rights of individuals, households 
or communities with respect to land. Water also can be accessed under 
different types of rights. Tenure includes not only property rights, but also 
use rights of a permanent or seasonal nature. A tenure system may include 
rights sanctioned both by law and by custom. That is, alongside the formal 
legal systems, following defined administrative procedures, there also exist 
customary rules accepted by the majority of users. [Forni, 2003]  
 
Furthermore, land ownership regimes are generally classified into four categories: 
1) private land, mulk, in which one has full rights of ownership, alienation and 
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usufruct; 2) state land, mƯrƯ, where the state provides usufruct usage, codified 
during the Ottoman period (land code of 1858) to counter the power of large 
landholders; 3) public land, hƗbǌs (or waqf in South-West Asia) which is inalienable, 
XVXDOO\ IRU FKDULWDEOH XVH DQG  ´GHDG· ODQG mawƗt, often used for communal 
JUD]LQJDQGDSROLWLFDO ´JUH\DUHDµ 5DH-9). Furthermore, land and water 
tenure are presently governed by a legal plurality combining Islamic law, 
FXVWRPDU\ ODZRU ¶urf, and national statutory law. I describHKRZWKHVH ¶ODZV· DUH
combined below. 
 
Beni Isguen oasis consists of a mixture of mulk, communal, and hƗbǌs lands (owned 
by the mosque). Most of the land is now private property, yet the riverbeds are 
communally owned, and those who cannot afford to own land may plant date palms 
here, which are then privately owned. This is in accordance with local Islamic 
interpretation, that water not held in artificially made constructions is public 
property40.  
 
)LQDOO\IURP+DP]D·VVWDWHPHQWZHUHWXUQWRWKHQRWLRQRI joint management and 
conversely, an important source of dispute, namely, that one share may be 
(perceived to be) worth more than the others. For example, although a plot of land 
may be divided equally according to land surface, one of the divisions might contain 
                                                 
40 It is quite difficult to accurately reconstruct a picture of  historical land tenure in the 
oasis. Two different Mozabite sources related to me that none of  the land was owned, and 
only individual palms were, in accordance with ¶XUI This is hard to square with the much 
repeated statement that virtually all Mozabites owned a second property in the oasis to 
spend the hot summers. From old farmers, I have been able to reconstruct a visual 
description of  the oasis, where about 70 per cent was farmed on sharecropping basis, on 
plots about 2 hectares in size. The rest, in the area known as Ujujen, consisted of  
residential land. The oasis now consists of  virtually all private houses and gardens with 
very few half  hectare plots, and the majority of  farming occurs in the new concessionary 
land Ntissa, which is state-owned but can become private property after five years of  
proper management. 
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a property, making it more desirable. This situation is clearly difficult to resolve, 
and one solution was to sell the whole property and divide the proceeds. I argue 
below that such disputes depend on notions of shifting or multiple centres of 
authority. Before this, I must describe in more detail the local customary laws on 
which dispute settlement is based, ¶XUIand how this intersected with Islamic law. 
 
&XVWRPDU\ODZ¶urf 
 
Local disputes were historically resolved according to ¶XUI (similar to ҵƗda in 
Central Asia), or customary law, consisting of encoded verbal rules or 
agreements41. 1HMLE H[SODLQHG ¶urf and its relation to Islamic law by means of a 
story: 
 
2QHGD\WKH3URSKHW0RKDPPHGVDZDPDQSROOLQDWLQJDSDOPWUHHDQGVDLG´ZK\
are you doing that? You should leave it alone to pollinate naturally by the windµ. 
The man did as he was told, and at harvest season the production of dates was very 
ORZ:KHQWKH3URSKHWOHDUQHGRIWKLVKHH[FODLPHG´LQGHHGWKHUHDUHVRPHWKLQJV
which I do not know, and different regions have their own specificities with their 
own ways and laws not covered in the Holy 4X·UDQ)RUWKLVWKHUHLV¶urfµ. 
~ Nejib, 07/02/12 
 
This example reveals the interaction between pre-Islamic local custom, and sharƯҵa. 
Moreover, Sartori & Shahar (2012) have the following to say regarding the 
UHODWLRQVKLSRI¶urf to Islamic law: 
 
The sharp distinction between Islamic law and ҵurf / ҵƗda, taken for granted 
by Western students of Islamic law for decades, has been challenged in 
recent years by scholars who emphasised the fuzzy boundaries between 
sharƯҵa and custom. In particular, anthropologists studying the socio-legal 
sphere in Muslim societies have contended that Muslim laymen hardly make 
a distinction between sharƯҵa and custom in their everyday lives. It appears 
that jurists, too, have been tolerant towards custom and have viewed it as 
                                                 
41 Some opponents of  legal pluralism have argued that customary law is largely a colonial 
invention (e.g. Ranger et al. 1997). While in many ways this statement contains much 
truth, especially in the codification of  custom in written form, it is also demonstrable that 
¶XUI has pre-colonial origins (Scheele 2008). 
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perfectly Islamic, as long as it does noW YLRODWH 4XU·DQLF SUHVFULSWLRQV
[2012: 648] 
 
However, Islamic jurists: 
 
have perceived these as two distinct normative orders, and it is precisely 
this distinctiveness that enabled them to interrogate the relations between 
Islamic law and custom and discuss the circumstances under which law-
abiding Muslims are allowed to act in accordance with local customs. 
Apparently, the fuzzy boundaries between sharƯҵa and ҵurf in daily life made 
it all the more necessary for jurists to distinguish between them at the 
doctrinal and discursive levels. [2012: 649] 
 
Access to limited resources, not to mention densely occupied living spaces and 
intense heat, may give rise to frequent quarrels42. I once witnessed a disagreement 
over the building on a footpath by a particular party. This party claimed that it was 
public property and thus free to use, while his neighbour claimed that the path, 
adjacent to his land was in fact his property. This dispute was probably resolved 
quite simply by consultation with a Mozabite expert on property use, as private and 
public usage had clear precedents. Regarding resolution of more ambiguous 
problems, I was informed that this usually began by an informal process. 
Arbitration of conflict was first attempted by appealing to family members. If this 
first point of call failed, then an appeal would be made to the cashƯra, council of 
families, to pressure parties to resolve their problems in an equitable way. If this 
GLGQ·WZRUNWKHQWKHSUREOHPZRXOGEHHVFDODWHGWRPHPEHUVRIWKHPRVTXHZKRVH
elevated social standing usually gave them the necessary gravity in the eye of the 
beholder to sort the problem out. Here, the cazzƗba had a more formal approach, 
involving the following steps: 
 
1. Look for the rule in the 4X·UDQ. If not then, 
2. Look for it in the Hadith, sayings of the prophet. If not there, then, 
                                                 
42 Historically disputes took place between individuals, clans (or safs) or even whole towns, 
as I described elsewhere (chapter four, on segmentary theory). 
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3. Look for similar examples in the 4X·UDQ and try to weigh up the pros and cons 
for the people. If not there, then,  
4. /RRNWR¶urf, customary law. If not, 
5. Look to civil law. 
 
Interestingly, Nejib exclaimed that now actions 4 & 5 are the wrong way round, 
people look to civil law first, then to customary law. He went on to use the 
metaphor of a house, remaUNLQJ WKDW ´\RX FDQ·W EXLOG D KRXVH IURP WKH WRS <RX
have to start with the foundations, the local layers. The customary and civil law 
VKRXOGEHFRPSOHPHQWDU\\HWWKH\DUHLQYHUWHGµ7KLVpoints us to the fact that the 
state law is now a further complicating factor in power relations between 
regulatory systems. Furthermore, Nejib argued that local institutions are better 
geared toward local problems, and they can find tailor-made solutions, whereas the 
state tends to offer one-size-fits-all policies. 
 
IsVXHVFRPPRQO\FRYHUHGE\¶urf involve the sanctity of the family, such as building 
regulations. For example, if a bakery is opened next to a family residence and it 
makes a disturbance (as bakeries commonly begin work early in the morning), then 
the family has the right to demand that the bakery has to move. I was curious as to 
KRZ GHFLVLRQV ZHUH UHDFKHG DQG KRZ QHZ DSSOLFDWLRQV RI ¶urf were made, and it 
became clear that consultation was a key part. 
 
The 4X·UDQ has allowed for customary law to be applied to deal with particulars of 
DVLWXDWLRQLWVD\V´DSSO\WKHOHJDOLW\DQGWKHULJKWFXVWRPµ3HRSOHWU\DQHZODZ
for ten years or so, and consult people as to its efficacy and worth. Custom is the 
accumulation of experience over time. Another example is shafaca: if you sell a 
house, you must ask your neighbours, otherwise they can cut in on the contract 
[right of pre-emption]. This is for conserving community. Yet another example 
RI¶urf is where in the past all neighbours around a well would give up a piece of 
land around it including the space for the animal to pull the line. Now neighbours 
¶VWHDO·WKDWODQGDVWKH\KDYHHOHFWULFLW\[for pumps].  But it is collective land. The 
$OJHULDQODZGRHVQ·WNQRZDERXWWKHVHWKLQJVVRWKHUHLVFRQIOLFW7KHUHLVD)rench 
hangover of rules from that time. They have updated their rules, however, here we 
have not. Such rules are adapted to French and European customs and geography, 
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not ours. Another example is the customary law that stipulates that houses cannot be 
built higher than others, for access to sunlight, but now people go to the hokuma 
[local government] and they say you can build as high as you like. People can say 
nothing. Also, they may put windows, but this is haram. /·RXPQD >WKH ZDWHU
guards] in the past would have said, ´FORVHLWµ,IWKHSHUSHWUDWRUVGLGQ·WOLVWHQWR
these words, then the issue would be taken to the cashƯra, at that time people were 
very afraid of this authority. If they needed to go higher up, they would go to the 
mosque. People respected these institutions then, before there was solidarity. France 
broke everything. People say, ´DEDGDJUHHPHQWLVEHWWHU WKDQJRLQJWRWKHWULEXQDOµ 
~Nejib, 24/11/13 
 
There is much here worthy of discussion, but importantly it was stated that the 
various customary authorities, from family members to councils, are said today not 
to hold the same power of awe over individuals, who instead often decide to try 
WKHLUFKDQFHVDWWKHODZFRXUWVRUVHWWOHIRU´EDGDJUHHPHQWVµ7KXVORFDODXWKRULW\
is waning. New more inclusive forms of governance are being experimented with, 
as I explain in chapter eight, leaving the problem of how to deal with serious 
conflict without the force of locally recognised sanctions.  
 
Discussing the issue with Nebil, he claimed that one reason that people were going 
to the law courts rather than deal with it internally, was due to the length of the 
traditional process: 
 
Going to the family would take a week, going to the cashƯra would take another 
ZHHN«WKHUHFDQQRWEHWZRSRZHUVLQWRZQ,I\RXKDYHWZREURWKHUV\RXOLVWHQWR
the older one. 
 ~ Nebil, 18/11/13 
 
This statement interestingly discusses the relationship between local and state 
legal institutions in terms of kinship, using the metaphor of older and younger 
brothers. We further discussed what role the state law courts played: 
 
<RXPD\JRWRWKHIDPLO\IRUH[DPSOHLI\RXKDGQ·WEHHQSDLGIRUGRLQJDMRE,I\RX
went to the justice for such a petty manner, they woulGVD\WR\RX´ZK\GLGQ·W\RXJR
WR WKH IDPLO\ ILUVW" :KDW DUUDQJHPHQWV GLG \RX PDNH"µ $ SHUVRQ ZLWK D EDG
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FKDUDFWHUPD\PDQLSXODWHWKH¶urf as it is flexible, but they cannot get away from the 
power of the law. 
~Nebil, 18/11/13 
 
From these examples, it is clear that the influence of local institutions has been 
ZDQLQJIRUVRPHWLPHDVORFDOSHRSOHSXWLWEHFDXVHSHRSOHDUH´QRW*RGIHDULQJµ
RU ´EHFDXVH WKH )UHQFK WRRN WKH SRZHU DZD\µ +RZHYHU IRU FHUWDLQ LVVXHV OLNH
divorce, people still prefer to consult the traditional institutions. Furthermore, my 
interlocutors declared that they try to keep women away from the courts, 
SUHIHUULQJWRGHDOZLWKVXFKGLVSXWHVORFDOO\DOWKRXJK,REVHUYHGWKDWWKLVZDVQ·W
always the case). Perhaps the most important influence is that of the introduction of 
French civil law, in providing an alternative venue to be exploited by those who 
could, in order to demand individual shares of inheritance. But before entering an 
examination of the more recent legal system and its effects, it is essential to discuss 
how land was jointly managed in the past, and how and why this has changed with 
the new inheritance practices. 
 
7.3.3 Atomisation of the extended family 
 
2QDFRROZLQWHU·VGD\%HVVHPDQG1HMLEYLVLWXVIRUGLQQHU2QFHDJDin, I enquire 
how the problem of inheritance has been managed so as not to continually diminish 
the palm gardens. Bessem replies that in the past families operated like Christian 
families, with one son managing the garden, one professor, one doctor, two 
practicing commerce in the north, and one imƗm or lawyer. The merchants would 
invest some money in the palm grove, and everyone would get their share of dates or 
the sale of dates. But sometimes, and more regularly now, one would complain of not 
having an equal income and would demand their share. Then the family would 
either buy their part, or sell part of the palm grove, dividing it to a smaller size, or 
even sell the whole plot and divide it. 
~Field notes, 25/12/12 
 
From this and other conversations as described above, I began to understand that 
historically resources such as land tended to be managed in common, presided over 
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by the family patriarch (see Crawford 2008: 15, for a comparison in the Moroccan 
context). Families, as in medieval Europe it was pointed out to me, were like 
microcosms of society, in that sons would actively choose different careers, e.g. one 
priest, one lawyer, one teacher, one soldier, one farmer, so that each could draw on 
the benefits of the various social and political fields for the overall prosperity of the 
family. Thus the proceeds of each would be roughly equally shared out among 
members, such as the seasonal harvest of the land43. This situation no longer seems 
to be prevalent. 
 
Recently, however, a certain atomisation has been taking place in Mozabite society, 
dissolving this microcosm. On discussing the issue of inheritance with an elderly 
farmer: 
 
Sons used to bring their wives into the household of their father, until they have 
children, at which point they would move out, rent or buy a house of their own. 
With inhHULWDQFH LI WKH\ DJUHH WKH\ GLYLGH WKH ODQG EHWZHHQ WKHP ,I WKH\ GRQ·W
agree, they sell the land. Daughters are often the source of disagreements, as their 
spouses often demand cash. 
~Bayoub Abbes, 19/11/13 
 
As noted by Farrag (1971), this drive to small, atomised families most probably is 
related to the ability of wealthy individuals to break away, setting up independent 
households, rather than being forced to wait for the patriarch to die, in order to 
inherit and finally gain authority. As Bayoub noted, however, this could be 
exacerbated by affinal relations, such as the spouse, wishing to make a claim. 
Furthermore, certain factors, analysed below, have caused family members to cease 
to acquiesce to the ascendancy of the elder male, especially after the death of the 
father, and seek their share of the communal resources in monetary value.  
                                                 
43 Bessem pointed out that he was influenced by the local radical Mozabite thinker, 
Abderrahmane Hadj-Nacer (2011), in coming to this understanding regarding extended 
household management. 
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Regarding the allocation of property following a death, paradoxically, despite the 
doctrine of Ibadite (and indeed wider Amazigh) equality, it may be due to new 
notions of individual equality that have caused a downfall in previous management 
methods of family oasis plots. Historically, equality was generally sought between 
household heads, while a hierarchy of age and gender ruled within the households 
(Crawford 2008: 12). Currently, while hierarchy between generations still exists, it 
appears that equality is sought between siblings. Thus, the eldest sibling is no 
ORQJHUWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDQGLVQRORQJHUDEOHWRWDNHRQWKHPDQWOHRI¶SDWULDUFK·
of the family household. 
 
It is my contention that by breaking off and starting their own households, young 
wealthy families are circumventing social visibility (as discussed in chapter five), 
creating barriers by means of walls to this mechanism of social control in the 
0·]ab. Walls are more prevalent in Mozabite oases than others I have encountered 
in North Africa, and they are erected and maintained according to local norms 
regarding the privacy of the family. Thus, such norms of privacy could be seen to 
be offsetting norms of control through visibility and the social gaze. Further, it is 
the wealthy that are most able to afford such walls. Therefore again, it is the 
wealthier classes that are eschewing traditional normative practices. 
 
Bourdieu argued that in Algeria, atomisation was driven by the promotion of 
private property by French laws (1961: 84, in Fowler 1997: 15), which agrees with 
my assertion of the rise in importance of individual rights. Of course, family 
managed farms were already privately owned, but Bourdieu seems to be arguing 
WKDWZLWKSULYDWLVDWLRQFDPHD ¶PRGHUQ· LQGLYLGXDOLVWHWKLFSHUKaps alongside this 
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emphasis on individual rights. It is this disruptive, often violent, social upheaval 
that I now examine in more detail. 
 
7.3.4 Civil law and colonialism in Algeria 
 
%HIRUHWKHPRVTXHSURWHFWHGWKHRDVLVHQVXUHGWKHODZ¶urf, dictated when certain 
things were done in the oasis, such as cutting the branches. In Morocco it is different, 
there they have the king, who protects their interests. Here, there is conflict with the 
VWDWH WKH\ GRQ·W DFW LQ WKH SHRSOHV· LQWHUHVWV 1RZ WKH PRVTXH Kere is only for 
praying, and it is the population and the government together. It was the French 
who took away the power of /·RXPQD and the mosque. 
~ Salah Ba Ali, farmer, 19/09/13 
 
On the African continent, customary law was mainly created in reaction to colonial 
rule (Ranger 1997: 456, also in Hobsbawm, The Invention of Tradition)44. However, 
in the Islamic world, Islamic law existed prior to colonial civil or common law, 
which coexisted with pre-existing local customary laws. This resulted in a plurality 
of laws, as although the colonial rulers needed to apply European Roman laws such 
as criminal and commercial laws in order to facilitate market expansion, they had to 
leave certain elements intact such as family law or personal-status law, in order to 
ensure social stability (Sartori & Shahar 2012). Indeed, key to maintaining a 
delicate control meant allowing Muslim communities to continue to practice the 
Islamic faith undisturbed, and a central tenet of this is Islamic law, sharƯҵa 
(Christelow 2014: 4). Clearly, customary laws were subservient to colonial 
authority (Nasr 2001: 43). Moreover, indigenous systems of law were not merely 
incorporated into statutory law, but were adjusted, with unsatisfactory ones being 
criminalised as dangerous or primitive (Sartori & Shahar 2012). An important 
factor of legal pluralism under colonial rule is that colonial powers were able to 
                                                 
44 As Ranger (1997: 456) XQHTXLYRFDOO\SXWVLW´ZKDWZHUHFDOOHGFXVWRPDU\ODZFXVWRPDU\
land rights, customary political structure and so on, were in fact all invented by colonial 
FRGLILFDWLRQµ 
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apply different law codes of different pre-existing ethnic divisions, in order to 
maintain a divide-and-rule policy (Ibid.). 
 
Interestingly, pluralistic hegemonic regimes, rather than being solely sites of power 
and subordination, have been used for counter-hegemonic purposes by indigenous 
populations (Nader 2002: 36), or manipulated opportunistically as a way out of 
customary modes of practise, such as with traditional inheritance rights (for 
example, civil law gave women equal property rights (Rae 2002: 9)). Indeed, a 
PXOWLSOLFLW\ RI OHJDO UHJLPHV KDV DIIRUGHG D NLQG RI ¶IRUXP VKRSSLQJ· E\ OLWLJDQWV
based on opportunistic self-interest, as I found in the M·]DE(von Benda-Beckmann 
1981). Furthermore, not only did colonial law affect Islamic and customary laws, 
the mother countries in turn were transformed by the encounter (Comaroff 2001). 
 
Colonial subjugation varied from direct to indirect rule. Algerians experienced a 
particularly brutal form of direct colonial rule (Fanon 1959; 1963), where the 
French centralised and bureaucratised a formerly highly variable judicial order by 
introducing a court of appeal which oversaw the previously independent qadi law 
(Islamic jurisprudence) system45 (Christelow 2014: 9). The first phase of colonial 
rule entailed removing all vestiges of Ottoman political structures and, reflecting 
Ottoman rule, they regarded the Algerians as never having had an indigenous state. 
The sultan or bey was left to remain as a symbol of national sovereignty, as in 
Morocco and Tunisia. Next, they eradicated all tribal structures, and reassigned 
their fragmented remains to territorial units or communes under direct French 
administration. The commune leader or qcaid was selected by the French, often 
                                                 
45 In the 1880s the French attempted to eliminate the Muslim courts entirely. This led to 
the first popular protest movement in Algeria after 60 years of  colonial rule, and eventually 
the French withdrew this policy (Christelow 2014: 9). 
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from outside the area, and thus usually despised by the local population for 
subservience to the colonials and for their domineering habits (Ibid: 12).  
 
7KH 0·]DE ZDV OHIW DORQH E\ WKH FRORQLDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ IRU WKH ILUVW  \HDUV
apparently the new administration admired the Mozabites disciplined self-
RUJDQLVLQJDELOLWLHV)LQDOO\LQWKH)UHQFKDQQH[HGWKH0·]DEDVSXQLVKPHQW
for aiding and sheltering members of a resistance movement led by Abd al-Qadir, 
and also tripled their taxes46 (Amat 1888: 238). From the Mozabite point of view, 
they were caught between a rock and a hard place, fearing both the advancing 
colonials and the dynamic Abd al-Qadir. For a long time they hedged and debated 
as to which side appeared to be gaining the upper hand (Bennoune 1986). However, 
following annexation, as Bennoune puts it: 
 
«WKH FRXQFLO RI WKH FOHUNV ZKLFK JRYHUQHG WKH 0R]DELWHV VLQFH WKH
declaration of the state of secrecy in Ouargla, and which was operating 
clandestinely, never recognized either the legal validity of annexation or the 
French authority represented locally by the appointed officers. The clerks in 
accord with the committee of the halqƗt (circles) organized the total boycott 
and avoidance of the French administration and the means of its presence: 
schools, hospitals, military service and even tax evasion. In a word, the 
Mozabites tried to minimize as much as possible their dealings and relations 
with the colonial power and the medium of its domination. [1986: 110] 
 
Thus, the Mozabites largely continued to attend to their own affairs, preferring to 
solve their problems and conflict internally, according to their own methods of 
justice, resolution or punishment. However, a new precedent was set, and an 
                                                 
46Amat (1888: 26) relates the French proclamation: ´,QKDELWDQWVRI0]DEZKHQ\RXKDYH 
made your submission to France, we promised you that our powerful protection will cover 
\RXLQ\RXUWUDYHOVDQGGXULQJ\RXUVWD\LQRXUFLWLHVZHKDYHNHSWRXUSURPLVH«\RXZLOO
keep your municipal djemcaa as a useful measure and your Abadites sheikhs will do your 
justice. We affirm the authority of your leaders and we will respect the decisions of your 
sheikhs when they act with fairness and justice. But we will also reach out and strike those 
who fail in their duty, or vis-à-vis the administration and the defendant, or vis-à-vis the 
Government of the French Republic.µ (my translation from the French) 
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alternative seat of justice was available for those who didn·W DJUHH ZLWK WKH
judgements of the Mozabite authorities, or who wished to subvert traditional 
arrangements regarding land tenure, inheritance, and authority (the household 
patriarch, the cashƯra, the cazzƗba). 
 
Such a shift in the centres of authority and identity has been alluded to by Scheele 
(2009: 107-11) in her work on the Kabyles of Northern Algeria. I contend that at a 
certain point, Mozabite individuals, most probably from the wealthier section of 
society, who were already subverting the practice of tebria by forming their own 
bourgeois circles, turned to another centre of authority, that of the nation-state. 
This was probably more attractive than accepting the authority of the colonials, as 
the new state had a self-proclaimed Islamic identity. Support for this view was 
SURYLGHG E\ VHYHUDO LQGLYLGXDOV LQ WKH 0·]DE ZKHQ GLVFXVVLQJ FKDQJHV UHJDUGLQJ
local power. For example, Nejib informed me that: 
 
In the past before the French when a crisis happened, the community found solutions 
to problems and then put them into writing. The French removed power from the 
mosque to make decisions and placed an outsider muqqadam ZKRGLGQ·WXQGHUVWDQG
SHRSOHRUORFDOKLVWRU\+HFDQ·WILQGDVROXWLRQWRWKHSUREOHPV7KHPRVTXHXVHGWR
be able to solve disputes by reference to Islamic law, solving disputes quickly so that 
WKHODQGGRHVQ·WORVHYDOXHXQOLNHQRZ1RZSRZHULVFHQWUDOLVHGDVFLYLOODZ 
~ Nejib, 23/11/12 
 
Further, in discussing the matter with Bechir, a student of city planning: 
 
I ask about power and how the French at first allowed local autonomy, but then took 
LWDZD\%HFKLUVD\VWKDWIURPWKHORFDOSRLQWRIYLHZWKH\GLGQ·WUHDOO\PDQDJHWR
interfere. But now power is given to central government, because they are an Islamic 
institution, but they respeFWORFDOVSHFLILFLWLHV*HQHUDOUHJXODWLRQVVRPHWLPHVGRQ·WILW
ZLWK ORFDO UHJXODWLRQV 7KH\ RIWHQ DOORZ H[FHSWLRQV KRZHYHU HJ ´ZH DUH IUHH WR
deal with the mosque about 90 per cent. In other mosques in Algeria, the imƗm is 
chosen from the ministry of Religion, this is important, as religion is the most 
LPSRUWDQWWKLQJLQ0R]DELWHVRFLHW\µ$OVRWKHUHDUHQRSROLFHPHQ7KLVFKDQJHLQ
power dynamics took place gradually since independence. 
~Field notes, 21/09/13 
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Nejib argued that civil law cannot decide a local situation of which it knows 
nothing, by relating how two neighbours disagreed over something and went to 
court, and the judge told them that the law could tell them nothing that their own 
FRPPRQ VHQVH RU ORFDO FRQYHQWLRQV FRXOGQ·W )XUWKHU WR WKLs, Salah Ba Ali added 
that judges indeed often enquired of plaintiffs whether they had exhausted the local 
processes first. This shows that conflict between customary and statutory laws is 
not always necessarily the case. 
 
The brutal French colonial rule was experienced more violently in Algeria than 
anywhere else, and the disruptive effects were far reaching. We can see these effects 
continue into the postcolonial period, for as the fledging state attempted to oppose 
the dominant imperial powers in its formation, including attempts at socialism, the 
colonial structures, especially the legal system, resisted and endured. This probably 
WRRN VRPH WLPH WR ILOWHU GRZQ WR WKH 0·]DE LQ LWV UHPRWH HQFODYH LQ WKH GHVHUW
protected by the parochial cazzƗba. Yet, (some) Mozabites decided to strategically 
engage with the new Islamic Algerian state because it was seen as morally and 
ideologically aligned with local interests. This arguably opened up the possibility of 
choosing an alternative pathway for litigating disputes. This shows that 
FRORQLDOLVPZDVQ·WVLPSO\H[SHULHQFHGDVDORVVRIORFDOagency; rather, it provided 
alternatives for those who wished and were able to exploit them. In contrast to 
indirect rule, French imperialism in Algeria sought an assimilationist policy 
&KULVWHORZ&XOWXUDOFKDQJHFDPHVORZO\WRWKH0·]DEGHVSLWHWKHIHDUV
of some (e.g. Amat 1888: 228). Arguably, it is only recently that large-scale changes 
have been felt, primarily due to the introduction of global mass media, and despite 
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futile resistance by the cazzƗba. I now discuss this final component of change 
regarding notions of inheritance.  
 
7.3.5 Globalisation & changing values 
 
While formal modes of local governance have been denigrated by the presence of 
the state, informal means of normative order have also been slowly eroded by 
conflict with the new ideas that arrive by global mass media. Recently, youth have 
been experimenting with alternative forms of identity in the less socially 
accountable realms of social media (as one local friend complained to me). Again, 
this social arena is largely outside of the customary physical space which succumbs 
to social visibility. These new, unregulated spaces allow young people to 
experiment and engage with new ideas and values, and some of these values are 
locally perceived as a threat to the moral fabric of the community. In engaging with 
the outside as never before, the previous sacrosanct inner sanctum of the local 
community, once upheld by the family and mosque appears to have been violated 
from within, a kind of Trojan horse, as young Mozabites sit in front of their 
computers within the walls of the old towns engaging with an unprecedented, 
unregulated flow of information, ideas and images. Individuals are now debating 
the role of conformity (with social norms) in limiting the creative process, for 
H[DPSOHUHIHUULQJWRHFRQRPLFDOO\VXFFHVVIXO¶:HVWHUQ·UROHPRGHOVVXFKDV6WHYH
Jobs. 
 
In discussing the effects of globalisation, I asked Omar about what he meant when 
KHVDLGWKDW´WKHFXOWXUHLVJHWWLQJORVWµ+HUHplied: 
 
In the past we were isolated. With the event of globalisation, the young people 
TXHVWLRQWKHLUZD\VDQGFXOWXUHDQGSHUKDSVVHHWKHPVHOYHVDV´UHWDUGHGLJQRUDQWµ
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Plus now there are many people around with different ways. Religion is being lost, 
DQGWKLVLVWLHGXSYHU\VWURQJO\ZLWKWKHLUFXOWXUHRULGHQWLW\3HRSOHGRQ·WOLVWHQWR
the cazzƗba as much anymore. [I ask him for an example of culture or religion 
JHWWLQJORVWKHUHSOLHV@IRUH[DPSOHQHLJKERXUVZRXOGQ·WPDNHSUREOHPVRYHUODQG
this ZRXOGQ·WKDYHKDSSHQHGLQWKHSDVWE\*RGIHDULQJSHRSOHQRZWKH\JRWRWKH
courts. 
~Omar Blidi, 25/11/12 
 
Omar went on to speak of conserving traditions, afraid of a monoculture in the 
future due to globalised mass media on the internet and TV. He referred to Japan as 
a notable model, that some things need to remain closed at times, some things open; 
not all things open all the time. He regarded community to be the natural human 
state, and associated the rise of individualism with industrialism. Another friend 
had this to say:  
 
people may have seemed a bit harsh in the past, closed off to people who are open-
minded today, e.g. being open to foreigners, but maybe we are letting bad things in. 
this is my view. Like now people on Facebook are calling themVHOYHV¶HPR·RUFUD]\
SHUVRQ7KLVGLGQ·WKDSSHQWKUHH\HDUVDJRLWLVWKHEDGHIIHFWVRIJOREDOLVDWLRQ 
~Omar Ben Enis, 08/10/13 
 
7KH SHRSOH , VSRNH WR LQ WKH 0·]DE ZHUH FOHDUO\ DIUDLG RI VRPH RI WKH HIIHFWV RI
globalisation, yet some were obviously embracing such change. I found it 
heartening at least, that such change was the subject of debate, by the young and 
old alike, and thus they were contesting such change, determined, largely to accept 
it only on their own terms. 
 
Benmoussa (2013) argues that globalisation has indeed affected Algerian values 
regarding land. He states that the French drive to privatise communally managed 
land did not affect all of Algeria equally, and the less-profitable southern 
rangelands were not affected as those in the North. In the South, tribes continued 
to have right of use of rangelands (although these technically belonged to the 
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state); it was not until the end of the 1980s after the self-declared socialist period in 
Algeria and the privatisation of the economy, that this began to change. Benmoussa 
describes how communal land is now being privatised and sold off by means of a 
legal loophole, where portions of land may be given to poorer individuals for 
temporary use, a tradition named haq al-afou (lit. Arab: right to tranquillity). This 
transition is recognised by national statutory law, and then the land may be sold off 
to a third-party from outside the tribe. The author further argues that although 
this technicality in the law provides the mechanism for privatisation of communal 
lands, globalisation has provided the impetus for change through changing local 
values to support self-interest over that of the community, in agreement with my 
own arguments. 
 
To summarise all of the above, I suggest that the breakdown of extended 
households toward a more atomised family unit has been strongly influenced by 
¶Western· images, of notions of individual freedom and independence, without the 
overbearing obligations to the family and wider society. Such notions of choice and 
REOLJDWLRQ ZHUH EHLQJ RSHQO\ GLVFXVVHG LQ WKH 0·]DE VXFK DV DW P\ (QJOLVK
language club). I further theorise that an increase in the wealth of some, especially 
since France opened her borders for a period, leading to expansion of Mozabite 
business, but also due to education since independence and the creation of a 
professional class. This same newfound independence and freedom of choice for the 
individual (over the community) has resulted in more individuals making 
inheritance claims rather than allowing for property to be managed in common by 
the family head. This in turn has been facilitated by the introduction of French 
statutory law. Thus we have structural changes facilitating change from outside the 
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valley, combined with changes in values and motivations of individuals, which have 
resulted in the present problem of disputed, fragmented and abandoned land. 
 
7.4 A tale of two systems: a polyvocal discussion on the problems of 
legal pluralism  
 
The cazzƗba help to bring equilibrium among the people, and to respect the rule of 
ODZ«,IWKHUHLVDFRQIOLFWWKHFRXUWVRIWHQ- LIWKH\FDQ·WILQGDVROXWLRQ- refer the 
case back to ¶XUI, customary law, using jurisprudence. 
~ Salah Ba Ali, 11/04/13 
 
In order to present the wider debate on how the above issues are framed at the local 
level, I present here an excerpt from a discussion on the topic between Ba Noah (a 
local geologist and son of a prominent imƗm), Mustapha (a petrochemical engineer 
and president of the amal association for youth employment) and myself:  
 
Mustapha: What is your sense of local governance issues? 
Nejm: I think the problem is that there are two laws, national and local, and that 
they conflict. In Morocco they still agree to follow local rules and participate in local 
sanctions.  
Ba Noah: Yes, having the state law is the problem.  
Mustapha: One response would be to adapt state law to local sensibilities, the 
second would be to create awareness of local problems through the associations.  
Nejm: Yes, there are the carrot and the stick approaches. The difficulty would be to 
have local lawyers engage with politicians, perhaps representatives of the region to 
convince the state to allow the region to come up with their own agendas and to 
follow local rules, that in America and other places they allow tribal law, although 
not without its problems, is essentially a devolution.  
Ba Noah: The problem is not with convincing the state, but with convincing people 
locally to come up with a common goal, or strategy. In the past everyone had their 
part to play in society, now everyone is just living [independently]. The spirit of law 
and order comes from need. If people opened up a new land, they would need to rely 
on each other once more through working together [twiza]. We need new horizons.  
Nejm: In the West, people have tried to make intentional communities and failed at 
the organisation level, e.g. endless decision-making due to democratic ideals causing 
stagnation of action.  
Ba Noah: Yes but we have centuries of tradition of organisation that we can draw 
on.  
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Mustapha: Many structures are good such as the mosque, the cashƯra etc., but now 
WKHUHLVODFNRIWUXVWVXFKDVE\\RXQJSHRSOHEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ·WDJUHHZLWKUXOHVWKDW
were made to serve previous times and which are now out of context.  
Ba Noah: You can give incentives to non-cooperative persons, such as the wealthy, 
what do they need, maybe give them money or some other kind of help.  
Nejm%XW WKHULFK WKLQN WKH\QHHGQRWKLQJVR WKHUH·VQRWKLng you can give them. 
Mustapha: These people are very rare.  
Nejm: At the moment, /·RXPQD LQGLYLGXDOVGRQ·WKDYHWKHSRZHUWRPDNHILQHVVR
they must go to the ayyen, who will then talk to the individuals.  
Mustapha: It is important to have the non-cooperative person talk to another 
FRUUHVSRQGLQJ¶ULJKW·SHUVRQIRUZLOOLQJQHVVWRDFTXLHVFHWRWKHGHPDQGV 
Nejm: perhaps the reputation of the family is a resource of the rich that can be 
affected, so shaming them would be a manner of insuring cooperation. Also, in some 
countries they have tribal law which is respected, although not without problems. 
Ba Noah: The people need a common strategy. 
Mustapha: So we are back to associations! The cashƯra, schools even. 
Ba Noah: In the past the organisation in the valley worked, with representatives at 
different levels.  
Mustapha: Following national political parties has caused some local divisions, 
making it even harder to share a common vision.  
~ Field notes, Mustapha & Ba Noah, 27/10/13 
  
 
While the conversation addressed many issues, the major themes can be 
summarised as: a preference for local solutions; that community solidarity is based 
on mutual need and mutual vision; that compliance could be further achieved 
through persuasion by respected individuals; but that community was threatened 
by traditional authority becoming irrelevant, and further by political divisions. 
 
This preference for local solutions contrasted with my suggestions which involved 
devolution of state power and potentially a form of state-VDQFWLRQHG ¶WULEDO ODZ·
This attitude came up repeatedly, and while it revealed the unwillingness to oppose 
the authoritarian regime, it also highlighted the willingness to deal with issues at 
the local level. Similarly, when it came to meetings regarding oasis problems, 
people explicitly focused on what could be engaged with, rather than listing 
abstract global issues over which nobody had any control. Such pragmatism and 
motivation in formation of social organisations is the focus of the next chapter.  
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7.5 Discussion 
,Q FRQVLGHULQJ ERGLHV RI ¶ODZ· IURP ORFDO FXVWRPDU\ DQG ,VODPLF WR FRORQLDO DQG
postcolonial, which is the most important in terms of controlling, regulating or 
motivating behaviour? Usually, with the creation of the nation-state, dispute 
settlement between parties is delegated from the local to the national, in the form of 
law courts. This appears to follow a trend whereby the notion of individual rights 
ends up usurping the moral prerogative of social care IRU RQH·V IHOORZ KRXVHKROG
members and neighbours. As such, this points away from ineffectual critiques of 
legal pluralism, toward a more insightful wider analysis of different ideological 
systems, as Fuller (1994), drawing on Geertz (1983) would have us do.  
 
Put another way, as I have documented above, the rise of the state and a new legal 
IUDPHZRUN ZLWK LWV FRUUHVSRQGLQJ ¶VRFLDO FRQWUDFW· LH WD[DWLRQ LQ UHWXUQ IRU
supposed government protection of private property through state legal apparatus), 
KDYHVXSSODQWHGVRFLDODOOHJLDQFHWRRQH·VIDPLO\DQGQHLJKERXUV7KLVVLWXDWLRQLV
HVSHFLDOO\SUHYDOHQWLQODUJH¶IDFHOHVV·VRFLHWLHVZKHUHVRFLDOLQHTXDOLWLHVH[DFHUEDWH
fear, making it less likely that strangers will intervene RQ DQRWKHU·V PLVIRUWXQH
(Nader 2002: 55) 7KH ¶VWDWH· DQG WKH ¶QDWLRQ· PXVW EH XQSDFNHG VRPHZKDW
however: although this is not the place here to go into detail, it must be reasserted 
WKDWWKH¶QDWLRQ·LVQRWVLPSO\DQDEVWUDFWSROLWLFDOFRQVWUXFWEXWDVRFLDORQH7KH
state is reinforced by SHRSOHWKURXJKHYHU\GD\SUDFWLFHVDQGE\WKH¶VWDWH·WKURXJK
banal nationalist rituals (Sharma & Gupta 2006). In this way, people participate in 
reconstituting the state in the everyday, even when they claim to resist its 
influence. 
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Indeed, LQWKH0·]DE LW LVHYLGHQWWKDWWKHZHDOWK\FODVVDUHIRUHPRVWLQEUHDNLQJ
away from traditional ordering practises, such as religion, tebria, the patriarch, 
gossip and such, by drawing on technologies of the state. This accords with 
arguments made in the previous chapter, in that they can afford to deal with 
problems through the use of money, rather than having to go through drawn-out 
negotiations with peers, as dictated by reciprocal work. In this case, rather than go 
through the customary channels (family, cashƯra, cazzƗba), those who can afford 
them employ lawyers. As it turns out, this has protracted disputes rather than 
expediting them, but receiving individual shares has become more important than 
joint management of land and resources. Indeed, perhaps in the creation of barriers 
to visibility by the wealthy, Mozabite society is moving away from a face-to-face 
society and thus formal litigation processes are becoming necessary. However, as 
PDQ\ SHRSOH DJUHHG DV ZLWK 1HMLE·V DERYH DQDORJ\ RI WKH KRXVH QDWLRnal law 
courts have little understanding of local norms and practices, whereas local 
authorities may be able to give a more nuanced ruling. It is clear that local power 
SOD\V LQWR SHRSOH·V GHFLVLRQ-making around present day disputes; with some 
perceiving the national law courts as being more neutral in their decision-making, 
as having less personal interest; yet entirely the opposite may be reckoned also, as 
VWDWHLQWHUHVWVLQWKH0·]DEDUHVHHQDVFOHDUO\OHVVWKDQQHXWUDO 
 
My argument is this: such a move by certain local people toward a state-centred 
social contract based on taxation - again, based on the idea of individual consumer - 
thus replaces a local social contract comprised by messy, complex obligations. This 
latter is not predicated on the exchange of money and the threat of force, but on the 
circulation of obligation, and a withdrawal of cooperation if obligations are not met 
(see Roberts 1979: 30). This conceptualisation of contract theory, I contend, goes 
   
 
263 
EH\RQG PHUH ¶IRUXP VKRSSLQJ· DV VHDUFKing for strategic advantage (Benda-
Beckmann 1982). Finally, in response to critics of legal pluralism, I urge that an 
analysis of multiple regulatory systems need not entail a dilution of the notion of 
law, but instead allows for a critical perspective of power relations between 
individual and state actors. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This thesis asks how Mozabites respond to and create social and ecological change. 
The problems associated with inheritance claims to land resources are clearly socio-
ecological problems, emerging from the long-term hangovers of colonialism and 
more recently globalisation. It would appear that while some Mozabites have 
adapted to these changing conditions, this has not benefitted the community as a 
whole. To specify, they have not been able to modify current institutions or create 
new ones to deal with the new challenges involved with dealing with multiple 
systems of law and the power dynamics involved which have denigrated customary 
practice. It is not clear whether such jostling for advantage will result in a kind of 
group adaptation as theorised in chapter five, for it is clear that the new political 
elite (the merchant class) is the only beneficiary of the current circumstances, as 
they alone can afford to pay high legal costs. Thus, a new equilibrium may have 
been achieved, but one that supports a new hegemonic status quo. As the 
conversations with Mustapha and Ba Noah above show, however, people are not 
remaining idle in the face of these challenges, but looking for new (and old) 
solutions. 
 
In summary, differences in the perceived quality of different land parcels appeared 
WREHDNH\IDFWRULQVRPHRIWKHVHLQKHULWDQFHFRQIOLFWV,QWKH0·]DEIRUPDOODZV
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whether written or verbal, often contain an explicit moral dimension. Islamic 
interpretations are used to argue for the representation of an ideal Muslim 
community, largely as imagined and reconstructed by the cazzƗba during sermons, 
repeated in 4X·UDQLF schools to pupils and in the home or at work by mothers and 
fathers to their children. For being able to repeat a certain difficult passage in the 
Holy Book, a father may reward his son with a date palm, a venerable gift. I have 
shown that oral customary law, scriptural Islamic law and state statutory law may 
be in conflict (as when usHGWR¶IRUXPVKRS·E\LQGLYLGXDOV\HWFDQEH¶KDUPRQLRXV·
DOVRDVZKHQUHIHUUHGWRE\¶HQOLJKWHQHG·MXGJHV 
 
In the analysis in this chapter, I have had to extend the event-based approach to fit 
the problem by necessarily abstracting to deal with multiple events, or a trend of 
events. This is largely acceptable under event analysis theory (Vayda 2013). My 
lack of access to households and legal documents has constrained the analysis of 
specific conflict cases, however, and some of the above theory is conjectural, 
although still using the method of elimination of possible explanations through 
logical examination. Further research time in the region would be needed to access 
these documents. 
 
To conclude, because of the social changes outlined above, Mozabite society 
appears to be becoming more fragmented. This would not be a problem in a post-
modern consumer-oriented neoliberal society, where any issue can (apparently) be 
resolved through money, if one has enough of it. Yet, when people truly need each 
other in order to survive, this is not enough. As I show in the next chapter, 
management of natural resources which require participation of the whole 
community necessitates the need for a social consciousness beyond individual 
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consumerism, and following a recent natural disaster, many have been questioning 
VXFK QRWLRQV DV ¶LQGLYLGXDOLVP· DQG ¶FRPPXQLW\· DQG WKHLU RXWFRPHV UHJDUGLQJ
competing visions of a locally desirable society.  
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8. Voluntary politics: Associational 
OLIHLQWKH0·]DE 
 
A Muslim should not start to make prayers on the dry oued because it may be full by 
the time he stops. 
~Bessam, 18/10/12 
 
This chapter continues themes raised in the previous one, in that it examines 
governance, but this time of common resources rather than private property, 
primarily irrigation water (but also agricultural knowledge, labour, and date pollen, 
among others). There is some crossover in property classifications, however, and 
fields can be dynamic, as in times of crisis. For example, water running through 
artificial constructions in Beni Isguen, for example, (such as wells) is classified as 
private (in accordance with Islamic law), although this designation can be relaxed 
during crisis times such as drought. On the other hand, river water is common 
property, and so is canal water, as canals are communally constructed. In contrast 
to private property, where one can more or less do what one likes until it is passed 
on, communal water management is very much a political affair, as the actions of 
one affect others.  
 
The literature on natural resource management for sustainability and resilience 
abounds with reference to co-governance (Ackerman 2004; Folke et al. 2005; Duit 
et al. 2010). This usually refers to joint management between small communities 
and the state. For example, Trimble & Berkes (2015: 2) optimistically refer to such 
LQLWLDWLYHVDV´LQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQWKDWFRQVLGHUVWKHVKDULQJRIFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVµ
The focus is on collective learning and power sharing, indeed the ¶empowerment· of 
communities. Despite a focus on multiple stakeholders, resilience and co-
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governance literature lacks a theory of the state (Ratner et al. 2012). The different 
sub-disciplines of political anthropology (which previously focused on stateless 
societies) and political ecology are today, by contrast, largely centred on 
investigating how the state is implicated in the everyday, drawing for example on 
Foucauldian notions of discourse and technologies of governmentality (e.g. Sharma 
& Gupta 2006), feminism and neo-Marxist theory (Neumann 2014: 46²9). Indeed, 
Sharma & Gupta (2006) criticise state discourse on power sharing, however, which 
WKH\ GHVFULEH DV ´QHROLEHUDO ´XQORDGLQJµ RI SXEOLF VHUYLFHV RQWR HPSRZHUHG DQG
´UHVSRQVLELOL]HGµ LQGLYLGXDOV DQG FRPPXQLWLHV 0DQ\ VWXGLHV LQ SROLWLFDO
anthropology have centred on corruption, in the forms of factionalism, patron client 
relations, and bossism, for example (Nuijten 2003: 2). Some attempts at fusing 
resilience and political ecology theory have resulted in progress in addressing this 
deficiency in the former (e.g. Hornborg 2013).  
 
I discuss here the politics of water management, and a general shift from 
hierarchical forms WR RUJDQLVDWLRQ EDVHG RQ YROXQWDU\ DVVRFLDWLRQV LQ WKH 0·]DE
and the theoretical implications of both. In terms of the former, much has been in 
written connecting the development of irrigation to advanced societies and 
¶FLYLOLVDWLRQ· :LWIRJHO  :KLOH VXFK WKHRULHV KDYH EHHQ ODUJHO\ GLVFUHGLWHG
(Lewellan 2003: 60), anthropologists have continued to advance political theory on 
irrigation and society, such as the link between politics and scale, whereby larger 
groupings require specialised authorities to regulate water users (Geertz 1972; 
Lansing 1987; Price 1995; Mabry 1996). My research corroborated such links, with 
interesting implications for notions of self-regulation (chapter nine; see also Harvey 
2012: 69). In the Maghreb, some have documented the direct replacement of 
¶WUDGLWLRQDO· DXWKRULWLHV E\ YROXQWDU\ DVVRFLDWLRQV (Scheele 2008) or hybridisation 
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between them (Bergh 2009)7KHFDVHRIWKH0·]DELVGLIIHUHQWIRUROGHUDXWKRULWLHV
continue to coexist with the newer ones. De Tocqueville originally envisaged that 
such civil society groups would serve as a benign, mediating link between state and 
society. Many later theorists have problematized such relations (Gramsci 2006; 
Comaroff & Comaroff 1999), with some claiming that the state uses civic 
organisations as an excuse to withdraw welfare services (Liverani 2009: 7). Yet 
others claim that civil society, even if limited, offers a path to resistance (e.g. 
Butcher 2014). My research corroborated this. Attempting to get around this 
impasse, I redefine civic organisations in Beni Isguen as micro-social movements. 
Even the definition of social movements is not without its drawbacks (e.g. Gledhill 
2000: 184), yet I justify my usage of the term to distinguish how local progressive 
groups, such as farmer associations, are dealing with change, in contrast to 
¶WUDGLWLRQDO· RUJDQLVDWLRQV WKDW DUH more concerned with and geared toward 
maintaining the status quo. This brings us squarely back to the central question of 
this thesis, of how Mozabites are navigating sociological change in relation to oasis 
resources. I have dealt with labour and land in the previous chapters, now I turn to 
communal management of water.   
 
8.0 CRPPXQDOLUULJDWLRQSUREOHPVLQWKH0·]DE 
Unlike other commonly managed resources, which may be subject to collapse from 
overuse if poorly managed or unregulated (Hardin 1968; McCay & Acheson 1987: 
18; Ostrom 1990) WKH SUREOHP LQ %HQL ,VJXHQ DQG WKH 0·]DE LQ JHQHUDO LV WKDW
people are using communal water less, not more. Following government 
development in the 1960s, some individuals have used pumps to draw well water, 
rather than relying solely on the communal floodwaters. This has caused parts of 
the irrigation system to fall into disrepair, affecting everyone, as each section must 
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be maintained to retain flow to all. This maintenance was historically overseen and 
regulated by the O·oumna water officials who had power to fine, as sanctioned by the 
mosque. Some new wells are individually owned, while others are owned by the 
state, which involve collectives of water users. The organisation of this latter group 
has not been without problems due to lack of enforcement for non-compliance. 
 
Well-intentioned development plans have combined with other more insidious state 
interventions, originating with the colonial state to subjugate populations. I argued 
in the previous chapter that local Mozabite litigation procedures have been 
displaced to the national state legal system, which was not simply a result of top-
down interference, but a result of local agency by particular parties. However, 
despite local contestations, the fact cannot be avoided that the manoeuvrings of the 
French helped remove a key component of power from the local authorities 
(cazzƗba): the power to punish. Previously, the ancient institution of water guards, 
O·RXPQD, were given authority to punish individuals for infractions according to 
their expertise, such as relating to the irrigation canals, buildings that affected 
public byways, and so on. The French arguably stripped the cazzƗba and by 
association O·RXPQDof their capacity to punish crimes, though a degree of normative 
control still exists. An alternative explanation is that Mozabites refused to accept 
ORFDO DXWKRULW\ ZLWK WKH SUHVHQFH RI D ¶KLJKHU· DXWKRULW\ WKH VWDWH %RWK
explanations are legitimate and add to a more complex understanding. 
 
Here, I investigate how these local institutions have been eroding and why, and 
ZLWK W\SLFDO 0R]DELWH ¶UHVLOLHQFH· KRZ QHZ RUJDQLVDWLRQDO IRUPDWLRQV KDYH
emerged to take their place. I ask whether these new formations are able to do the 
same job without coercive capacities. Firstly, however, I present a recent 
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catastrophic flood event which, I argue, forced people to reflect on the state of local 
management institutions. Then I return to the present and discuss the two current 
management structures for water and other resources, one old, one new. One could 
EH IRUJLYHQ IRU YLHZLQJ QHZ DVVRFLDWLRQV DV LQ WKH DVFHQGDQW DQG ¶WUDGLWLRQDO·
authorities as in decline, but as I explain, things are not necessarily as they appear 
at first sight. I then return to the flood as I work backwards in time through the 
causes for the present state of affairs, and I discuss how local people themselves are 
questioning current social trajectories and transformations regarding especially 
social relations and value sets, and reimagining how traditional structures could be 
reworked for future benefit. 
 
8.1 The 2008 flood event 
In 2008, a devastating flood ripped through the oued ULYHU0·]DE WHDULQJGRZQ
earthen buildings and causing the loss of life. Although floods are erratic, even 
chaotic, they are still expected within a certain timeframe (Park 1992), so what 
made this one particularly devastating? Was it the scale of the flood, which brought 
an unprecedented quantity and velocity of powerful, churning effluence? Or was it 
that the inhabitants of the valley were somehow unprepared? Was it an act of God 
DVSXQLVKPHQWIRUVRPHVRFLDOLQGLVFUHWLRQDVRQH0R]DELWHSXWLW´ZHVHHHYHQWV
DV DQ DFW RI SURYLGHQFHµ" ,W LV XQGHUVWDQGDEOH WKDW WKH SDUDGR[LFal force which 
refills the underground aquifers, brings nourishing mountain silt, and washes away 
the salt accumulations, yet can also take away life, is attributable to God (see also 
Ilahiane 1996). Indeed, it was related to me that just a day before the flood arrived, 
a significant conflict arose between ethnic factions in the valley. It happened that a 
disagreement occurred between the Mozabite and the Arab imƗms as to their 
prediction for the final day of Ramadan, the month of fasting. A scuffle broke out, 
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and blows were dealt. The subsequent flood was widely perceived as a direct 
punishment for such impious behaviour. 
 
The flood arrived on the day of Eid at 7.30 am, after dawn prayers. Beni Isguen 
ZDVQ·WDIIHFWHGDVPXFKDV WKHRWKHUqsǌr of the pentapolis, as it sits off the main 
FRXUVHRIRXHG0·]DELQDVHSDUDWHYDOOH\.KDGLU.KRWDDIDUPHUDQGDJURQRPLVW
took me on a tour of al Atteuf, the oldest qsar, and furthest along the oued 0·]DE
He related the events to me: 
 
I was lucky to hear about the flood early, as I keep bees upstream in Berriane [about 
30 km away], and a friend called me to tell me. Thank God the flood split in two 
[in Berriane] before going on to Ghardaia and another direction, otherwise the 
flood would have been even worse. Before 2008, the last major flood was July 2004, 
a reasonably big one. It usually comes in May-June, or autumn, roughly every 1½ 
years. The last was September 1st 2011. In al Atteuf, the impermeable limestone 
rock at the end holds the water, giving it nowhere to go, and only slowly sinks into 
the phreatic aquifer. 
 ~Khadir Khota, 13/11/13 
 
This holding of water by the limestone floor means that the water wells up, 
softening the locally sourced mud adobe walls, causing them to crumble if the water 
has nowhere to drain. This is the primary means by which buildings were 
destroyed. The flood finally subsided at about 10.30 am, leaving chaos in its wake: 
destroyed houses, detritus everywhere, including rubbish, flooded cellars, and 
tragically, 78 human mortalities. Aid came from different corners, as groups such as 
the boy scouts and the Red Crescent emerged seemingly from nowhere to help 
people remove water from their cellars and clean the roads. Food packages were 
sent from other districts of the country to be distributed by the cDVKD·LU (pl. for 
cashƯra) and mosques to whoever needed it. A committee for each quarter of each 
town was formed, and the president of each reported to the ayyen what was needed. 
Although Beni Isguen was not in the direct flood path and so was less affected, 
   
 
272 
damage was still accrued by some buildings. These were rebuilt over the duration 
RI WKUHH PRQWKV RQ HYHU\ )ULGD\ E\ WKH SHRSOH RI WKH DUHD WKURXJK ¶LQYROXQWDU\·
twiza, as ordered by the mosque. 
 
Local people complain that the state has not done enough, only acting in retrospect, 
and that even these actions have not been enough. One response by the state, for 
example, was to create a system of zones according to flood risk, enacted 
nationwide. The red zone is for land lying alongside riverine floodplains, and for 
here building permits are no longer allocated. In the intermediate zone permits are 
given with conditions, and above in the highest zones, such as the mountains, 
SHUPLWV DUH JLYHQ ¶IUHHO\· .KDGLU FRPPHQWHG WKDW GXULQJ WKH FRORQLDO HUa 
restrictions were more stringently enforced and it was only after independence that 
the expansion of building began in the more risky lower lying areas. 
 
I understood that Mozabites had dealt with violent floods in the past, so what had 
changed in the interim? Continuing our tour of al Atteuf, Khadir pointed out where 
the line still showed on buildings at around 2 m still stained on local shops and 
houses (fig. 8.1). He then showed me the 1.5 m high concrete walls the state had 
since erected along the oued, and pointed out where the buildings had been 
destroyed (fig. 8.2).  
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Figure 8.1 The remaining watermark at 2m in al Atteuf qsar. (03/11/13) 
 
Figure 8.2 New state-built concrete walls on the edge of the river. (03/11/13) 
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The 2008 flood is important as it still represents a significant point of reference in 
the local imagination. I was not there to witness it, thus I could not observe 
directly the ways in which it was dealt, yet I was able to observe the after ripples, 
not just physical but social. There was actually less focus on divine causes and 
LPSURSHUEHKDYLRXUWKDQRQWKHVRFLDOUDPLILFDWLRQV7KHTXHVWLRQ¶ZKDWZHUHZH
GRLQJZURQJ IRU WKLV GLVDVWHU WRKDSSHQRQ VXFK D VFDOH"· VHHPHG WREH WKHPDLQ
issue, again, revealing the local focus on pragmatic action. 
 
This event and its consequences prompts questions about local notions of risk and 
predictability. It seems likely that extreme variation in river behaviour within a 
known range would be expected by local people, and for these shocks there would 
be a contingent set of response actions already prepared. Yet unexpected variation, 
or surprises, may require something more, a certain flexibility of existing 
institutions, involving the capacity to learn and adapt to such unknown variations 
(see for example Davidson-Hunt 2006). I deal with this more thoroughly in the 
next chapter when I return to my original research questions about complex 
adaptive systems and adaptive management. 
 
A key question raised is why the 2008 flood caused so much damage. In framing the 
HYHQW DV D PLVPDQDJHPHQW HSLVRGH , DP IROORZLQJ ORFDO SHRSOHV· OHDG E\ DVNLQJ
which human factors were lacking that could potentially have averted the disaster. 
If floods, although erratic, have been a commonplace event for centuries, what went 
wrong? Should people rely on the government to protect them against such 
disaster, or could it be dealt with more effectively at the local level? Table 8.1 lists 
the possible causes, drawn from my conversations and interview with local farmers, 
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NGOs and government officials, as well as my own direct observations of irrigation 
problems. 
 
Table 8.1 List of possible causal factors leading to the mismanagement of the 2008 
flood. 
Multiple working hypotheses for the 
2008 flood damage 
Cause  
Yes/No 
1. Flood more powerful than usual Maybe 
2. People built houses by river Yes 
3. Lack of suitable building regulations No 
4. Lack of flood defences, e.g. river 
walls, diversion canals 
Unknown 
5. Lack of advance warning system No 
6. Irrigation vents not opened Yes 
7. Divine punishment for inappropriate 
behaviour 
Untestable  
 
This cataclysmic and catalytic event revealed a gaping hole (or even closed holes 
where they should have been open) in local management capacity to deal with flash 
floods. People organised well after the event, but were not adequately prepared prior 
to it. This sets the scene for a discussion of the management institutions that exist 
today in Beni Isguen oasis. These consist of new voluntary farmer associations, 
local and international NGOs, and O·RXPQDwater guards. The state, in the form of 
the municipal council is also discussed as to its role in managing Mozabite oasis 
resourcHV , DQDO\VH WKH SUREOHPV WKDW WKHVH GLIIHUHQW JURXSV IDFH ZLWKLQ WRGD\·V
social and political context. I go on to discuss the emergence of new groups due to 
the rise of civil society in Algeria, and explore the causes and ramifications of this. 
Next, I describe prior management structures, and ask, are they really in decline? I 
ILQLVKZLWKDGLVFXVVLRQRQZKDW,FDOO¶FR-RUGLQDWLRQZLWKRXWFRHUFLRQ·WKDWLVWKH
difficulty of creating social organisation without the capacity for sanctions (force, 
fines), which opens a debate on authoritarian (hierarchical), egalitarian (emergent, 
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equal), and anarchic (individualist) political modes of organisation (Sahlins 2008; 
see also Jessop 2003). 
 
8.2 Rise of new farmer associations; the decline and return of O·RXPQD
water guards 
This section brings us back to the present, to try to explain the ethnographic 
quotidien of the multiple ways in which oasis resources, both human and natural in 
WKH 0·]DE DUH FXUrently managed. The multiplicity of institutions, both 
complimentary and conflicting in different ways, reflect, I believe, the shifting 
structures that have traditionally managed the oases, and new ones which have 
emerged through necessity under the pressures of various processes of social 
change. I now discuss the local political present, and then go on to argue how local 
factors have interacted with historical, colonial and postcolonial state forces. 
 
8.2.1 Voluntary associations 
There are a bewildering QXPEHURIDVVRFLDWLRQVLQWKH0·]DEZLWKDJURXSIRUMXVW
about anything you could think of: neighbourhood associations, scout associations, 
sport associations, associations for the disabled, employment associations, farmer 
associations, and on and on. With over 73,000 groups, civil society associations 
have exploded in Algeria in recent times (Liverani 2008: xxviii). I was told that 
sporting (football) associations were the first to emerge in the 1970s. This group 
later became amal said (uplifting hope) and included other activities such as judo 
and karate. Other groups soon mushroomed to deal with countless social issues. 
 
8.2.1.1 Role of associations 
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As this thesis focuses on agriculture, here I will focus on two farmer associations, 
QDPHG7D]GDLW7XP¶GDWHSDOP·DQGFaddƗn $UDE¶ODQGSDUFHO·EDVHGLQWKHROG
oasis and new farming zone, Ntissa, respectively. I will also comment, however, on 
RWKHUIDUPHUDVVRFLDWLRQVIURPZLWKLQWKH0·]DEDQGRXWVLGHZKRP,PHWWKURXJK
conferences and through on-farm visits, to provide additional context and 
comparison. Other, non-farmer associations are also discussed in the context of new 
types of social organisation, which now exist alongside traditional formations, 
potentially causing friction where their areas of jurisdiction overlap. 
 
0\ SULPDU\ FRQWDFW LQ WKH 0·]DE ZDV LQ IDFW ZLWK WKH 7D]GDLW DVVRFLDWLRQ D
member of which I met first at an academic conference in Montpellier. Tazdait is 
VXSSRUWHG E\ D )UHQFK 1*2 ZKLFK DVVLVWV IDUPHUV QDPHG ¶%LRGLYHUVLW\ DQG
ExchangH RI ([SHULHQFH· %('( 7D]GDLW ZDV VSDZQHG IURP D ILYH-year 
SDUWLFLSDWRU\PDQDJHPHQWSURJUDPPHLQWKH0DJKUHEE\WKH¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO3ODQW
*HQHWLF 5HVRXUFHV ,QVWLWXWH· ,3*5, QRZ %LRYHUVLW\ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO IXQGHG E\
UNDP-GEF, founded in 1999. Farmers and phoeniciculteurs who participated 
decided to continue the initiative locally, and thus formed Tazdait. The primary 
role of Tazdait was to protect and valorise phoeniciculteur livelihoods and 
knowledge, and to protect date palms against the deadly disease, bayoud. Thus from 
the start, the role of scientific knowledge and discourse was significant. This is 
partially, at least, to do with the fact that members of Tazdait who are not 
phoeniciculteurs, are scientifically trained agronomists (indeed, there are perhaps 
more agronomists in Beni Isguen than farmers and phoeniciculteurs, presumably due 
to the higher social status conferred).  
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Significantly, part of the remit of Tazdait was to unite phoeniciculteurs and provide a 
forum for mutual support and exchange. Arguably, the success of Tazdait is 
because it has always created locally achievable goals, aimed at the local scale. For 
example, they have published an important book on local phoeniciculteur knowledge 
(Ben Saadoun & Boulahouat 2010). Also, through the support of BEDE, they 
secured the assistance of Petzel, a climber harness making company, who agreed to 
work with Tazdait to design innovative harnesses, specifically geared towards 
developing safety measures for phoeniciculteurs, for whom falls constitute a real 
livelihood risk. Future projects include developing further security for 
phoeniciculteurs, such as insurance, but also research and investment into animal 
traction, creatiQJDEODFNVPLWK·VVKRSDQGHQWHULQJWKH)DLU7UDGHPRYHPHQW IRU
local produce. 
 
Positions such as president, secretary, treasurer and so on are chosen through 
voting, in theory, democratically. I was present during one of these sessions, which 
took place in an cashƯra house. The yearly finances were reported to the group 
members, after which a local research project was presented (on local medicinal 
plants), and finally the elections were held. The affair was quite informal: a name 
would be suggested and the majority of members would vote yes or no. In practice, 
it was stated that there was a dearth of young people, and older members were 
worried about the renewal of the association, therefore, young people were 
encouraged and cajoled into positions, such as vice treasurer and so on. Individuals 
seemed unclear as to the extent of the responsibilities being assumed, and thus 
required some persuasion.  
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Tazdait received funding through BEDE and they were audited regularly by a 
development professional in order to ensure proper use of funds. I was also present 
during one of these meetings. The development professional informed me that 
Tazdait was successful compared to other farming associations in Algeria (he had 
just come from the Kabyle region) because they were proactive in searching for 
funding; they networked with other regional or international groups and 
exchanged ideas; they have diverse membership comprising individuals with 
different skills, such as researchers; and there is interaction with youth in the form 
of students. 
 
Tazdait interacts with other farming groups across Algeria and the Maghreb, 
under the umbrella organisation, Réseau Associatif de Développement Durable des 
Oasis (RADDO). The RADDO headquarters are located in the Association for the 
Protection of the Environment at Beni Isguen (APEB). This NGO is externally 
funded, and effectively works to provide a network between different farmer groups 
across the Maghreb, working primarily on oasis issues. It is led by Salah Ba Ali, 
who also happened to sit on the majlis ayyen, therefore providing a bridge between 
the new and the older local organisational structures. Some of the problems they 
are currently working on include adaptation to climate change, promotion of 
¶UHVSRQVLEOH·WRXULVPLQWHJUDWHGPDQDJHPHnt of water resources, and the economic 
development of oases. I participated in several of these meetings, and farmers would 
discuss local problems with the intention of producing practical solutions. I often 
heard the criticism, however, that for all the managerial talk and use of graphs, very 
little else actually materialised. One farmer contrasted RADDO and APEB, in that 
the problems they tackled were too generalised, and the people discussing them 
were remote, whereas smaller groups such as Tazdait were able to solve small but 
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realisable problems, and thus realised results, as mentioned earlier. Another 
LQWHUHVWLQJ FULWLTXH ZDV WKDW ¶UHDO· IDUPHUV FRXOG OLWWOH DIIRUG WKH WLPH DZD\ WR
attend such conference, with some as far afield as the luxury resort island of Jerba 
(see issues related to full-time and part-time farmers in chapter five). On the plus 
side, RADDO owned a conference centre in Ntissa named Akraz 7XP ¶IDUPHU·
which also served as a training centre in practical farming methods, such as drip 
irrigation, compost and organic agriculture. I was informed these courses were 
useful. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 RADDO meeting of farmer associations from across southern Algeria. 
(26/12/12) 
 
The FaddƗn association of farmers in the new concession region of Ntissa, adjacent 
to the old oasis, was also originally set up to disseminate scientific information. 
This degenerated, according to (another) Salah Ba Ali who set it up, into serving a 
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practical function, that of coordinating users of the 450m deep collective well that 
was the outcome of a state development project. State drilled wells have had 
beneficial effects, but not all outcomes have been positive. For one, many complain 
that the electricity from the communal pump is too expensive (3DZD/m3). 
3D\PHQWRI WKHELOO LV D FROOHFWLYH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DQG WKHUHIRUH LIRQHGRHVQ·WSD\
the electricity is shut off with the result that none of the farmers have access to 
water until it is paid. It may be the case that certain farmers struggle to raise the 
monthly funds, but it is more likely that because some individuals are not full-time 
farmers, and thus have less to lose if they do not water their fields on time, they are 
less likely or slower to pay up. I was informed that indeed this was the case. Some 
farmers do have individual wells to supplement the state well, but these are costly 
to drill and not as deep as the latter. In Ntissa, there is no water catchment like the 
ancient irrigation system in the oasis, therefore farmers are more reliant on the 
cooperative management of the deep well. When well water is cut off, farmers are 
forced to prioritise the crops they must water, leaving others to wilt and die.  
 
Cooperation among farmers may be strained in other ways, as when individuals 
perform an action that affects the collective without first consulting the others. 
There are no formal coercion mechanisms due to the voluntary nature of 
associations, therefore arguments and feuds may go on for some time, with serious 
matters requiring litigation through the intervention of the municipal council. 
Regarding making payments on time, there is little pressure that individuals can 
put on one another, and meetings are not frequent, at about twice per year. Some 
individuals prefer simply to go it alone and avoid the headache involved in having 
to negotiate with others. One farmer, Omar, built his own well by hand, digging for 
over three years. Admittedly, his was a unique case, for more often those who can 
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afford it pay a drilling company to dig a private well. This can be critical to the 
survival of crops and livelihoods. For example, another farmer, Khadir (whom I 
mentioned at the beginning), is part of a well collective in al Atteuf. It dried up in 
2012, so Khadir, with resources from his agricultural shop in Ghardaia, paid for 
another well to be drilled on his land, 40m deep. I observed that his farm (of mainly 
dates and oranges) was very productive (see fig 8.4), whereas in comparison his 
QHLJKERXU·VODQGZKRGLGQ·WRZQDSULYDWHZHOOZDVGU\DQGGHILFLHQW (fig. 8.5). 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Khadir Khota·Vwell-watered plot. (03/11/13) 
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Figure 8.5 .KDGLU·VQHLJKERXU·VGU\SORW (03/11/13) 
 
Other associations, such the djemcaat al hei, the neighbourhood associations, deal 
with problems such as adequate running water, electricity and upkeep of roads. 
Problems are made known to a cartier president, who then informs the city council. 
Some overlap, and therefore conflict exists, however, with other local institutions 
who have traditionally managed such problems. /·RXPQD, discussed below, used to 
deal with issues such as building regulations as well as irrigation, and the cashƯra is 
still involved with infrastructural governance. As Bechir, a local town-planning 
student informed me, the neighbourhood association: 
 
Is different from the cashƯra, because in the latter, everyone is part of a family group. 
The former group is comprised of different relations, of classmates and neighbours, 
non-blood relations. It is a relatively new thing, and it speaks to an Islamic sense of 
community. There is also the Protection for the Non-material Patrimony in the 
Mzab valley (OPVM). All men are expected to participate, one night a week, it is a 
part of social duty and benefits. What is unique about APEB is that it is part run by 
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the state and part local. That is, there is the agreement from the state, but it is run 
in a locally accepted, familiar way. Normally it takes time to trust something new, 
but here it is trusted because it is done in a locally accepted way, a friendly way. It is 
not done in a top-down manner, but with rules given by relatives, and therefore 
more acceptable to people. 
~Bechir 29/09/13 
 
Bechir here explains why and how the associations are acceptable to local ways of 
doing things: they involve relatives who outline the rules rather than unknown 
officials; that is, they run along patterns of local organisation familiar to people. 
Indeed, the state bureaucracy is not visible within the hallowed walls of the qsar, 
there are no police inside, and the gendarmerie LVRQO\IRXQGRXWVLGHWKHZDOOV¶1HZ·
associations meet in old meeting halls within the qsar. Further, the neighbourhood 
association is in agreement with local interpretations of religion, which asserts the 
importance of alliance across kinship lines, to unite the Islamic society as a whole. 
However, some confusion can arise between old and new institutions, as Nejib 
confided to me: 
 
there is no coordination, especially about who has responsibility over infrastructure 
issues. Thus there may be conflict between cashƯra and neighbourhood associations, 
conflict between cDVKD·LU, and conflict between rich and poor neighbourhoods, vis a 
vis respective projects. In the past, when the cashƯra ordered someone to do 
something they used to do it. Now there are over 50 associations in Beni Isguen, 
there is no coordination, it is anarchy. They need the experience of running them 
over time, a new system. 
 ~Nejib, 26/11/13  
 
Nejib highlighted a key distinction in his statement between the new and old 
institutions, that of authority. Previously, in hierarchical fashion, the traditional 
groups were able to give orders, or punish for orders that were not followed, as 
local authority, based on religion, gender, age or wealth, was respected. In the 
family, age, which involved replacement over time was key, whereas relations 
between the genders was and still is immutable (although of course elder women 
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exercised power over the younger). Between families, the authority of the cashƯra 
was observed, being made up of family heads, although the wealthy held most 
influence. Finally, the cazzƗba held absolute authority over all matters. /·RXPQD
who was in charge of water, building, date palms and other communal matters, 
were in fact a kind of police force, who derived their power to fine from the mosque.   
 
8.2.1.2 Political issues of associations 
It should now be clear that the main problem of contemporary oasis institutions 
was a lack of coercive influence. As I explained in the previous chapter, the presence 
of a higher authority, the French judicial system, provided an alternative venue for 
SHRSOHWR¶IRUXPVKRS·DQGFLUFXPYHQWORFDOIRUPVRIFRQWURO7KLVGLGQRWKDSSHQ
so much during the colonial period, however, as local Mozabites largely boycotted 
French institutions. It was not until after independence, that the Mozabites decided 
to engage with the new Algerian state, given legitimacy due to its Islamic status. 
7KLVKDVOHIWUDWKHU¶ZHDN·LQVWLWXWLRQVLQWHUPVRIUHWDLQLQJWKHSRZHUWRRUJDQLVH
loFDOO\ ZLWKRXW QHHGLQJ WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ RI WKH VWDWH ZKHQ GHDOLQJ ZLWK ¶UXOH-
EUHDNHUV·RUDQWL-VRFLDOLQGLYLGXDOV2VWURP·V(1990) fifth necessary component for 
community-based management). Thus, such democratic structures work fine while 
all are interested in cooperating, yet difficulties arise when individuals do not 
cooperate. This is due to the voluntary nature of civic associations themselves. I 
ZDVDGYLVHGWKDWLQWKH0·]DESUREOHPDWLFLQGLYLGXDOVZHUHDFWXDOO\IHZDQGWKDWLW
was possible to put some pressure on them through, for example the ayyen or the 
cazzƗba, whose moral authority was still overtly respected. Being a relatively small-
scale population, these face-to-face measures still have some effect, which would not 
be the same in large cities. 
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To give another example, another limited resource not under private control is date 
palm pollen. All date palms need to be hand pollinated, creating a strong demand, 
and therefore competition for pollen and pollinators, at present generally based on 
a first-come-first-served basis. The associations did once attempt to create rules of 
use, but being based on benign mutual consent only, the regulation was soon 
broken. Nejib had discussed with me the idea of creating a plantation of male palms 
in the communal oued area, thus reducing competition by making the resource 
abundant. This initiative could actually work, but unfortunately the abundance 
solution is not applicable in other circumstances, such as for water.  
 
As I will describe in the proceeding section, the state reluctantly permitted the 
development of civil society in Algeria, with one crucial condition: that associations 
were not to use their clout to meddle in state policy, in other words, to form unions 
or political parties. Most of the associations were cautious, although those I spoke 
to in fact remarked that they did apply pressure, through their leaders, on the local 
council when it came to improving roads and public services. One association 
president, Mohamed Brik from nearby Laghouat, related the following example: 
 
The Ministry for Public Works built the new bridge over the river. They sealed it 
off, however, with large cans. The people on the other side had to drive down over 
the river. There was sewage running into the river. One day, I saw a kid hanging 
out of a car window, almost falling into the dirty water. I decided to write to the 
council with a petition of 25 landowners who lived on the other side of the river, 
and copied in other officials [on the email]. The official was away that day in 
Algiers, but his secretary called him and they decided in a rush to open the bridge the 
next day. When this worked, people asked me to intervene on other things, like being 
hassled by the gendarmes, but I refused, there must be a limit! 
~Mohamed Brik, 02/04/13 
 
This story shows the importance of leadership in organising and pressuring the 
state. The state has attempted to extend its influence through other administrative 
means (Sharma & Gupta 2006), such as changing the regulations to make it harder 
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for certain groups that cause trouble, such as making accounting rules more 
complex, or other through similar means. In September of 2013 before I left, they 
changed the rules again, requiring detailed accounts going back the previous three 
years, and other regulations. This was around the time of the surrounding Arab 
¶XSULVLQJV· DQG VR ZKLOH FDXVLQJ FRPSOLFDWLRQV LQ VRPH DUHDV WKH VWDWH PDGH
concessions in others, such as subsidising interest-free loans for small investors in 
agricultural land as well as training.  
 
I argue thaW WKH HPHUJHQFH RI FLYLO VRFLHW\ LQ WKH 0·]DE LV GXH WR WZR PXWXDOO\
reinforcing processes of change: the decline of local customary management 
structures, and the concomitant opening of a once-repressed civil society by the 
Algerian state. It is the latter that I deal with first. 
 
8.3 The rise of civil society in Algeria and the state 
Diamond (1994, in Butcher 2014) GHILQHV FLYLO VRFLHW\ DV ´the realm of organized 
social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous 
from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rulesµ%HQWKDOO(2000: 1) 
GHILQHVLWPRUHEURDGO\DV´DOOWKHDVVRFLDWLRQDOIRUPVLQVRFLHW\RWKHUWKDQWKHVWDWH
DQGWKHPDUNHWµ7KHWHUPLVFRPPRQO\DWWULEXWHGWRGH7Rcqueville based on the 
associationalism of 19th century America. This involves a position, as Liverani 
  SXWV LW ZKLFK LV ´LQGHSHQGHQW RI WKH VWDWH «>DQG@ RFFXSLHV WKH VSDFH
EHWZHHQ WKH ODWWHU DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDOµ /LYHUDQL IXUWKHU GHVFULEHV HSLVWemological 
and normative aspects of the term. Epistemological notions involve the 
interpretation of the contestation between society and the state, involving a balance 
of power and actions intended to protect the former from the latter. Normative 
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aspects invoke the democratic ideals of political freedom and empowerment in the 
face of state repression (Ibid.). 
 
The Comaroffs (1999: 3) posit that despite a post-1989 revolution in politics, 
common ideas of civil society uncritically advance traditional notions of community 
and social organisation, interestingly at a time when unfettered, pro-market post-
social ideas are being propounded. The very ambiguous, non-analytical nature of 
civil society discourse has provided its attraction to represent various differing 
ideals of pre-modern communitarianism and pre-national ideals, such as in India 
(Ibid: 6- 7KH DXWKRUV DUJXH WKDW WKH WHUP ¶FLYLO· SURIIHUV ¶:HVWHUQ· LGHDV RI
civilisation as RSSRVHGWRDEDUEDURXV ¶VWDWHRIQDWXUH·RIXQJRYHUQHGSRSXODWLRQV
which is clearly problematic for non-¶Western· societies in the postcolonial era (Ibid: 
7). Yet, most authors agree that historically, civil society emerged as a public 
domain from which to counter the hegemony of the monarchy, or the state (Keane 
1988: 65).  
 
Although civil society was encouraged by the French from around 1908 and was 
developed on their model, it only began to burgeon in the 1980s, after a decree on 
the freedom of association in 1987. This followed a period of repression of 
associative life by the new single-party government, the FLN. They banned Islamic 
JURXSVZRPHQ·VULJKWVJURXSVDQG$PD]LJKDVVRFLDWLRQVZKLFKZHre all seen by 
the FLN as a threat to its hold on power, and also to its totalitarian representation 
of Algerian life. This is indeed ironic, as the FLN itself was the fruit of two previous 
political movements, the PPA and Etoile Nord Africaine, which themselves relied 
heavily on associative connections to draw together the emerging intelligentsia and 
the popular masses (Liverani 2008: 15). The main reason for the new concession by 
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the state appears to be a strategic one of (minimal) appeasement, following the food 
riots that were spawned by a lack of state subsidies on basic foodstuffs, after the 
drop in global oil prices in 1985 (Butcher 2014). This fluctuation revealed the 
weakness of the state economy, despite being based on an abundance of oil 
(although not on the scale of Qatar, for example), has not been diversified, nor seen 
any trickle down to local economies. The economy was also heavily centralised, still 
rooted in a socialist model, making local economies particularly vulnerable to price 
fluctuations. 
 
/LYHUDQL  KDV DUJXHG FRQWUDU\ WRGH7RFTXHYLOOH·V FODVVLF IRUPXODWLRQRI
civil society as a pre-requisite to democratic government, that state strategy was to 
permit a limited form of civil society to perform the tasks of administering the 
social services of which the state was perceived to be failing to provide. Thus, when 
social services continued to break down, civil society could be blamed as the 
scapegoat. Leca (foreword to Liverani 2008) cRQWHVWV /LYHUDQL·V GHSLFWLRQ RI WKH
$OJHULDQJRYHUQPHQW DV D ¶ZHDN VWDWH· H[SODLQLQJ WKDWZKLOH$OJHULDQVJHQHUDOO\
may not have faith in the government per se, aka the FLN, they do believe in the 
state as a national representation. In my personal experience, at the time of the on-
going uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, people expressed to me that while they 
distrusted the opaque authoritarian rule of le pouvoir )UHQFKOLW¶WKHSRZHU·WKH\
were more fearful still of violent political change, still remembering the awful 
violence of the 1990s, and in some cases the war of independence itself. People 
preferred stability and security to political freedom (even though many small, 
largely unreported protests were erupting nationwide, mainly related to 
employment and housing).  
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Meanwhile, Butcher (2014) gives a more optimistic view, arguing that in general 
even though nation-states heavily reliant on oil are less likely to democratise, in the 
case of Algeria, despite restrictions, civil society has flourished. For example, 
powerful business associations and the Algerian Human Rights League (LADDAH) 
have in fact challenged government policy. In 2011, these groups joined forces to 
form the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNDC). Following a 
protest march, the government agreed to lift the two-decade long state of 
emergency. She concludes: 
 
While the government may have initially allowed associations with the 
LQWHQWRIDSSHDULQJWR´OLEHUDOL]HµZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHPDQLSXODWLQJWKHVH
associations for their own gains, this process has actually provided an 
opening for some civic associations to organize and oppose the government. 
This process of liberalization, regardless of how empty it may have seemed 
DWILUVWPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGDQ´RSHQLQJRIWKHIORRGJDWHVµWKDWQRZFDQQRW
EHFORVHG7KXVWKHUHFHQW´$UDE6SULQJµDQGWKHSURWHVWVLQ$OJHULDFDQEH
VHHQ DV GLUHFWO\ IDFLOLWDWHG E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V SULRU OLEHUDOL]DWLRQ DQG
opening of the system to civic associations. [Butcher 2014: 13] 
 
The state has since brought in further restrictions concerning civic associations, 
LQFOXGLQJ D FRQGLWLRQ WKDW ¶JRDOV RI WKH DVVRFLDWLRQ PXVW QRW EH FRQWUDU\ WR
´QDWLRQDO YDOXHVµ· Ibid: 13), and groups can now be disbanded without the 
intervention of a judge. 
 
While %XWFKHU OLNH PDQ\ RWKHUV GRHV QRW TXHVWLRQ ¶GHPRFUDF\· DV D QRUPDWLYH
concept (for a critical review of the term see for example Schmitter & Karl 1991), 
and her analysis may be regarded as overly sanguine, it seems clear that despite 
restrictions, civil society is exploding in Algeria. The timing of this emergence in 
WKH0·]DELVFRQFXUUHQWZLWKWKe relaxing of state laws around civic society at the 
HQGRIWKHV<HWWKLVULVHRIDVVRFLDWLYHOLIHLQWKH0·]DELVQRWMXVWDWRS-down 
process, where democratically minded individuals are simply waiting for the laws to 
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change to allow them to coalesce.  The region already had its own set of customary 
organisational structures, and I would suggest that these traditional structures 
were in the process of breaking down at the time of the new laws, thus leaving a 
governance ¶YRLG·,WLVWKHVHWUDGLWLRQDl institutions that I now describe, as well as 
the conditions of their decline, as well as their contemporary return, albeit in a 
mutated form. 
 
8.4 Customary governance: /·RXPQD 
Early on in my stay I heard rumours about a semi-mythical, ancient organisation of 
specialists known as O·RXPQD who had guarded the hydraulic system for a very long 
time. Yet, I could find out very little about this masonic-like group. Even the 
IDUPHUV,VSRNHWRGLGQ·WNQRZRIDQ\RIWKHP:KDW,GLGKHDUZDVIUDPHGLQWKH
negative: yes, they used to protect the waterways from debris or illicit building 
activities, but they were corrupt, for they would turn a blind eye to illegal activity if 
you were a relative. Even some of the cazzƗba who oversaw and sanctified O·RXPQD·V
authority were seen to be corrupt. People (who will remain anonymous) informed 
me that the wealthy were essentially exempt from punishment. Beyond their 
elevated status, it was understood that often cazzƗba legitimacy was based on 
financing from the elite. Thus in return for favours, the cazzƗba turned a blind eye 
WRLQIUDFWLRQV7KLVOHGWRWKHFRPPRQO\SHUFHLYHGQRWLRQWKDWWKHUHZDV¶RQHUXOH
IRUWKHULFKDQRWKHUUXOHIRUWKHSRRU·2QHSDOPVSHFLDOLVWWROGPH 
 
/·RXPQD used to enforce all the rules of the oasis, not just water, involving the 
clearing of lanes, building regulations, and so on. For example, fallen trees must be 
cleared from pathways. Buildings must not be over 5m tall. Now their power is 
gone since after independence, the dangerous Hizib al wahad, one-God one-party 
[FLN]6RQRZ WKLQJVGRQ·WJHWGRQH SHRSOH WHQG WREXLOGZKHUH WKH\ OLNH$OVR
SHRSOHGRQ·WOLVWHQWRWKHPEHFDXVHWKH\KDYHWZRIDFHVLIWKHULFKJLYHWKHPPRQH\
they look the other way. 
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~Nejib, 07/02/12 
 
/·RXPQD·s power was negated by the French, who gave authority instead to a 
centrally appointed, usually non-local qcaid. However, as Nejib clarified, local 
organisations continued to govern, and it was not until the revolution and 
independence that power was really taken away. After many months of working 
with farmers and palm experts, I finally realised that someone I had been working 
with all along, Hamza, was in fact a member of O·RXPQDHe was able to inform me 
of the contemporary situation regarding this ancient organisation. 
 
8.4.1 Role of O·RXPQD 
The term O·RXPQD FRPHVIURPWKHURRW¶amƯn·$UDELFIRU¶IDLWKIXO·RU¶UHOLDEOH·DQGLV
therefore related to the term ¶al DPHQD·, discussed elsewhere, and has local 
significance referriQJWROR\DOW\7KXVIRU0·]DE¶O·RXPQD·PHDQV¶RXUIDLWKIXO·. The 
various subdivisions of O·RXPQDofficials were in charge of different tasks; here I will 
discuss the water guards. The most important task was to guide the flash floods in 
the proper direction when they arrived, by means of switches and gates. First, the 
floodwaters would be directed along the primary canal via the primary gate, which 
is named tazouni wamen. The water is first directed toward the tagherbit (western 
door), for which Hamza was responsible, then to bougoufa, at which point the 
correct gate is sealed so that clean water is directed down into the wells, preventing 
the accumulation of debris, which is deposited on the sides of the canal. Thus, the 
aquifer is allowed to recharge first. After this, the water is directed towards the 
gardens, so that they may benefit. The waters hydrate the soil and plants, rinse 
away excess salt and add nutrients from the silt.  
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Figure 8.6 An irrigation canal. (23/04/13) 
 
All this coordination involves communication between officials, who historically 
gave signals from watchtowers, each one positioned within the oasis so that it has a 
view to the one before and after on the horizon. Beni Isguen oasis is divided up into 
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fifteen cartiers, or sections, with 3 watchtowers, and 2-4 officials in charge of each 
section. The names of the sections are given in figure 4.7. 
 
Officials, who are usually local to the area, are chosen for their expertise in the field 
(see Geertz 1971 for a comparative discussion of water officials in Morocco and 
Indonesia). During non-flood periods, the task of O·RXPQD is to monitor their 
delegated area. Officials are, therefore, usually farmers who already frequent the 
area on a daily basis and can also provide such monitoring. They look out for 
individuals who illegally block the canals, for whatever reason, but usually for 
building purposes or dumping waste. Previously, O·RXPQDhad the authority to fine 
individuals who broke the rules. Today, they only have recourse to report the 
individuals to the ayyen council, who use their recognised status to put pressure on 
individuals by talking to them, but they have no ability to penalise. 
 
8.4.2 Two case studies 
I observed one such example of this when a local hotel owner, attempting to 
provide better access to the front of his business, consulted with only one such 
elderly, retired O·RXPQDofficial. This involved building a small concrete bridge over 
a canal that ran past the house I was living in. The official informed the hotelier 
that his proposition was sound in theory, and so the latter forged ahead without any 
further concern for due process. One day I heard shouting outside my house. I later 
found the bridge knocked down and all building work abandoned. The hotelier had 
paid the price for not consulting his neighbours, who had knocked the bridge down, 
perhaps feeling that his prestige as a wealthy man of influence would win him 
powerful support in favour of his project. In this case, however, he was 
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unsuccessful. It appeared that the bridge would not have affected the flow of water; 
the real issue was the lack of consultation with the appropriate parties. 
 
In 2007, I was informed, a conflict broke out between the people of Bouchemjen and 
Bahmed ou Musa (see fig. 4.7). When the oued flooded, the water that normally 
flowed from west to east along the canal through Inghid, past Bouchemjen and on 
to Bahmed ou Musa became blocked (allegedly unintentionally), and the water 
started to pool near a house, so an individual affected made another blockage at 
Bouchemjen to prevent this from exacerbating further. There was a conflict so the 
council came and made a seguia for the water in the canal to drain to the main oued 
Ntissa. For unknown reasons they didn't yet remove his dam. This instance shows 
a lack of contingent planning, that is, what actions to take in an emergency. 
Supposedly, if O·RXPQDhad been present and on call at the height of the problem, 
they could have been consulted. As the council were now seen as the appropriate 
authorities, they were certainly not present, and could only take action after the 
event. 
 
These examples highlight that consultation is an essential part of decision-making 
LQ WKH 0·]DE ZKLFK DJUHHV ZLWK FXVWRPDU\ ODZ ¶XUI (chapter seven), in that 
neighbours, especially the sanctity of the family, is paramount in the case of 
development activity. Thus, despite the hierarchical nature of O·RXPQD, who derived 
its authority from the cazzƗba (and now tellingly from the ayyen), consultation is the 
norm in attempting to mediate problems before they escalate into conflict. Adad 
(2008), who researched the development of housing in the area for low-income 
IDPLOLHV GHVFULEHG WKLV ´VSLULW RI RUJDQLVDWLRQµ DV EHLQJ FRQVistent with Ibadite 
GRFWULQH +H IXUWKHU FODLPV WKDW ´WKH 0·]DE LV D ZRUOG ZKHUH FRPPXQLW\
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FRQVXOWDWLRQ KDV EHFRPH ODZµ $GDG   DOWKRXJK KH RYHUHPSKDVLVHV
WHQGHQFLHVWRZDUGV¶KDUPRQ\·DQGFRKHVLRQLQWKHDUHD 
 
8.4.3 The return of O·RXPQD 
Following the revelation that my friend Hamza was in fact a water official and that 
they were still present in the oasis, albeit in a reduced role, I thought I was 
witnessing an ancient institution in decline. However, based on further enquiry, it 
appeared that in fact, they had declined already and what I was seeing constituted a 
reappearance, following a re-evaluation of the need to police at the local level. This 
monitoring can be viewed as part of the social visibility that I discussed in chapter 
five. Perhaps several events led to this reappraisal of the need for this policing in 
the oasis, but it is evident that after the 2008 flood, people became serious about it. 
 
Following the 2008 flood, it appears that a movement arose to bring back O·RXPQD
Discussions took place in Ghardaia on how to persuade people to open their water 
vents once again in a coordinated manner, to prevent this disaster from happening 
again. /·RXPQDshould, in theory, be able to prevent people from building in risky 
areas also. The same discussion took place in Inghid, to police illegal building and 
encroachment on agricultural land. The need to police the oasis was discussed in 
agricultural conferences that I attended. In Beni Isguen, as evidenced by Hamza, a 
return was concretely taking place. As I understand it, there was a direct causal 
link between the flood and fragmented attempts to reinstate this organisation. 
Opinion was divided, however. Some clearly saw the need to implement local 
strategies involving local people who knew the particularities of the area. They 
distrusted state interventions because they saw that the state implemented policies 
from far away and lacked a fine-grained understanding of local issues and ecology. 
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Others, however, simply stated that O·RXPQD have no sanctified authority, and 
therefore no influence. Others still were wary of them for other reasons, such as 
perceptions of cronyism toward friends and relatives, as described earlier. This 
viewpoint contradicts the previous point that involving local actors is not the 
answer due to ties of kinship and other reciprocal obligations, which are said to 
affect fair judgement. Indeed, unless there is trust in the organisation, as the notion 
of amƯn implies, cooperation will prove difficult. 
 
8.5 Discussion 
I have tried WRVKRZWKDWPDQDJHPHQWRIFRPPRQUHVRXUFHVLQWKH0·]DERUPRUH
succinctly, coordination of people in how they relate to natural resources, currently 
includes two types of organisation: 1) O·RXPQD, which has returned following a 
general decline in traditional governance structures; and 2) voluntary associations, 
which have risen to fill the management gap left by the erosion of the older 
structures. I have chosen to term associations as micro-social movements to reflect 
that they may be more apt at dealing with change than conventional political 
structures in the Beni Isguen, which may be more concerned with upholding the 
status quo. Indeed, Kerri (1976) presents a similar conception for voluntary 
aVVRFLDWLRQV,GHSDUWIURP.HUUL·V position, however, which is that such movements 
entail adaptive mechanisms to social change. For while they may indeed be 
responsive, I argue that adaptation may not be the primary reason for the existence 
of these groups, and such representation is overly functionalist and reductionistic. 
Similarly, I recognise that the social movement designation is not unproblematic, 
for as Gledhill (2000: 184) demonstrates, some social movements may represent the 
status quo also, such as the pro-lifers in the United States who murder abortion 
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doctors. Yet, I retain this designation for conceptual rather than theoretical 
reasons, in order to contrast with customary local organisations.  
 
I suggested that civil society was only able to emerge to fill this gap after the 
´RSHQLQJ RI WKH IORRGJDWHVµ DV %XWFKHU  SXW LW DOEHLW ZLWK UHVWULFWLRQV RQ
political activity. I showed the causes for this strategic move, entailing a defensive 
manoeuvre by the government which was instigated by the precipitous drop in 
global oil prices. I also described, following the 2008 flood, how the debate on the 
need for a locally based irrigation official to prevent the recurrence of such disasters 
led to the return of the O·RXPQD (see fig. 8.7). Both of these management 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV ODFN ¶WHHWK·KRZHYHU7KLV LVQRWDSUREOHPZKLOHSHRSOHDJUHH\HW
when conflict breaks out, as it inevitably does, the need for intervention is currently 
solved by appealing to the municipal council, or for more grievous matters, to the 
gendarmerie. Yet these officials are seen as outsiders to Mozabite society, and more 
practically, lack understanding of local sensibilities and fine knowledge of local 
ecology. 
 
Despite the need for coordinated behaviour to manage the hydraulic system, a 
FRQIOLFWDURVHGXHWRQRWLRQVRISULYDWHSURSHUW\¶2Qmy land, I am the lord of all I 
VXUYH\·ZDVWKHHWKRVWKDWZDVFRQveyed to me about certain people. As the town 
had spilled over into the oasis and many people now lived there permanently, they 
had no wish for their gardens and potentially their homes to be flooded. 
Furthermore, in private property behind the ubiquitous walls that shielded family 
life, there is the question of visibility that I raised earlier (chapter five). Visibility 
leads to control due to the fact that certain social behaviours are modified by the 
degree to which others will react (Roberts 1979: 38)+RZHYHULIRQH·VDFWLRQVDUH
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not visible to society, this normative enforcement is not present, and one is guided 
by conscience alone. If an individual feels they are not likely to get caught breaking 
the rules, he may have less incentive to follow them. This is not to say that society 
functions solely to restrain basic human desires, however, as people tend to 
continually IROORZ UXOHV GXH WR WKH ZHLJKW RI ¶WUDGLWLRQ· DV ´D SDUWLFXODU ZD\ RI
doing things [which] has been followed again and again, and with repetition has 
DFTXLUHGD¶ULJKWQHVV·RYHUWLPHµ5REHUWV 
 
The harmony model of social order has been strongly contested in legal and 
political anthropology going back to the 1960s, with scholars positing that conflict 
is not pathological but the norm (Comaroff & Roberts 1986: 5), the acceptable 
degree of which is different in different societies (Nader 2002: 34), and that trouble 
itself is the basis of much social organisation (Roberts 1979: 34). In his classic (if 
rare) comparative study, Geertz (1972) noted that Moroccan Berbers were inclined 
toward individualist antagonism in disputes, with Islamic law being the primary 
factor in resolution, as opposed to group-oriented Balinese who solved problems 
through consensus. Though normally against such essentialising, Geertz does 
claim the Moroccan example to be common to all of Morocco, even though such 
claims of a pan-Berber culture have now been definitively discredited (e.g. Crawford 
2001: 405). Mozabite oppositional social formations apparently inspired Masqueray 
to theorise the rudiments of a later segmentary theory, according to Durkheim, 
upon which the latter developed his theory of mechanical society (1984: 57²87). My 
fieldwork observations contradict all of this. It is true that society is ordered into 
the extended family, cashƯra, aarsh, and qsar, other crosscutting obligations negate 
VXFKVLPSOH ¶EXLOGLQJEORFN·H[SODQDWLRQRIVRFLDORUGHUVXFKDVUHOLJLRXVWLHVDQG
neighbourhood associations. Entire towns are no longer in conflict, although 
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unfortunate battles between Mozabites and Shaamba Arabs have erupted recently. 
:KDW KDV EHHQ FODLPHG WR EH D ¶PRGHUQ· WUHQG RI LQGLYLGXDOLVP LV QRW KRZ WKH
majority conduct their affairs. This may change in the future, as the wealthy class, 
such as hotel owners, attempt to circumvent such consultation with relevant local 
parties ² DVRQHORFDOSXWLW´WRKDYHWKHLURZQVHWRIUXOHVµWKHULVHRIDVVRFLDWLRQV
shows a clear, continued trend of growing support for collaborative effort over 
individualistic action. 
 
Despite the decline of the power of O·RXPQD and the cazzƗba, I would argue that 
¶FDUURW DQG VWLFN· IRUPV RI FRHUFLRQ GR VWLOO H[LVW $OWKRXJK WKH XVH RI tebria has 
declined dramatically, the withdrawal of social support, a sort of informal 
ostracism, continues. For example, a known thief was pointed out to me. Such 
people are tolerated but have low social standing and are mostly avoided. Thus, 
shame, despite being problematized by several authors (Herzfeld 1980; Akpinar 
2003) remains a powerful ordering force in this relatively small-scale society. 
Enforcement now lies in the hands of the state, through the local gendarmerie and 
law courts. The problem, as stated to me several times, and related by the following 
metaphor, is that in relying on the state first, onHLVDWWHPSWLQJWREXLOGRQH·VKRXVH
from the top downwards rather from the foundations, and so dealing with problems 
from the bottom-up, through family, cashƯra and so on, is seen as the natural way to 
proceed. Further, the state is seen as remote and lacking in detailed knowledge of 
local issues, and thus is likely to deliver inappropriate solutions. 
 
Wittfogel (1957: 66) posited that larger irrigation systems require centralised 
government to coordinate them, and these historically grew into despotic elites. 
Other studies have shown that complex states have risen without extensive 
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irrigation systems (Lewellen 2003: 60; see also Leach 1959 for an earlier critique). 
Using a comparative method, Mabry (1996: 6) showed that although small-scale 
irrigation systems are much more common (especially to the Middle East, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America), a correlation does exist between larger irrigation 
systems and centralised management. For example, Uphoff (1986: 81) discovered 
that areas of 40 ha or less tended to be governed by groups or irrigators 
themselves, whereas areas between 40 and 400 ha were managed by a central 
official. Studies of irrigation systems based on surface water, such as in Morocco 
(Ilahiane 1996), Egypt (Price & Brewer 1996) and elsewhere, show the presence of 
locally appointed water officials, usually individuals known for their honesty. 
Building on Geertz, Lansing (1987; 1993) KDVDUJXHGWKDW%DOL·VFRPSOH[LUULJDWLRQ
system, over hundreds of hectares in area, is optimally managed by local water 
temples, arising to regulate both water flow and minimize pests (grasshoppers). 
Vayda (2009) KDVUHIXWHG/DQVLQJ·VPRGHOKRZHYHUVWDWLQJWKDW/DQVLQJLJQRUHG
alternative explanations for the origins of this coordination, and that pests only 
became a problem recently during the Green Revolution due to pesticides which 
killed their predators. Instead, coordination could have come about as a reaction to 
force by populations up or downstream (Vayda 2009: 40-41). Whatever the case 
PD\EHLQ%DOLFRRUGLQDWLRQRIWKHLUULJDWLRQV\VWHPLQWKH0·]DEFOHDUO\UHTXLUHG
the presence of a dedicated and sanctified group to channel the floodwaters and to 
fine individuals who blocked the flow of water. As personal pumps came into 
IDVKLRQSHRSOHSHUFHLYHGWKDWWKH\GLGQ·WQHHGWRUHO\RQWKHIORRGZDWHUVDQ\PRUH
Sadly, this was only to substitute the advantages of the flood and to forget its 
destructive qualities. When the massive 2008 flood arrived, blocked water pooled 
and destroyed property, and life. Thus the need for coordination was reassessed. 
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/·RXPQD have returned, but their presence is contested, and their authority 
ambiguous, without the religious sanction they once had to punish when needed. 
 
I suggested to several people that the solution to the need for coercion might be to 
achieve central recognition of local authority to punish, such as returning the 
ability to give fines to the cazzƗba or O·RXPQD. Such legal recognition of local police 
is evident in the form of recognition of tribal law, as with indigenous peoples in the 
United States and Australia (Griffiths 2011). Alternatively, oasis populations in 
neighbouring Morocco continue to fine despite the presence of national statutory 
law, based on local agreements. People tended to disagree with me, however, 
stating that the mosque should be confined to religious matters, and that social 
cooperation should be based on incentives rather than punishment. Some stated 
that the mosque, in fact, often persuaded people to follow the rules. This would 
seem to imply a shift from hierarchical modes of governance to more egalitarian 
ones based on consultation and consent. Such a view would ignore, however, that 
many people still seek recourse from the state when it comes to conflict, thus 
maintaining top-down forms of organisation and control.  
 
The relationship with the state is certainly ambiguous. Despite local recognition of 
the Algerian nation-state, this move was largely strategic, and many Mozabites 
prefer to remain autonomous in many matters, such as freedom of religion, or in 
solving minor disputes, although this does not prevent certain individuals turning 
to the state when it suits them. Relations with the state have become increasingly 
strained, as during the most recent iteration of violent riots between Mozabites and 
Arabs. I witnessed how riot police stood by while hooded Arab youth threw rocks 
at Mozabite people and property. The state was forced to take action only after 
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Mozabites published videos of the events online, which were picked up by the 
global media, and a peaceful Mozabite protest in the capital. 
 
Many Mozabite youth appear to be engaging these very notions, of the meaning of 
society, questions of identity, and how to maintain both tangible and intangible 
heritage. Explicitly learning from the mistakes of the previous generation 
(although reluctant to reveal their elders in a negative light), youth such as Bechir 
GLVFXVVWKH¶VRFLDOFRQWUDFW·DWthe local level, in terms of obligations and duties in 
return for the many social benefits offered by Mozabite society. These youth are 
proud of local identity, and attempt to achieve cooperative consent by the use of 
incentives, such as appealing to the economic, religious or ecological interests of 
people: 
 
7KH LGHD LV WR ZRUN RQ SHRSOH·V LGHRORJLHV DQG WR HQODUJH WKH PRYHPHQW
exponentially. In order to achieve concrete change, we need to analyse what people 
really want. By speaking the language of peoplH·V FRUH LQWHUHVWV ZH FDQ FRQYLQFH
them. For example, if people are just interested in religion, you can say they will be 
SXQLVKHGE\+RO\*RG%XWJOREDOPHGLDPDNHVDQGVKDSHVSHRSOH·VWKLQNLQJQRZ,I
they are materialistic, you can show them the material benefit. After the 2008 flood, 
people were touched materially. You talk in the language they understand. Another 
H[DPSOH LV WKDW SHRSOH EORFNHG RII WKHLU JDUGHQGUDLQV EHFDXVH WKH\GLGQ·W OLNH WKH
flood coming into the house. A study was made, showing that old field, unblocked, 
KDGPRUHQXWULHQWVWKDQQHZILHOGVWKDWDUHEORFNHGRIIWKDWGLGQ·WJHWWKHQXWULHQWV
from the flood water. This gives another way to convince them. 
~ Bechir, 21/09/13 
 
%HFKLURSWLPLVWLFDOO\UHPDUNHGWKDW´WKH\RXWKDUHDOZD\VGiscussing the future and 
WKHULJKWZD\WRSURFHHG(YHQLIWKH\PDNHPLVWDNHVLWLVJRRGWKH\DUHHQJDJLQJµ
This evidence of intergenerational contestation of values, knowledge and identity 
corroborates my assertions that a Gramscian framework gives us a more accurate 
theoretical view of the local dynamic equilibrium of Mozabite socio-politics, than 
that of consensus-based resilience theory. It is important to note that such political 
jostling is not necessarily primarily adaptive in function, although social change 
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may have ecologically adaptive outcomes. For instance, the delicate power struggle 
between the secular (the ayyen) and religious (the cazzƗba) councils potentially 
contributed to a maladaptive situation, whereby the communal irrigation system 
collapsed due to, what I argue to be individualistic, neoliberal principles which de-
emphasise messy, reciprocal ties of obligation in favour of paying for such services 
instead (i.e. government-supplied water). Meanwhile, intergenerational 
contestation has questioned the social and ecological consequences of such values, 
resulting in a re-emphasis of certain communitarian ethics, alongside other, 
¶PRGHUQ·IRUPVVXFKDVVFLHQWLILFLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWQXWULHQWV7KLVVKRZVKRZWKH
newer hegemony is being challenged at the local level by the (re)formulation of 
ideologies by various groups. Some might frame this as a contestation between 
¶WUDGLWLRQDO· DQG ¶PRGHUQ· VHWV RI YDOXHV whereas Gramsci viewed this rather as 
power relations between oppressor and oppressed, in terms of class and capital 
(Crehan 2002: 6²7). It thus could be suggested that the merchant class (represented 
by the ayyen) formed links with the wider political economic relations of the nation-
state in order to overthrow the local political order. Yet, as I have argued, this 
involved the contentious use of ideological manoeuvring, making such linking to 
national body politic possible only with the legitimacy of the Islamic Algerian state. 
Thus, in Gramscian terms, in order to shift the dominant ideology (this is not to 
SRUWUD\ ¶LGHRORJ\· DV KRPRJHQRXVOy held, but rather as a common theme), the 
Mozabite students are attempting to challenge it by assembling an alternative 
social ideal that is rooted in everyday needs, thus appealing to how people are 
directly implicated by cooperation whether through economic, religious or 
ecological means. 
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This implies, as I demonstrated in the previous chapter, a revision of the relations 
RIWKH¶VRFLDOFRQWUDFW·LQWHUPVRIULJKWVDQGGXWLHVEDFNIURPWKHLQGLYLGXDOWRWKH
nation-state to the individual and the immediate community47. In a polemical 
review, Brown & Purcell (2005) attempt to warn against the current trend in 
political ecology of over-emphasising the local over the national in terms of the 
appropriate scale for effective governance. Such a view is reminiscent of older 
FULWLFLVPVRIWKH¶QREOHVDYDJH·(Ellen 1986; Redford 1991), and more recent debates 
surrounding community-based conservation (Agrawal & Gibson 2001; Campbell & 
Vainio-Mattila 2003; Otto et al. 2013). Brown & Purcell (2005), however, confine 
their argument to theoretical considerations of how scale is socially constructed 
rather than on the direct link between scale and governing bodies in terms of 
regulation. By contrast, I, along with others (Mabry 1996: 6) using the example of 
irrigation, propose that larger groups appear to need external bodies to assist with 
regulation. This also challenges ideas of self-regulation in resilience theory, and 
also commons management as advanced by Ostrom (2009), in that it emphasises 
the role for hierarchy and authority for the direction and coordination of resource 
users (see also Park 1992). 
 
From this, it may be theorised that leadership is key to group organisation of larger 
bodies. The key issue that arises from this observation thus centres on the question 
of political legitimacy. Who gives the leader their authority? How does this process 
work and how is it solidified? Foucault·V (1991) notion of governmentality 
expresses KRZD¶YHUWLFDO·XQLWDU\QRWLRQRISROLWLFDOOHJLWLPDF\LVLQWHUQDOLVHGDQG
                                                 
47 The social contract theory of  Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant has seen something of  
DUHVXUJHQFHZLWK5DZO·VZRUNV(1971, in Boucher & Kelly 1994: 1). Graeber (2011: 71²6) 
argues that classic social contract theory only makes sense if  one assumes that markets 
historically emerged separately from the state, yet falls apart if  governments are seen as 
WKH ´JXDUGLDQVµ RI  DQ LQGLYLGXDO·V GHEW WR VRFLHW\ ZKLFK KH FRQWHQGV WUDQVODWes to 
taxation, and smaller debts to monetary fines. 
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maintained through horizontal aggregated relations extending throughout the 
bureaucracy and the populace. From the view of those who wish to challenge 
authority, how does the dominant class thus PDLQWDLQLWVKHJHPRQ\DQGZK\FDQ·W
political structures be more fluid (i.e. when those in power cease to represent the 
needs of the public, how to remove them)? Voluntary associations appear to 
represent a more representative, egalitarian politics, yet as I have shown, the 
removal of authority from leaders, i.e. the ability to punish, can result in political 
stagnation, as in disputes over inheritance, and inability to coordinate water users. 
Yet such a deadlock may be overcome through the careful manoeuvring with the 
state policy and instruments. Indeed, farmer associations have been able to prevent 
LOOHJDO DFWLYLWLHV E\ FDXWLRXVO\ LJQRULQJ WKH VWDWH·V SURYLVLRQ WR QRW HQJDJH LQ
political activity, as evidenced by the following example from nearby Laghouat: 
 
There was a man whose job it was to police building, who worked in the town hall, 
he prevented illegal walls, and so on. He was killed during the violence of the 1990s, 
and it is not known if he was killed by Islamists or someone he had fined taking 
revenge. Now there are environmental police at the town hall but they do nothing. 
For example, a man started building an illegal enterprise, a concrete silo on local 
farming land, they thought he was building a chicken coup. I started writing letters, 
and the gendarmes came and asked him for his permit, of which he had none. They 
moved him on, but the trouble was that in the time they took to respond, he had 
already laid the foundations. We are the watchers, however, and I am not afraid to 
put my name on a document. The area is legally restricted to agricultural activities, 
thus there is a need for local monitoring, for even if there are not communally 
PDQDJHG UHVRXUFHV ¶SULYDWH· DFWLYLWLHV PDy affect others in an adverse way. So 
activities in the area must be compatible, otherwise I will campaign against them. 
 ~Mohammed Brik, 02/04/13 
 
To conclude, rather than a linear progression from traditional, hierarchical forms of 
governance to modern, democratic ones, the present composition reveals the 
continued existence of several, mixed forms of political behaviour: authoritarian 
(still to some degree the family, the cashƯra, the cazzƗba and the state), individualistic 
market-driven, competitive behaviour (the labour market, mercantile selling of 
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goods, consumption of goods and services), and consensus-based egalitarian 
decision-making (associations). The existence of these mixed modes of governance 
could be seen as evidence for a society in transition, as newer forms gradually 
replace the old. The same could be argued of the mixed forms of economy and law 
in the previous chapters ,QVWHDGRI WKHHFOLSVHRI WKH ¶WUDGLWLRQDO·E\DPRQROLWKLF
modernity, however, along with Pascon (1986: 20), I would argue that this hybrid 
composition in fact constitutes a locally negotiated form of modernity itself.           
 
8.6 Conclusion 
'HEDWHV UHJDUGLQJ WKH ¶QDWXUH· RI KXPDQLW\ DQG WKH FRUUHVSRQGLQJ UROH RI
government have abounded in the social sciences, and despite the arguments in the 
1970s between formalism and substantivism, some schools, such as sociobiologists 
and evolutionary psychologists, follow in the footsteps of Hobbes and Smith and 
continue to argue for an intrinsically selfish human nature, and thus the need to 
regulate it via government (e.g. Chagnon 1988). Others, following Aristotle and 
Durkheim, posit that humanity is essentially social. Sahlins (2008: 104-12) goes 
beyond this, arguing that the possibility of selfish and cooperative behaviour exists 
as a potential in all of us, and it is the form of socialisation and upbringing that 
encourages one or the other. These notions of human nature influence political 
WKLQNLQJDERXW WKH ¶ULJKW·ZD\ WRJRYHUQVRFLHW\ IURPGLFWDWRULDOPRGHV VRFLDOLVW
forms, to market-based individualistic systems, through to anti-authoritarian and 
anarchic modes of government. Alternatively, anarchists have argued that the very 
H[LVWHQFH RI WKH VWDWH XQGHUPLQHV KXPDQLW\·V LQKHUHQW FDSDELOLW\ WR VHOI-organise 
(e.g. Kropotkin 2002: 288).  
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:KDW GRHV WKLV PHDQ IRU WKH 0·zab? The previous would suggest that what is 
important is the value systems transmitted by those involved in raising and 
educating Mozabite youth. It has been shown that notions of al amena (faithfulness 
or loyalty), once portrayed in stories, are being replaced by television in the home. 
The mosque does continue to preach the values of sociality, of right behaviour in 
UHODWLRQWRRQH·VQHLJKERXU<HWHGXFDWLRQWDNHVPDQ\IRUPVDQGZLWKH[SRVXUHWR
other forms of thought via national education or the internet, local normative ways 
of being are increasingly put into question. Often, as I experienced, this takes the 
form of open debate, by listening to differing ideas of other Muslims, for example, 
and talking amongst themselves about what they have heard. However, ideologies 
are not always explicit, and therefore, arguably non-social, individualist notions 
(which run counter to cooperative modes) may slip in under the guise of economic 
norms around business and financial thinking, or with ideas of creativity and 
FRPSHWLWLRQ,KDYHXWLOLVHG*UDPVFL·VQRWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\Ds a way to understand 
such ideological contestations. I have clarified that such political jostling may or 
PD\QRWKDYHDGDSWLYHTXDOLWLHV,QWKH0·]DEKRZHYHUVXFKGHEDWHKDVUHVXOWHGLQ
reflection on how to better manage critical oasis resources such as water. The new 
generation has realised that the current form of technological adaptation to their 
environment and watershed systems dictates that they must at least coordinate in 
order to safely channel water around the system, both to prevent harm and damage, 
and to receive the benefits of the flood. They have been discussing how to 
reconfigure local ideological relations and value systems in relation to this need. 
This is not a neo-functional analysis whereby social institutions and values exist 
primarily to support the whole; this alternative theoretical view reflects rather, that 
local people have realised that a degree of sociality involving coordination and 
cooperation is unavoidable for the successful management of communal resources. 
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9. Meta-analysis: Historical events 
or systems models in 
understanding change? 
 
In the preceding three chapters I have investigated in turn, certain specific 
problems pertaining to the management and governance of Beni Isguen oasis. This 
chapter presents a final, meta-analysis in order to search for inconsistencies and 
further insights. The study has raised certain key analytical questions, which I 
explore here. I found that the key event regarding the governance of the oasis in 
WKH0·]DEFRQFHUQHGWKHWLPLQJDQGLGHRORJLFDOOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHLQWHJUDWLRQZLWK
the Algerian state, which also involved pragmatic considerations. Based on a 
UHVLOLHQFH DVVHVVPHQW WKDW , FDUULHG RXW , FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH 0·]DE RDVHs can be 
classified as non-equilibrium systems, meaning that they exist in states of dynamic 
equilibrium in response to changing climatic conditions, but are also socially 
dynamic, in response to processes of the wider political economy. I return to my 
research question, and I find that certain Mozabite institutions and practices bear 
resemblances to adaptive management. I further compare my ethnographic data to 
the indicators of adaptive management given by Fabricius et al. (2007). Adaptive 
management and resilience, as explanatory frameworks, were shown to contain 
inconsistencies, however, in that the former is ultimately framed as a learning tool, 
whereas certain phenomena may have no definite centre of stability and remain 
unpredictable (Park 1992). Most importantly, resilience theory has been shown to 
be limited in its social analysis and representation. Building on Hatt (2013), I have 
suggested an alternative framework which draws on the Gramscian notion of 
dynamic equilibria of power, thus offering a comparable social analysis to the 
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ecological conceptualisation in resilience theory. In relation to this, I discuss issues 
of the notion of self-regulation in the literature, arguing that the composition of 
hybrid systems of governance, law and economy, contradict simplistic 
representations of a balance of power theorised to hold self-organising systems 
together. 
 
This chapter is thus divided into three sections. The first is a brief historical 
revision, involving themes of identity, power and economy as organising factors. 
The second part consists of a comparative analysis of the event and resilience 
approaches. The third section addresses the central research question of whether 
Mozabites practice adaptive management, and goes on to explore theoretical 
implications regarding the politics of self-organisation. The three main themes thus 
far presented have centred on social change in relation to the management of 
natural resources. Importantly, I have aimed to understand the context regarding 
how such changes have come about within wider processes of global change, and 
how these have been experienced at the local level. All this could be framed 
uncritically in terms of a narrative of the forces of ¶:HVWHUQ· modernity and 
globalisation, including liberalism and neoliberalism through the colonial and 
postcolonial eras, sweeping across the globe, and finally catching up to the secluded 
desert refuge of the Mozabites. This simplistic overview is problematic in several 
ZD\V 0RVW LPSRUWDQWO\ ¶PRGHUQLW\· LV QRW D PRQolithic homogeneous global 
entity, but is experienced and contested differently in different regions (Harvey 
1996: 27; Mills 1997). The anthropology of globalisation has shown how local 
people repeatedly adapt new elements to fit with local cosmologies and practices 
(e.g. Watson 2006: 37)7KHUHIRUHKHUH,GHVFULEHKRZWKHSHRSOHRIWKH0·]DEKDYH
   
 
311 
QHJRWLDWHG FKDQJH RYHU WKH FHQWXULHV HVSHFLDOO\ ZLWK UHIHUHQFH WR WKHLU RDVHV·
natural resources. 
 
9.1 Mozabite history revisited 
 
9.1.1 Historical reconstruction of oasis livelihoods 
 
This section reconstructs the major significant change events affecting Beni Isguen 
oasis and its inhabitants in combination. Since the battle of Siffin in 657 CE (see 
chapter 4), those who would become the Ibadites distinguished themselves from the 
rest of the Islamic community through a code of dissociation, and refusal to 
recognise the Caliph as legitimate due to his impious, self-seeking behaviour, thus 
creating a code of behaviour that would last through the longue durée. Following the 
collapse of the cosmopolitan Tahert in 909, the Ibadites, guided by their sheikh, 
sought isolation from diverse influences for religious and political reasons, blaming 
such diversity as the main cause of the downfall, and thus reinforcing the notion of 
dissociation. After the subsequent fall of Sedrata, they moved to the present 
ORFDWLRQRIWKH0·]DEYDOOH\3DOPWUHHDJULFXOWXUHZDVGHYHORSHGRYHUWLPHEXWWKH
population grew beyond the capacity of the area to support itself. Mozabites began 
to migrate across Algeria in order to trade. At the same time, they participated 
heavily in the North African slave trade, financing Shaamba and Touareg caravans48. 
This meant that they had to again interact with the outside world, and thus 
dissociation became a more internal spiritual or psychological distancing from non-
Ibadites.  
 
                                                 
48 It is uncertain whether oasis land was utilised on a communal or private tenure basis, as 
both of  the these systems exist at present, although customary law points to the private 
ownership only of  trees, rather than land. 
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Regarding the internal oasis economy, in recent centuries most of the oasis land 
appears to have been owned by wealthy families, who used slaves or rented land to 
khammƝs. Scheele (2012: 55) has convincingly argued that the massive earthwork 
projects for the initiation and maintenance of irrigation canals and buildings 
required a large, low-cost work force. The removal of this capacity with 
emancipation (by French colonial law in 1848), as Amat (1888: 228) projected, 
would have a major effect on oasis economies across the Maghreb. I contend that 
this would have resulted in a lull of productivity, after which landowners sought 
more financially rewarding activities, and were wealthy enough to reinvest in other 
economic activities. Poor farmers struggled on, relying on family members (mostly 
sons) to help in difficult menial tasks, such as walking beasts of burden back and 
forth, in the endless irrigation activity necessitated by the fierce desert sun.  
 
In the 1960s following independence, the economic system of twiza was essentially 
phased out with the rising cost of living, created by government infrastructural 
development in the region. This, along with the creation of industrial jobs drew 
labour away from the oasis. As agricultural activity decreased, more oasis land 
became used for housing to support the expanding population. As more individuals 
sought atomised households, rather than patriarchal ones, more and more land 
claims resulted in the stagnation of many plots due to contested ownership. This 
situation was facilitated by the plurality of legal systems available, as more wealthy 
individuals sought to take advantage of a French created and Algerian maintained 
judicial system. Thus farming production decreased significantly. This shift 
involved a relaxation in the position of dissociation maintained by Mozabites with 
the outside world, allowing this use of state institutions.  
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,VZDVQ·WXQWLOWKHFLYLOZDUVLQ:HVWHUQ$IULFDRIWKHVWKDWSahelian migrant 
labourers were forced to reroute their movements back (since the slave trade) to 
Algeria, thus bringing in a new source of cheap labour. At the same time, 
government land concessions in nearby Ntissa resulted in a resurgence of oasis 
IDUPLQJ 'XULQJ WKH V ¶EODFN GHFDGH· RI YLROHQFH HYHU\WKLQJ UHPDLQHG
reasonably quiet, with any innovative activity suppressed. In the 2000s, however, 
farmers began to self-organise to take control of the maintenance and protection of 
the oasis resources and livelihoods. This was due to two major social shifts, the 
decline of local authority, and the instigation of article 20 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights by the government, entailing freedom of association 
(Pillay 2012). Both of these involved state power, for following independence, 
Mozabites ostensibly decided to drop the practice of dissociation, and recognise the 
authority of the new state, due to its proffered Islamic status. As I argue below, this 
involved pragmatic and political considerations, for a shift in the balance of power 
favoured the economic elite whose secular power, ensconced within the secular 
council (the ayyen) relegated the long held authority of the cazzƗba to that of solely 
moral influence. Meanwhile, the rise of civic groups has led to a parallel form of 
political organisation challenging this new powerful elite. Farming associations so 
far have been able to use their resources to access global knowledge sources, 
funding and other forms of support, and even at times to make demands of central 
government. Yet, as ultimate power lies in the hands of the state, through the 
instruments of the gendarmes and the judicial system, the issue of how to get 
people to conform to the rules, has in my view, become a central issue.  
 
The rekindling of civil society in Algeria, however, has created the opportunity for 
significant creativity in this domain. All of this is fertile ground for theoretical 
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investigations of innovative (and historical) forms of economic and political 
organisation, including bottom up, inclusive governance such as anarchism (see for 
example Graeber 2004), recent trends in commons management (as in Ecuador, e.g. 
Bauwens & Kostakis 2014; and Greece, e.g. Karyotis & Kioupiolis 2015), and 
advances in democratic, self-regulatory complex systems. I return to these themes 
and their problems later. The reframing of associations as ¶PLFUR· VRFLDO
movements, as I have done, may be more useful for viewing their capacity to deal 
with recent change, and help avoid the pitfalls commonly linked with emancipatory 
notions of civil society. But first, it is necessary to analyse how these change events 
have been historically intertwined, and what this has meant for life in Mozabite 
society. Further, I discuss how my research findings challenge other explanations 
RIFKDQJHIRXQGLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQWKH0·]DE 
 
9.1.2 How do the three major themes of social change combine and what does 
this reveal? 
 
 
$GLIIHUHQWYLHZRIFKDQJHLQWKH0·]DE 
To reiterate, Bennoune (1986) importantly theorised that political change in the 
0·]DEhas been driven by class, specifically, with the rise of an elite merchant class 
that challenged the authority of the cazzƗba. This conceptualisation replaced earlier 
ahistorical functional analyses (Alport 1953; Bourdieu 1962). Yet the problem with 
%HQQRXQH·V DQDO\VLV LV WKLV LI WKH PHUFKDQW FODVV EHJDQ emerging in the tenth 
century (at the time of the commercial city of Tiaret), as he posits, why has it taken 
a millennia to overthrow the clerical class? My central argument regarding all of 
WKH PDMRU VRFLDO VKLIWV LQ WKH 0·]DE is related to the timing of when and why 
Mozabites decided to participate in the nation-state. Denial of legitimacy of rule ever 
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since the perceived tyranny of the early sultans, and later the colonial rulers can be 
linked to the Mozabite principle of dissociation. With the Ottomans and for a 
period of time the French, the Mozabites enjoyed relative autonomy. When the 
)UHQFK DQQH[HG WKH 0·]DE WKH 0R]DELWHV VLOHQWO\ ER\FRWWHG )UHQFK LQVWLWXWLRQV
and rule. It was not until the creation of an independent, Islamic Algeria that the 
Mozabites decided to participate in the state.  
Beyond ideological rationale, joining the nation-state had pragmatic goals, based on 
security and freedom of commerce. Yet, I argue, it was primarily the wealthy 
merchant class that took advantage of this new orientation, to participate in 
national administrative structures, in order to abrogate local control, whether 
moral, normative or punitive. By appealing to a higher authority, yet based on local 
QRWLRQV RI KLHUDUFK\ WKH VWDWH LV WKH ¶ROGHU EURWKHU· DQG WKHUHIRUH KDV JUHDWHU
authority), local sanctions such as fines could be ignored, and alternative systems of 
property and inheritance invoked. Tebria could be avoided simply by forming 
groups that could ignore the sanction, as such cooperative measures only work if all 
agree to participate in them. 
Other factors such as competing ideologies about how to live that could have driven 
the change already existed prior to independence, as Mozabites had participated in 
the wider economy for centuries, and been exposed to other ways of thinking and 
being. This factor therefore was not new, although ideological shifts have certainly 
accelerated since the 1960s through much increased education and exposure to 
mass media, as well as increased foreign travel. Alongside newer, liberal ideas of 
private property and individual rights, increased wealth can be seen as a driving 
factor in overthrowing local control, through subverting social visibility by means 
of acquiring separate housing and living in nuclear families away from the eye of 
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the mother-in-law and the authority of the patriarch. A proportion of Mozabites 
have always been very wealthy, acting as regional money-lenders, owning water 
shares in other Saharan localities, financing the slave trade and long-range 
transport systems into the present, even owning shares in cotton as far afield as 
England (Scheele 2012: 131-132). Overall, wealth does appear to have increased 
recently, however, with opportunities such as access to foreign and domestic 
markets and jobs. 
Other factors such as demographic changes may certainly have played a role. Face-
to-face social control through visibility (see chapter five) is only practical below a 
certain population threshold. Some have argued that civil laws are necessary 
beyond a certain population size where grievances are usually between anonymous 
parties who have no common social obligations (Nader 2002: 34; Roberts 1979: 25). 
In the past, Mozabites settled this problem through group fission, creating new 
settlements further upULYHU KHQFH WKH UHVXOWLQJ VHYHQ FLWLHV RI WKH 0·]DE , ZDV
informed that the fortified walls surrounding the qsǌr were not only to keep 
undesirables out, but prevented further population expansion. Moreover, the 
geological form of the river valleys prevented further expansion. On top of this, 
immigration from other regions of Algeria to the valley has largely exacerbated 
population increase, further complicating local cultural administration capabilities, 
not to mention generally challenging normative behaviour at the day-to-day level. 
 
Therefore, potential factors of social change were already present before 
independence, such as financial power (Alport 1954, Farrag 1971), dominant 
political forces (Amat 1888: 228), alternative ideological values around rights and 
property (Bourdieu 1962), and class division (Bennoune 1986). Therefore, I 
postulate that overtly, the tipping point was ideological (religious) alignment, in 
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that the new nation-state was seen as in alignment with Ibadite notions of 
legitimate authority. Yet, the underlying reason for change was more than likely 
pragmatic opportunism for the wealthy elite to take advantage of state 
administrative protection to bolster trade and protect private property and power. 
This legitimacy ² the abstention of dissociation and thus beginning of participation 
² provided the elite with the legitimacy to effectively overthrow cazzƗba control, or 
at least minimize it, while paying it lip service, and to further their own personal 
aspirations. 
 
Shifting centres of authority and identity 
All of this, perhaps, could be framed in terms of shifting centres. Scheele (2009: 
107) has discussed this to some degree, yet I explore these ideas in more depth. 
Many cultures throughout history have perceived their place in the universe as an 
RULJLQSRLQWORFDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKH¶QDYHORIWKHZRUOG·DPRQg other terms. Yet 
when the central point of reference shifts, say, during national formation and a 
people are told really they live on the periphery, especially when living in the 
GHVHUWDFRJQLWLYHVKLIWFDQRFFXUVLPLODUWRWKDWRI*DOLOHR·VKHOLRFHQWric universe. 
)RUDPLOOHQQLXP0R]DELWHVKDYHUHWXUQHGWRWKH0·]DEDIWHUWKHLUIRUD\VLQWRWKH
Tell and beyond to retire and eventually be buried amongst their ancestors. For 
many, this is still the case. Yet for others, I argue, the seduction of the developed 
capital (Algiers, Paris, New York) is irresistible. For these individuals, attracted by 
other values that directly challenge WKHLU RZQ WKH 0·]DE YDOOH\ KDV EHFRPH D
backwater. For most, however, there may be multiple points of reference. For 
examplH WKH 0·]DE PD\ UHPDLQ D VSLULWXDO KRPHODQG YLVLWHG DW WLPHV ZKLOH
Marseille remains the central pole of business and everyday life, Mecca remains a 
broader centre on the religious plane from which Islam radiated and to which they 
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position their prayers on a daily basis; paradise remains a mythological centre, a 
reference point upon which all devout and moral life is directed. These multiple 
reference points are probably representative for many in the present globalised 
world, as being constituted of deterritorialised notions of identity (Appadurai 1996: 
37²39). Thus local pride may be constitutive of various role models, be they the 
Prophet himself, or the late creator of Apple, Steve Jobs. 
 
A concurrent shift to that of centres is that of changes to the social contract 
(Skyrms 2014),QWKH0·]DEWKHUHKDVEHHQ a strong sense of a local social contract, 
in the terms of a strong local sense of obligations or duties, in return for social 
benefits, and this is being reconsidered. Many Mozabites do benefit from a sense of 
social welfare, of free (or nearly free) locally produced services. There is also a sense 
that such social welfare can be withdrawn, providing an incentive to be a 
participating community member, as the other side of the coin is social isolation (an 
informal tebria). Conversely, many today also rely on the state to provide services 
(through the municipal council). A difference can be seen in comparing Mozabites 
with the Shaamba Arabs. Regarding rubbish collection for example, whereas the 
Shaamba will leave mess to be gathered by the authorities, the Mozabites usually 
self-organise (often coordinated by the mosque) and deal with it themselves, 
although today participation is allegedly only carried out by around half of able-
bodies males. This example is one of many which reveal a shift of social 
responsibility from the local to the state, and arguably a move from a thinking 
ethical involvement in social interactions, to an unthinking legalist mode of 
interaction, which places the law, and thus the state, as the ultimate moral arbiter. 
Put another way, a responsibility of care fRURQH·VQHLJKERXULVUHPRYHGDQGWKXV
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absolved due the presence of state structures which can remotely perform the same 
function, albeit in an impersonal manner.  
 
This means that a shift to a social contract with the state implies, rather than 
participating in a shared local moral economy, instead the payment of taxes is 
sufficient to maintain the (alternative) contract. This is arguably the direction that 
ERXUJHRLV WKLQNLQJ KDV JRQH LQ WKH 0·]DE IURP D SURGXFWLYH VHQVH RI UHFLSURFDO
communal work and effort, to a sense that consumption can solve everything, and 
verily drive society itself, mirroring wider global social and economic trends 
(Harvey 2010: 327). Interestingly, this inverts the notion of the contract as 
developed by Hobbes. For Hobbes and others (e.g. Rousseau, Locke), the selfish 
nature of humans necessitates the strong authority of monarchy, and later the state. 
In this case, however, individuals are co-opting the authority of the larger powers, 
in order to escape the smaller, local one.  
 
Hatt (2013) developed the notion of VRFLDODWWUDFWRUVDV ¶VWDELOLVHUV·RI LGHQWLW\ WR
mirror the ecological attractors which act as a gravitational centre and thus relative 
stability (see chapter two). These social attractors serve as norms and values within 
society which may serve to pull in different directions, thus illustrating conflict and 
power in social relations. +DWWJLYHV WKHH[DPSOHVRI ´QDWXUHµ ´FRQVHUYDWLRQµDQG
´SURSHUW\µ DV DWWUDFWRUV LQ D &DQDGLDQ YLOODJH ZKHUHE\ GLIIHUHQW JURXSV UDOOLHG
around different values depending on whether power boats were acceptable 
(property) or not (nature & conservation). ,GHSDUW IURP+DWW·V FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ
however, for I argue that focusing solely on attraction, and thus agency, deflects 
from how power operates in terms of political structures to prevent rural Algerians 
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from challenging the state. By contrast I have attempted to portray how both 
structure and agency interact.  
 
Conceptualising social change 
Some Mozabites perceive all these changes as indicative of a slow decline of core 
FRPPRQYDOXHVZKHUHDVRWKHUVVHHLWDVDWLPHO\WUDQVLWLRQLQWR¶PRGHUQ·OLIHDQG
that as Muslims they can improve their lives by questioning previously 
unchallenged beliefs without losing their most important values and practices. 
Likewise, some fear assimilation into a homogenous global consumer culture, 
whereas others actively contest and debate the future direction of development, 
highlighting rather cyclical forms of change rather than linear ones, as generations 
learn IURP WKHSUHYLRXVRQH·VPLVWDNHV7KLV LV WKHTXHVWLRQ WKDW YH[HG %RXUGLHX
(1962) in his reflections on how Mozabites managed to adjust to changing social 
conditions, such as French colonial hegemonic notions of private property, while 
shielding central core notions. I present, I believe, a clearer vision of diverging 
VRFLDO G\QDPLFV RI WKRVH WKDW HPEUDFH ¶PRGHUQLW\· DQG WKRVH ZKR GR QRW
Potentially all societies contain progressive and conservative camps, and what may 
be essential is not that either wins (resulting in either radical but undirected 
change, or a static state of paralysis) but that a tension is maintained from which 
comes a sense of dialectical change consistent with a constantly shifting social and 
ecological climate. Indeed, WKH ¶WUDGLWLRQ·YHUVXV ¶PRGHUQLW\·GHEDWHPD\EHEHWWHU
framed and understood as a struggle between oppressor and oppressed, as Gramsci 
would have it. This view of the contestations between unequal groups has informed 
my analysis. 
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Such reflection is essential to the question of how this dynamic, flood-based 
Saharan region is managed. Further, this assessment of the multifaceted social 
UHDOLWLHV LQWKH0·]DEFRQWDLQLQJZKDW,KDYHWULHGWRSRUWUD\RIWKHPHVV\VRFLDO
dynamics that colour real-world situations of natural resource management, allows 
us to revisit the central question upon which this thesis has been organised. Yet 
before this I review the different approaches utilised in this thesis. 
 
9.2 A comparison of the event and resilience approaches to oasis 
management 
The historical account given above was constructed using an event-based analysis 
ORRVHO\ UHODWHG WR 9D\GD·V (2015) approach (abbreviated here to ACE: abductive 
causal eventism). I chose to utilise this approach in order to test the systems theory 
that underpins adaptive management, in order to seek to understand causal 
relationships across time and space. My use of the event approach involved more 
PDFURVFDOHVWKDQ9D\GD·VPRUHPLFUR-focused chains of events (although see pages 
160-7 for a comparative analysis of individual farms), to incorporate important 
factors to Mozabite life, such as French colonialism and State development projects. 
These forces can still be viewed as events, if seen as the point of contact, and the 
resulting cascading effects. Here I will briefly compare the event and systems 
frameworks.  
 
Of theoretical concern to resilience theory LVWKHQRWLRQRI¶HPHUJHQFH·7KLVLVVDLG
to come from the interaction of multiple factors, resulting in ¶Pore than the sum of 
WKH SDUWV· such as consciousness). 5HVLOLHQFH WKHRULVWV FODLP WKDW ¶HPHUJHQFH·
cannot be explained by being boiled down to the individual parts, therefore, for 
emergence takes place through the unpredictable interaction of the components. It 
   
 
322 
is this unpredictability and potential reflexivity that causes a system to be adaptive 
(such as artificial intelligence). Thus, systems theorists focus on attempting to 
manage such complexity by adaptive management, through structured 
experimentation, aimed at learning by doing. ACE, by contrast, deals primarily 
with explanatory power, and thus looks historically and contextually for answers 
through a process of elimination, and thus akin to detective work seeks to identify 
specific causes which can then be managed. The evidence given here suggests that 
it is possible to unpick causal factors by looking to multiple threads linked by 
concrete and intangible events, as I have illustrated throughout chapters 6-8. 
Alternatively, I also claim that elements such as adaptive pressure and cultural 
choice may historically intertwine in ways that is very difficult to disentangle. The 
key difference is the availability of data regarding historical events from which to 
perform an analysis. The event approach has been criticised for not being able to 
pay attention to discourse (as acknowledged by Walters 2012), but it is conceivable 
that one may equally perform an ¶archaeology· of language used to get at such an 
analysis. 
 
 The point of departure for resilience theory is the ¶state· of a socio-ecological 
system (whereas for ACE, it is a concrete event - while ACE does not deny the 
(provable) existence of states or structures, it does not presuppose them either). 
The resilience assessment (see appendix III) gave a view of the oasis as a series of 
economic states, emphasising labour as the key variable that governed the 
maintenance of a particular economic system, or change to another. From here one 
may investigate which phenomena influenced this variable (for example an 
important element of change between economic states was French colonial rule 
through the abolition of slavery, the primary source of labour). The modelling of 
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states highlighted the interaction of other components, such as water, labour, 
knowledge and land access. Some of this was hypothetical, however, and the ACE 
approach was more robust at examining real problems. 
 
ACE can give a more specific historical sequence of how contemporary events have 
unfolded and been shaped. The ACE approach was most useful for specific problems 
that were identified to me by local people. From there I was able to identify causal 
chains, by eliminating alternatives. By working on three different issues and then 
backwards and outwards in time and space, I was able to illustrate the greater 
context surrounding the more specific issues, and to see their interrelationships. 
For example, I was able to note the legal context and, more specifically, how some 
Mozabites chose to opportunistically draw on statutory law in order to get around 
local control institutions. I was further able to trace how the atomisation of family 
households along with population pressure has increased the number of land 
disputes. Resilience analysis did not identify this, due to a focus on structural 
factors rather than the agency of local actors. Further, the ACE approach produced 
a much more detailed vision of the causes of labour instability. 
 
Realistically, I had to stretch the methodological boundaries of the ACE approach 
to include each management problem. Moving from single events to trends of 
HYHQWVZDVQ·WUHDOO\DSUREOHPDVZLWKODQGFRQIOLFW: land abandonment was clearly 
a common phenomenon affected generally by a singular causal factor, that of legal 
forum shopping (which itself, I argue is due to complex reasons). Similarly, local 
emergence of the cash economy generally was due to the creation of infrastructure 
by state development projects, causing a need for cash among farmers who had to 
pay for electricity for the first time, to operate their wells. Both labour instability 
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(chapter six) and the political landscape (chapter eight) could be characterised as 
states, although I added to the robustness of the latter analysis by beginning with a 
single event, the 2008 flood, and tracing its effect on other institutions. Similarly, 
the causal analysis of real-life cases of workers moving around between different 
employers, asking about their intentions, as well as analysing the experience of the 
farmers in these circumstances, contributed to a much more robust understanding 
of labour problems. Overall, I experienced ACE to be the more powerful approach 
for understanding of what people are trying to manage in the oasis and how they are 
approaching it, based on the contextualisation of specific problems, rather than the 
more abstract view based on hypothetical interactions as suggested by resilience 
thinking. 
 
9.3 Adaptive management in Beni Isguen oasis? 
 
9.3.1 Revisiting the research question 
 
Now, I am able to finally return to the central thesis question: Do Mozabites use 
adaptive management (AM) to manage their oases? How do they adapt to social 
and ecological change and create such changes? If not adaptive management, then 
how do they manage? Which leads to the subsequent logical possibility: that 
institutions must show social learning and flexibility in response to such change, or 
will undergo transformation. This belies the sense that such organisations expect a 
JLYHQUDQJHRIYDULDELOLW\¶VKRFNDEVRUSWLRQ·ZKHUHDVXQNQRZQFKDQJHPD\SXVK
them beyond the limits of adaptability into decline and potentially transformation 
into a new form. 
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It will be remembered that adaptive management theory was developed in the 
1970s to deal with the frustration of the uncertainty inherent in the management 
involving complex non-linear systems that resisted long-range predictability. It is 
RIWHQ VXPPDULVHG DV ¶SROLF\ DV H[SHULPHQW· )XUWKHUPRUH AM emphasises 
qualitative over quantitative understanding of systems in order to visualise 
complex interactions, although indicators may be used as minimal measurement 
VHHEHORZ'HILQLWLRQVRI$0YDU\5LVWHWDO·V FRQVHUYDWLYHGHILQLWLRQRI
AM confines it to a systematic procedure of structured experiments aimed at 
increasing knowledge of unpredictable systems. This usage appears to assert the 
role of professional managers as primary users of AM. More expansive definitions 
tailored toward community-based co-management of natural resources (e.g. 
Armitage 2003) emphasise the participative dimension of AM that involves 
FRQVXOWDWLRQ ZLWK PXOWLSOH ¶VWDNHKROGHUV· LQ DFKLHYLQJ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH
dynamism of socio-ecological systems. 
 
Beginning with Rist et al.·V  GHILQLWLRQ ZH PD\ FRQVLGHU WZR HOHPHQWV RI
agriculture in Beni Isguen, the first potentially generalisable to farmers 
everywhere, the second spHFLILF WR WKH 0·]DE EXW UHODWDEOH WR RWKHU %HUEHU
communities in modified form): farmer experimentation, and customary law, ¶XUI
Regarding the first, experimentation, it may be argued that farmers everywhere 
engage in experimentation. Alternative views exist as to whether wealthier or 
poorer farmers practice such experimentation, based on perceptions of risk and the 
stakes involved (see Benessaiah 2011). Mahmoud, for example, was forced by 
poverty to undertake certain experiments through trial and error, such as letting 
ZHHGV JURZ IRU KH FRXOGQ·W DIIRUG WKH KHOS WR SLFN WKHP +H IRXQG WKDW OHWWLQJ
weeds grow in certain areas protected tree saplings from the hot desert winds, 
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while providing fodder for his donkey, who fortuitously preferred to eat the weeds 
than the young trees. Such happenstance experiments clearly enhance knowledge of 
specific instances, but it would be hard to compare such isolated events with the 
systematic structured experimentation of AM which aimed at system-wide 
understanding. The boundary here between farmer experimentation and the 
systematic experiments of AM is not entirely clear, however. 
 
¶8UI(customary law), however, provides an interesting corollary to AM in certain 
NH\DUHDV)LUVWO\ ,KDYH DUJXHG WKDW ¶urf involves consultation with the relevant 
parties to arrive at semi-formal agreements. Secondly, according to my informants, 
QHZ DJUHHPHQWV LQYROYLQJ ¶urf are tried for a period of time before they become 
VROLGLILHGLQWRFXVWRP7KXV ¶urf involves key elements that are analogous to AM, 
namely policy as experiment, and consultation with stakeholders. The latter is 
interesting, for while an emphasis on consultation implies self-organising 
egalitarian notions of political organisation, agreements are enforced by hierarchies, 
whether O·RXPQD (as sanctioned by the cazzƗba or now the ayyen), or by the 
municipal council, to whom people turn when agreements are broken or adequate 
consultation has not taken place. Furthermore, critics of AM point to its 
consultative aspect as a pragmatic downfall. I would argue, however, that rather 
than constituting a limitation, the consultative dimension must rather incorporate 
an understanding of contestation and power, through which agreement is achieved 
as an unstable compromise. Indeed, I have pointed to how this may be 
conceptualised throughout this thesis (especially chapters five & eight). 
 
The QRWLRQ RI ¶urf as being similar to AM, however, necessitates that this 
institution is in active use. The contemporary presence of legal pluralism negates 
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the primacy of customary law as praxis. The practice by elite groups of ¶forum 
shopping· for ways of subverting local ordering norms by appealing to state law 
WKXV UHOHJDWHV WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI ¶urf as adaptive management. Judiciary 
jurisprudence is also a factor in this equation, for judges may or may not choose to 
pay attention to customary law in their rulings. The patchy QDWXUH RI ¶urf 
agreements between small groups also differentiates it from AM, which postulates 
consensus regarding management actions by entire groups. Finally, adaptive 
management has been adopted as a framework by the RADDO NGO, perhaps due 
to their contact with my own research. How this may be implemented remains to 
be seen. The problem with this is that according to local people, discourse by this 
organisation never translates to action, thus policy will never even make it to the 
experimentation stage, depending on their interpretation of AM. Most importantly, 
as I have argued, management of the Beni Isguen oasis is made up of a patchwork of 
different organised and individualistic management efforts, and thus cannot be 
represented as a fully comprehensive, integrated image. Thus, in answer to the 
central question, institutions and practices in Beni Isguen bear some resemblance to 
adaptive management, albeit with certain key qualifications.  
 
In order to corroborate the foregone conclusions, I compare my ethnographic 
ILQGLQJVZLWK)DEULFLXVHWDO·VVL[NH\LQGLFDWRUVRIDGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQW 
 
1. Leadership and vision (organising toward a common goal), 
2. Knowledge networks (local knowledge regarding ecological processes, 
history, policy; incorporation of  other knowledge, new methods), 
3. Institutions nested across scales (the ability to reorganise or establish new 
institutions, linked to other non-local institutions to increase their 
influence), 
4. Embedded cultural management practices (e.g. supernatural sanctions for 
resource protection; linked land and identity), 
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5. Beneficial policies (e.g. clear land rights, inclusive participation in 
governing), and 
6. Motivation (e.g. common interests, values)  
 
1. Leadership and vision  
Leadership is key to association success. Farmers generally do not have a lot of 
time, and thus leaders help to guide organisational activities. The issue then is how 
much influence does the leader have? In my experience, however, the answer is 
very little. Unfortunately I had no direct experience of the FaddƗn association 
meetings, but I did meet members who related that there was no means of coercing 
IDUPHUV ZKR GLGQ·W SD\ WKHLU ELOOV DQG WKLV DIIHFWHG ZDWHU VXSSO\ WR DOO 7KLV
problem highlights the egalitarian ethos within the political organisation of 
associations. I never witnessed any coercion. Leaders seemed to lead more through 
inspiration, a bit of persuasion, and by means of administration. This raises two 
separate issues. In order to inspire, leaders need to have time on their hands. The 
most successful associations (in terms of simply carrying out projects) were those 
whose leaders had time. For example, Mohamed Brik of Arghoub Association was 
retired and relatively well off. This meant he could spend time researching and 
going to conferences, and then disseminating the information to the other members 
of the group. He told me there was no way he could have done all this if he was still 
employed. One farmer joked to me that the authoritarian method would have been 
useful in coordinating fellow farmers during a visit to an international conference in 
Italy. 
 
Difference of vision, regarding different groups who focus on the same problems, is 
also an issue. For example, local infrastructure is dealt with by the cashƯra, by the 
djemcaat al hei (neighbourhood groups), and by the local council. Farmer 
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associations are able to put some pressure on the council, by making demands 
through their leaders. Although this highlights again the role of leaders, it does 
reveal some confusion about responsibility for certain issues. The hierarchical mode 
of the cashƯra, themselves lead by an elite of the wealthiest individuals, is slowly 
being challenged by more inclusive methods of governing. 
 
The idea of vision and organising toward a common goal may be contested, for 
some diversity of vision may be more useful in terms of multiple conversations 
regarding decision-making. Unity of vision may imply a totalitarian normativity, as 
I argued in reference to hegemony. Arguably, a wider number of viewpoints are 
EHLQJOLVWHQHGWRWKDQEHIRUHLQWKH0·]DEWKH cazzƗba, the rich, and the patriarchs 
no longer dominate discourse as strongly as before, although the voices of women 
outside of their gender are still relatively silent. This diversity contributes to 
innovation in terms of agricultural practice and social organisation. On the other 
KDQGRIFRXUVHXWWHUGLVXQLW\RIYLVLRQLVDOVRXQKHOSIXODVLQWKHFDVHRIWKH0·]DE
coordination is needed for the maintenance of irrigation systems, and other forms of 
mutual assistance. I conclude that leadership is crucial WRRUJDQLVDWLRQLQWKH0·]DE 
 
2. Knowledge networks 
Knowledge networks are clearly prevalent in Beni Isguen, and local people are 
highly connected with international organisations involved in issues of 
environment and livelihoods. Locally based RADDO facilitates networks that 
encourage the transmission of scientific knowledge across the Maghreb, as well as 
local knowledge between oasis communities. These networks enabled me as a 
researcher to communicate with other oasis farmers. This highlights, however, the 
issue of scale. Mozabite physical, architectural structures are famous for their 
   
 
330 
¶KXPDQ-VFDOHG·GLPHQVLRQV)XUWKHUDV,KDYHQRWHGHOVHZKHUHVHYHUDOWLPHVORFDO
people stated that local institutions are far more appropriate for dealing with local 
problems and ecologies, in reference to development, judicial verdicts, and political 
decision-PDNLQJ 7KH DVVRFLDWLRQV DQG 1*2V DFWLYH ZLWKLQ WKH 0·]DE FRPH LQ
many shapes and sizes. When it comes to managing an oasis, organisations should 
be neither too large nor too small. Further, oases vary enormously in size. Larger-
scaled organisations are able to connect groups across space, but tend to lose the 
fine-scaled resolution regarding local knowledge of the area and have been shown 
to be lacking in terms of practical outcomes. Organisations that are too small would 
not be representative of the entire oasis population and may create discordance 
about proper governance. Conceivably, smaller groups could combine with larger 
groups, of course. Essentially, larger-scaled organisations may assist with 
generating ideas about general oasis components (soil, economy and so forth), yet 
decision-making and the realisability of goals is more feasible at the local level. 
Further, governance in terms of ensuring that individuals follow local rules is 
arguably much more achievable at the local level, something I will return to later. 
 
Ideas about the proper role for local and scientific knowledge are varied in the 
0·]DE 6RPH KLJKOLJKWHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH WUDGLWLRQDO NQRwledge of older 
farmers, while others stated that modern knowledge will simply replace the old. 
Local knowledge involves details such as precisely what time of day to cut a date 
branch (in the morning it is most supple), and how to prune a date bunch so as to 
ensure the health of the tree while encouraging optimal growth of dates 
(maximising yields can cause the branch to break and harm the tree).  
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Similarly, disagreements occurred over modern and traditional irrigation methods. 
These could have reflected modern ideas regarding intensive production as opposed 
to stabilising strategies, however. For example, traditional seguia irrigation reaches 
a wider stretch of land and may be less efficient in terms of water conservation, but 
it encourages deeper and wider root growth of plants, making them more 
structurally stable in the face of bad weather, and able to draw on deeper nutrients. 
Others claimed that they could reproduce the seguia benefits with a drip system. 
<HW DJDLQ VRPH DUJXHG WKDW ¶WUDGLWLRQ· DQG ¶PRGHUQLW\· HDFK KDG VHSDUDWH
complementary roles to play, with science providing the means, and tradition 
providing the policy, or direction.  
 
3. Institutions nested across scales 
Fabricius et al. posit that adaptive management is enhanced when governance is 
linked across scales, e.g. involving individual, community, municipality and central 
government (Ibid: 9). This focus is similar to the previous criterion, except that the 
authors here neglect the role of power and conflict between local communities and 
the state. Citing Dietz et al. (2003) WKH\ QRWH ´DQ DGYDQWDJH WR LQVWLWXWLRQDO
GLYHUVLW\LVWKDWLWSURPRWHVDOLJQPHQWRIUXOHVDQGSROLFLHVDWGLIIHUHQWVFDOHVµIbid: 
9). A central finding from Beni Isguen is that incorporating the local into the state 
legal system has resulted in a disempowerment of local governance institutions and 
their capacity to manage their natural resources, benefitting only a proportion of 
0R]DELWH VRFLHW\ )DEULFLXV HW DO GR UHFRJQLVH KRZHYHU WKDW ´SRZHUIXO
stakeholders might use information and resources from cross-scale interactions to 
XQGHUPLQHWUXVWDQGUHLQIRUFHWKHLURZQDXWKRULW\µIbid: 9). 
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7KH DXWKRUV FODLP WKDW ´LQVWLWXWLRQDO QHWZRUNV FDQ DOVR VWUHQJWKHQ WKH SRZHU RI
communities to avert external policy and econoPLF WKUHDWV IURP ORFDO WR JOREDOµ
citing that such networking can support communities to counter large 
multinational corporations, such as mining companies. Yet, while acknowledging 
that government inefficiency can harm cross-scaled governance, they suggest that 
´EULGJLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQV ZKLFK EULGJH WKH GLYLGH EHWZHHQ FRPPXQLWLHV DQG RWKHU
levels of government, are often vital in ensuring that governance capacity is 
GHYHORSHG RU PDLQWDLQHGµ 7KLV YLHZ VXJJHVWV WKDW KDUPRQ\ FDQ H[LVW EHWZHHQ
levels of governance from local to central. I offer a contrasting view, that 
JRYHUQDQFH RFFXUV ODUJHO\ LQ VSLWH RI WKH VWDWH LQ WKH 0·]DE &HQWUDOLVHG
government has in fact decreased the local ability to manage their resources, as the 
state owns a monopoly on the use of force and sanctions and is recognised as such. 
 
Rather, international networking has helped the Mozabite community to bypass the 
restrictions of the state, by gaining support from internal organisations. Support 
has come in different forms. For example, tKH ¶%LRGLYHUVLW\ ([FKDQJH DQG
'LVVHPLQDWLRQ RI ([SHULHQFH· %('( 1*2 LQ 0RQWSHOOLHU FRQQHFWHG 0R]DELWH
farmers (through the Tazdait association) with the Petzel climbing-harness 
company, who have provided innovative designs for safety harnesses for palm 
climbers. Support also comes in terms of access to scientific knowledge, and 
funding. Central government also tends to prefer to deal with groups, even while 
banning the political activity of such associations (see chapter eight). However, 
individuals also make networks and bring wider knowledge to the area through 
HGXFDWLRQ DQG , PHW VHYHUDO LQGLYLGXDOV ZKRKDG XQGHUWDNHQ PDVWHU·V GHJUHHV LQ
France and applied the knowledge locally in the oasis. 
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Therefore, although this point by Fabricius et al. is partially nuanced, it does not go 
far enough in clarifying the potential problems of linking with institutions that are 
(mostly) not beneficial to them. Anthropological studies have shown that today no 
SRSXODWLRQVUHPDLQLVRODWHGIURP¶PRGHUQ·GHYHORSPHQW:ROI1982). What is most 
important, I argue, in terms of successful governance of local resources is local 
empowerment, and how larger scaled institutions support or detract from this. Yet, 
as a fine-grained study such as this reveals, local communities are certainly not 
homogenous, making governance a site of contestation (Fabinyi et al. 2014).  
 
4. Embedded cultural management practices 
Here Fabricius et al. discuss how supernatural sanctions, taboos, and social 
institutions may be seen as part of adaptive management. My study has focused on 
culturally-embedded management systems and thus agrees with this point. For 
example, local practices exist such as the sharing of water during times of drought. 
Legally speaking, mulk, or private property regarding water must be relaxed so that 
those without water in their wells can receive water from those who have. Further, 
until recently, the O·RXPQD water guards received their authority to fine for 
infractions directly from the mosque. The mosque still retains a degree of moral 
authority, thus an individual may ask the mosque to put out a call for twiza, such as 
to restore a broken wall. Order is still largely maintained through local hierarchical 
institutions such as the family, the cashƯra and the cazzƗba, but as I have already 
argued, this authority is waning in the eyes of younger generations, who look to 
WKH ¶KLJKHU· DXWKRULW\ RI WKH VWDWH LQVWHDG %H\RQG WKLV KRZHYHU QRUPDWLYH
SUHVVXUHVUHPDLQYHU\VWURQJLQWKH0·]DEYDOOH\HVSHFially in Beni Isguen which is 
still considered to be very conservative, even by local standards.  
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5. Beneficial policies (e.g. clear land rights, inclusive participation in governing) 
The authors are quite general in defining beneficial policies as those which may 
assist in the successful management of local natural resources. The Algerian state 
has provided land concessions, loans and training to farmers, along with limited 
subsidies in areas such as dairy production. Yet beside access to tenured land (most 
of which is located in very unproductive areas), most farmers that I spoke to stated 
that government policy did not go far enough. Many agricultural development 
plans have proved to be unsuccessful, and even detrimental to local areas, for 
example, in Oued Souf, attempts to enhance aquifer storage resulted in the flooding 
and killing of thousands of date palms. Locally, development has caused the cost of 
living to rise substantially, transforming local livelihoods previously predicated on 
a gift economy (see chapter six). Some farmers confided to me that many 
government policies related to freedom of associations are extremely problematic, 
involving bureaucracy which not only restrained political activity, but prevented 
beneficial local development, causing individuals to give up associative participation 
entirely. 
 
6. Motivation 
Here, the authors discuss the importance of common vision and interest of 
stakeholders in natural resource management. I agree that this is a key factor. I 
have described how need raises the stakes, in terms of individual will to survive 
environmental and social disorder (chapter five). Stated more clearly, farmers who 
do not have a safety net, in terms of another job, additional financial resources and 
so on, tended to be more innovative in finding solutions to problems, in that they 
FRXOGQRW ¶DIIRUG·WRIDLO7KLVFKDOOHQJHVWRVRPHGHJUHHWKHRU\UHJDUGLQJ¶VRFLDO
SURWHFWLRQ·UHJDUGLQJWKHUROHRIGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRILQVXUDQFHLQWKHFRQWH[WRIULVN
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management (e.g. Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux 2007). Others who had alternative 
revenue streams could afford for their crops to fail and indeed I witnessed this. Need 
further defined the level of interest among diverse groups, which included 
bourgeois and peasant farmers, homeowners, hotel owners, and labourers. Further, 
beyond trust, need was described to me as a key factor in the cooperation of 
different interest groups, and the lack of this factor explained the breakdown in 
social relations, for as certain individuals have become more wealthy, their 
perceived reliance on others has decreased (as discussed in chapter 6). This 
discussion of innovation and need does not rule out other forms of social insurance. 
For example, many poorer families benefit from interest-free loans in order to start 
businesses or buy homes (although many that I met also preferred to build up 
capital alone, asserting their independence from the favours involved in such 
transactions), and one palm expert I knew was aided for two years after falling from 
a tree. Yet, these instances are very different from direct, personal access to 
alternative revenue, for loans involve all sorts of social ties of obligation and 
honour. 
 
This finding that wealth has contributed to a breakdown in social relations, could 
suggest the opposite, that poverty causes people to help each other, inferring that 
wealth production increases individual resilience at the cost of group resilience. 
This is clearly not a hard and fast rule, however, as poverty has in some cases 
severely reduced cooperation during hard times, such as in South Africa (Cundill et 
al. 2005). 
 
In summary, based on my fieldwork data, my assessment reveals that three of the 
six indicators given by Fabricius et al. are present: leadership, knowledge networks, 
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and embedded cultural management practices (see table 9.1). The others are partial 
or lacking. The factors that are lacking involve problems of relations with the state 
(3 & 5), and unequal dependency on the oasis as a primary source of livelihood (6). 
Such a naïve focus on questions of scale is common in the resilience literature, and 
could benefit from better incorporation of political economic theory. Finally, the 
Fabricius et al. emphasise long-term strategies, whereas Mozabite adaptation might 
be more faithfully classified as tactical, due to chaotic occurrence of floods. In other 
words, adaptive management styled experiments would not result in increased 
understanding of this climatic system due to lack of predictable patterns (see 
appendix III for an analysis of Beni Isguen oasis as a complex adaptive system). I 
conclude that this comparison largely agrees with my previous statements, that 
certain institutions and practices in Beni Isguen are comparable to adaptive 
management, with some notable qualifications. Following this assessment, it is thus 
important to clarify how in practice Mozabites actually do manage this complex, 
G\QDPLFDQGXQSUHGLFWDEOH¶V\VWHP· 
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7DEOH3UHVHQFHRUDEVHQFHRI LQGLFDWRUVRIDGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQWLQWKH0·]DE
community, based on Fabricius et al. (2007). 
Indicator Presence or absence? Comments 
1. Leadership and vision Yes Observations of leaders as key 
to organising associational 
activities 
2. Knowledge networks Yes A problem is that locally 
adapted knowledge may be 
subsumed by non-specific 
scientific agricultural 
knowledge 
3. Institutions nested 
across scales 
No Central power is an obstacle 
to local management capacity 
4. Embedded cultural 
management practices 
Yes Culturally embedded 
institutions are present 
5. Beneficial policies No  Similar to 3, beneficial policies 
are seriously lacking 
6. Motivation Some Motivation is mixed, 
depending on whether 
farmers or landowners have 
alternative revenue streams 
 
 
9.3.1 How do Mozabites manage their oasis? 
 
If adaptive management is not sufficient to conceptualise how Mozabites manage 
oasis resources, many of which have unpredictable dynamic qualities, then how can 
we better assess and convey the way they do manage? This study has shown that 
management is constituted by a combination of different organisations, including 
civil society, farmers, NGOs, the state and the mosque, involving varying power 
relations. Some aspects are carried out according to market-based practice along 
individualist lines; some are group oriented (especially regarding knowledge 
provided by NGOs and government research facilities). Behavioural norms are 
guided by historical precedence, religious ideology and ecological constraints. The 
mosque purportedly retains moral, if not juridical influence. The state provides 
limited assistance (such as wells) while arguably hindering economic development, 
and ultimately underpins law and order through the threat of force (punishment).  
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But how do they manage risk?  The main ecological problems are drought and 
floods, potentially exacerbated by climate change in the future. State wells (into 
deep aquifers) have provided an alternative water source to help buffer against 
drought when the artisanal aquifer runs low. Yet, collective well associations are 
fraught with problems, as I have discussed. Extra wealth does provide a buffer, but 
for long-term stability wealth needs to be reinvested in agricultural resources (such 
as extra wells or drip irrigation), guided by suitably appropriate knowledge. Some 
redistribution of wealth does occur, through other resources, e.g. free drinking 
water for all via the mosque from privately drilled water sources. Loans can provide 
temporary support following short-term loss of livelihood, such as an accident (e.g., 
falling from palm trees), or floods (which swamp crops for 1-2 months). Floods are 
not well managed at present, probably as no large inundations have hit the area for 
over a decade (in Beni Isguen). The state has retrospectively taken action to 
reinforce river walls and create risk zones, and the community at large has been 
rethinking the role of O·RXPQDafter the 2008 disaster. /·RXPQD·V ability to govern 
flood management is weakened by its incapacity to fine, however. Yet, other means 
beyond punishment are being discussed locally, such as education concerning the 
benefits of flood irrigation, the creation of incentives and more.  
 
This study has especially looked at social changes linked to ecology, and how this is 
dealt with. Roberts (pers. comm.) has suggested that the traditional djemcaa (like the 
cazzƗba) was sufficient in dealing with routine governance, but when it comes to 
radical social change and empowerment, associative movements are more 
appropriate, and it appears that civil society is indeed in the process of 
experimenting with new forms of more inclusive government. I showed how what I 
   
 
339 
refer to as micro-social movements have been developing alongside more 
customary organisations. I proposed that these movements have emerged to replace 
the loss of the diminishing traditional governing structures, but also to deal with 
new problems, such as how to enter international labour markets, learn new 
languages, or how to integrate new agricultural knowledge. Some friction between 
the new and older organisations does occur, regarding who has primacy for dealing 
with issues. While the older structures remain in decidedly hierarchical form, the 
new movements are inclusive, and with the decline of authority, people appear to be 
attracted to this egalitarian form. Thus, rather than collapsing into a form of 
anomie, local people are decidedly re-organising, for which Mozabites are famous, 
along different lines. As they experiment with these new forms of governance, 
based on voluntarism and agreement, certain issues emerge, such as how to deal 
with dissent and conflict. Rather than appealing to the state to legitimate the use of 
force to punish offenders (except in inheritance and serious cases or course), ideas 
are being formulated for how to non-violently persuade non-conformists, through 
didactic education, direct persuasion by respected individuals, and social exclusion 
DQGUHPRYDORIVRFLDOEHQHILWVWKHORFDO¶VRFLDOFRQWUDFW·DQLQIRUPDOYHUVLRQRIWKH
institution of tebria). 
 
9.4 Discussion: Self-regulating systems? 
All of this leads to a discussion of the so-called self-UHJXODWLQJFDSDFLW\RI¶V\VWHPV·
which are central to ideas of resilience. First I frame the discussion before returning 
WRKRZWKHFRQFHSWFRPSDUHV LQ WKH0·]DE:KHUHGRHV WKH ¶UHJXODWLRQ·DVSHFWRI
self-regulating systems come from? Self-regulating systems have their corollary in 
processual political theory of the 1970s (see Comaroff & Roberts 1986: 11) as 
opposed to rule centred discourse apparent in legal anthropology (e.g. Moore 2000: 
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178). Paralleling these two approaches, Durkheim considered moral rules to exist 
outside of the SHUVRQ ZKHUHDV IRU )RXFDXOW PRUDOLW\ LV UDWKHU ´WKH PDQQHU LQ
which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the 
SUHVFULSWLYHHOHPHQWVWKDWPDNHXSWKHFRGHµ(1990 [1984]: 25²26, in Fassin 2014: 
7). Furthermore, the balanced-opposition of segmentary theory of Evans-Prichard 
and Gellner falls into the self-UHJXODWLRQ FDPS DQG VR GRHV %RXUGLHX·V WKHRU\ RI
practice which rejects deterministic rule-based behaviour in favour of 
improvisational interaction guided by codes of honour (e.g. Bourdieu 1977: 11). By 
contrast, based on his fieldwork in Kabylia, Roberts (Roberts 2014: 20) rejects 
acephalous process descriptions of Maghrebian society, whose authors have not 
understood, he asserts, the importance of the djemcaa (similar to the cazzƗba) in 
Berber (and also Arab) government. Scheele (Scheele 2014) also argues that 
Bourdieu ignores the presence of law as an aspect that defines identity and norms in 
Kabylia. I found leadership to be central to organisational ability, although this 
raises questions of legitimacy, as I explore below. 
 
Much recent literature in the social sciences has focused on notion of self-
regulating (or self-organising) systems as a new form of governance, with many 
examples based on modern social movements such as Occupy (Chesters 2003; Urry 
2005; Chesters & Welsh 2006; Juris & Razsa 2012). Some of these contributions, 
however, are limited by their singular focus on theory, and lack of practical 
examples (e.g. Sawyer 2005). Jessop (2003) claims self-organising systems to 
constitute a new form of governance, contrasting it to top-down and market-based 
forms, yet his technical discussion also lacks any case studies. Purkis (2001), by 
contrast, provides an ethnographic description of issues of power experienced by 
the anarchist movement Earth First! Following Bakunin, Purkis suggests that 
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group members while attempting to avoid authoritarian structures, lacked a 
necessary distinction between authoritative and authoritarian. He goes on to 
comment, paraphrasing Coover et al.   ´WKLV LV QRW XQXVXDO LQ UDGical 
JURXSVDQGWKHUHLVDQHHGWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQ¶OHDGHUVKLS·DVDFRPSRVLWHRIOHDUQDEOH
skills, a set of functions rather than as a personal trait or the exercising of power 
SHUVHµ(Purkis 2001: 170).  
 
Anarchists are interesting in their view on power, and 3XUNLV· among others 
describe the incredibly long discussions that are then necessary to achieve 
consensus through debate and compromise. Indeed, Purkis further shows that 
power cannot be ignored by such groups, for certain people tend to dominate over 
others, for reasons such as charisma, experience or access to social and material 
resources. Such groups may be aware of and thus attempt to prevent such 
accumulation of power through certain means. Indeed, anthropologists have 
GHVFULEHG KRZ DFHSKDORXV VRFLHWLHV UDWKHU WKDQ UHIOHFWLQJ D ORZHU ¶HYROXWLRQDU\·
position, have rather developed ways to check power (Gledhill 2000: 13), such as 
through chiding or group fission.  
 
Returning to resilience theory, it has been suggested that Holling·s development of 
the self-UHJXODWLQJ DGDSWLYH F\FOH ZDV LQVSLUHG E\ 9RQ +D\HN·V IUHH-market 
economics (Walker & Cooper 2011). Jessop (2003), however, provides an 
interesting distinction between the blind emergence of equilibrium through market 
competition, and the reflexive organisation of individuals. This reflexivity 
distinguishes the difference between ¶HPHUJHQFH·RIRUJDQLVDWLRQof ecological and 
social systems. It also thus highlights the socio-political dimension of negotiation 
and regulation.  I have further argued that scale must be considered as to whether 
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organisations require separate, authorised groups to regulate them. This was on the 
evidence of water users based on irrigation management, backed up by other 
instances in the literature (e.g. Geertz 1972; Lansing 1989; Mabry 1996). I contend 
that while smaller groups may be able to spontaneously self-regulate, larger groups 
require intervention.  
 
In line with the view of shifting authoritarian to more inclusive governance as 
presented in this thesis (see introduction), a distinction between leaders and 
authority must be suggested. Who gives leaders their authority? In the case of 
O·RXPQD, it was the mosque, followed by the ayyen, yet arguably it was the 
population also. This should be clear from the accounts given by those who 
GHVFULEHGWKHPDVFRUUXSWDVRSSRVHGWR¶IDLWKIXO·DVWRZKLFKWKHZRUGamƯn ² the 
root of O·RXPQD - refers), and thus began to ignore their authority. In voluntary 
associations then, similar qualities such as reliability, charisma, knowledge and 
morality may be seen in their leaders. Thus the ability of these leaders to govern is 
based on principles of attraction rather than coercion. Potentially, it is also due to 
their small size, where all are known to each other and therefore more accountable. 
I have discussed scale and social visibility elsewhere (chapter five). On a normative 
note, I am not prescribing small communities as ideal units of governance, for 
locals have described to me the suffocating dimension of accountability, with some 
indeed preferring the freedom invisibility inherent to cities. As I have argued, 
rather than the small scale, it is the networks that small groups have forged with 
other organisations, nationally and internationally, that has assisted with local 
governance, in terms of increasing knowledge, or in terms of resisting political 
hegemony. As I have also shown, these types of linkages can be drawbacks for the 
entire community, depending on the group using them. For instance, I showed how 
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the secular elite affiliated itself with the state in order to bypass local authority, 
with negative consequences IRU WKH RDVLV ¶DEDQGRQHG· ODQG 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG
micro-movements have contested the hegemony of the state through the creation of 
networks with international organisations. 
 
Resilience theory assumes that the self-organisation potential of all social systems 
operates in an egalitarian context. This is arguably due to a limited, functional view 
of management in small communities as being consensus based (e.g. Ostrom 1990; 
Berkes 2005). By highlighting issues of power, inequality and scale, I have 
problematized this view. Yet, instead of dismissing resilience theory wholesale, I 
have proposed an alternative social theory that is more compatible to its 
sophisticated ecological theory, thus providing the opportunity to further develop 
resilience theory as a whole.  
 
9.5 Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter I drew together the three central strands of this 
thesis ² labour, land and power ² into a brief historical meta-analysis organised 
around the themes of identity, economy and politics in Beni Isguen oasis. I then 
clarified my position in reference to other theorists who have written about the 
0·]DE HVSHFLDOO\ UHJDUGLQJ FKDQJH DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW FDWDO\VLQJ
event was based on timing of the ideological and pragmatic realignment of the 
0·]ab with the independent Algerian nation-state. I theorised how the elite class 
manipulated the central ideological positionality of Mozabite dissociation in order to 
subvert local control. By using an historical analysis I differ from functionalist, 
synchronic perspectives of Mozabite negotiation with socio-political and ecological 
change. 
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The second section involved a comparative analysis of the event and systems 
approaches. I discussed resilience theory as defined by the notion of emergence as 
the complex, unpredictable interaction between social and ecological elements. 
Alternatively, event analysis claims that historical causal factors can be unpicked by 
a focus on concrete events, through a process of elimination. While it may be 
impossible to unravel certain histories due to a lack of available data, I showed 
through this study that it is possible to identify causes and form contextual 
histories of management issues. 
 
In the third section I returned to the main thesis question: Do farmers in Beni 
Isguen use adaptive management? I argued that certain key principles, practices 
and institutions bear strong similarity to definitions of adaptive management, but 
with key qualifications. I discussed that rather than being a limitation, the 
consultative element of the adaptive management procedure should embrace a 
broader view of how to achieve consensus through a more nuanced view of 
contestation and power. Practically speaking, different social norms of group 
communication and listening for different communities, and practitioners must be 
sensitive to local sensibilities. Following this I contrasted my ethnographic data to 
the six indicators of adaptive management given by Fabricius et al. (2007). This 
corroborated my view that an appreciation of political economy is lacking in 
resilience theory. I continued with a discussion of how management actually takes 
place in Beni Isguen through a patchwork manner with hybrid economic and 
political forms, by which I mean that there is no consensual management overview, 
despite some attempts to do so.  
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I finished with a discussion of self-regulating systems, to which the title of this 
thesis relates: authority, anarchy and equity (following Sahlins 2008). After 
presenting certain theoretical problems in the literature such as relating to social 
movements, I presented an analysis of the organising role of authority, with a 
discussion of where the power of leaders and authority comes from. Analyses of the 
sources of political power tend to point to its dispersed, disaggregated nature, 
highlighting the cracks and fissures at which resistance can be aimed. Nilsen (2015) 
argues that such horizontal Foucauldian conceptions deny the actual degree of 
power that the elite hold, which prevents subordinated groups from rising up and 
effecting political change, otherwise it would happen all the time. In this thesis I 
described how Mozabite farmer associations have been able to exploit certain 
cracks, such as the opening of civil society to create a degree of political pressure on 
the Algerian state, with some positive results. Furthermore, they have strategically 
enhanced their position by networking with international NGOs. In general, 
Mozabites have been looking at ways to achieve minimal community solidarity 
through creative, non-coercive methods. These means of organisation speak to 
questions that other alternative social movements across the globe are asking, 
regarding the role of authority. It would be naïve to attempt to address 
contemporary organisation in politics without discussing how power should be 
navigated, and I hope that the discussion given here may add to that conversation. 
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10. Conclusions: Politics of  the 
palm 
 
/LIHZLWKLQWKHDULG0·]DEYDOOH\RDVHVKDVHQWDLOHGDVXSUHPHFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWWR
produce and maintain the abundant verdure watered by sparkling flows of pumped 
water, framed by aesthetically pleasing soft lines of hand sculpted walls and 
doorways, all of which engender a sense of quiet and reflection, especially within 
the cooler spaces under the palms and earthen roofs. This contrasts with the bustle 
of the towns, especially at market time, and even more so with the barren rocky 
landscape outside the valley. Desert aesthetics appear to be characterised by 
frugality, based on the minimum of physical objects needed for life, whether in the 
home or outdoors. Such austerity appears to suit the lifestyle chosen by Mozabites, 
who in some ways resemble a monastic order. Yet for those born into this society, 
increasing exposure to the alternatives presented through the global media, 
education and travel throws their own lives into sharp relief, and through this 
FRQWUDVW WKH ¶ULJKWQHVV· RI WKH FKRVHQ 0R]DELWH OLIHZD\ LV QRZ TXHVWLRQHG 7KH
KLJKHUWUXWKRI,VODPLVQRWLQGRXEWKHUHEXWWKH¶FRUUHFW·ZD\RIEHLQJD0XVOLm is 
increasingly open to interpretation.  
 
During my time in Beni Isguen, I experienced and engaged in conversation and 
debate on proper forms of conduct within local social relations, usually didactically 
in response to perceived misconduct of unacceptable behaviour. This reflection 
might be directed, for example, at guiding the youth toward more moderate, 
VRFLDOO\ DFFHSWDEOH GLVSRVLWLRQV VXFK DV LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH ¶XQUXO\· EHKDYLRXU
observed during the success of Algerian squad in the 2014 football world cup), at 
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perceived corruption by local officials, or at individualistic behaviour that 
marginalises the interests of the wider community. Such behaviours were often 
explained as due to external influences arising from the West which encouraged 
moral perversion. Some Mozabites blamed all ills on the opening up of their 
community to wider society, while conversely others encouraged the active 
engagement with outside values to achieve a more morally consistent form of 
Islamic identity based on intelligent reflection rather than blind faith. 
 
7KHVHW\SHVRITXHVWLRQVHQFRXUDJHDGLIIHUHQWYLHZRI¶DXWKHQWLFLW\.·Identity here 
is EDVHG RQ FKDQJH DQG LQQHU UHIOHFWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQ RQ ¶WUDGLWLRQ· (see also 
Theodossopoulos 2013). Such reflexivity may be said to entail a sort of indigenous 
anthropology (Sahlins 2015), whereby local order and praxis is compared to that of 
other societies around the world. Historically, social order was maintained through 
largely authoritarian modes of control, with hierarchies of power based on 
theocracy, gerontocracy, patriarchy, plutocracy and ethnic identity. These were 
exercised through the institutions of the mosque over the populace, elder males 
over their families, and the wealthy over the poorer classes and white over black 
Mozabites and non-Ibadites. This contrasted with an ethic that historically 
promoted radical egalitarianism (see chapter four), although arguably the only real 
equity was found among male household heads (Dominguez & Benessaiah 2015). 
While a reading of contemporary local politics limited to the local scale might 
suggest a decline and transition from authoritarian to more democratic structures, 
a wider sociological analysis offers a view whereby local hierarchies of power are 
being replaced by national ones. Such a relationship, based on modern bureaucracy 
DQGVRFLDOGLVWDQFHDVFRPSDUHGWRWKHLQWLPDF\RI¶YLOODJH·SROLWLFV, arguably gives 
more impetus for local resistance. This has been especially evident in local attitudes 
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of mistrust toward the state in recent riots, during which the police were seen as 
prejudiced against the Mozabites, favouring local Arabs. Conversely, when new 
institutions are expressed in a familiar manner they are locally accepted (as I 
showed in chapter eight), as with voluntary associations, through which political 
expression is channelled along forms acceptable and manageable by the state 
(Gledhill 2000: 18). 
 
I have argued, however, that voluntary associations, which I frame as micro social 
movements, may be viewed as local sites whereby power is contested. By using 
*UDPVFL·VQRWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\,KDYHDLPHGWRUHDVVHVVKRZ0R]DELWHIDUPHUDQG
student movements have been challenging contemporary local power structures 
not just through ideological contestation (as Gramscian analysis is often limited in 
anthropology ² see Crehan 2002: 172), but through the praxis of regional and 
international networking and alliance building with NGOs to provide support 
through means of knowledge and financial resources. Thus social movements such 
as farmer associations are an important source of governance in terms of 
generating necessary social change rather than suppressing it.  
 
&RQIOLFWDQGOHJDOSOXUDOLVPLQWKH0·]DE 
The overall purpose of this thesis was to analyse if and how local people have been 
able to engage and manage social change in relation to the management of natural 
UHVRXUFHV,QWKH0·]DEOLIHLVWLJKWO\ERXQGWRHFRORJLFDOSURFHVVHVWKXVUHTXLULQJ
the participation of society in the upkeep of oasis and town, as opposed to modern 
cities in which responsibility is usually delegated to the state through local councils 
in return for tax payment. I have explored the differences between local and 
national social contracts (chapter seven), by plotting alternative strategies whereby 
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certain groups (the merchant class embodied by the ayyen LQ WKH 0·]DE KDYH
utilized state resources and power in order to bypass local authority. Thus I 
GHVFULEHGKRZWKHSUHVHQFHRIPXOWLSOHEXWXQHTXDOV\VWHPVRI¶ODZ·HQDEOHGIRUXP
shopping by individuals to search for the most advantageous outcome. Such 
wrangling was typical of inheritance disputes over land succession in the oasis. The 
subjection of Algerians to civil law by the colonial French completely overhauled 
and further complexified the historical judicial integration of Islamic and customary 
laws. I explained that despite a general mistrust of state law as a colonial 
imposition, some were utilising the judicial system to maximise personal gain. This 
recent practice has been enhanced by an atomisation of the extended household, and 
perhaps the newly autonomous sons and daughters-in-law have had a hand in 
influencing the demand for individual shares. I described that in the past land was 
managed by the family patriarch, who held the family and its resources together by 
means of his authority. I further described how locals are blaming such anomie on 
processes of globalisation that have eroded local standards based on duty and 
service to the community. Based on this discussion I suggested a new formulation 
RI WKH ¶VRFLDO FRQWUDFW· WKXV H[SDQGLQJ 9RQ %HQGD-%HFNPDQQ·V  FRQFHSW RI
¶forum-shopping·. Furthermore, following Fuller (1994), I pointed to a more useful 
analysis of legal pluralism as involving competing (and unequal) ideological 
systems. 
 
10.2 Social movements and voluntary politics 
Moving on from this discussion of private property and associated norms and 
values, I continued with a corresponding analysis of the management of 
communal/private property, especially water. Access to flowing water is central to 
the maintenance of life in the desert. Oases typically access water by means of 
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springs, rivers or wells to underground aquifers, the latter being the form utilised 
LQ WKH0·]DE8QGHUJURXQGDTXLIHUVDUH UHSOHQLVKHGE\XQSUHGLFWDEOH IODVK IORRGV
which in themselves can be violent, requiring proper management in order to 
diminish their force through social and technical measures. A group named O·RXPQD
customarily organised the irrigation canals, fining people who blocked the flow of 
water. State development has involved the drilling of deep wells in order to 
supplement artisanal wells, aiming to safeguard against recurrent drought. This 
resulted in a different social formation around communal wells. I argued in chapter 
eight that the latter organisations differ significantly from the former in that they 
are based on voluntary as opposed to hierarchical principles. Such a move to 
egalitarian structures reflects the change in local political preferences, yet these 
formations have often entailed stagnation when communal agreements are broken. 
I went on to suggest that some form of minimally authorised leadership appears 
necessary to guide such groups through such disputes and for general decision-
making. Referring to the literature on irrigation, I argued that while small groups 
may be able to self-organise, larger groups appear to require regulation by separate 
officials. Uphoff·V (1986: 81) comparative study confirms this. Scale, therefore, is 
clearly a key consideration to political organisation.  
 
Yet, experiments are also occurring in non-coercive governance. Some local 
students have been looking at other ways to achieve group consent and the 
cooperation necessary for communal irrigation management. It appeared that the 
recent 2008 flood was an important factor in galvanising such consent through 
understanding that despite the illusion of insurance created by wealth, Mozabites 
are not immune from the destructive force of the floods. Through appeals to 
different interests, whether religious, financial or ecological, students and others 
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are attempting to reassert more broadly, community values against the current 
ideological hegemony centred on individual property and rights.  
 
10.3 Migrants and the moral economy 
/RFDOGHEDWHRQ ¶SURSHU·VRFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGWKHPHDQLQJof community could 
also be seen regarding labour relations. The relationship of Mozabites to the quite 
recent social category of labour migrants from the Sahel also revealed local 
prejudices. Despite the religious policy of dissociation, Mozabites were increasingly 
forced to interact with other social groups who have DUULYHG LQ WKH 0·]DE IRU
various reasons. Labour migrants, mostly young Malians, were minimally tolerated 
for they were needed to perform menial labour that Mozabites increasingly 
preferred not to do. I proposed that the Malians· arrival in the early 1980s filled a 
gap left since the abolition of slavery in 1848. (The latter took many decades to be 
realised in practice, partly due to the French reluctance to interfere with certain 
economically beneficial relationships.) The lull in agriculture occurred in Beni 
Isguen during which time agriculture was largely family run, based on a moral 
economy of mutual aid (twiza) combined with sharecropping arrangements on land 
owned by wealthy merchants. I described how postcolonial state development, as 
mentioned above, caused living costs to rise, largely putting an end to twiza 
UHODWLRQVKLSV7KLV,DUJXHGFDXVHGDVKLIWLQORFDOUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKLQWKH0·]DE
as people increasingly paid for services for which in the past they relied on 
reciprocal aid. These market-based relationships further encouraged a hierarchy 
among peers that was not experienced with twiza exchanges. Thus the market 
economy did cause a certain experience of anomie. I argued, however, that local 
experience of market relations does not equate to the conventional impression of 
global market domination, rather economic practices continue to be mixed, 
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depending on local purposes, whether to raise cash or to engage in family oriented 
practice. Furthermore, I discussed local conceptual barriers to the wholesale 
adoption of market-based practice and ideology.  
 
10.4 Addressing power, agency and inequality in systems theory and 
beyond  
Systems theory purports to be superior to other forms of analysis in 
conceptualising complex human-environment interactions (Duit et al. 2010). A 
common criticism of resilience theory is that, by turn, it is lacking in social theory 
(Hornborg 2013; Hatt 2013; Fabinyi et al. 2014). My assessment is that this is 
indeed the case, due to a framing of social adaptation as being contingent on 
consensus. Throughout this thesis I have referred to social conflict, inequality and 
contestation as a more accurate framing of how power relations are actually 
negotiated in everyday life. Arriving at this social analysis was made possible 
through the use of event analysis, which enabled me to look at historical conditions 
within which people make decisions relating to oasis management. In chapter five, I 
suggested a way for resilience and adaptive management to incorporate power and 
FRQIOLFWLQVSLUHGE\*UDPVFL·VKHJHPRQ\,QWKDWFKDSWHU,IXUWKHUSUREOHPDWL]HG
the primacy of adaptation in explaining social institutions and strategies in the 
oasis, by showing that cultural preferences play a strong role, as well as other 
factors such as the market.  
 
I began the thesis by discussing whether the social and ecological realms may be 
theorised as a totality, or if due to fundamental differences they should be 
considered apart. Actor Network Theory (ANT) based studies (e.g. Latour 2005) 
including recent anthropological approaches to infrastructure attempt to visualise 
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the linkages between material and immaterial phenomena (Larkin 2013). However, 
along with Kipnis (2015) I am reluctant to attribute human-style agency on non-
humans, preferring instead to describe degrees of agency that material phenomena 
may impress on humans in terms of constraints. Here, I have attempted to portray 
how material and immaterial factors affect each other by following lines of palms 
and people, and by exploring the contextual worlds within which they are folded. 
The representation of societies as involving contested, dynamic equilibrial relations 
centred on both shared and competing ideologies is more analogous to how 
ecological communities are theorised in terms of social ecological systems (SES). A 
key difference that I initially raised concerned the reflexive capacity of societies, yet 
theorisation based on hegemony does not appear to require this factor as essential. 
Even a slight shift from conflict to ethical reflexivity, however, to constitute a view 
of humans as reflective self-fashioning agents, could disturb this flattened 
distribution of agency (see also Laidlaw 2014: 107). The relationship between 
structural constraint and ethical reflection on decision-making regarding natural 
resource management will be the subject of further inquiry. 
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Appendix I: NVivo codes 
x Biophysical 
o Built environment 
o Date palm 
o Ecological change 
 Climate change 
 Disease-pest 
 Drought 
 Floods 
o Irrigation system 
o Ntissa (new concession area) 
x Economy 
o Labour 
o The market 
x Everyday 
o Attitudes 
o Discourse 
o Local histories 
o Religion 
o Sayings 
o Social change 
o Solidarity and inequality 
o Values 
x Governance 
o Associations 
o Individual decisions 
o International NGOs 
o The State 
 Development 
 French colonial rule 
o Local management 
 ¶8rf 
 cAshƯra 
 Ayyen 
 cAzzƗba 
 The family 
 /·RXPQD 
x Knowledge, practices & adaptive strategies 
o Adaptive strategies 
o Modern farming 
o Phoeniciculteurs 
o Traditional farming 
o 7UDQVPLVVLRQZRPHQ·VULOHV 
x Land tenure 
o Communal ownership 
o Inheritance issues 
o Private ownership 
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Appendix II: Example of questions asked on a typical farm survey 
 
x What are the main problems?  
x Is salinization a problem?  
x Where are your seeds from?  
x Do you have labour problems?  
x What crises have you experienced? How did you deal with them?  
x Have you experienced plant diseases?  
x How do you deal with flood?  
x Where do you sell crops?  
x Do you get decent price for your produce? Does it fluctuate?  
x Do you use new methods? (e.g. drip irrigation, compost, chemical 
fertilizer/pesticides, hybrid seeds)  
x Do you experiment? 
x Which activities are governed by the seasons? 
x Is the farm profitable?  
x What are the inputs?  
x How much is water/electricity?  
x Which crops do you grow and why?  
x What is your experience of  government development?  
x How long have you been farming here?  
x Do you employ tree climbers?  
x How did you get into farming?  
x Do you have farming ancestors?  
x Where does your knowledge come from?  
x Are your children interested?  
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Appendix III: Summary of resilience assessment 
I utilised the Resilience Assessment developed by the Resilience Alliance (Alliance, 
R. 2010) in order to view the oasis through the framework of a socio-ecological 
system, which would allow me to assess it as a complex adaptive system. This 
involved identifying and narrowing down the key components or variables involved 
in the structure of the oasis as a functioning system. Then I was led to assess which 
variables were less stable, and the thresholds of such variables (core variables were 
land access, water availability, labour availability and appropriate knowledge). I 
then noted the main drivers which affected these variables (these included climate, 
global market prices, mass media, migration, the state, and colonialism). Then, I 
described the alternative states that the oasis could exist in, which were essentially 
either as a functioning agroecosystem, or as an unmanaged arid landscape, with 
labour and water as the key variables. From this I differentiated five economic 
forms of exploitation, which were: slave-based agricultural oasis, gift and feudal 
economy agricultural oasis, urban garden oasis, non-agricultural land, and a 
capitalist oasis (see table III.1). These have changed according to historical 
processes roughly along a line, although in reality some of the systems (except of 
course slavery), continue to coexist, which confounds the idea of separate states 
given by resilience theory (more on this later).  
 
Table III.1. Alternative oasis states. 
No. State Crops cultivated 
1 Slave-based agricultural oasis: communal land tenure 
and family managed land, worked by slaves (labour 
economy) and specialists (knowledge). Water hauled 
by slaves and camels from artisan wells. No cash, slave 
economy. 
Mainly arable (barley, 
wheat), mixed date palms 
and other fruit trees 
(approx. 15 per cent) and 
some vegetables. 
2 Gift and feudal economy agricultural oasis: privately 
owned land by merchants, farmed by khammƝs (with 
knowledge) by means of twiza (labour economy). 
Water hauled by sons of khammƝs. No cash, gift 
economy/feudal economy. 
Same as above. 
3 Urban garden oasis: Merchants move onto the land, 
worked by labour migrants and palm specialists 
(knowledge), water pumped electrically from collective 
and state-owned wells. Cash drives the economy, 
consumerist-led. Labour is paid for. 
Mainly date palms and 
other fruit trees. 
4 Arid, non-irrigated (water) land used by nomadic 
pastoralists (knowledge and economy) on a communal 
management agreement (land) (generally unrecognised 
by the state).  
Wild crops used for 
pastoral grazing. 
5 Newly developed capitalist oasis (alongside the urban 
one): Privately owned medium sized plots (land), 
worked by working class or bourgeois farmers trained 
in modern techniques (knowledge), worked by labour 
migrants (labour economy), water is pumped from 
privately-owned wells or collectively accessed state-
owned wells. 
Date palms, fruit trees and 
vegetables, some alfalfa for 
livestock; livestock.  
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The key driver behind the shift from each state to another was then described. 
According to the modelling, the decline of agricultural production based on slavery 
was due to the abolition of slavery by the French rulers. The next, second state 
involved a number of khammƝs continuing to farm the land using twiza as the 
primary economic method of labour organisation (alongside sharecropping), until 
market prices drove down the desirability of growing certain crops, such as wheat 
and barley. Government development of infrastructure drove up the cost of living 
and thus people stopped engaging in twiza and instead demanded cash. The dual 
development of education and oil work drew away potential skilled and unskilled 
labour alike. As the local population increased and more young families were 
willing and able to buy separate houses, more housing developments occurred 
within the oasis. The same trend has seen the fragmentation of land over 
generations due to the demand for individual inheritance, rather than allowing 
FRPPXQDOO\RZQHGPDQDJHPHQWE\WKHH[WHQGHGIDPLO\·VSDWULDUFK7KLVGURYHXS
the price of land causing farmers to sell their land. The low status of farmers also 
exacerbated the decline of farming in the area. It has been stated that fathers are 
now afraid to let their sons climb the tall date palms. Farming has only seen a 
return in Beni Isguen with the opening of the new concessionary land in Ntissa for 
free by the state beginning in 1988. Training and loans are now also provided. The 
arrival of unskilled labour migrants in the 1980s from Mali and elsewhere brought 
back the possibility of cheap labour. 
 
One of the most revealing aspects of the assessment was looking at how various 
components interacted, for example, drought could affect farm profitability and the 
ability to pay labourers, which could cause them to migrate elsewhere. Shifting 
market prices could have the same effect. Another interesting exercise was mapping 
each problem (oasis economy, land tenure, political organisation) onto the adaptive 
cycle model (see chapter 2). Certain systems were resistant to such mapping as they 
followed unpredictable trajectories, such as climate. Others such as political 
systems were interesting, because according to the model, the point at which the 
system exists along the cycle can be key to the timing of management interventions 
(ref). Both farming associations and O·RXPQD are currently insufficient in 
management capacity when it comes to the ability to punish rule-breakers. Yet, 
according to the model both institutions are still early on in terms of organisational 
growth, thus they are not yet rigid or established in their practice and form, and 
therefore the possibility of improvement exists. This might be contrasted with the 
more rigid nature of the mosque. In fact, the reason for the breakdown of 
traditional structures, according to Resilience thinking, lies in their very rigidity. 
The persistence of these structures may contradict this view, although as I have 
argued, the decline over the pasW ILYH GHFDGHV LV GXH WR WKH IDFW WKDW WKH 0·]DE
fortified qsǌr have now opened up to outside influences, in terms of state power, 
tourism and mass media, which has had structural and ideological effects on local 
personhood and control. 
 
Perhaps the most revealing outcome of the assessment was the focus on exclusivity 
RI ¶VWDWHV·:KLOHD IRFXVRQYDU\LQJIRUPVRIHFRQRPLFV\VWHPZDVLQWHUHVWLQJLQ
terms of identifying the key components and agents of change, exclusivity was a 
telling difference between models and lived reality. For today, in each problematic 
WKDW,KDYHLQYHVWLJDWHGPXOWLSOHIRUPVRIHDFKGRPDLQH[LVW LQWKH0·]DE,QWKH
economic realm, monetary, gift (twiza), feudal (khammƝs or sharecropping), 
redistribution and barter all coexist. In terms of land, private, communal, state-
owned and mosque land are all present. In political systems authoritarian, anarchic 
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and democratic forms all are potentially vying for position. These forms may or 
may not be mutually exclusive, and some are more dominant than others. Yet, such 
diversity and hybridity is likely the form that modern life will increasingly take, at 
all levels, acknowledged or not.  
 
To summarise, the Resilience Assessment highlighted that certain key phenomena 
in the oasis are indeed dynamic, which require ingenuity, flexibility, strategy, 
knowledge and coordination to deal with. Namely, water, land access, labour and 
knowledge are all variable components. Farm income is a variable which is 
contingent on the first four factors, as well as markets. Elements that affect these 
variables include climate, land tenure law, labour markets, access to suitable 
knowledge (local and scientific), and market prices. The assessment focused more 
on social institutions and learning in regards to how humans deal with shocks and 
disturbances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
359 
Bibliography 
Abderrezak, A., 2001. Persistence in hydrocarbon shocks: the Algerian experience. 
The Journal of North African Studies, 6(3), pp.11²22. 
Achy, L., 2013. The Price of Stability in Algeria. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
Ackerman, J., 2004. Co-JRYHUQDQFHIRUDFFRXQWDELOLW\EH\RQG´H[LWµDQG´YRLFHµ
World Development, 32(3), pp.447²463. 
Adad, M.C., 2008. La Participation de la Population a son Habitat-FDVG·XQ
Nouveau Qsar DX0·]DESciences & Technologie D, (28), pp.67²76. 
Adamson, K., 2005. Understanding Post-independence Visions of Economic 
Prosperity in Algeria through the Mirror of the Second Napoleonic Empire. 
Topics in Middle Eastern and North African Economies, electronic journal, 7. 
Available at: 
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=meea 
[Accessed June 4, 2015]. 
Adger, W.N., Benjaminsen, T.A., Brown, K. & Svarstad, H., 2001. Advancing a 
political ecology of global environmental discourses. Development and 
Change, 32(4), pp.681²715. 
Afsaruddin, A. & Ameri, A., 1999. +HUPHQHXWLFVDQG+RQRU1HJRWLDWLQJ)HPDOH´
3XEOLFµ6SDFHLQ,VODPLF$WH6RFieties. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
CMES. 
Ageron, C.R., 1991. Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present. New Jersey: 
Africa World Press. 
Aghrout, A. & Bougherira, R.M., 2004. Algeria in Transition: Reforms and 
Development Prospects. London: Routledge. 
Agrawal, A., 2005. Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of 
Subjects. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Agrawal, A. & Gibson, C.C., 2001. Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, 
Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press. 
Ahern, J., 2011. From fail-safe to safe-to-fail: Sustainability and resilience in the 
new urban world. Landscape and Urban Planning, 100(4), pp.341²343. 
Ahmida, A.A., 2011. Bridges across the Sahara: Social, Economic and Cultural Impact of 
the Trans-Sahara Trade during the 19th and 20th Centuries. Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Akpinar, A., 2003. The Honour/shame complex revisited: violence against women 
in the migration context. In WoPHQ·V6WXGLHV,QWHUQDWLRQDO)RUXP. Elsevier, 
pp. 425²442. 
   
 
360 
Al-shahib Walid & Marshall, R.J., 2003. The fruit of the date palm: its possible use 
as the best food for the future? International Journal of Food Sciences and 
Nutrition, 54(4), pp.247²259. 
Allen, C.R., Fontaine, J.J., Pope, K.L. & Garmestani, A.S., 2011. Adaptive 
management for a turbulent future. Journal of Environmental Management, 
92(5), pp.1339²1345. 
Alport, E.A., 1954. The Mzab. Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 
and Ireland, pp.34²44. 
Amat, C., 1888. /H0·]DEHWOHV0·]DELWHV. Paris: Challamel. 
Anderies, J.M., Folke, C., Ostrom, E. & Walker, B., 2012. Aligning Key Concepts 
for Global Change Policy: Robustness, Resilience, and Sustainability. CSID 
Working Paper Series #CSID-2012-002. 
Andersson, R., 2009. Socio-HFRORJLFDOV\VWHPVGRQ·WH[LVW7RZDUGDFULWLTXHRIWKH
ontological foundations of Earth System Science. In Amsterdam Conference on 
the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change, Amsterdam, 2-4 
December 2009, conference stream on Theoretical and Methodological Foundations 
of Earth System Governance. 
Appadurai, A., 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Armitage, D.R., 2003. Traditional agroecological knowledge, adaptive management 
and the socio-politics of conservation in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. 
Environmental Conservation, 30(1), pp.79²90. 
Armitage, D.R., Plummer, R., Berkes, F., Arthur, R.I., Charles, A.T., Davidson-
Hunt, I.J., Diduck, A.P., Doubleday, N.C., Johnson, D.S., Marschke, M. & 
others, 2008. Adaptive co-management for social-ecological complexity. 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 7(2), pp.95²102. 
Asad, T., 1978. Equality in nomadic social systems? Critique of Anthropology, 3(11), 
pp.57²65. 
Austen, R.A., 2010. Trans-Saharan Africa in World History. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bafouloulou, S., 2013. Ghardaia: La Mysterieuse. Ghardaia: Imprimerie de Oasis. 
Balée, W., 1998. Historical ecology: premises and postulates. Advances in Historical 
Ecology, pp.13²29. 
Bargatzky, T., Anderson, M., Earle, T., Ghidinelli, A., Goldschmidt, W., Peoples, 
J.G., Petersen, G., Santangelo, A. & Smith, M.E., 1984. Culture, 
Environment, and the Ills of Adaptationism [and Comments and Reply]. 
Current Anthropology, pp.399²415. 
   
 
361 
Barth, F., 1973. A General perspective on nomad-sedentary relations in the Middle 
East. In C. Nelson, ed. The Desert and the Sown. Berkley: University of 
California Press, pp. 11²22. 
Bateson, G., 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Battesti, V., 2005. Jardins au Désert, Évolution des Pratiques et Savoirs Oasiens. Jérid 
Tunisien. Paris: IRD éditions. 
Baudrillard, J., 1998. The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures. Thousand Oaks: 
Sage. 
Bauwens, M. & Kostakis, V., 2014. From the communism of capital to capital for 
the commons: Towards an open co-operativism. tripleC: Communication, 
Capitalism & Critique. Open Access Journal for a Global Sustainable Information 
Society, 12(1), pp.356²361. 
Bellil, R., 1999. Les Oasis du Gourara (Sahara Algérien). Paris: Peeters Publishers. 
Benayas, J.R., Martins, A., Nicolau, J.M. & Schulz, J.J., 2007. Abandonment of 
agricultural land: an overview of drivers and consequences. CAB Reviews: 
Perspectives in Agriculture, Veterinary Science, Nutrition and Natural Resources, 
2, pp.1²14. 
Benda-Beckmann, von, ):KR·VDIUDLGRIOHJDOSOXUDOLVP"The Journal of 
Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 34(47), pp.37²82. 
Benda-Beckmann, von, F., von Benda-Beckmann, K. & Wiber, M., 2006. Changing 
Properties of Property. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Benda-Beckmann, von, K. von, 1981. Forum shopping and shopping forums: 
Dispute processing in a Minangkabau village in West Sumatra. The Journal 
of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 13(19), pp.117²159. 
Benessaiah, N.L., 2011. /LYHOLKRRGDQG´5HVLOLHQFH": An Investigation of Palm Disease 
Adaptive Management among a Moroccan Oasis Community. Unpublished MSc 
Thesis. Canterbury, UK: University of Kent. 
Benessaiah, N.L. & Calis, I., Forthcoming. African Trysts: Rethinking the Saharan 
Divide. In African Anthropologies in the Postcolony. Pretoria: HSRC Press. 
Benmoussa, B., 2013. An effect of globalisation? The individual appropriation of 
¶DUFKODQGVLQ$OJHULDThe Journal of North African Studies, 18(5), pp.668²
677. 
Bennoune, M., 1986. Cultural ecological theory and the formation of the Ibadite 
desert confederacy. Dialectical Anthropology, 11(1), pp.93²117. 
%HQWKDOO-&LYLOVRFLHW\·VQHHGIRUGH-deconstruction. Anthropology Today, 
pp.1²3. 
   
 
362 
Bergh, S.I., 2009. Traditional village councils, modern associations, and the 
emergence of hybrid political orders in rural Morocco. Peace Review, 21(1), 
pp.45²53. 
Berkes, F., 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge generation, 
bridging organizations and social learning. Journal of Environmental 
Management, 90(5), pp.1692²1702. 
Berkes, F., Colding, J. & Folke, C., 2000. Rediscovery of traditional ecological 
knowledge as adaptive management. Ecological Applications, 10(5), pp.1251²
1262. 
Berlin, B., 1992. Ethnobiological Classification: Principles of Categorization of Plants 
and Animals in Traditional Societies. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Berman, R., Quinn, C. & Paavola, J., 2012. The role of institutions in the 
transformation of coping capacity to sustainable adaptive capacity. 
Environmental Development, 2, pp.86²100. 
Bernard, H.R., 2006. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. Lanham, MD: Altamira press. 
Berque, J., 1951. Terroirs et seigneurs du Haut Atlas occidental. In Annales. 
Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations. EHESS, pp. 474²484. 
Biber, E., 2013. Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law. 
Akron Law Review, 46(4). 
Biersack, A., 1991. Thinking Difference: A Review of Maril\Q6WUDWKHUQ·V7KH
Gender of the Gift. Oceania, 62(2), pp.147²154. 
Bierschenk, T., 1988. Religion and political structure: remarks on Ibadism in Oman 
and the Mzab (Algeria). Studia Islamica, pp.107²127. 
Blaikie, P., 1985. The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries. 
London: Longman. 
Bloch, M., 1992. The Historian's Craft. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Blumler, M.A., 1996. Ecology, evolutionary theory and agricultural origins. In D. 
R. Harris, ed. The Origins and Spread of Agriculture and Pastoralism in 
Eurasia. London: Routledge, pp. 25²50. 
Bouchair, A., 2004. Decline of urban ecosystem of Mzab valley. Building and 
Environment, 39(6), pp.719²732. 
Boucher, D. & Kelly, P., 1994. The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls. London; 
New York: Routledge. 
Bourbeau, P., 2013. Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research. 
Resilience, 1(1), pp.3²17. 
   
 
363 
Bourdieu, P., 1979. Algeria 1960. The Disenchantment of the World, The Sense of 
Honour, The Kabyle House or the World Reversed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bourdieu, P., 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bourdieu, P., 1962. The Algerians. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Braudel, F., 1958. Histoire et Sciences socialesௗ: La longue durée. Annales. Économies, 
Sociétés, Civilisations, 13(4), pp.725²753. 
Bray, D., 2000. Adaptive Management, Organizations and Common Property 
Management: Perspectives from the Community Forests of Quintana Roo, 
Mexico. In Community Forestry in Mexico: Concordance and Contradiction 
Between Institutions, Policies and Economies. Constituting the Commons: 
Crafting Sustainable Commons in the New Millennium, the Eighth Biennial 
Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common 
Property. Bloomington, IN. 
Brower, B.C., 2013. $'HVHUWQDPHG3HDFHWKHYLROHQFHRI)UDQFH·VHPSLUHLQWKH$OJHULDQ
Sahara, 1844-1902. New York: Columbia University Press. 
%URZQ-&	3XUFHOO07KHUH·VQRWKLQJLQKHUHQWDERXWVFDOHSROLWLFDO
ecology, the local trap, and the politics of development in the Brazilian 
Amazon. Geoforum, 36(5), pp.607²624. 
Bryan, E., Ringler, C., Okoba, B., Roncoli, C., Silvestri, S. & Herrero, M., 2013. 
Adapting agriculture to climate change in Kenya: Household strategies and 
determinants. Journal of Environmental Management, 114, pp.26²35. 
Butcher, C., 2014. Can oil-reliant countries democratize? An assessment of the role 
of civil society in Algeria. Democratization, 21(4), pp.722²742. 
Calassanti-Motylinski, G.A. ed., 1908. &KURQLTXH'·LEQ6DJKLU6XU/HV,PDPV
Rostemides De Tahert. Paris: Leroux. 
Calis, I., 2011. The Everyday Order of Things: An Ethnographic Study of Occupation in a 
West Bank Palestinian Village. Unpublished Ph.D. UK: London School of 
Economics and Political Science. 
Campbell, L.M. & Vainio-Mattila, A., 2003. Participatory development and 
community-based conservation: Opportunities missed for lessons learned? 
Human Ecology, 31(3), pp.417²437. 
Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J.M. & Abel, N., 2001. From metaphor to 
measurement: resilience of what to what? Ecosystems, 4(8), pp.765²781. 
Carrier, J.G., 1992. Emerging alienation in production: A Maussian history. Man, 
pp.539²558. 
Carrithers, M., Candea, M., Sykes, K., Holbraad, M. & Venkatesan, S., 2010. 
Ontology Is Just Another Word for Culture Motion Tabled at the 2008 
   
 
364 
Meeting of the Group for Debates in Anthropological Theory, University of 
Manchester. Critique of Anthropology, 30(2), pp.152²200. 
Cash, D.W., Adger, W.N., Berkes, F., Garden, P., Lebel, L., Olsson, P., Pritchard, L. 
& Young, O., 2006. Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance and 
information in a multilevel world. Ecology and Society, 11(2), p.8. 
&DWDOGL*$EGHOKDPLG5	6HOYD)7KH7RZQRI*KDUGDwDLQ0·]DE
Algeria: Between Tradition and Modernity. Traditional Dwellings and 
Settlements Review, pp.63²74. 
Caughley, G., Shepherd, N. & Short, J., 1987. Kangaroos: Their Ecology and 
Management in the Sheep Rangelands of Australia. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Chagnon, N.A., 1988. Life histories, blood revenge, and warfare in a tribal 
population. Science, 239(4843), pp.985²992. 
Chandler, D., 2014. Beyond neoliberalism: resilience, the new art of governing 
complexity. Resilience, 2(1), pp.47²63. 
Chatty, D., 2006. Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 
21st Century. Leiden: Brill. 
Chesters, G., 2003. Shape shifting: civil society, complexity and social movements. 
Anarchist Studies, 11(1), pp.42²65. 
Chesters, G. & Welsh, I., 2006. Complexity and Social Movements: Multitudes at the 
Edge of Chaos. London: Routledge. 
Christelow, A., 2014. Muslim Law Courts and the French Colonial State in Algeria. 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Clements, F.E., 1916. Plant Succession: An Analysis of the Development of Vegetation. 
Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington. 
Comaroff, J.L., 2001. Colonialism, culture, and the law: A foreword. Law & Soc. 
Inquiry, 26, p.305. 
Comaroff, J.L. & Comaroff, J., 1999. Civil Society and the Political Imagination in 
Africa: Critical Perspectives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Comaroff, J.L. & Roberts, S., 1986. Rules and Processes. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Conklin, H.C., 1957. Hanunoo Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of 
Shifting Agriculture in the Philippines. Rome: Forestry Development Paper, 
(12). 
Coté, M., 2006. 6LOH6RXI0·pWDLW&RQWp&RPPHQWVH)DLWHWVH'pIDLWXQ3D\VDJH. 
Constantine: Saïd Hannachi. 
   
 
365 
Cote, M. & Nightingale, A.J., 2011. Resilience thinking meets social theory: 
Situating change in socio-ecological systems (SES) research. Progress in 
Human Geography. 
Coupaye, L., 2009. Ways of Enchanting. Journal of Material Culture, 14(4), pp.433²
458. 
Crawford, D., 2013. Inventive articulation: how High Atlas farmers put the global 
to work. The Journal of North African Studies, 18(5), pp.639²651. 
Crawford, D., 2008. Moroccan Households in the World Economy: Labor and Inequality 
in a Berber Village. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 
Crawford, D., 2001. Work and Identity in the Moroccan High Atlas. Ph.D. Santa 
Barbara: California. 
Crehan, K.A., 2002. Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology. Berkley: University of 
California Press. 
Cristancho, S. & Vining, J., 2004. Culturally defined keystone species. Human 
Ecology Review, 11(2), pp.153²164. 
Cronon, W., 1983. Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New 
England. New York: Norton & Co. 
Crumley, C.L., 2007. Historical ecology: integrated thinking at multiple temporal 
and spatial scales. In A. Hornborg & C. L. Crumley, eds. The World System 
and the Earth System: Global Socioenvironmental Change and Sustainability Since 
the Neolithic. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, pp. 15²28.  
Cundill, G.N., Fabricius, C. & Marti, N., 2005. Foghorns to the future: using 
knowledge and transdisciplinarity to navigate complex systems. Ecology and 
Society, 10(2), p.8. 
Daddi Adoun, Y., 1991. Les Institutions Tradionelles et les Pouvoirs officiels au Mzab. 
MA. Paris: Institute National des Langues et Civilizations Orientales. 
Danermark, B., 2002. Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. New 
York: Psychology Press. 
Darnhofer, I., Gibbon, D. & Dedieu, B., 2012. Farming Systems Research: an 
approach to inquiry. Farming Systems Research into the 21st Century: The New 
Dynamic, pp.3²31. 
Davidson, D.J., 2010. The Applicability of the Concept of Resilience to Social 
Systems: Some Sources of Optimism and Nagging Doubts. Society & Natural 
Resources, 23(12), pp.1135²1149. 
Davidson-Hunt, I.J., 2006. Adaptive learning networks: developing resource 
management knowledge through social learning forums. Human Ecology, 
34(4), pp.593²614. 
   
 
366 
Davidson-Hunt, I.J. & Berkes, F., 2000. Environment and Society through the Lens 
of Resilience: Towards a Human-in-Ecosystem Perspective. In International 
Association for the Study of Common Property Conference, Indiana. Available at: 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/handle/10535/2019 [Accessed June 23, 
2015]. 
Davidson-Hunt, I.J., Berkes, F., Berkes, F., Colding, J. & Folke, C., 2003. Nature 
and society through the lens of resilience: toward a human-in-ecosystem 
perspective. In Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for 
Complexity and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53²82. 
Davis, J., 1987. Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution, an account of the Zuwaya and 
Their Government. Berkley: University of California Press. 
Davoudi, S., Shaw, K., Haider, L.J., Quinlan, A.E., Peterson, G.D., Wilkinson, C., 
Fünfgeld, H., McEvoy, D., Porter, L. & Davoudi, S., 2012. Resilience: A 
BridgiQJ&RQFHSWRUD'HDG(QG"´5HIUDPLQJµ5HVLOLHQFH&KDOOHQJHVIRU
Planning Theory and Practice Interacting Traps: Resilience Assessment of 
a Pasture Management System in Northern Afghanistan Urban Resilience: 
What Does it Mean in Planning Practice? Resilience as a Useful Concept for 
Climate Change Adaptation? The Politics of Resilience for Planning: A 
Cautionary Note. Planning Theory & Practice, 13(2), pp.299²333. 
Descola, P., 2013. Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E. & Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. 
Science, 302(5652), pp.1907²1912. 
Dominguez, P. & Benessaiah, N.L., 2015. The decline of community-based 
management of natural resources in Morocco: the case of the Yagour agdal. 
Quaternary International, (In press). 
Donnadieu, C., Donnadieu, P., Didillon, H. & Didllon, J.M., 1977. Habiter Le Désert: 
/HV0DLVRQV0R]DELWHV5HFKHUFKHV6XU8Q7\SH'·DUFKLWHFWXUH7UDGLWLRQQHOOH
Pré-Saharienne. Brussels: Editions Mardaga. 
Drury, W.H. & Nisbet, I.C.T., 1973. Succession. Journal of the Arnold Arboretum, 
54(3), pp.331²368. 
Duit, A., Galaz, V., Eckerberg, K. & Ebbesson, J., 2010. Governance, complexity, 
and resilience. Global Environmental Change, 20(3), pp.363²368. 
Durkheim, É., 1984. The Division of Labour in Society. Macmillan. 
(GZDUGV6´5HFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHQDWLRQµWKHSURFHVVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJ&DWDODQ
autonomy. Parliamentary Affairs, 52(4), pp.666²676. 
Eickelman, D.F., 2001. The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological 
Approach 4th edition. New York: Pearson. 
(O+DPHO&´5DFHµVODYHU\DQG,VODPLQ0DJKULEL0HGLWHUUDQHDQWKRXJKW
the question of the Haratin in Morocco. The Journal of North African Studies, 
7(3), pp.29²52. 
   
 
367 
El Jamali, H., 2011. Community-Based Water Management: The Oasis of Figuig, 
Morocco Recent Extensions and Transformations. MSc thesis. University of 
Geneva. 
Ellen, R.F., 1982. Environment, Subsistence, and System: The Ecology of Small-Scale 
Social Formations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ellen, R.F., 1986. What Black Elk left unsaid: on the illusory images of Green 
primitivism. Anthropology Today, 2(6), pp.8-12. 
Ellen, R.F., 1996. The cognitive geometry of nature. Nature and Society: 
Anthropological Perspectives, p.103. 
Ellen, R., 2007. Local and scientific understanding of forest diversity on Seram, 
Eastern Indonesia. In P. Sillitoe, ed., Local Science vs Global Science: Approaches to 
Indigenous Knowledge in International Development. New York: Berghahn, pp.41-74.  
 
Ellis, J., 1994. Climate variability and complex ecosystem dynamics: implications 
for pastoral development. In I. Scoones, ed. Living with Uncertainty: New 
Directions in Pastoral Development in Africa. London: Intermediate 
Technology Publications, pp. 37²47. 
Ellis, J.E., Coughenour, M.B. & Swift, D.M., 1993. Climate variability, ecosystem 
stability, and the implications for range and livestock development. In R. H. 
Behnke, I. Scoones, & C. Kerven, eds. Range Ecology at Disequilibrium. New 
Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral Adaptation in African Savannas. 
London: Overseas Development Institute, pp. 31²41. 
Ellis, J.E. & Swift, D.M., 1988. Stability of African pastoral ecosystems: alternate 
paradigms and implications for development. Journal of Range Management, 
41(6), pp.450²459. 
Entelis, J.P., 2011. Algeria: democracy denied, and revived? The Journal of North 
African Studies, 16(4), pp.653²678. 
Entelis, J.P., 1986. Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
Escobar, A., 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. New Jersey: New Jersey. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E., 1940. The Nuer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fabinyi, M., Evans, L. & Foale, S.J., 2014. Social-ecological systems, social 
diversity, and power: insights from anthropology and political ecology. 
Ecology and Society, 19(4), p.28. 
Fabricius, C. & Cundill, G., 2014. Learning in adaptive management: insights from 
published practice. Ecology and Society, 19(1), p.29. 
Fabricius, C., Folke, C., Cundill, G. & Schultz, L., 2007. Powerless spectators, 
coping actors, and adaptive co-managers: a synthesis of the role of 
communities in ecosystem management. Ecology and Society, 12(1), p.29. 
   
 
368 
Fanon, F., 1959. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. 
Fanon, F., 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. 
Farrag, A., 1971. Social control amongst the Mzabite women of Beni-Isguen. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 7(3), pp.317²327. 
Fassin, D., 2014. A Companion to Moral Anthropology. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Ferguson, J., 1990. The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Folke, C., 2006. Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological 
systems analyses. Global Environmental Change, 16(3), pp.253²267. 
Folke, C., Hahn, T., Olsson, P. & Norberg, J., 2005. Adaptive governance of social-
ecological systems. Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 30, pp.441²
473. 
Folke, C. & Rockström, J., 2009. Turbulent times. Global Environmental Change, 
19(1), pp.1²3. 
Forni, N., 2003. Land tenure policies in the Near East. Land Reform, FAO, 1. 
Available at: ftp://193.43.36.93/docrep/fao/005/Y8999T/Y8999T03.pdf 
[Accessed June 23, 2015]. 
Foucault, M., 1991. Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller, eds. 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, pp. 87²104. 
Fowler, B., 1997. Pierre Bourdieu and Cultural Theory: Critical Investigations. SAGE. 
Friedman, J., 1979. Hegelian Ecology. In P. C. Burnham & R. F. Ellen, eds. Social 
and Ecological Systems. New York: Academic Press, pp. 253²270. 
Friedman, J., 1974. Marxism, structuralism and vulgar materialism. Man, 9(3), 
pp.444²469. 
Fuller, C., 1994. Legal anthropology: legal pluralism and legal thought. 
Anthropology Today, pp.9²12. 
Galaz, V., 2005. Social-ecological resilience and social conflict: institutions and 
strategic adaptation in Swedish water management. AMBIO: A Journal of the 
Human Environment, 34(7), pp.567²572. 
Al-Gamal, S.A., 2011. An assessment of recharge possibility to North-Western 
Sahara Aquifer System (NWSAS) using environmental isotopes. Journal of 
Hydrology, 398(3), pp.184²190. 
Garibaldi, A., 2009. Moving From Model to Application: Cultural Keystone Species 
and Reclamation in Fort McKay, Alberta. Journal of Ethnobiology, 29(2), 
pp.323²338. 
   
 
369 
Gatt, C. & Ingold, T., 2013. From description to correspondence: Anthropology in 
real time. In W. Gunn, E. Otto, & R. Charlotte Smith, eds. Design 
Anthropology: Theory and Practice. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 139²158.  
Geertz, C., 1963. Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia. 
Berkley: University of California Press. 
Geertz, C., 1972. The wet and the dry: Traditional irrigation in Bali and Morocco. 
Human Ecology, 1(1), pp.23²39. 
Gellner, E., 1969. Saints of the Atlas. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Gellner, E., 1985. The Roots of Cohesion (Review Article). JSTOR. Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2802226 [Accessed May 27, 2015]. 
Ghazal, A., 2013. Intellectual Traditions, Islamic Reform and Nationalism in the 
Mzab. In The Southern Shores of the Mediterranean and Beyond: 1800 - to 
the Present. University of Minnesota. Available at: http://ias.umn.edu/wp-
content/upLoads/2013/03/Amal-Ghazal-Southern-Shores-Conference-
Paper.pdf [Accessed November 5, 2015]. 
Ghazal, A.N., 2010. The other frontiers of Arab nationalism: Ibadis, Berbers, and 
the Arabist-Salafi press in the interwar period. International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, 42(01), pp.105²122. 
Giller, K.E., Tittonell, P., Rufino, M.C., Van Wijk, M.T., Zingore, S., Mapfumo, P., 
Adjei-Nsiah, S., Herrero, M., Chikowo, R., Corbeels, M. & others, 2011. 
Communicating complexity: Integrated assessment of trade-offs concerning 
soil fertility management within African farming systems to support 
innovation and development. Agricultural systems, 104(2), pp.191²203. 
Gilsenan, M., 1990. Very like a camel: The appearance of an anthropolRJLVW·V
Middle East. In R. Fardon, ed. Localizing Strategies: Regional Traditions of 
Ethnographic Writing. pp. 222²239. 
Glacken, C.J., 1976. Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western 
Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century. Berkley: 
University of California Press. 
Gladwin, H. & Murtaugh, M., 1980. The attentive-preattentive distinction in 
agricultural decision making. In P. F. Barlett, ed. Agricultural Decision 
Making. Anthropological Contributions to Rural Development. pp. 115²136. 
Glantz, M.H., 1988. Drought and Hunger in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gledhill, J., 2000. Power and Its Disguises: Anthropolical Perspectives on Politics. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Godoy, R.A., 1985. State, Ayllu, and Ethnicity in Northern Potosí, Bolivia. 
Anthropos, 80(1/3), pp.53²65. 
   
 
370 
Goichon, A.M. & Marçais, W., 1927. La Vie Féminine Au Mzab: Étude De Sociologie 
Musulmane. Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner. 
Golly, F.B., 1993. A History of the Ecosystem Concept in Ecology. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Gonçalvès, J., Petersen, J., Deschamps, P., Hamelin, B. & Baba-Sy, O., 2013. 
4XDQWLI\LQJWKHPRGHUQUHFKDUJHRIWKH´IRVVLOµ6DKDUDDTXLIHUVGeophysical 
Research Letters, 40(11), pp.2673²2678. 
González, J.A., Montes, C., Rodríguez, J., Tapia, W. & others, 2008. Rethinking the 
Galapagos Islands as a complex social-ecological system: implications for 
conservation and management. Ecology and Society, 13(2), p.13. 
Goodman, J.E., 2005. Berber Culture on the World Stage: From village to video. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Goodman, J.E., 2009. Bourdieu in Algeria: Colonial Politics, Ethnographic Practices, 
Theoretical Developments. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Grabbatin, B. & Rossi, J., 2012. Political Ecology: Nonequilibrium Science and 
Nature-Society Research. Geography Compass, 6(5), pp.275²289. 
Graeber, D., 2011. Debt: The First 5,000 Years. Melville House. 
Graeber, D., 2004. Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology. Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press. 
Gramsci, A., 2000. A Gramsci Reader: Selected writings, 1916-1935 David Forgacs, ed. 
New York: New York Univesrity Press. 
Gramsci, A., 2006. State and Civil Society. In A. Sharma & A. Gupta, eds. The 
Anthropology of the State: A Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 71²85. 
Greenberg, J.B. & Park, T.K., 1994. Political ecology. Journal of Political Ecology, 
1(1), pp.1²12. 
Grégoire, E. & Schmitz, J., 2000. Afrique Noire Et Monde Arabe: Continuités Et 
Ruptures. 9DXFOXVH(GLWLRQVGHO·$XEH 
Gregory, C.A., 1982. Gifts and Commodities. London: Academic Press. 
De Grenade, R., 2013. Date palm as a keystone species in Baja California peninsula, 
Mexico oases. Journal of Arid Environments, 94, pp.59²67. 
Griffiths, A., 2011. Pursuing Legal Pluralism: The Power of Paradigms in a Global 
World. The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 43(64), pp.173²
202. 
Griffiths, J., 1986. What is legal pluralism? The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, 18(24), pp.1²55. 
   
 
371 
Gunderson, L., 1999. Resilience, flexibility and adaptive management³antidotes 
for spurious certitude. Conservation ecology, 3(1), p.7. 
Gunderson, L.H., 2000. Ecological resilience²in theory and application. Annual 
Review of Ecology and Systematics, pp.425²439. 
Gunderson, L.H., Holling, C.S. & Light, S.S., 1995. Barriers and Bridges to the 
Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Gupta, A. & Sharma, A., 2006. Globalization and Postcolonial States. Current 
Anthropology, 47(2), pp.277²307. 
De Haan, A., Brock, K. & Coulibaly, N., 2002. Migration, livelihoods and 
institutions: contrasting patterns of migration in Mali. Journal of 
Development Studies, 38(5), pp.37²58. 
De Haas, H., 2001. Migration and Agricultural Transformations in the Oases of Morocco 
and Tunisia. Developing Areas Study Group, Royal Dutch Geographical 
Society (KNAG). 
De Haas, H., 2010. Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. 
International Migration Review, 44(1), pp.227²264. 
De Haas, H., 2007. The impact of international migration on social and economic 
development in Moroccan sending regions: a review of the empirical 
literature. International Migration Institute, Working Paper, 3. 
De Haas, H., 2008. The myth of invasion: the inconvenient realities of African 
migration to Europe. Third World Quarterly, 29(7), pp.1305²1322. 
Hadj-Nacer, A., 2011. La Martingale Algérienne: Réflexions sur une crise. Algiers: 
éditions Barzakh. 
Hammoudi, A., 1980. Segmentarity, social stratification, political power and 
VDLQWKRRG5HIOHFWLRQVRQ*HOOQHU·VWKHVHVEconomy and society, 9(3), pp.279²
303. 
Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. The population problem has no 
technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality. Science, 
162(859), pp.1243²1248. 
Harris 1979. ¶&DQQLEDOVDQG.LQJV·$Q([FKDQJH. (reply by Marshall Sahlins.) 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1979/06/28/cannibals-and-kings-an-
exchange/ [accessed March 13 2016]. 
 
Hart, D.M., 1981. 'DGGD·$WWDDQG+LV)RUW\*UDQGVRQV7KH6RFLR-political 
2UJDQLVDWLRQRIWKH$LW·$WWDRI6RXWKHUQ0RURFFR. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Harvey, D., 2012. Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution. 
London: Verso. 
   
 
372 
Harvey, P., 1996. Hybrids of Modernity: Anthropology, the Nation State and the 
Universal Exhibition. New York: Psychology Press. 
+DWW.6RFLDODWWUDFWRUV$SURSRVDOWRHQKDQFH´UHVLOLHQFHWKLQNLQJµDERXW
the social. Society & Natural Resources, 26(1), pp.30²43. 
+DX·RID(2XUVHDRILVODQGV,Q(+DX·RIDHGA New Oceania: Rediscovering 
Our Sea of Islands. Suva, Fiji: School of Social and Economic Development, 
The University of the South Pacific in association with Beake House, pp. 2²
16. 
Hawes, A., 2008. Handful of Honey: Away to the Palm Groves of Morocco and Algeria 
Unabridged edition. London: Pan Books. 
Hebert, J.S., 2011. Event Ecology: An Ecological Analysis of Discourses Surrounding the 
Disappearance of the Kah Shakes Cove Herring (Clupea pallasi). MA thesis. 
Portland State University. 
Heland, von, J. & Sörlin, S., 2012. Works of doubt and leaps of faith: An 
Augustinian challenge to Planetary Boundaries. Journal for the Study of 
Religion, Nature & Culture, 6(2), pp.151²175. 
+HQU\&0$OJHULD·V$JRQLHV2LOUHQWHIIHFWVLQDEXQNHUVWDWHThe Journal 
of North African Studies, 9(2), pp.68²81. 
Herzfeld, M., 1980. Honour and shame: Problems in the comparative analysis of 
moral systems. Man, pp.339²351. 
+RGJHV0,PPDQHQWDQWKURSRORJ\DFRPSDUDWLYHVWXG\RI´SURFHVVµLQ
contemporary France. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 20(S1), 
pp.33²51. 
Hoffman, K.E., 2008. We share walls: Language, land, and gender in Berber Morocco. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 Holden, S.T. & Otsuka, K., 2014. The roles of land tenure reforms and land 
markets in the context of population growth and land use intensification in 
Africa. Food Policy, 48, pp.88²97. 
Holling, C.S., 1978. Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. Chichester: 
J. Wiley & Sons. 
Holling, C.S., 1996. Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. In P. 
Schulze, ed. Engineering with Ecological Restraints. Washington, DC: 
National Academy, pp. 31²44. 
Holling, C.S., 1973. Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of 
Ecology and Systematics, 4, pp.1²23. 
Holling, C.S., 2001. Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and 
Social Systems. Ecosystems, 4(5), pp.390²405. 
   
 
373 
Holling, C.S., Gunderson, L.H. & Ludwig, D., 2002. In quest of a theory of adaptive 
change. Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural 
Systems, pp.3²24. 
Holsinger, D.C., 1980. Migration, commerce and community: the MƯzƗbƯs in 
eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Algeria. The Journal of African History, 
21(01), pp.61²74. 
Holsinger, D.C., 1986. Muslim responses to French imperialism: an Algerian 
Saharan case study. International Journal of African Historical Studies, pp.1²
15. 
Holsinger, D.C., 1980. Trade routes of the Algerian Sahara in the XlXth Century. 
5HYXHGHO·2FFLGHQW0XVXOPDQHWGHOD0pGLWHUUDQpH, 30(1), pp.57²70. 
Homewood, K.M., 2004. Policy, environment and development in African 
rangelands. Environmental Science & Policy, 7(3), pp.125²143. 
Hornborg, A., 2013. Revelations of resilience: From the ideological disarmament of 
disaster to the revolutionary implications of (p)anarchy. Resilience, 1(2), 
pp.116²129. 
Hornborg, A., 2001. The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, 
Technology, and Environment. Lanham, MD: Rowman Altamira. 
Hornborg, A., 2009. Zero-sum world. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 
50(3-4), p.237. 
Ben Hounet, Y., 2007. Des tribus en Algérie?. À propos de la déstructuration tribale 
durant la période coloniale. Cahiers de la Méditerranée, (75), pp.150²171. 
Ilahiane, H., 2004. Ethnicities, Community Making, and Agrarian Change: The Political 
Ecology of a Moroccan Oasis. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Ilahiane, H., 1996. Small-scale irrigation in a multiethnic oasis environment: the 
case of Zaouit Amelkis village, southeast Morocco. Journal of Political 
Ecology, 3, p.89. 
Ingold, T., 2011. Being Alive: Essays on Movement, Knowledge and Description. 
London: Taylor & Francis. 
Ingold, T., 2000. The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and 
Skill. London: Routledge. 
Jackson, A., 1987. Anthropology at Home. London: Tavistock Publications. 
Jana, R., Bandyopadhyay, S. & Choudhuri, A.K., 2013. Reciprocity among farmers 
in farming system research: Application of social network analysis. Journal 
of Human Ecology, 41(1), pp.45²51. 
Janssen, M.A., Walker, B.H., Langridge, J. & Abel, N., 2000. An adaptive agent 
model for analysing co-evolution of management and policies in a complex 
rangeland system. Ecological Modelling, 131(2), pp.249²268. 
   
 
374 
Jessop, B., 2003. Governance and meta-governance: on reflexivity, requisite variety 
and requisite irony. Governance as Social and Political Communication, pp.101²
16. 
Johnson, B.L., 1999. The role of adaptive management as an operational approach 
for resource management agencies. Conservation Ecology, 3(2), p.8. 
Jomier, A., 2012. Iৢlâত ibâঌite et intégration nationaleௗ: vers une communauté 
mozabiteௗ? (1925-1964). Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée, 
(132), pp.175²195. 
Joseph, J., 2013. Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality approach. 
Resilience, 1(1), pp.38²52. 
Juris, J. & Razsa, M., 2012. Occupy, Anthropology, and the 2011 Global Uprisings. 
Cultural Anthropology. Available at: 
https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/63-occupy-anthropology-and-the-
2011-global-uprisings [Accessed July 20, 2015]. 
Karyotis, T. & Kioupiolis, A., 2015. Self-managing the commons in contemporary 
Greece. From agricultural co-operatives to an emerging solidarity economy. 
In I. Ness & D. Azzelini, eds. Ours to Master and to Own. Chicago: 
Haymarket Books. 
Kaufmann, M., 2013. Emergent self-organisation in emergencies: resilience 
rationales in interconnected societies. Resilience, 1(1), pp.53²68. 
Keane, J., 1988. Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of European 
Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and 
Political Power. London: Verso. 
Keenan, J., 2001. Sahara Man: Travelling with the Tuareg. London: John Murray. 
Keenan, J., 2013. The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa. London: 
Pluto Press. 
Keenan, J., 2004. The Lesser Gods of the Sahara: Social Change and Contested Terrain 
Amongst the Tuareg of Algeria. London: Routledge. 
Keesing, R.M., 1974. Theories of culture. Annual Review of Anthropology, pp.73²97. 
Keesing, R.M. & Strathern, A.J., 1998. Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary 
Persepctive 3rd ed. London: Harcourt Brace College Publishers. 
Kerri, J.N., Ayabe, T., Bhowmick, P.K., Brunt, L., Caulkins, D.D., Dobyns, H.F., 
Gold, G.L., Handelman, D., Kertzer, D.I., Little, K. & others, 1976. Studying 
Voluntary Associations as Adaptive Mechanisms: A Review of 
Anthropological Perspectives [and Comments and Reply]. Current 
Anthropology, pp.23²47. 
Khalifa, A.S., 1985. 0·]DE&RPPXQLW\$OJHULD1RUWK$IULFD,WV3ODQQLQJDQG
Architectural Aspects, Past, Present and Fututre. MA thesis. Arizona: University 
of Arizona. 
   
 
375 
King, C. & Thomas, D.S., 2014. Monitoring environmental change and degradation 
in the irrigated oases of the Northern Sahara. Journal of Arid Environments, 
103, pp.36²45. 
.QDXVV3$OJHULD·V´$JUDULDQ5HYROXWLRQµ3HDVDQW&RQWURORU&RQWURORI
Peasants. African Studies Review, 20(03), pp.65²78. 
Köeppen, 2016. World Maps of Köppen-Geiger climate classification. 
http://koeppen-geiger.vu-wien.ac.at/ [Accessed March 11 2016]. 
Konseiga, A., 2005. New patterns of migration in West Africa. Stichproben (Vienna 
Journal of African Studies), 8, pp.23-46. 
Kremen, C. & Miles, A., 2012. Ecosystem services in biologically diversified versus 
conventional farming systems: benefits, externalities, and trade-offs. Ecology 
and Society, 17(4), p.40. 
Kristianasen, W., 2006. Truth & Justice after a Brutal Civil War: Algeria: The 
Women Speak. Review of African Political Economy, 33(108), pp.346²351. 
Kropotkin, P.A., 2002. Anarchism: A Collection of Revolutionary Writings. New York: 
Courier Corporation. 
Lambin, E.F., Turner, B.L., Geist, H.J., Agbola, S.B., Angelsen, A., Bruce, J.W., 
Coomes, O.T., Dirzo, R., Fischer, G. & Folke, C., 2001. The causes of land-
use and land-cover change: moving beyond the myths. Global Environmental 
Change, 11(4), pp.261²269. 
/DQVLQJ-6%DOLQHVH´ZDWHUWHPSOHVµDQGWKHPDQDJHPHQWRILUULJDWLRQ
American Anthropologist, 89(2), pp.326²341. 
Lansing, J.S. & Kremer, J.N., 1993. Emergent properties of Balinese water temple 
networks: coadaptation on a rugged fitness landscape. American 
Anthropologist, pp.97²114. 
Larkin, B., 2013. The politics and poetics of infrastructure. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 42, pp.327-343. 
Latour, B., 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Law, J., 2004. After Method: Mess in Social Science Research. London: Routledge. 
Leach, E.R., 1959. Hydraulic society in Ceylon. Past & Present, (15), pp.2-26. 
Leach, E.R., 1970. Political Systems of Highland Burma. a Study of Kachin Social 
Structure. London UK: University of London Athlone Press. 
Lebel, L., Anderies, J.M., Campbell, B., Folke, C., Hatfield-Dodds, S., Hughes, T.P. 
& Wilson, J., 2006. Governance and the capacity to manage resilience in 
regional social-ecological systems. 
   
 
376 
Lee, K., 1993. Compass and Gyroscope: Integrating Science and Politics for the 
Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Lee, K.N., 1999. Appraising adaptive management. Conservation Ecology, 3(2), p.3. 
Lepkin, M.S., 2004. Birds of Paradise: The Discourse Semiotics of Co-Operative Work in 
Pre-Saharan Morocco. Ph.D. thesis. Arizona: University of Arizona. 
Leslie, P. & McCabe, J.T., 2013. Response Diversity and Resilience in Social-
Ecological Systems. Current Anthropology, 54(2), pp.114²143. 
Lewellen, T.C., 2003. Political Anthropology: An Introduction. Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO. 
Lin, B.B., 2011. Resilience in agriculture through crop diversification: adaptive 
management for environmental change. Bioscience, 61(3), pp.183²193. 
Liverani, A., 2008. Civil Society in Algeria: The Political Functions of Associational Life. 
London: Routledge. 
Logan, B.I. & Moseley, W.G., 2002. The political ecology of poverty alleviation in 
=LPEDEZH·V&RPPXQDO$UHDV0DQDJHPHQW3URJUDPPHIRU,QGLJHQRXV
Resources (CAMPFIRE). Geoforum, 33(1), pp.1²14. 
Lowi, M.R., 2009. Oil Wealth and the Poverty of Politics: Algeria Compared. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lydon, G., 2009. A paper economy of faith without faith in paper: A reflection on 
Islamic institutional history. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 
71(3), pp.647²659. 
Lydon, G., 2009. On Trans-Saharan Trails. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mabry, J.B., 1996. Canals and Communities: Small-Scale Irrigation Systems. Arizona: 
University of Arizona Press. 
Mamou, A., Besbes, M., Abdous, B., Latrech, D.J. & Fezzani, C., 2006. North 
Western Sahara Aquifer System (NWSAS). In S. Foster & D. P. Loucks, 
eds. Non-Renewable Groundwater Resources. Paris: United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, pp. 68²74. 
Mann, M., 1986. The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to 
AD 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Mares, M.A., 1999. Encyclopedia of Deserts. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Marfaing, L. & Wippel, S., 2004. /HV5HODWLRQV7UDQVVDKDULHQQHV­/·pSRTXH
Contemporaine: Un Espace En Constante Mutation. Paris: Karthala Editions. 
Marouf, N., 1980. /HFWXUH'H/·HVSDFH2DVLHQ. Paris: Sindbad. 
   
 
377 
Marx, E., 1977. The tribe as a unit of subsistence: nomadic pastoralism in the 
Middle East. American Anthropologist, 79(2), pp.343²363. 
Marx, K., 1867. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Volume. 1: The Process of 
Capitalist Production. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 
Masqueray, E., 1878. &KURQLTXHG·$ERX=DNDULD. Paris: Aillaud. 
Masqueray, E., 1886. Formation des Cités hez les 3RSXODWLRQV6pGHQWDLUHVGHO·$OJpULH
.DE\OHVGX'MXUGMXUD&KDRXwDGHO·$RXUkV%HQL0H]kE Thèse présentée à la 
)DFXOWpGHVOHWWUHVGH3DULVO·8QLYHUVLWpLPSpULDOHGH)UDQFH 
Masqueray, É., 1995. Les Kanoun des Beni-Mzab. Etudes et Documents Berberes, 13, 
pp.211²228. 
Mauss, M., 2011. The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies. 
Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Fine Books. 
McCay, B.J. & Acheson, J.M., 1987. The Question of the Commons: The Culture and 
Ecology of Communal Resources. University of Arizona Press. 
McDougall, J., 2006. History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mefnoune, A.N. & Abdessalam, B., 2011. Dictionnaire Mozabite Français. Algiers: 
Enag. 
Milestad, R., Dedieu, B., Darnhofer, I. & Bellon, S., 2012. Farms and farmers facing 
change: The adaptive approach. In Farming Systems Research into the 21st 
Century: The New Dynamic. Springer, pp. 365²385. 
Mills, M.B., 1997. Contesting the margins of modernity: Women, migration, and 
consumption in Thailand. American Ethnologist, 24(1), pp.37²61. 
Milton, K., 1996. Environmentalism and Cultural Theory: Exploring the Role of 
Anthropology in Environmental Discourse. New York: Taylor & Francis. 
Moller, H., Berkes, F., Lyver, P.O.B. & Kislalioglu, M., 2004. Combining science 
and traditional ecological knowledge: monitoring populations for co-
management. Ecology and Society, 9(3), p.2. 
Moore, S.F., 1973. Law and social change: the semi-autonomous social field as an 
appropriate subject of study. Law and Society Review, pp.719²746. 
Moore, S.F., 2000. Law as Process: an Anthropological Approach. Münster: LIT 
Verlag. 
Moran, E.F., 1990. The Ecosystem Approach in Anthropology: From Concept to Practice. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Moran, E.F., 2009. People and Nature: An introduction to human ecological relations. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
   
 
378 
Mortimore, M.J. & Adams, W.M., 2001. Farmer adaptation, change and 'crisis' in 
the Sahel. Global Environmental Change, 11(1), pp.49²57. 
Mougou, R., Mansour, M., Iglesias, A., Chebbi, R.Z. & Battaglini, A., 2011. Climate 
change and agricultural vulnerability: a case study of rain-fed wheat in 
Kairouan, Central Tunisia. Regional Environmental Change, 11(1), pp.137²
142. 
Moussaoui, A., 1996. Logiques du Sacré eW0RGHVG·RUJDQLVDWLRQGHO·HVSDFHGDQVOH6XG-
Ouest Algérien. Ph.D. thesis. Paris: EHESS. 
Mundy, M., 1995. Domestic Government: Kinship, community and polity in North Yemen. 
London: I.B.Tauris. 
Munson, H., 1989. On the irrelevance of the segmentary lineage model in the 
Moroccan Rif. American Anthropologist, 91(2), pp.386²400. 
0XQVRQ+5HWKLQNLQJ*HOOQHU·V6HJPHQWDU\$QDO\VLVRI0RURFFR·V$LWF
Atta. Man, pp.267²280. 
Munson, H., 1991. The Segmentary Lineage Model in the Jebalan Highlands of 
Morocco. Tribe and State: Essays in Honour of David Montgomery Hart, pp.48²
68. 
Nadasdy, P., 2007. Adaptive co-management and the gospel of resilience. In F. 
Berkes, N. C. Doubleday, & D. R. Armitage, eds. Adaptive Co-Management: 
Collaboration, Learning and Multi-Level Governance. Vancouver: UBC Press, 
pp. 208²227. 
Nader, L., 2002. The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects. Berkley: University of 
California Press. 
Naphegyi, G., 1871. *KDUGDLDRU1LQHW\GD\VDPRQJWKH%·QL0R]DEDGYHQWXUHVLQWKH
oasis of the desert of Sahara. New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons. 
Narotzky, S., 1997. New Directions in Economic Anthropology. London: Pluto Press. 
Nasr, S.V.R., 2001. Islamic Leviathanࣟ: Islam and the Making of State Power: Islam and 
the Making of State Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nath, B., 1998. Environmental Management in Practice: Instruments for Environmental 
Management. New York: Psychology Press. 
Nee, V., 1989. A theory of market transition: From redistribution to markets in 
state socialism. American Sociological Review, pp.663²681. 
Nemecek, T., Dubois, D., Huguenin-Elie, O. & Gaillard, G., 2011. Life cycle 
assessment of Swiss farming systems: I. Integrated and organic farming. 
Agricultural Systems, 104(3), pp.217²232. 
Netting, R.M., 1974. Agrarian ecology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 3(1), pp.21²
56. 
   
 
379 
Neumann, R., 2014. Making Political Ecology. London: Routledge. 
Nilsen, A.G., 2015. For a Historical Sociology of State²Society Relations in the 
Study of Subaltern Politics. In New Subaltern Politics: Reconceptualizing 
Hegemony and Resistance in Contemporary India. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Noy-Meir, I., 1973. Desert ecosystems: environment and producers. Annual Review 
of Ecology and Systematics, 4, pp.25²51. 
Nuijten, M.C.M., 2003. Power, community and the state: the political anthropology 
of organisation in Mexico. 
Odum, E.P. & Barrett, G.W., 1971. Fundamentals of Ecology. Philadelphia: Saunders. 
Ostrom, E., 2009. A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Social-
Ecological Systems. Science, 325, pp.419²422. 
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Otto, J., Zerner, C., Robinson, J., Donovan, R., Lavelle, M., Villarreal, R., Salafsky, 
N., Alcorn, J., Seymour, F. & Kleyneyer, C., 2013. Natural Connections: 
Perspectives in Community-Based Conservation. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Oussedik, F., 2012. The Rites of Baba Merzoug. In J. McDougall & J. Scheele, eds. 
Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa. Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, pp. 93²108. 
Panter-Brick, C., 2014. Health, Risk, and Resilience: Interdisciplinary Concepts and 
Applications. Annual Review of Anthropology, 43(1), pp.431²448. 
Park, T.K., 1992. Early trends toward class stratification: Chaos, common property, 
and flood recession agriculture. American Anthropologist, 94(1), pp.90²117. 
Park, R.E., 1936. Human Ecology. American Journal of Sociology, 42, pp.1²15. 
Partridge, E., 2005. Disequilibrium Ecology: Much Ado About Nothing. In Group 
Meeting of the International Society for Environmental Ethics, Pacific Division. 
American Philosophical Association. San Francisco. 
Partridge, E., 2000. Reconstructing ecology. In D. Pimental, L. Westra, & R. Noss, 
eds. Ecological Integrity: Integrating Environment, Conservation, and Health. 
Washington, DC: Island Press, pp. 79²97. 
Pascon, P., 1986. Capitalism and Agriculture in the Haouz of Marrakesh J. R. Hall, ed. 
London: KPI. 
Paumgarten, F. & Shackleton, C.M., 2011. The role of non-timber forest products 
in household coping strategies in South Africa: the influence of household 
wealth and gender. Population and Environment, 33(1), pp.108²131. 
Pavard, C., Bossu-Picat, C. & Rollet, P., 1975. /XPLqUHVGX0·=DE. Paris: Delroisse. 
   
 
380 
Peterson, G., 2000. Political ecology and ecological resilience: An integration of 
human and ecological dynamics. Ecological Economics, 35(3), pp.323²336. 
Pillay, N. 2012. Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Navi Pillay at a press conference during her mission to Algeria. 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsI
D=12542&LangID=E#sthash.nbnxDTmr.dpuf. [Accessed March 12 
2016]. 
Pirie, F., 2013. The Anthropology of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Posey, D.A., 1985. Indigenous management of tropical forest ecosystems: the case 
of the Kayapo Indians of the Brazilian Amazon. Agroforestry Systems, 3(2), 
pp.139²158. 
Price, D.H., 1995. The cultural effects of conveyance loss in gravity-fed irrigation 
systems. Ethnology, pp.273²291. 
Price, D.H. & Brewer, D.D., 1996. The relationship between power and position in 
LUULJDWLRQQHWZRUNVLQ(J\SW·V)D\RXP2DVLVAvailable at SSRN 2249953. 
Puri, R., 2010. Participant Observation. In H. Newing, ed. Conducting Research in 
Conservation: A Social Science Perspective. pp. 85²97. 
Puri, R.K., 2015. The Uniqueness of the Everyday: Herders and Invasive Species in 
India. In J. Barnes & M. R. Dove, eds. Climate Cultures: Anthropological 
Perspectives on Climate Change. Agrarian Studies Series. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, pp. 249²272.  
Purkis, J., 2001. Leaderless Cultures: The problem of authority in a radical 
environmental group. Leadership and Social Movements, pp.160²177. 
Rae, J., 2002. An overview of land tenure in the Near East Region. Part I. Available 
at: http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/aq202e/aq202e.pdf [Accessed June 8, 
2015]. 
Ranger, T., Grinker, R.R., Gubkermann, S.C. & Steiner, C., 1997. The invention of 
tradition in colonial Africa. In Perspectives on Africa: A Reader in Culture, 
History, and Representation. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Rappaport, R.A., 1968. Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea 
People. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Rappaport, R.A., 2000. Pigs for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea 
People, 2nd edition. Illinois: Waveland Press. 
Ratner, B.D., Oh, E.J. & Pomeroy, R.S., 2012. Navigating change: Second-
generation challenges of small-scale fisheries co-management in the 
Philippines and Vietnam. Journal of Environmental Management, 107, pp.131²
139. 
Redford, K.H., 1991. The ecologically noble savage. Cultural Survival Quarterly, 
15(1), pp.46²48. 
   
 
381 
Resalliance, 2016. Available at: http://www.resalliance.org/about [Accessed 
March 11, 2016]. 
Resilience Alliance, 2010. Assessing Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems: Workbook 
for Practitioners, Version 2.0. Available at: 
http://www.resalliance.org/index.php/resilience_assessment [Accessed 
June 27, 2012]. 
Rist, L., Campbell, B.M. & Frost, P., 2013. Adaptive management: where are we 
now? Environmental Conservation, 40(01), pp.5²18. 
Rival, L., 2009. The Resilience of Indigenous Intelligence. In K. Hastrup, ed. The 
Question of Resilience: Social Responses to Climate Change. Copenhagen: The 
Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, pp. 293²313. 
Roberts, H., 2014. Berber Government: The Kabyle Polity in Pre-colonial Algeria. 
London: I.B.Tauris. 
Roberts, H., 2002. Perspectives on berber politics: on Gellner and Masqueray, or 
'XUNKHLP·VPLVWDNHJournal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 8(1), 
pp.107²126. 
Roberts, S., 2005. After government? On representing law without the state. The 
Modern Law Review, 68(1), pp.1²24. 
Roberts, S., 1979. Order and Dispute. London: Penguin. 
Robertson, A.F., 1987. The Dynamics of Productive Relationships: African Share 
Contracts in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Archive. 
Robinson, G.E. & Huang, Z.-Y., 1998. Colony integration in honey bees: genetic, 
endocrine and social control of division of labor. Apidologie, 29(1-2), pp.159²
170. 
Rocheleau, D., 2011. Book review forum: Explaining Human Actions and 
Environmental Changes. Dialogues in Human Geography, 1(3), pp.377²381. 
Rodden, J., 2004. Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and 
measurement. Comparative Politics, pp.481²500. 
Rosen, L., 1979. Social identity and points of attachment: Approaches to social 
organization. In C. Geertz, H. Geertz, & L. Rosen, eds. Meaning and Order in 
Moroccan Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19²111. 
Ross, M.L., 2008. Oil, Islam, and women. American Political Science Review, 102(01), 
pp.107²123. 
Ruedy, J.D., 2005. Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Ben Saadoun, N. & Boulahouat, N., 2010. Le Palmier Dattier: Raconté par un 
Cultivateur. Paris: Magenta Impression. 
   
 
382 
Sabates-Wheeler, R. & Devereux, S., 2007. Social protection for transformation. 
IDS bulletin, 38(3), pp.23²28. 
Sabourin, E., 2000. Reciprocity and gift economy practises in Brazilian Northeast 
peasant communities: a contribution to rural development. In X Congresso 
Mundial de Sociologia Rural, Rio de Janeiro. 
Sabourin, É. & Sabourin, E., 2007. Brazilian Peasants: Between Market Exchange and 
Reciprocity. Versailles Cedex: Éditions Quae. 
Sahlins 1978. Culture as Protein and Profit. Review of Cannibals and Kings: The 
Origins of Cultures by Marvin Harris. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1978/11/23/culture-as-protein-and-
profit/ [accessed March 13 2016]. 
Sahlins, M., 2008. The Western Illusion of Human Nature. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm. 
Sahlins, M., 2015. An Anthropological Manifesto: Or the origin of the state. 
Anthropology Today, 31(2), pp.8²11. 
Salmon, E., 2012. Learn My Songs. Anthropology Now, 4(3), pp.15²23. 
Sandford, S., 1983. Management of Pastoral Development in the Third World. 
Chichester: Wiley. 
Sartori, P. & Shahar, I., 2012. Legal Pluralism in Muslim-Majority Colonies: 
Mapping the Terrain. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 
55(4-5), pp.637²663. 
Sauer, C.O., 1956. The agency of man on the earth. In W. L. Thomas, ed. Mans Role 
in Changing the Face of the Earth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 
49²69. 
Sauer, J.J., 2014. The Archaeology and Ethnohistory of Araucanian Resilience. New 
York: Springer. 
Savage, E., 1992. Berbers and Blacks: IbƗ Ư Slave Traffic in Eighth-Century North 
Africa. The Journal of African History, 33(03), pp.351²368. 
Sawyer, R.K., 2005. Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Scheele, D.J., 2012. Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the 
Twentieth Century 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scheele, J., 2008. A taste for law: rule-making in Kabylia (Algeria). Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 50(04), pp.895²919. 
Scheele, J., 2014. Community as an Achievement: Kabyle Customary Law and 
Beyond. In F. Pirie & J. Scheele, eds. Legalism: Community and Justice. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 177²200. 
   
 
383 
Scheele, J., 2009. Village Matters: Knowledge, Politics and Community in Kabylia, 
Algeria. Woodbridge: James Currey. 
Scheele, J. & McDougall, J., 2012. Introduction. In J. McDougall & J. Scheele, eds. 
Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, pp. 1²16. 
Schlager, E. & Ostrom, E., 1992. Property-rights regimes and natural resources: a 
conceptual analysis. Land Economics, pp.249²262. 
Schmitter, P.C. & Karl, T.L., 1991. What democracy is... and is not. Journal of 
Democracy, 2(3), pp.75²88. 
Schreiber, E.S.G., Bearlin, A.R., Nicol, S.J. & Todd, C.R., 2004. Adaptive 
management: a synthesis of current understanding and effective application. 
Ecological Management & Restoration, 5(3), pp.177²182. 
Scoones, I., 1999. New ecology and the social sciences: what prospects for a fruitful 
engagement? Annual Review of Anthropology, pp.479²507. 
Scott, J.C., 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J.C., 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Scott, J.C., 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and subsistence in 
Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
6KDILDL0+%07KHRU\RI´6KDUHFURSSLQJµIURPDQ,VODPLF(conomic 
Perspective: A Study of al-MuzƗraދa & al-MusƗqƗt. ࢖ࢫ࣮࣒ࣛୡ⏺◊✲: 
Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 4(1-2), pp.190²209. 
Sharma, A. & Gupta, A., 2006. Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the state in an 
Age of Globalisation. In A. Sharma & A. Gupta, eds. The Anthropology of the 
State: a Reader. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1²42. 
Sidoti, E., Gagliano, A. & Tringali, G., 2015. A survey on planning, expectations 
and factors influencing the stabilization process of migrating people in 
Palermo, Western Sicily. Journal of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene, 51(1). 
Sinaceur & ޏIrƗqƯ SƯnƗৢir, Z., 1994. /H'LFWLRQQDLUH&ROLQG·DUDEH'LDOHFWDO0DURFDLQ. 
al-Manahil, Ministère des Affaires Culturelles. 
Skyrms, B., 2014. Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sogn, E., 2014. Throw a Survey at It. Anthropology Now, 6(1), pp.25²34. 
Spiga, N., 2010. Les Modalités de Transmission des Valeurs Ibadites dans la Famille 
Mozabite Contemporaine. MA thesis. Constantine: Universite Metnouri 
Constantine. 
   
 
384 
Spooner, B., 1989. Desertification: the historical significance. In R. Huss-Ashmore 
& S.H. Katz, eds. African Food Systems in Crisis. Part, 1, London: Routledge. 
pp.111-162. 
Steward, J.H., 1955. Theory of Culture Change. Champaign: University of Illinois 
Press. 
Strathern, M., 1988. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with 
Society in Melanesia. Berkley: University of California Press. 
Strinati, D., 2004. An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture. London: Routledge. 
Available at:  
Stringer, L.C., Dougill, A.J., Fraser, E., Hubacek, K., Prell, C. & Reed, M.S., 2006. 
8QSDFNLQJ´SDUWLFLSDWLRQµLQWKHDGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQWRIVRFLDO²ecological 
systems: a critical review. Ecology and Society, 11(2), p.39. 
Talley, J.L., 2015. Emergence. Problem Solving 2.0. Available at: 
http://www.problemsolving2.com/problem_types/complexity_emergence.
htm [Accessed May 5, 2015]. 
Tansley, A.G., 1935. The use and abuse of vegetational concepts and terms. Ecology, 
16(3), pp.284²307. 
Tengö, M. & Hammer, M., 2003. Management practices for building adaptive 
capacity: a case from northern Tanzania. In F. Berkes, J. Colding, & C. 
Folke, eds. Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for 
Complexity and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 132²
162. 
Theodossopoulos, D., 2013. Emberá indigenous tourism and the trap of 
authenticity: Beyond inauthenticity and invention. Anthropological Quarterly, 
86(2), pp.397²425. 
Thompson, J. & Scoones, I., 2009. Addressing the dynamics of agri-food systems: 
an emerging agenda for social science research. Environmental Science & 
Policy, 12(4), pp.386²397. 
Toledo, V.M., Ortiz-Espejel, B., Cortés, L., Moguel, P. & Ordonez, M.J., 2003. The 
multiple use of tropical forests by indigenous peoples in Mexico: a case of 
adaptive management. Conservation Ecology, 7(3), p.9. 
Toutain, G., Dolle, V., Ferry, M. & others, 1990. The status of oasis farming 
systems. Options Mediterraneennes. Serie A. Seminaires Mediterraneens, (11), 
pp.7²18. 
Turner, B.S., 1974. Islam, capitalism and the Weber theses. The British Journal of 
Sociology, 25(2), pp.230²243. 
Tyre, A.J. & Michaels, S., 2011. Confronting socially generated uncertainty in 
adaptive management. Journal of Environmental Management, 92(5), pp.1365²
1370. 
   
 
385 
Ulturgasheva, O., Rasmus, S., Wexler, L., Nystad, K. & Kral, M., 2014. Arctic 
indigenous youth resilience and vulnerability: Comparative analysis of 
adolescent experiences across five circumpolar communities. Transcultural 
Psychiatry, 51(5), pp.735²756. 
81(6&20·=DE9DOOH\- UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Available at: 
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/188 [Accessed June 24, 2015]. 
Uphoff, N.T., 1986. Improving International Irrigation Management with Farmer 
Participation: Getting the Process Right. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Urry, J., 2005. The complexity turn. Theory Culture and Society, 22(5), p.1. 
Vayda, A.P., 2013. 9 Causal Explanation for Environmental Anthropologists. In H. 
Kopnina & E. Shoreman-Ouimet, eds. Environmental Anthropology: Future 
Directions. New York: Routledge, pp. 207²224. 
Vayda, A.P., 2009. Explaining Human Actions and Environmental Changes. Lanham, 
MD: AltaMira Press. 
Vayda, A.P., 1983. Progressive contextualization: Methods for research in human 
ecology. Human Ecology, 11(3), pp.265²281. 
Vayda, A.P. & McCay, B.J., 1975. New directions in ecology and ecological 
anthropology. Annual Review of Anthropology, 4, pp.293²306. 
Vayda, A.P. & Rappaport, R.A., 1968. Ecology, cultural and noncultural. 
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, pp.477²497. 
Vayda, A.P. & Walters, B.B., 1999. Against political ecology. Human Ecology, 27(1), 
pp.167²179. 
Vayda, A.P. & Walters, B.B., 2011. Causal Explanation for Social Scientists: A Reader. 
Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press. 
Vetter, S., 2005. Rangelands at equilibrium and non-equilibrium: recent 
developments in the debate. Journal of Arid Environments, 62(2), pp.321²341. 
Viveiros de Castro, E., 2012. Cosmological perspectivism in Amazonia and 
elsewhere. HAU: Masterclass Series, 1, pp.45²168. 
Volpi, F., 2013. Algeria versus the Arab spring. Journal of Democracy, 24(3), pp.104²
115. 
Voß, J.P. & Bornemann, B., 2011. The Politics of Reflexive Governance: Challenges 
for Designing Adaptive Management and Transition Management. Ecology 
and Society, 16(2), p.9. 
Walker, B., Holling, C.S., Carpenter, S.R. & Kinzig, A., 2004. Resilience, 
adaptability and transformability in social²ecological systems. Ecology and 
Society, 9(2). 
   
 
386 
Walker, B.H. & Salt, D.A., 2006. Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems And 
People in a Changing World. Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Walker, J. & Cooper, M., 2011. Genealogies of resilience From systems ecology to 
the political economy of crisis adaptation. Security Dialogue, 42(2), pp.143²
160. 
Walker, P.A., 2005. Political ecology: where is the ecology. Progress in Human 
Geography, 29(1), pp.73²82. 
Wallin, B., Gaye, C., Gourcy, L. & Aggarwal, P., 2005. Isotope Methods for 
Management of Shared Aquifers in Northern Africa. Ground Water, 43(5), 
pp.744²749. 
Walters, B. & Vayda, A., 2009. Event ecology, causal historical analysis, and 
human-environment research. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, 99(3), pp.534²553. 
Walters, B.B., 2012. An event-based methodology for climate change and human²
environment research. Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography, 
112(2), pp.135²143. 
Walters, C., 1986. Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources. New York: 
Macmillan. 
Walters, C.J. & Holling, C.S., 1990. Large-scale management experiments and 
learning by doing. Ecology, 71(6), pp.2060²2068. 
Ward, M.N., Lamb, P.J., Portis, D.H., El Hamly, M. & Sebbari, R., 1999. Climate 
variability in northern Africa: Understanding droughts in the Sahel and the 
Maghreb. In A. Navarra, ed. Beyond El Niño. Berlin: Springer, pp. 119²140. 
Watson, J.L., 2006. *ROGHQ$UFKHV(DVW0FGRQDOG·VLQ(DVW$VLD. Redwood City: 
Stanford University Press. 
Weber, M., 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology. Berkley: 
University of California Press. 
Weber, M., 2002. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: And Other 
Writings. London: Penguin. 
Wehrden, Von . H., Hanspach, J., Kaczensky, P., Fischer, J. & Wesche, K., 2012. 
Global assessment of the non-equilibrium concept in rangelands. Ecological 
Applications, 22(2), pp.393²399. 
Westley, F., Carpenter, S.R., Brock, W.A., Holling, C.S. & Gunderson, L.H., 2002. 
Why systems of people and nature are not just social and ecological 
systems. In L. H. Gunderson & C. S. Holling, eds. Panarchy: Understanding 
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island 
Press. 
Westoby, M., Walker, B. & Noy-Meir, I., 1989. Opportunistic management for 
rangelands not at equilibrium. Journal of Range Management, pp.266²274. 
   
 
387 
Whittle, A. & Spicer, A., 2008. Is actor network theory critique? Organization 
Studies, 29(4), pp.611²629. 
Wiens, J.A., 1977. On Competition and Variable Environments: Populations may 
H[SHULHQFH´HFRORJLFDOFUXQFKHVµLQYDULDEOHFOLPDWHVQXOOLI\LQJWKH
assumptions of competition theory and limiting the usefulness of short-term 
studies of population patterns. American Scientist, 65(5), pp.590²597. 
Williams, B.K., 2011. Adaptive management of natural resources³framework and 
issues. Journal of Environmental Management, 92(5), pp.1346²1353. 
Williams, B.K. & Brown, E.D., 2014. Adaptive management: from more talk to real 
action. Environmental Management, 53(2), pp.465²479. 
Wittfogel, K.A., 1957. Chinese society: An historical survey. The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 16(03), pp.343²364. 
Wolf, E.R., 1982. Europe and the People Without History. Berkley: University of 
California Press. 
Worster, D., 1977. 1DWXUH·V(FRQRP\7KH5RRWVRI(FRORJy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Yahiaoui, T., 1999. Vernacular Architecture and the Qsǌr RIWKH0·]DE. MA thesis. 
University of Wales: The School of Architecture. 
Zaid, A. & De Wet, P.F., 1999. Origin, geographical distribution and nutritional 
values of date palm. Date Palm Cultivation. 
Zaimeche, S.E. & Sutton, K., 1998. Persistent strong population growth, 
environmental degradation, and declining food self-sufficiency in a rentier 
oil state: Algeria. The Journal of North African Studies, 3(1), pp.57²73. 
Zebrowski, C., 2013. The nature of resilience. Resilience, 1(3), pp.159²173. 
Zeys, E., 1887. Legislation Mozabite: Le nil du mariage et de sa dissolution. Revue 
Algérienne et Tunisienne de Législation et de Jurisprudence, 3, pp.247²58. 
Zid, S. 2003. Ville Nouvelle en Zone Arid: Une cite-jardin en Hoggar, Sahara 
Algerien. Unpublished MA Thesis. Ecole Polytechnique Federal de 
Lausane. 
=LPPHUHU.6+XPDQJHRJUDSK\DQGWKH´QHZHFRORJ\µ7KHSURVSHFWDQG
promise of integration. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
84(1), pp.108²125. 
 
